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KAUTILYA: FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE ANCIENT HINDU WORLD

George Modelski
The Australian National University

Kautilya is believed to have been Chanakya, a Brahmin who served as Chief Minister to Chandragupta (321–296 B.C.), the founder of the Mauryan Empire. Chandragupta gained his first successes, soon after the death of Alexander the Great, in campaigns against some of the satraps the Macedonian conqueror had established west of the Indus. He then turned against the Nanda Empire and succeeded in destroying it. The victory over the Nandas and his subsequent conquests gave him control over a large part of the Indian subcontinent, including the Ganges and Indus valleys and parts of the Deccan.

According to early texts, Chanakya was responsible for the education and later policy guidance of Chandragupta. It was he who installed Chandragupta on the throne and thus brought to power the dynasty whose most illustrious ruler was Asoka, Chandragupta's grandson. But that is about the sum of our knowledge about the man whose name has also come to be associated with the *Arthasastra*, a remarkable treatise on government and foreign policy.

I. THE ARTHASASTRA

The authorship of the *Arthasastra* has been a subject of debate among Indologists.[1] However, no proof having been established that Chanakya—Kautilya did not write it, little is to be gained here from pursuing the controversy. If he is accepted as the author, the work itself may be dated at about 300 B.C.

Despite this ancient origin and despite references to it in other early texts, Kautilya's *Arthasastra* was brought to the attention of the modern world only in the first decade of this century when a Sanskrit manuscript was translated into English by Dr. R. Shamasastry.[2] Since then, numerous commentaries have appeared and a considerable literature has grown around it.

The literal meaning of "Arthasastra" is Science of Polity; it has been rendered as the study of politics, wealth and practical expediency, of ways of acquiring and maintaining power. In the ancient Hindu world Arthasastra was an established branch of knowledge, and by Kautilya's time was beginning to be distinguished as a branch separate from and contrasting with sciences (*sastras*) dealing with other objects of life such as *dharma*—religious and moral duty.

Kautilya's *Arthasastra* is the finest, fullest and most cogently reasoned Sanskrit treatise on this branch of learning, but it is no more than the fullest statement of a tradition that had been current, in part orally, for several centuries prior to Kautilya's writing, and that had also produced a number of lesser works. Many of the terms and distinctions that are interesting in Kautilya can already be found in the great Hindu epics of *Mahabharatta* and *Ramayana*. The text we are concerned with is thus in itself, no more than a small part of the Sanskrit heritage.

---

[1] P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmasastra* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930–46), Vol. I, pp. 85–104; A. A. Macdonell, *India's Past* (Oxford: Clarendon 1927), pp. 168–70.

[2] The fourth edition of that translation, *Kautilya's Arthasastra*, tr. R. Shamasastry (Mysore, 1951), is the source of quotations in this paper and page citations refer to it too. However, the translation of a number of Sanskrit terms has on occasion been altered in the light of other commentaries, or else the Sanskrit term itself has been used. Two other English translations of Kautilya's work, Jolly-Schmidt's (Lahore, 1923–4) and Ganapati Sastri's (Trivandrum, 1924–5) were unfortunately not available at the time of writing this paper.

Kautilya's work, which in English translation is about 200,000 words long, covers a wide field and not all of it would today be of interest to students of politics. Key parts contain detailed provisions of civil and criminal law, or recommendations on military tactics or the use of magic. Others discuss the duties of various government officials, and as such are valuable as sources of information about the details of life in that period. On the other hand, the *Arthasastra* does not concern itself with questions of political philosophy and morality (what is the state, the nature of political obligation) which have been the favourite topics of much of the more contemporary academic discussion of politics. Only about one-quarter of it deals with matters properly a part of International Relations. These parts, nevertheless (chiefly Books I, VI–IX, XII–XIII) remain to this day of considerable interest.

Kautilya's *Arthasastra* is, above all, a manual of statecraft, a collection of rules which a king or administrator would be wise to follow if he wishes to acquire and maintain power. In inspiration it is therefore close to other digests of rules of statecraft and of advice to princes such as Sun Tzu's work on *The Art of War* or Niccolo Macchiavelli's *The Prince*. But unlike *The Prince*, which had little if any influence on the behavior of the ruler to whom it was dedicated, Kautilya's work is part of a larger literature disseminated by "schools" and was intended to be learnt, often by heart. Like other Sanskrit writings it has verse passages and such easy-to-learn classifications as the eight elements of sovereignty or the six types of foreign policy.

Today's students of international relations, ever sensitive to the criticism that their work lacks "historical illustrations" or "empirical-concreteness" should be delighted with Kautilya's complete lack of historical sense. This characteristic Kautilya shares, of course, with the whole of the Hindu literary and political tradition; his extensive work has, with insignificant exceptions, no references at all to past experience, or even contemporary events. Such basic parts of it as the theory of the elements of a state, or of the Circle of States are left altogether without historical illustration or example. Indeed, it has been noticed that this treatise, reputedly authored by Chandragupta's chief minister, nowhere refers to that ruler or to the empire he is said to have launched. Such a lack of historical reference would be inconceivable in current work on international relations, one of its canons being the need to show the direct and immediate pertinence of propositions to present-day developments or to the trends of history. Yet, perplexingly, this book which influenced political practice for over a millenium has none of this. And there is a lesson here, for it is precisely this absence of historical "baggage" and also this abstractness, which ensured that the *Arthasastra* remained suitable for use in instruction centuries after the death of its author.

A work of learning must detach itself from its immediate milieu if it is to endure for long. Kautilya achieved this not only by avoiding historical references, but also by making his work remarkably abstract. Indeed the strength and the interest of the *Arthasastra* lie in its abstractness and in the systematic quality of its propositions. This is not to say that all of these propositions are of high interest, because they are not; much of even the international chapters is no more than tiresome detail or laboring the obvious, of the order of "if you want success, pursue right policies." But we also find there a store of valuable concepts, distinctions and generalizations which, because of the abstract form in which they are stated, are of timeless quality. What is more, the work exhibits form and structure and a high order of intellectual discipline: concepts or propositions in one part are used and expanded in other parts. The whole resembles an assemblage of mathematical equations, some systematically related and others not, some demonstrably of empirical relevance and others not, but all shiningly clear by force of their abstract formulation.

Allusion has already been made to *The Prince*, a work with which Kautilya's *Arthasastra* has often been compared. It is similar to it in both formal and substantive respects. Kautilya's work, as Macchiavelli's, pursues the same values: how a prince can maintain his power and enlarge it. Neither discusses basic issues of political philosophy and international order; they take for granted the existing social system and only ask how to preserve it. Both value intrigue and adopt on the whole a ruthless and instrumental approach to politics, elevating success in the game above all other considerations. They study the problems of conquering power over other states, and do not really accept the logic and the necessary limitations of a system of states of equal power. Where Kautilya differs from Macchiavelli is in his style and in his abjuration of historical method: his is a dry account of the complexities of administration and foreign policy unredeemed by the colorful incidents, (from classical and Italian practice) so freely quoted in *The Prince.*

The *Arthasastra* as such is not therefore, as a whole, a work of international relations theory, but it does lay the foundations for the discussion of a number of problems and contributes basic elements out of which propositions of considerable generality have been and continue to be fashioned. Some of these are remarkably fresh and pertinent even today.

In the remaining portions of this paper I shall first give an account of the structure of Kautilya's argument relevant to international relations; this deals mainly with foreign policy but to some extent also, with international systems. I shall then ask what additional information about the structure and operation of the Hindu international system may be elicited from Kautilya's work, and indicate some topics which are inadequately treated and some questions about relations between social structure and international order which arise from it.

II. FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS[3]

The point of departure for Kautilya's discussion of problems of foreign policy is his analysis of the "elements" of the state (*anga* or *prkrti*). These are: King, Minister, Country, Capital (or Fort), Treasury, Army, Friend, Enemy.[4]

The list of the *angas* is the common property of traditional Hindu literature.[5] In itself it need not be regarded as particularly illuminating, but it is sound and basic, and in one form or another (in part, as "elements of national power"), has survived to this very day as a mainstay of reflection and analysis of international politics. Clearly, it is the elementary vocabulary of discussion on foreign affairs.

Kautilya enumerates the desirable qualities each of these elements should display and points out, too, that his list of elements is arranged in descending order of importance: each succeeding element is less important than the one before it, the king being most important of all. A ruler who possesses the elements of state and who wisely takes care of them "will never be defeated," he says, and then devotes the whole of Book VIII to a systematic analysis of the "troubles and calamities" which might befall each one of these elements (in otherwords, to their 'malfunctioning').

The king is the focal point of analysis; he strives to maintain and improve his position knowing that the determinants of status in international society are two: "power" and "happiness":

> The possession of power and happiness in a greater degree makes a king superior to another; in a lesser degree, inferior; and in an equal degree, equal. Hence a king shall always endeavor to augment his power and elevate his happiness.[6]

Neither 'power' nor 'happiness' is clearly or exhaustively defined or analysed. We know, however, that 'power' is to be understood as 'strength' and that it has three components: power of deliberation or decision-making, including capacity for intrigue; the treasury and the army; and resolve and determination. Thus power refers essentially to activity and application of the elements of the state, just mentioned. 'Happiness' on the other hand is that which can be attained by the use of power. It is to some degree a measure of success of foreign policy and the implementation of its objectives, but it also indicates those qualities such as righteousness and also internal stability—and not power alone—that enter into the determination of international status.

A king's position is not, however, unchanging; his status relative to another king is variable and needs continuous attention. A king prevents a deterioration in his position and secures an improvement (a desire for which is a built-in feature of the system) in two ways: by attention to the elements of his power, and by external action. Kautilya enjoins the ruler to pursue what we might describe as power-investment: a wise king adopts policies that add to the resources of his country and enable him "to build forts, to construct buildings and commercial roads, to open new plantations and villages, to exploit mines and timber and elephant forests, and at the same time to harass similar works of the enemy."[7] Status is also obviously affected by successes in military and other fields, but the king is cautioned to rely on strengthening his own power before embarking upon foreign adventures.

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[3] In addition to works cited elsewhere in this paper the following have been found useful, and are relevant to the international relations aspects of Kautilya's treatise: Max Weber, *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958); Kalidas Nag, *Les Theories Diplomatiques de L'Inde Ancienne et L'Arthasastra* (Paris: Maisonneuve Freres, 1923); N. N. Law, *Inter-State Relations in Ancient India* (London, 1920); M. V. Krishna Rao, *Studies in Kautilya* (Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1958); Friedrich Wilhelm, *Politische Polemiken im Staatslehrbuch des Kautalya* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960); P. C. Chakravarti, *The Art of War in Ancient India* (Dacca, 1941); R. C. Majumdar, *ed., The Age of Imperial Unity* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951).

[4] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

[5] For an extensive discussion and review of literature on the *angas* see Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, chs. 1–10.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

According to Kautilya, and here is one of the more interesting portions of his analysis, the king's status determines his foreign policy. That policy differs according to whether it is directed toward kings who are superior, inferior or equal to him. The bulk of the international portions of the *Arthasastra* is a discussion of the policies that may be appropriately pursued by 'superior' or 'inferior' kings; comparatively little space is devoted to the practice of relations between equal powers.

The basis of this discussion is the concept of *sadhgunya*, or the "six-fold policy". This comprises the following six types of foreign policy: Accommodation (*sandhi*); Hostility (*vigraha*); Indifference (*asana*); Attack (*yana*); Protection (*samsraya*); Double Policy (*dvaidhibhava*). Having to choose between them, an inferior king pursues Accomodation, seeks Protection or resorts to Double Policy; the superior king can afford Hostility or Attack, while one facing an equal maintains Indifference. The concept of *sadhgunya* Kautilya shares with other Hindu authors, but it is he who has built a system of thought upon it.

"Whoever is inferior to another shall seek Accommodation (*sandhi*) with him, says Kautilya."[8] *Sandhi* must be understood as agreement, entente, accord or other kinds of political link secured by a weaker power. An enumeration of the varieties of *sandhi* we find in the *Arthasastra* shows this to be a type of relationship subsisting between those essentially unequal.

Hindu political thought delighted and excelled in classification and developed typologies and categorizations that go further than anything now practised in this field. The *sandhis* listed by Kautilya show considerable attention to the problem of distinguishing between types of unequal political cooperation. As an example of classifications found in the *Arthasastra*, here is a list of *sandhis* ordered according to the type of submissive agreement made by the weaker party.[9]

Sandhis relating to the army:
- *Atmamishasandhi,* agreement whereby the king and a fixed number of his troops present themselves when called by the superior king.
- *Purushanturasandhi,* whereby the commander in chief or the crown prince alone (but not the king) will present the army when called.
- *Adrshtapurushsandhi,* whereby no person is specified to serve with the army called by the superior king.

Sandhis relating to wealth:
- *Parikrayasandhi,* offer of wealth (tribute) whereby other elements of the state remain free.
- *Upagrahasandhi,* offer of as much money as can be carried on a man's shoulder.
- *Kapalasandhi,* paying an immense amount.
- *Suvarnasandhi* (golden peace), where the amount paid is tolerable.

Sandhis relating to territory:
- *Adistasandhi,* cession of part of territory.
- *Uchchhinnasandhi,* cession of the whole terriory except for the capital.
- *Avakrayasandhi,* agreement to hand over the produce of the land.
- *Paribushanasandhi,* promise to hand over more than the land yields.

This classification suggests the types of relations that prevailed between unequal powers, but it does not exhaust them. The relationship of *sandhi* also was pertinent to such specific purposes as the colonization of uninhabited land, the construction of enterprises (*e.g.*, forts or mines) or even to the generalized desire for mutual peace (*asparipanitasandhi*). On occasion *sandhi* was apparently also applicable to relations between equal powers, but the *Arthasastra* is not too clear about this. Underlying all types of *sandhi* was a strongly competitive element, the accommodation reached being but a phase in a continuous status contest.

Protection (*samsraya*, literally taking shelter; often inaccurately translated as alliance), is another type of policy available to the 'inferior' and is to be used "when a weak king is attacked by a powerful enemy" but not otherwise, for such dependence is judged to be dangerous. However, once the relationship of protection has been entered into, it entails obligations such as the need to seek permission when building new works or seeking to install an heir-apparent, and generally for all foreign policy operations. The policy of protection creates heavy liabilities.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 293.

[8] *Ibid.*, Shamasastry's term for *sandhi* is 'peace'; this seems not precise enough.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 299–300; this is only an example; other writers use different lists and classifications; see also Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 224.

The third type, the so-called Double Policy, too, is a resort of the weak, but allows greater freedom to act in pursuit of one's own interests. It entails the maintenance of entente with one king, purchased by concessions of the *sandhi* type, in combination with an active policy of harassment of another king. Profits of such action may be shared with the first king.

The choices of a superior king are Hostility and Attack. Hostility is a form of cold war or active competition; but should not be regarded as war in the sense of actual military operations; this latter Kautilya terms *yana*, Attack or marching against the enemy. Attack is launched when the enemy's troubles have been diagnosed as grave.

Large parts of the *Arthasastra* examine the problems of the *vijigishu* (the ambitious one), the king who is intent on pushing on active policy. Book IX deals with "The Work of an Invader"; the timing and the location of attack, the intelligence that needs gathering before it, its uses for exploiting the divisions in the invaded country. Great play is made of intrigue, and of the use of spies and traitors, almost in preference to the deployment of the army—wisely considered an expensive undertaking. Book X carries the discussion to the strategic and military plane (encampment, engagements, battlefields, etc.), but Book XIII continues with such strategic-political problems as seizing the enemy's capital by means of propaganda (*e.g.*, inflating the *vijigishu's* power by means of rumors, magic or proclaiming his association with the gods), capturing the enemy king by subterfuge, infiltrating agents into the enemy's camp, etc. Political warfare overshadows military operations.

We may conclude by noting *asana*—Indifference, which we could also render as isolation—the type of policy Kautilya deems appropriate to relations between equals. "If a king thinks that 'neither is my enemy strong enough to destroy my works nor am I strong enough to destroy his' then he should observe *asana*." However important the relationship between equals is to international relations, Kautilya devotes only one chapter (VII, 4) to policies determined by it.

The '*sadhgunyas*' represent a typology of foreign policy based upon the status of the actor. They need to be distinguished from the *upayas* or the four "influence techniques," which are another classification of types of policy, also found in Kautilya.

In the *Arthasastra* references to *upayas* are less frequent and less systematic than those to *sadhgunyas*. They occur in such varied chapters as "Procedures for Issuing Royal Writs," "Conquered King" and "Methods for Dealing with Internal and External Enemies." The four *upayas* (also translatable as 'means of policy') are: Conciliation (*sama*), Gift (*dana*), Dissension (*bheda*) and Punishment (*danda*). As concepts, the *upayas* are more universal, and of greater analytical power than the *sadhgunyas*, and indeed they are applicable to all types of policies, both domestic and external. But Kautilya does not use them in the way he does the "six-fold policy," as the backbone of his analysis, and does not elaborate to any degree, presumably taking a measure of acquaintance with them for granted in his readers. That which Kautilya describes as Gift is, of course, in modern society, in relation to domestic politics, the planned redistribution of incomes and resources; and in relation to international politics, foreign aid. Here is what he has to say in the entire treatise about Gift as an instrument of policy of a traditional agrarian society;

> Gifts are a means of (favorably) influencing the disaffected (I, 13).
>
> In the context of negotiations, gift, or the offer of money, amounts to bribery (II, 10).
>
> In internal politics, the way to win over those who are in collusion with outsiders is by gifts: favors and remission of taxes or the award of jobs (IX, 5).
>
> Gifts are of five kinds: remission of what is to be paid; continuance of what is being given; repayment of what is received; payment of one's own wealth; and help for a voluntary raid on the property of others (IX, 6).
>
> Gifts are more difficult to use than conciliation, but are easier than dissension and punishment (IX, 6).
>
> Gifts and conciliation should be used to subdue weak kings, and dissension and threats against strong kings. Such gifts might include grants of land and girls in marriage, and the creation of a climate of security and freedom from fear (VII, 16).

Another of the *upayas*, Dissension, is discussed more extensively but forms part of the sections dealing with the work of the invader and means of sowing confusion in the ranks of the enemy, which we have already mentioned. We may conclude that his observations on the *upayas* are of some interest and potentially of value, but do not form part of the systematic development of his argument.

The international portions of Kautilya's work thus amount in the main to an exposition of the principles and problems of foreign policy in a hierarchical system, each member of which determines upon action in the light of his inferior or superior status. The doctrine of the *upayas* by contrast is one of the application of political influence techniques pure and simple: it is unrelated to hierarchical considerations and does not therefore figure importantly in this analysis. It might have been more prominent if the modal type of relationship was that between equal powers.

III. THE CIRCLE OF STATES

Used as we are to building theories of international relations upon the axiom of equality of states we may find it surprising to what length Kautilya could carry his descriptions, and his prescriptions, by developing the implications of status differences. However, the study of international relations cannot fail to attend to relations between equals for it is there that it enters a province peculiarly its own. The theoretical model familiar to us is that of several and roughly equal powers precariously seeking to achieve and maintain a state of equilibrium.

In the work of Kautilya we shall search in vain for a balance of power theory but we do find in it an abstracted conception of the international system embodied in the idea of *mandala,* commonly translated as the Circle of States.[10] The concept of *mandala* occupies a prominent place both in Hindu and in Buddhist writings, but in relation to international politics it has been most fully developed in the *Arthasastra* (VI, 2). It could be described succinctly, in modern terms, as the model of a loose bi-centric international system.

Kautilya takes as his point of reference the *vijigishu,* the ambitious king, and posits as being in a state of constant opposition to him, actual or potential, the *ari,* the king or kings who are the immediate neighbors of the *vijigishu.* By developing further the axiom that neighborhood entails actual or potential opposition or enmity, he deems the king beyond the *ari* to be an enemy of *ari* and therefore a friend (*mitra*) of the *vijigishu,* and *mitra's* neighbor, in his turn, to be a friend of *ari* and an enemy of *mitra.* To his "rear," too, the *vijigishu* has, alternately, an enemy, a friend, and another enemy and another friend (each one of whom is identified by a special Sanskrit term). Over and above these 'committed' states Kautilya recognised the special position of two types of non-aligned powers: the *madhyama* or mediatory king ("who occupies a territory close to both the ambitious one and his immediate enemy in front and who is capable of helping both the kings, whether united or disunited, or of resisting either of them individually"), and also the neutral or detached (*udasina*) king ("situated beyond the territory of either kings detached and very powerful"). Each of the four "primary kings" (*vijigishu, ari, madhyama, udasina*) may serve as the centre or the focus for a Circle of States. To this ensemble of states and "Circles" are we justified in applying the concept of international system?

Kautilya's purpose and orientation were those of an advisor to a king, an up-and-coming and ambitious king, to be sure, but only one king among many. His problems were those of maintaining and improving his king's position rather than those of the society of states as a whole. Issues of international peace and order were secondary to him and he did not have to write about them in the same detail he used in his foreign policy analysis. But even in this subsidiary area he could not help coming upon questions of system-wide significance. The concept of the Circle of States (or *mandala*) is his principal device for dealing with them.

But there is room for differing interpretations. On the reading of some passages one can argue that by the Circle of States Kautilya means no more than the three kings who are each other's friends: *vijigishu,* his friend (*mitra*) and the friend's friend: in other words the *vijigishu's* friendship-alliance system. This understanding of the concept is confirmed by a number of other passages:[11] for instance, when the *vijigishu* is seen to gain the good graces of his Circle of States by allowing them generous spoils of war, or when various possibilities of forming a Circle of States are discussed, or when troubles within one's own Circle are contrasted with those of the enemy's Circle of States. The concepts of Friend and Enemy are examined (and distinctions are drawn between various types of natural and acquired friends and enemies), and they occupy a prominent place in various parts of the treatise. And insofar as both the Friend and the Enemy are two of the elements of state featured at the very onset of this discussion, the theory of *mandala* must be seen as a continuation of Kautilya's foreign policy analysis.

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[10] For a graphic account of the *mandala* see i.a. Adda Bozeman *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton University Press 1960) pp. 122–3.

[11] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, pp. 307, 295, 297, 358.

There are equally numerous passages in which the Circle acquires and carries a generalised and a more universal meaning.[12] There are, for instance, references to the pressure of opinion exercised by it in the direction of considerate treatment for submissive kings, or against breaking treaties and destroying friends. Kautilya declares that the *vijigishu* may attack the *madhyama* king only if the Circle of States has turned against the latter and is favorable to the *vijigishu's* cause.

This apparent contradiction may be resolved if we assume that in Kautilya's writings we witness an evolution in the concept of the international society; we see the idea of a minimum-solidarity community (which is implicit in that of an international system), evolving by extension from the king's friends to all the rulers the king is in contact with. In other words the emphasis shifts gradually from 'friends' to 'all other than immediate enemies.' In Kautilya's work the solidarity-community aspect of international systems appears in an explicit way mostly in the negative sense of a body of opinion whose views must be taken account of, and which therefore puts a limit upon the freedom of foreign policy. Below we shall note some other factors of solidarity which are implied in various parts of the treatise.

On balance, Kautilya's Circle of States may be regarded as the germ of the concept of an international society. Looking more closely at his formulations, we see him delineating a distinct model of the international system, though admittedly it is only one of a number of possible models. We might call it a checkerboard model, because the basis of it is the proposition that one's neighbor is one's enemy and that one's neighbor's enemy is therefore one's obvious friend. This regular alternation between friends and enemies produces, for the system, a checkerboard effect. The "locational determinism" implied in Kautilya's Circle may need to be qualified and was, in fact, qualified in the *Arthasastra*. Friendship and enmity are not solely determined by position. But the checkerboard still is a more illuminating model of world politics than the bloc-pattern recently in vogue.

In other respects, too, the *mandala* is superior to current but in fact cruder models of loose bi-polar systems. It departs from the idea that the two major powers in an international system must occupy in relation to each other polar positions, that is, places at the two extremes of a spectrum of political locations. Rather it indicates that, geographically and otherwise, they may both be close to the centre of the international system, each the hub of a circle of states, but the two hubs close to each other. Kautilya's distinction between the two types of non-alignment, of the mediatory king and of the neutral-indifferent king, too, appears as an attractive feature of his scheme. On these grounds, "loose bi-centricity" appears as a more discriminating, if still highly abstract, scheme of an international system, than "loose bi-polarity."

We have so far sought to reproduce the structure of thought relating to international relations and made explicit in the *Arthasastra*, and we have identified the *mandala* as a notable, if partial contribution to understanding international systems. Kautilya's other references to problems of an international system are no more than those which are incidental to answering questions arising out of the conduct of foreign policy. We may nevertheless confirm from these further references that a rudimentary conception of such an agrarian system[13] is implicit in the *Arthasastra*, and that its chief elements other than the *mandala* are those which indicate that the system possessed definite *geographical scope*, that it gave evidence of *integration and solidarity*, and that it embraced attempts to cope with *international order*.

That the international system within which Kautilya's princes exercised their status-seeking existed in a "world" of its own is indicated in a number of passages. The *Arthasastra* refers several times to those who will conquer "the earth," or "the earth bounded by the four quarters."[14] And in another place it indicates that this earth is to be understood roughly as the Indian sub-continent south of the Himalayas.[15] This is the physical setting of Kautilya's international relations, and the arena in which the *vijigishu* could exercise his ambition. If the concept of the Circle of States is to be endowed with the meaning of international system, we must assume that a *mandala* would encompass a significant part of this 'earth.'

Within these geographical confines states were interrelated in a variety of ways. There was of course trade, and Kautilya comments upon trade routes, both by land and sea, upon tolls and customs arrangements and upon the commodities subject to trade. There was also migration and Kautilya not only mentions the superintendent of passports as a separate government officer but also refers to the phenomenon of migration caused by unfavorable political conditions.[16] Then, as now, migratory movements were taken to be an index of domestic stability and political and international success.

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[12] See in particular, *ibid.*, pp. 298, 340, 385, 344–5.

[13] For the concept of an agrarian international system see George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 14 (October, 1961), pp. 118–43.

[14] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, pp. 289, 367, 437, 10.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 368.

Political contact was maintained at two levels.[17] At the official level there were envoys sent from one king to another, and of these Kautilya distinguishes three grades. His account of their duties stresses the faithful conveyance of the king's message but enlarges at even greater length upon the need to gather information, to make friends at the host king's court and to learn about the nature of internal conflicts with the view to facilitating subversion. Diplomatic contacts of this type do not seem to have led to the elaboration of a system of diplomatic conventions. At the nonofficial level, there were resident and itinerant agents in other kingdoms, maintained for purposes of intelligence and estimating the state of the opponent's elements of power, and for fomenting dissension and maintaining contact with the disaffected. Proportionately, Kautilya pays much more attention to espionage than to diplomacy and recommends the use of spies and secret agents not only in external relations but even more thoroughly for the purpose of controlling the country, and checking upon government officials and the execution of official orders.

However, there is little in Kautilya that would indicate the existence of stable patterns of collaboration among the princes. Diplomacy, as mentioned, seems rudimentary and unregulated. There are no references to meetings or congresses of kings or their ministers. Family links between courts seem weak, and less prominent than those known to have obtained in other agrarian international systems. There are some references to gifts of girls in marriage, etc.,[18] but the rules of caste and the practice of early marriage may have reduced this potential area of international dealings.

Discussing problems created by the sudden death of a king, Kautilya includes messengers of Friends and Enemies among those to whom the minister displays the newly installed king and to whom he should make promises of increased benefits. Here are the elements of a practice of recognition. But the dangers inherent in regular exchanges of royal visits proper are strikingly illustrated in the same chapter when Kautilya suggests that those among neighboring kings who threaten trouble at such a critical moment be invited on the pretext of attending a festival, wedding or elephant hunt or by some other ruse and then captured or even killed.[19]

The atmosphere of suspicion engendered by such practices, together with the difficulties which questions of ranking and precedence must have posed in this status-conscious society, tended to reduce the range of contacts between rulers and thus minimized the growth of an international solidarity. While it is apparent that it was not unusual for neighboring kings to be invited to attend festivals and ceremonies it is unlikely that this served as a major opportunity for developing solidarity between kings, if only because of the dominant role played in them by the priestly caste, the Brahmins. Kautilya says very little about ceremonies and sacrifices, such as the coronation or the king's inauguration (*Rajasuya*), and in such other accounts of these occasions as are available we search in vain for evidence of the participation, ritual or otherwise, of other sovereigns.[20] Attendance at festive or ritual events was regarded as amounting to an acknowledgement of the superiority of the host king, and the *Asvamedha* ceremony for the inauguration of a ruler of superior status, for instance, included one hundred princes as a means of symbolising the power of the king performing the sacrifice. That is why the ceremonies could not easily serve as the medium for the development of relations between powers of equal status.

Such elements as there were binding the system together must therefore have come not from the royal houses, but from the homogeneity of the social system as a whole, and above all from the caste system and its principal custodians and beneficiaries, the Brahmins. The maintenance of that system was the element which made for solidarity between Hindu states and set them apart from non-Hindus. Kautilya outlines the essentials of the caste system at the very outset of his book and enjoins the king never to allow people to swerve from their duties, to preserve the "customs of the Aryans, and to follow the rules of caste and the divisions of religious life."[21] But the Brahmins also had some specific functions to perform in the maintenance of culture and communications within the Hindu international system. There is in Kautilya the suggestion that the official envoys, hence the personnel of diplomacy, were Brahmins; some of the king's spies and secret agents, too, were of the priestly caste.[22] It seems implied in the chapter on "Royal Writs" (II, 10) that such royal communications, including diplomatic notes, were couched in Sanskrit. Brahmins, who were the preservers of that language, would then be needed for writing and interpreting them and we may infer therefore that this was the language of Hindu diplomacy and the international language of that system. To the extent that the observance of treaties was guaranteed by a solemn oath,[23] the Brahmin priest too would have a part in the maintenance of international obligations.

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

[17] See also Ludo Rocher, "The Ambassador in Ancient India," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* (Madras), Vol. 7 (1958), pp. 344–60.

[18] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 283; see also p. 10.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 283–5.

[20] See *e.g.*, Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 72 ff; N. N. Law, *Aspects of Ancient Indian Polity* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1921), p. 161 ff. However, V. N. Goshal (in *Studies in Indian History and Culture*, Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1957, p. 318), suggests that the king's ally (*janyamitra*—friend from a foreign country) may have had a part in the central portion of the *Rajasuya* ceremony.

The functioning of the international system, and the degree of solidarity within it, thus depended to a considerable degree upon the Brahmins. But we must note this: within the caste system the Brahmins had a position superior to the warriors from whom most of the kings were recruited. A consolidation of kingly power, possibly through international contacts and collaboration—a process that occurred in other international systems—would have tended to reduce the standing of the highest caste. It may well be that it is because of the Brahmins' functions in the field of diplomacy, culture and communications that the international solidarity of the Hindu world remained at a low level.

IV. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

In a system whose solidarity was maintained in such precarious circumstances, and in which moreover, the aspirations to high status were pursued with near-complete ruthlessness the problem of preserving a semblance of international order must have been particularly important. What has Kautilya to say about this?

A *laissez-faire* conception of the international system depicts order as the by-product of the unhampered interplay of the states members of it. Each king his own and his friend's policeman—this picture is to some extent borne out in the *Arthasastra.* It may be deduced from it that members of the Circle of States did exercise some restraint upon the acquisitive and expansionist tendencies of the rulers. They would condemn wealth acquired by breaching treaties or destroying friends; they would regard it as provocative if a victorious king coveted the land and the property, sons and wives of defeated princes. The ministers of such a ruler might take refuge within the Circle and receive support for their subversive intrigues against him. This does not amount to a doctrine of international morality, but it is evidence for the existence of a certain amount of pressure favoring the maintenance of order.

These were minimum functions only and entirely unspecialised. But there was one exception, in that the theory of *mandala* implies that in a bi-centric situation some regulatory functions might be fulfilled by the mediatory and possibly even the indifferent king. Both are powerful, but the prestige and status enjoyed by the mediatory-king and hinted at in some passages[24] seem attributable not only to his power but also to system-wide functions performed by him. These, however, remain largely unexplained except for the allusion contained in the very name *madhyama*—mediatory or middle king.

Clearly this is insufficient. The agrarian international system which is implied in Kautilya's analysis calls for more elaborate provision for the maintenance of order. We may ask: to what extent did the Hindu international system exploit for purposes of assuring its own stability the hierarchical features previously referred to?

In all social systems the ranking order is of course a regulatory device of considerable importance. But while Kautilya and his princes are evidently most conscious of the relative status of rulers there is but scant evidence in his work that these inequalities became enshrined in a legitimate and recognised international stratification system, such as for instance we witness in modern international society with its fairly clear distinctions between great and small powers each possessing well understood rights and obligations. While status-seeking was obviously important, the status that was held out as a goal was not an orderly progression through a number of grades—as some hierarchical societies might have solved this problem—but rather the all-or-nothing goal of the 'conquest of the world.'

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[21] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 15–19; see also R. Shamasastry, *Evolution of Indian Polity* (Calcutta, 1920), pp. 126–8. For the diplomatic functions of the *Purohita* (the royal priest) see Law, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[23] Shamasastry tr., *op. cit.*, p. 341.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 344–5 in particular.

No system of ranking can be extracted from Kautilya.[25] But we can say that the role of the *vijigishu* which he examines in some detail has implied in it rights and duties which contain elements of an authority role within that international system.

The *vijigishu* has sometimes been rendered as "the conqueror," and the ideal which guided and inspired him, dominion over the four corners of the world, as "empire." These terms have led to confusion because some interpreters of the relevant passages in the *Arthasastra* have read into them the suggestion that the acquisition of superior status so keenly pursued by the *vijigishu* led to extensive conquests, large-scale occupation of territory, replacement of ruling dynasties and the establishment of an alien administration. It has been pointed out[26] that this is not a correct reading of the *Arthasastra* or of the historical situation then as a rule prevailing. There were indeed cases of outright conquest and in one of his last chapters (XIII, 5) Kautilya suggests rules for the restoration of peace and order in a conquered country; he advocates moderation and the minimum of changes. But such cases were exceptional: "the just conqueror (*vijigishu*) is satisfied with mere obeisance."[27] In Kautilya's system the assertion of superior status brought not conquest, but submissive cooperation as expressed in the policies of *sandhi* and *samsraya*, to which the bulk of international analysis is devoted. The victor who seized the land or property of the defeated ruler would incur the open hostility of the whole Circle of States.

The 'conquest of the earth' thus meant little more than the acknowledgement of the superiority of one ruler by other princes. The formal expression of the claim to superiority was the celebration of an elaborate, year-long horse-sacrifice, the *Asvamedha.*[28] In a complex ritual, which we have already had occasion to mention, one hundred horses were released and allowed to wander. They were guarded by one hundred princes—an indication of the superior status of the sacrificer. The horses had to pass through territories and realms over which it was intended to assert supremacy. The entrance of a sacrificial horse implied a challenge to its ruler. A powerful king ran little risk of his horses being seized and could vindicate his claim to supremacy.

The 'conqueror' of the Hindu world was therefore no more than the ruler who has been recognized as being dominant within it or within an important section of it. He was a king of kings but not the ruler of a tightly administered empire. Even the Mauryan Empire which seems to have had something of an administrative service is not really an exception, and it lasted less than 150 years. The rights of the *vijigishu* would be governed by the type of accommodation he reached with submissive princes, but would usually include the authority to issue approval of such activities as the acquisition of new property, celebration of marriage, royal succession, construction of defensive works, trade in horses and the capture of elephants. His permission would also have to be secured if an attack were to be launched.[29] Such a relationship had in it undoubtedly an element of control over the maintenance of order.

But this element was never large. The mere assertion of superiority unaccompanied by the exercise of direct control was never lasting. The *Asvamedha* sacrifice had to be often repeated and the challenge implicit in it led to frequent conflicts. The status of protection accepted by lesser kings did not stop them from pursuing their interests even to the extent of waging war. Kautilya follows up his brief account of the duties of the protected ruler with a chapter detailing the ways in which such a ruler may proceed to attack other kingdoms. Nowhere do we find a hint that the rights of the superior king were exercised toward moderating conflict or ambitions, or by arbitrating or settling disputes.

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[25] For a discussion of royal ranks see, however, Law, *op. cit.*, p. 12 ff; Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 63 ff. A late work, the *Sukranitisara* has an ingenious system whereby rulers are graded into eight classes according to their income.

[26] Kane, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 65–72; W. Ruben, "Inter-state Relations in Ancient India and Kautalya's Arthasastra," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. IV (1955), pp. 137–59; H. N. Sinha, *Sovereignty in Ancient Indian Polity: A Study in the Evolution of Early Indian State* (London: Luzac, 1938), pp. 258–63; for a different view see Duncan Derrett, "The Maintenance of Peace in the Hindu World: Practice and Theory," *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. VII (1958), pp. 361–87.

[27] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

[28] Law, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19, 181–91; there is no mention of it in Kautilya.

[29] Shamasastry, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

V. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

We are led to the conclusion that on Kautilya's own showing neither the problem of solidarity nor of authority or order were satisfactorily solved in the Hindu world, especially in view of the disruptive processes at work within it. Are we to belive that Kautilya constructed an inherently unstable system?

In part, no. The elements of stability and solidarity within his system must be supplemented with greater emphasis upon that which we have already hinted at, the strength of the social structure underlying the Hindu world. The basic unit of that structure was the village and that remained unchanged for millennia. The stability of the village was in turn conditional upon the stability of the caste system, dominated by the Brahmins. The specifically diplomatic functions of the Brahmins mentioned by Kautilya have previously been alluded to. It remains to point out that in addition the Brahmins performed other generally crucial functions which helped to maintain the cohesion of the system. By contrast with the notable lack of contact and communication between other elements of it, the Brahmins were the only system-wide agency of culture and solidarity.

Their most important role in this field must easily have been in education. This was their responsibility at the local level and included the training of all male members of the twice-born castes, especially the sons of Brahmins and of princes. On the system level, certain cities, and Banaras and Taxila in the North in particular, served as centres of learning, becoming famous for their learned teachers and acquiring veritable 'colleges'; their students included princes from distant regions. The Brahmins' freedom to travel, and predilection for doing so, assured the continuous dissemination of culture over wide areas, and the maintenance of contact between centres of learning and of religious and also political life.

Their other key function was of course in state ceremonials and sacrifices which formed such an essential feature of Hindu life. In these, the Brahmin priest had a dominant position and acted in effect as the representative of the international (or Hindu) system. In Vedic texts the names of kings who 'subdued the earth' are given together with those of the priests who consecrated them. The sanction of the priest was naturally required before the king, by performing such sacrifices as the *Asvamedha,* laid a claim to increased international status. The presence of the Brahmins seemed to offset the absence of other sovereigns from the ceremonies, a feature which we noted and commented upon at an earlier stage. The sanction of the priests was needed, too, before the king entered into international agreements or embarked upon hostilities—the latter in particular requiring elaborate ritual preparations. The social primacy of the Brahmins indeed served as the main check upon royal power. Excessive growth of this power, for instance in an integrated empire, would endanger the influence of the Brahmins and thus the caste system.

To a greater degree than is explicit in Kautilya the stability of the Hindu international system was thus assured by its social structure. But this is not the whole answer. India presents a paradox to the student, in the sharp contrast between the strength of its social structure, and the fluidity of its political and international systems. How do we account for this?

The hypothesis has been advanced by Eric J. Miller[30] that

> a necessary correlate of a rigid caste system is a system of territorial segmentation which has two functions: it promotes localised interdependent relations between castes, especially at the village level, by limiting the spatial range of intercaste relations for all castes; and it supports the hierarchical order of castes by permitting greater mobility and a greater spatial range of intercaste relations for those at the top of the scale than for those at the bottom.

If we substitute, as we must, for "system of territorial segmentation" the term "international system," we see that the main body of the hypothesis is borne out by our own analysis of Kautilya's writings. But we cannot accept this hypothesis without qualifying it, as follows. Not every international system is compatible with a rigid caste system; but only that which exhibits the features brought out by our analysis of Kautilya: low international solidarity maintained by contacts of the highest caste which performs priestly functions, and international authority of an intermittent and generally ineffective kind.

Low system solidarity was an important feature of the Hindu world and came into play strikingly when its external integrity came to be periodically threatened by barbarian invaders. The lack of communications and the absence of habits of cooperation between rulers militated against common action against the intruders. External political control, thus established, restricted in turn the power of the kings, but not the influence of the Brahmins. Although Hindu political institutions were notoriously short-lived, the social system remained remarkably stable.

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[30] "Caste and Territory in Malabar," *American Anthropologist,* Vol. 56 (June, 1954), p. 410.

Thus one answer to our paradox seems to be that the social stability of the Hindu world was purchased at the price of international instability and disorder. Kautilya's distinctly unstable international system served to maintain the caste system. The order of castes and the rule of the Brahmins, were conditional upon a near-anarchical system of petty though ambitious kingdoms (which frequently deserve no better name than chiefdom), striving after power but incapable of creating both the resources and the ideology needed for forging broader communities and wider loyalties. The processes which occurred elsewhere, the creation of a universal empire in China, or the emergence of a system of a small number of semi-equal great powers in Western Europe, did not take place in the Indian subcontinent and gradually the Hindu world was absorbed first in the Moslem, and later the European realms. Interesting questions remain: is international disorder the price of social stability? Does international peace depend upon continuous social change? Whatever the answers may be, Kautilya's *Arthasastra* remains with us as an impressive monument to man's ability to reason clearly, if abstractly, about the most complex problems of social and international affairs.

THE PARTY WHIP ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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In the literature on political parties in the United States Congress two points are usually stressed. First, it is said that the political party label lacks a precise programmatic content because "party government" in the British sense is absent in the American Congress.[1] Second, however, it is contended that the party label is the single most important and reliable attribute in predicting the voting behavior of a Senator or Representative.[2]

Between these two contentions lies a sizeable area of unexplored territory. If party is the best predictive device in analyzing voting behavior in Congress then, despite the lack of "party government," the party machinery in both houses must have effects that deserve study. Professor Huitt has suggested the necessity and importance of this kind of study: "... the preoccupation with reform has obscured the fact that we have no really adequate model of party leadership as it exists in Congress, and that none can be constructed because we lack simple descriptions of many of the basic working parts of the present system."[3] Huitt himself and a few others have filled some of these gaps.[4]

An important office of party leadership that has received no sustained treatment is that of whip. Only two moderately long articles have been specifically devoted to it, and neither analyzes the relation of the whips to rule by the majority party.[5] Other works on Congress men-

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The findings and conclusions are those of the author and do not purport to represent the views of the Brookings Institution, its trustees, officers, or other staff members.

[1] See Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York, 1956), p. 399; E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942); and the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950).

[2] See David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (Dec., 1956), p. 1023; Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959), pp. vi–vii; Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951); and Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics* (New York, 1958), p. 379 (appendix).

[3] Ralph Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (1961), p. 334; see also Robert L. Peabody and Nelson Polsby, *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 269–270.

[4] See Huitt, *op. cit.*; Malcolm E. Jewell, "The Senate Republican Policy Committee and Foreign Policy," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (Dec., 1959), pp. 966–980; Hugh A. Bone, "An Introduction to the Senate Policy Committees," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (June, 1956), pp. 339–359; George Galloway, "Leadership in the House of Representatives," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1959), pp. 417–441; and James A. Robinson, *The House Rules Committee* (Indianapolis, 1963). Paul Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York, 1927), is an older treatment of some parts of the House leadership.

[5] These are "Whips' Effectiveness Tested on Close 1961 House Votes," *Congressional Quarterly*, Weekly Report #24 (June 16, 1961), pp. 992–998; and Alfred Steinberg, "Shepherds of Capitol Hill," *Nation's Business*, Jan., 1952, pp. 31–33. The first article presents roll call data and infers "effectiveness" from them; but no direct link between the data and the whips is established. The second is a popular treatment of the role and importance of the whips.

tion the whips, but only in passing.[6]

This article proposes to (1) recount briefly the 20th Century history of the whips in the House of Representatives, (2) describe the whip organizations in the House, (3) analyze the role played by the House Democratic whip organization in the Second Session of the 87th Congress (1962) and the First Session of the 88th Congress (1963), and (4) suggest the broader importance of the whips in the House.

I

Champ Clark, Speaker of the House for eight years (1911–19), called the whips "the right hands of the two leaders," and described the principal duty of a whip as "to have his fellow political members in the House when needed."[7] His comments are still accurate, although the functions performed by the whips have become more diversified in recent years. The whips are (1) responsible for the presence of their fellow party members, but they must also (2) transmit certain information to them, (3) ascertain how they will vote on selected important pieces of legislation, and (4) guide pressure to change the minds of the recalcitrant and stiffen the wills of the wavering.

Most of these functions have been performed at least haphazardly in the House since 1789, although the name "whip" was not formally applied to a party official in the House until the end of the 19th Century.[8] Throughout most of the 19th Century members functioning as whips were in evidence only in connection with important legislation and only when the division between the parties was close enough to necessitate a device that would help gain a high degree of party regularity.[9] Many of these whips were volunteers for a given floor fight only.[10] Both parties began to designate their whips formally for an entire Congress around the turn of this century. Table I lists them and summarizes their House careers.

The Republicans. The exact method of Tawney's initial appointment as Republican whip in 1897 is obscure. Speaker Cannon ended it by appointing him Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in 1905, although he had never previously served on that Committee. Watson, who succeeded Tawney,[11] resigned from the House in 1908 to run for the

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A short article for a small audience (University of Oklahoma alumni) but with some general interest is Carl Albert, "Oklahoma and the Democratic Whip," *Sooner Magazine*, July, 1955, pp. 18–19.

[6] See Clem Miller, *Member of the House* (New York, 1962), pp. 52–54; DeAlva S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston, 1916), pp. 104–106; George Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis, 1922), p. 222; Truman, *The Congressional Party*, pp. 227 ff.; Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy* (New York, 1963), pp. 97–100; George Galloway, *History of the United States House of Representatives*, H. Doc. 246, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (1961), pp. 102–103; Floyd M. Riddick, *Congressional Procedure* (Boston, 1941), pp. 75–77; and Riddick, *The United States Congress: Organization and Procedure* (Manassas, Va., 1949), pp. 101–102.

[7] Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics* (New York, 1920), vol. 2, p. 337.

[8] The name "whip" derives from the British fox-hunting term "whipper-in," used to describe the man responsible for keeping the hounds from leaving the pack. It was first applied to the British Parliament about 1770. For a description of the British whips see Roland Young, *The British Parliament* (London, 1962), pp. 75–77; also Eric Alexander, Viscount Chilston, *Chief Whip* (London, 1961).

For a brief description of the whip in the United States Senate see a speech by J. Hamilton Lewis, long-time Democratic Senate whip, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 80, pt. 7, pp. 7044–7046 (1936).

[9] See MacNeil, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–100; and Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 104. See also David S. Barry, *Forty Years in Washington* (Boston, 1924), pp. 100 ff. for comments on one Republican whip in the late 19th Century, Omar Conger of Michigan.

[10] Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 338, says he was acting as volunteer whip as late as 1909. Important Republicans who acted as volunteer whips in the late 19th Century were Thomas Reed of Maine and James Wilson of Iowa.

[11] DeAlva S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, note 6 above, p. 105, states that Watson was, in 1899 (his second term), the first whip chosen by party caucus; and he indicates that Tawney succeeded Watson. Alexander's assertion is repeated by MacNeil, p. 97; Galloway, *History*, p. 102; Steinberg, *op. cit.*; and in a speech by Representative Guy Hardy of Colorado in 1928, which is cited in Cannon's *Precedents*, vol. 8, p. 958 (1936).

This view is mistaken. Tawney was the first whip and was succeeded by Watson in 1905; see the *New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1905, 3:2; the *Washington Post*, Dec. 3, 1905, 2:2 and Dec. 13, 1905, 4:6; Edward T. Taylor, *A History of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives*, H. Doc. 299, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941), p. 51; and Charles W. Thompson, *Party Leaders of the Time* (New York, 1906), pp. 153, 195.

TABLE I. PARTY WHIPS IN THE HOUSE

Name, State, Years of service as whip	House career		
	Years before becoming whip	Years as whip	Years after being whip
Democrats			
Oscar W. Underwood, Alabama, 1900–01	5	1	14
James T. Lloyd, Mo., 1901–08	4	8	8
Thomas M. Bell, Ga., (1913–15?)†	?	?	?
William A. Oldfield, Ark., 1921–28	12	8	—
John McDuffie, Alabama, 1929–33	10	4	2
Arthur Greenwood, Indiana, 1933–35	10	2	4
Patrick Boland, Pa., 1935–42	4	7	—
Robert Ramspeck, Ga., 1942–45	12	3	—
John Sparkman, Alabama, 1946	9	1	—
John McCormack, Mass., 1947–49; 1953–55	18	4	13*
Percy Priest, Tenn., 1949–53	8	4	4
Carl Albert, Okla., 1955–62	8	7	2*
Hale Boggs, La., 1962–	17	2*	
Republicans			
James A. Tawney, Minn., 1897–1905	4	8	6
James E. Watson, Indiana, 1905–09	8	4	—
John W. Dwight, N. Y., 1909–13	6	4	—
Charles Burke, S. D., 1913–15	12	2	—
Charles M. Hamilton, N. Y., 1915–19	2	4	—
Harold Knutson, Minn., 1919–23	2	4	26
Albert H. Vestal, Indiana, 1923–31	6	8	—
Carl G. Bachmann, W. Va., 1931–33	6	2	—
Harry L. Englebright, Cal., 1933–43	6	11	—
Leslie C. Arends, Ill., 1944–	9	20*	

* As of the end of 1963.

† Bell served in the House from 1905 until 1931.

governorship of Indiana; he later served 16 years in the Senate. Though he had left the House, Cannon consulted him as a personal assistant in the 1910 rules fight.[12] The third Republican whip, Dwight, began to organize a more extensive system and develop modern techniques—particularly the use of a systematic poll prior to an important vote.[13]

During Wilson's presidency Burke and Hamilton were understandably less active than Dwight had been. In 1919, with the Republicans again in control of the House, the post of whip resumed its importance to them. In that year, reflecting other changes in party practice after 1910, the power of appointing the Republican whip was transferred from the Speaker (or Minority Leader, depending on electoral fortunes) to the Republican Committee on Committees.[14] The Republican Conference (caucus) could ratify or reject the Committee's recommendation. Except in 1919 itself the nor-

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The exact date of Tawney's appointment as whip is as obscure as his method of appointment. Taylor, *loc. cit.*, gives the date as 1897 and says that Speaker Reed made the choice. Thompson, *op. cit.*, refers to Tawney as being whip in 1902, although he does not indicate how long he had then been so. Before 1920 the documentation for the identity of party whips was almost non-existent. I have therefore given footnote references identifying the whips before that date.

[12] Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency* (New York, 1940), p. 70.

[13] See MacNeil and Alexander; also the *New York Times*, Jan. 20, 1928, and the *Washington Star*, March 14, 1909, 1:8; March 22, 1909 1:5; and April 4, 1911, 4:2.

[14] Cannon's *Precedents*, vol. 8, p. 961.

mal practice has been for the Conference automatically to adopt it.[15]

Knutson, who later became Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, was whip for four years.[16] He was followed in turn by Vestal, Bachmann, Englebright, and Arends. The last three in particular developed, expanded, and solidified the organizational structure of the Republican whip.

The Democrats. The first Democratic whip, Underwood, later became floor leader in the House, and still later, the same in the Senate. Underwood offered the resolution at the 1900 Democratic Caucus—going into a campaign year—which formally created the posts of whip and assistant whip. The Minority Leader then announced Underwood's appointment as whip.[17] The method of appointment for Democratic whips has never changed. The floor leader, aided by Democratic Speakers, has appointed all the Democratic whips.

Lloyd succeeded Underwood and served until he resigned to become Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in the crucial election years of 1908, 1910, and 1912.[18] The identity of the Democratic whip in the period from 1909 until 1921 is obscure. Bell was the whip during at least the 63rd Congress (1913–15). He may have been whip for the entire 12 years, or there may have been others, as yet unidentified, who served part of that period.[19]

Oldfield was whip for eight years, serving until his death. McDuffie followed him for four years, resigning after an unsuccessful race for Speaker against Henry Rainey in the 1933 Democratic Caucus. Greenwood also ceased to be whip after an intraparty struggle which resulted in the election of Joseph Byrns to the Speakership. He was replaced by Boland, an important Byrns supporter. Greenwood and Boland built the modern Democratic whip organization in the House in the course of coping with the exigencies of New Deal legislation.

The party whip organizations were initially the product of the close, hardfought party battles of the late 19th Century. By the late 1920s and the beginning of the party battles that predated the New Deal struggles the whips became even more prominent in the House. Both parties were eager to maintain disciplined lines either for or against far-reaching legislation. The top-heavy Democratic majorities of the 1930's began to be plagued by dissenting Southerners and Westerners; defection increased the need for machinery aimed at a high degree of party unity in voting. Republicans desired to produce a united opposition, and needed discipline to participate effectively in their recurrent coalitions with Southern

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[15] In 1919 the old-guard Republicans dominated the Party Conference, to the dismay of more progressive members. Fights over many issues, including the choice of the new whip, occurred in the Conference. See the *New York Times*, March 12, 1919, 1:4. Knutson, the winner, received 118 votes out of 182 cast.

[16] The only reference to Burke as whip I could find was on the floor plan of the Capitol in the *Congressional Directory* for the 63d Congress. For Hamilton see the *Washington Star*, April 1, 1917, 1:2. Hamilton also returned a form to the office of the *Biographical Directory of Congress* in 1928 in which he indicated that he was the Republican whip in the 64th and 65th Congresses. Knutson listed his tenure as whip as the 66th and 67th Congresses, on a similar form. Vestal became whip in 1923, not in 1925 as the *Biographical Directory* states. The files of the *Biographical Directory* indicate that his service as whip began in 1923; so does his obituary in the *Anderson* (*Ind.*) *Daily Bulletin*, April 2, 1932.

[17] See the *Washington Post*, Jan. 10, 1900, 4:5; and the *New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1900, 1:6. Sydney P. Epes of Virginia, who died two months later, was named assistant whip.

[18] Lloyd's service as whip is mentioned in the following places: *Congressional Record*, vol. 90, pt. 3, p. 3420 (1944); the *Hannibal* (*Mo.*) *Courier-Post*, April 4, 1944; and the *Canton* (*Mo.*) *Press-News*, April 4 (?), 1944. James E. Watson, in his memoirs, *As I Knew Them* (Indianapolis, 1936), p. 295, mentions Claude Swanson of Virginia as a Democratic whip. I have found no other substantiation for this, however. Lloyd was the designated Democratic whip during the entire time Watson was the Republican whip. I wish to thank Professor Clarence Berdahl for bringing Lloyd's service to my notice. See Berdahl's articles, "Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 43 (1949), pp. 309–321, 492–508, 721–734, for a treatment of many important facets of party history.

[19] The *Congressional Directory* floor plan of the Capitol for the 63d Congress shows Bell as whip. His obituary in the March 20, 1941, *Gainesville* (*Ga.*) *News* speaks of him as Democratic whip "for a term or two." Berdahl thinks that Bell was whip from 1909 until 1919; I have not been able to substantiate this. Bascom N. Timmons, in his *Garner of Texas* (New York, 1948), pp. 59–60, 61, 64, 74, indicates that John N. Garner was Democratic whip, probably during the 1909–1913 period. I have been unable to find other evidence for this.

Democrats. By 1963 the Democratic whip had a reasonable expectation of succeeding to the floor leadership and even the Speakership.[20]

Gradually the House began to recognize not only the importance of the individuals serving as whips but also the importance of the whips as institutions. From 1911 until the present the Republican whip has had an office in the Capitol, unless he chose to operate from his congressional office. The Democratic whip had an office in the Capitol in the 63d Congress (1913–15) and has had an office there continuously since 1919.[21] Since 1913 the House has provided for at least limited staff help to be appointed by the whips.[22] The sum was to be used for a messenger for each whip until 1947, when provision was also made for two clerks. In 1953 the party whips were given administrative assistants.[23] By 1963 the office of each whip had a budget of about $40,000.[24]

II

The whip organizations of the parties grew in size and complexity through the years of this century. By 1963, on both sides they were large, formal organizations that performed a variety of tasks.

The Republican Organization. John Dwight in 1909–1913 was apparently the first Republican whip to have assistants.[25] There is no evidence that any Republican until Carl Bachmann in 1931 again used assistant whips. Bachmann organized the Republican whip system on essentially the same basis that is still in use. He divided the country into two divisions and appointed Joseph Martin of Massachusetts to be in charge of the Eastern division and Harry Englebright of California to be in charge of the Western division. He also designated a "key man" in each state with Republican members. When a poll of the Republican members was necessary Bachmann asked Martin and Englebright to get reports from the key men about their state delegations.[26] When Englebright became Republican whip in 1933 he retained the pattern of assistant whips (increasing them to three in number) and "key men" in the state delegations.

The Republican whip from 1944 to the present, Les Arends of Illinois, formalized and expanded the key man system. By 1963 he had a deputy whip, three regional whips, and 12 assistant whips. After the chief whip is chosen he has a free hand in appointing all of his assistants. The Republican organization in the First Session of the 88th Congress is summarized in Table II.

The Republican whip organization performs the four functions already mentioned, involving attendance, information, polling, and pressure. The Republican whip keeps records of Republican members' voting on teller votes as well as on roll calls. This the Democratic whip does only informally and sporadically, without notes or records being kept.

The Republicans have developed a different pattern of leadership succession. Joe Martin had been an assistant whip before becoming Minority Leader and then Speaker, but no whip has yet become the Republican floor leader. Similarly, when a Republican Speaker

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[20] This expectation was not a guarantee, however. In 1962 all of the leaders advanced one place after the death of Speaker Rayburn. This provides some precedent but does not establish a pattern. For evidence that Albert's tenure as whip helped lead to his election as Majority Leader see Polsby, in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 246–247. It is customary, especially on the Democratic side, for the floor leader to become Speaker when that office falls vacant.

[21] This statement is based on the floor plans of the Capitol in the *Congressional Directory* for each session. The record may be somewhat incomplete.

[22] This information comes from a perusal of the Legislative Appropriations Acts in the *U. S. Statutes-at-Large.* The title "whip" was first used in the 1913 legislation.

[23] When the Republicans captured the House in the 1952 elections John McCormack was slated to move from Majority Leader to minority whip. He asked Speaker Martin, Majority Leader Halleck, and Minority Leader Rayburn if he might keep one of his long-time employees as Administrative Assistant. He and the Republican whip, Les Arends, then agreed that they both would have Administrative Assistants.

[24] The value of the party whip organizations was widely enough recognized in the House by the late 1950s for a portion of the Democratic membership to imitate the political parties and establish a third whip organization. In 1957 a loose alliance of liberal Democrats was formed in the House under the leadership of Representative Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota. This group immediately established a whip organization, which functioned at least sporadically. In 1959 both the Democratic Study Group and its whip organization were formally established. The Secretary of the DSG also serves as its whip.

[25] See the speech by Majority Floor Leader John Q. Tilson of Connecticut, *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 69, pt. 2, p. 1757 (1928).

[26] Letter from Carl G. Bachmann to the author, August 15, 1963.

TABLE II. REPUBLICAN WHIP ORGANIZATION, 1963
Whip: Leslie C. Arends, Illinois
Deputy Whip: Charles Hoeven, Iowa

Regional and Assistant Whips

Name and State	States in Zone	No. of GOP Members
Regional Whip: Katherine St. George, New York		
William Bates, Mass.	Conn., Mass., N. J., Me., N. H., Vt.	19
Carleton King, N. Y.	New York	21
William Curtin, Pa.	Pa.	14
Regional Whip: Jackson Betts, Ohio		
Elford Cederberg, Mich.	Michigan	11
Jackson Betts, Ohio	Ohio	18
William Van Pelt, Wisc.	Wisc., Minn., Iowa	16
Robert Michel, Ill.	Illinois	14
Richard Roudebush, Ind.	Indiana, Ky., Tenn.	12
Regional Whip: Catherine May, Wash.		
Walter Norblad, Ore.	Ore., Colo., Mont., Utah, Wash., Wyo.	13
Hjalmar Nygaard, N. D.	N. D., S. D., Nebr., Kans., Okla.	13
John Baldwin, Cal.	California	14
William Cramer, Fla.	Fla., Ariz., Md., N. C., Tex., Va., W. Va.	12

has been forced to become Minority Leader the Republican whip has kept his job, rather than surrendering it to the former Majority Leader. Thus Arends remained as whip in both 1949 and 1955 while Halleck lost any formal leadership title.[27] So long as Arends is content to continue indefinitely as whip, without contesting for the Speakership, the succession ladder simply bypasses him. This may be a temporary accident of personality; the test will come after his retirement, when it is seen whether his successor proves to be an aspirant for the Speakership or whether the post has become permanently neutralized.

The Democratic Organization. On the Democratic side Underwood had an assistant whip in 1900. But in the 1921–1928 period Oldfield had no assistant whips. John McDuffie (1929–1933) had two assistants. The great expansion in the whip organization, which had come in 1931 in the Republican Party, came in 1933 for the Democrats under Arthur Greenwood. He organized a system of 15 assistant whips, each responsible for the Democrats in a specific zone. The zones were identical with those established for the Democratic Steering Committee, which was also created in 1933.[28] The Steering Committee withered quickly but the whip zones remained. The initial 15 zones were similar in composition to the present 18 zones.

Greenwood's successor, Pat Boland of Pennsylvania, worked diligently to perfect the functioning of the organization. During his 7-year tenure the press and other Democratic leaders began to take public notice of his operations.[29]

The Democratic deputy whip, who is especially active on the floor in checking attendance and voting, is appointed by the whip.[30] The

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[27] In 1949 Halleck expected Martin to appoint him Deputy Minority Leader and so did not desire to be whip. In 1955 Halleck saw no need to disturb the 11-year tenure of Arends as whip merely for the sake of a title.

[28] Letter from Clarence Cannon to the author, September 23, 1963; Cannon's *Precedents*, vol. 8, pp. 961–962 (1936); and E. Pendleton Herring, "First Session of the Seventy-Third Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 28 (Feb., 1934), p. 69.

[29] See the statement by John McCormack after Boland's death, *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 88, pt. 3, p. 4318, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942). See also the *Washington Star*, August 18, 1935, D-2:6 and June 4, 1936, A-10:1; the *Washington Post*, August 25, 1935, III-3:2; and the *Scranton Times*, May 18, 1942.

[30] The post of deputy whip as a formal leadership position was created in 1955 for Hale Boggs of Louisiana, the present whip. John Moss of Cali-

Democratic assistant whips are either appointed by the dean of the delegations for which they are responsible or they are elected by members of those delegations.[31] Table III summarizes the Democratic whip organization in the First Session of the 88th Congress.

The assistant whips are responsible for a small number of Democrats, averaging between 14 and 15. The whips, or staff members designated by them, make the regular contacts with all of the Democratic members' offices. When the Democratic leadership in the House wishes to transmit information to all Democrats—or elicit information from them—the chief whip's office contacts the 18 assistants. In this way all Democrats can be alerted to come to the floor in 15 to 20 minutes. The leadership can ascertain the sentiments of virtually every Democrat in the House on a given bill in a day or two.[32]

III

The purpose of this section is to analyze the functioning of the Democratic whip organization in the Second Session of the 87th Congress (1962) and the First Session of the 88th (1963)[33], years of great activity for it. The

TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC WHIP ORGANIZATION, 1963

Whip: Hale Boggs, Louisiana
Deputy Whip: John Moss, Cal.

Assistant Whips

Name and State	States in Zone	No. of Dems.	Method of Selection
Torbert Macdonald, Mass.	Mass., Conn., R. I.	14	Election
Abraham Multer, N. Y.	N. Y.	20	Election
George Rhodes, Pa.	Pa.	13	Election
Peter Rodino, N. J.	N. J., Del., Md.	14	Election
Thomas Downing, Va.	Va., N. C.	17	Appointed
John Flynt, Ga.	Ga., S. C.	16	Appointed
James O'Hara, Mich.	Mich., Minn., Wisc.	16	Election
Winfield Denton, Ind.	Indiana	4	Election
Harley Staggers, W. Va.	W. Va., Ohio	10	Election
Robert Everett, Tenn.	Tenn., Ark., Ky.	15	Election
Gillis Long, La.	La., Miss.	13	Election
Don Fuqua, Fla.	Fla., Alabama	18	Election
Frank Karsten, Mo.	Mo., Iowa	9	Election
Dan Rostenkowski, Ill.	Illinois	12	Appointed
Jack Brooks, Tex.	Texas	21	Appointed
Ed Edmondson, Okla.	Oklahoma	5	Election
Thomas Morris, N. M.	N. M., Ariz., Alaska, Colo., Ida., Hawaii, Mont., Nev., Ore., Wash.	17	Appointed
John McFall, Cal.	California	23	Appointed

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fornia became deputy whip in 1962. Boland had a "principal assistant" or "chief assistant" whip, Thomas Ford of California. See the *Washington Star*, August 18, 1935, D-2:6, and *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 88, pt. 3, p. 4320, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942).

[31] Boland apparently appointed his own assistant whips. In 1939 he threatened to "fire" some of them for disloyalty to the President's program. *New York Times*, August 22, 1939, 20:3.

The assistant whips may develop some independent weight in their state delegations. See the chapter by Alan Fiellin in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[32] In the Democratic Study Group the Secretary and whip since its founding has been Frank Thompson of New Jersey. He was elected initially and has continued to be re-elected every two years by the full membership of the DSG, which totalled 126 in 1963. He has appointed four regional whips, each of whom has either four or five regional subwhips reporting to him. The subwhips are responsible for calling from four to six other DSG members.

The DSG whip organization takes no polls on legislation, since the group was formed on the basis of ideological congeniality. The organization distributes information on pending legislation and works for maximum attendance, particularly on teller votes on amendments in Committee of the Whole.

[33] One primary fact determined the time span here studied—the availability of files.

Democratic whip organization, be it remembered, has worked as an arm of the majority party in the House ever since 1933, except for two two-year periods (1947–49 and 1953–55). In the 1930s, as noted above, Boland had greatly expanded its use. Rayburn, on the other hand, who was a strong leader and had never been whip himself, used it less than the weaker Speakers of the 1930s. For example, the whip who served for the longest period under Rayburn, Carl Albert, employed his top staff member on congressional business rather than on whip business.[34]

But in 1962 and 1963 the new Speaker, John McCormack, began to use the whip organization for a greater number of formal polls. McCormack had been whip, as had the new Majority Leader, Albert. Hale Boggs, the new whip, had been deputy whip under Albert. Thus the three top Democrats in the House all appreciated the potentialities of the whip organization—both formal and informal. These three men, joined by D. B. Hardeman, Administrative Assistant to Boggs, and the deputy whip, John Moss, functioned as a small, close-knit group dedicated to attaining the most favorable voting outcomes on Administration bills. This group—not, conspicuously, including the chairman of the Rules Committee—met with White House and Departmental officials on legislative matters throughout 1962 and 1963

The Office of the Democratic Whip was composed of four people—Boggs, Hardeman, a secretary, and an intern—during the entire period studied. The office had a contact—generally a staff member—in the office of each of the 18 assistant whips. Information on poll requests was transmitted by telephone between the whip's office and the offices of the assistant whips. Occasionally the whip's office made contact with all Democratic members of the House directly, either on substantive legislative matters or on attendance needs.[35] The whip's office, located in the Capitol, served as a meeting place for White House and Departmental congressional liaison officials interested in the success of a particular bill.

The whip during these two years was Hale Boggs of Louisiana, a loyal Administration supporter on most matters. The deputy whip, John Moss of California, was even more consistently loyal.[36] The assistant whips, the primary direct contacts with rank and file Democratic members, varied considerably in their voting loyalty to the Administration. Table IV shows the support they gave the Administration on the 17 votes chosen for analysis here,[37] together with the support given by all Democrats in each whip zone on these same votes. In general, the assistant whips tend to be more loyal to the Administration than all Democrats, and variations in their individual loyalty tend to reflect the normal variations by zone.[38]

The problem of "disloyal" assistant whips is troublesome. The power to appoint and replace them rests exclusively with the Democratic delegations involved. But even if the whip had the power to remove assistant whips the roll-call voting record of the assistants would not be an infallible test. For example, in

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[34] This is not to suggest that Albert was not important as whip. Rayburn consulted him, but the whip organization as a whole was used less than in 1962–1963. It should be noted that when Albert became whip he replaced Percy Priest, who decided not to continue as whip in 1955 because he had become Chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. *Cong. Rec.*, Vol. 101, pt. 1, pp. 191–192 (1955).

[35] An unusual instance of this occurred in the drive for adjournment in October, 1962, when the leadership was having difficulty in keeping a quorum in Washington. The whip's office called or sent telegrams to all missing Democrats from east of the Mississippi at their homes, asking them to return. A similar situation, even more acute, developed in 1963 after President Kennedy's assassination, as the House struggled until Christmas eve to pass a foreign aid appropriations bill acceptable to President Johnson.

[36] For the 87th Congress *Congressional Quarterly* reports that Boggs had a 73 per cent and Moss a 91 per cent Kennedy Support Score.

[37] See footnote 40, *infra*, for a listing of the votes chosen.

[38] This evidence that assistant whips were more loyal (hence, more liberal) should be compared with Duncan MacRae's suggestion that elected party leaders tend to take middle-of-the-road positions on issues. MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), ch. 4.

The *Congressional Quarterly* study of the whips, *op. cit.*, p. 994, concludes that in terms of Democratic party support for the first half of the 1961 session "The performance of the whips was matched roughly by that of the membership as whole . . . " David Truman, *The Congressional Party*, p. 227, attributes some of the influence of the principal whips in the House to "their individual positions in the voting structure of the party." Donald Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, 1960), suggests that the Senate whips tend to fall off in party-line voting.

TABLE IV. VOTING OF DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANT WHIPS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR ZONES, 1962–1963

Part I: Per cent support of Administration on 17 key roll calls

States in Whip Zone	1962		1963	
	Assistant Whip	All Zone Members	Assistant Whip	All Zone Members
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Mass., Conn., R. I.	100	95	100	97
N. Y.	100	95	100	97
Pa.	100	98	90	95
N. J., Del., Md.	100	92	100	99
*Va., N. C.	43	53	60	56
Ga., S. C.	86	62	89	74
Mich., Wisc., Minn.	100	97	100	97
Ind.	100	96	100	97
W. Va., Ohio	57	83	100	93
Tenn., Ky., Ark.	71	81	90	90
*Miss., La.	86	41	100	53
*Alabama, Fla.	67	62	78	70
Mo., Iowa	100	80	100	81
*Illinois	100	98	100	98
*Texas	29	51	100	70
Okla. (Kan. & Mont. in 1962)	100	78	90	90
Wash., Ore., Alaska, Hawaii, Ariz., N. M., Utah, Colo., Ida., Nev. (Mont. in 1963)	67	86	100	92
California	100	98	100	97
Average	84	79	94	85

Part II: Per cent support of specific legislation

Year and Legislation	Support by all Assistant Whips	Support by all Democrats
1962:	(%)	(%)
Urban Affairs	61	55
Tax Bill	94	86
Debt Limit	89	84
Farm Bill	78	81
Trade Expansion Act	89	83
Public Works	89	82
U. N. Bonds	87	81
1963:		
Rules Committee	83	81
Public Works Appropriation	94	86
Medical Student Loans	95	87
Feed Grains Program	93	88
Debt Limit (May)	100	87
Area Redevelopment	83	77
Debt Limit (August)	100	93
Tax Bill	100	90
Debt Limit (November)	100	85
Cotton Bill	93	79

* Assistant whip changed during the two-year period.

1962 one assistant whip supported the Administration only rarely and yet did an excellent job as assistant whip, not only in reporting accurately but also in indicating the weak point of each member through which he might be induced to change his mind and support the Administration on a given bill. Loyalty is less important than accuracy and thoroughness. The Democratic assistant whips are expected to perform the functions involving attendance, information, and polling but they have a great deal of discretion in deciding whether they also wish to pressure their zone members to vote the Administration position.[39]

An analysis of how the Democratic whip organization performed these four main functions in dealing with the major legislation the House acted on in 1962 and 1963 will form the bulk of this section. "Major legislation" here indicates those measures on which the House leadership decided a poll should be taken, on which the poll was taken and completed, and on which the House acted either favorably or unfavorably by roll-call vote. This definition includes seven bills in 1962 and ten in 1963.[40]

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[39] The Republicans, starting with a base of greater party agreement on issues, look on their assistant whips as definite agents of the leadership. The method of appointment for Republican assistant whips—by the chief whip himself—insures some accountability to the leadership. On the Democratic side Boggs obviously cannot assume that the assistant whip appointed by Howard Smith will be an avid Administration supporter.

Boggs summarized the job of assistant whip in a telegram to the *Shreveport* (*La.*) *Times* in the fall of 1963: "The assistant whips keep members in their zones informed as to which bills will be scheduled for a vote and when. On a request from the House leadership, they ascertain how each member in their zone will vote on a specific measure, and report the results to the leadership. When important bills are being considered by the House, they try to make sure that the members from their zone are present for key votes. The assistant whips are responsible solely to their party colleagues in their zones. The executive branch has absolutely no voice in either selecting or removing assistant whips."

[40] The specific issues in 1962 were: (1) final passage of the resolution disapproving the reorganization plan which would have created an Urban Affairs Department, (2) final passage of the 1962 Revenue Act, (3) final passage of an increase in the national debt limit, (4) recommittal motion on the feed-grains section of the farm bill, (5) recommittal motion substituting a one-year extension of reciprocal trade for the Trade Expansion Act, (6) recommittal motion on the accelerated public works bill, and (7) final passage

The 17 votes include 14 which the Administration won (11 by close margins) and three which the Administration lost (two by close margins).[41]

The first function of the whip organization is to insure maximum Democratic attendance on the floor when critical votes are taken. Getting this is a matter both of keeping the members in Washington and getting them to the House chamber when the vote comes. To this end, the whip's office uses a variation of a poll called an attendance check. In this procedure the assistant whips simply ask the members if they will be in town "next Wednesday" or "next Wednesday and next Thursday." Answers to these questions tell the whip which members should be asked to change their plans and stay in town. Or, if the leadership has a choice in scheduling it can estimate on which one of two or three days the attendance and absence situation will work most in the Administration's favor.

On the day of a vote on the floor the whip's office checks its attendance poll against the absentees on the first quorum call of the day to indicate what members need to be called or may need pairs. The whip's office is particularly anxious to arrange live pairs—whereby an anti-Administration vote actually present is nullified by an absent pro-Administration vote. As the time of the vote or votes approaches, whip calls go out from the whip's office, specifying what is being voted on and indicating that the Speaker, Majority Leader, and whip desire the member's presence on the floor.[42]

The whip's office goes to great lengths to guarantee the presence of members on crucial votes. In April, 1963, votes on a medical student loan provision and on the feed-grains program were scheduled for the same week. The whip's office called one Democratic member who was on the West Coast to make a long-scheduled speech and arranged for her to fly back for the votes. It reached another member touring his district with the Argentine Ambassador and asked him to return to Washington. In the May, 1963, fight over increasing the limit on the national debt the whip's office was instrumental in arranging for two Democrats to attend the session in wheel chairs. Occasionally, faulty timing lost a vote. In the June, 1963, vote on the Area Redevelopment Act amendments, a member was told that the vote would be taken about two hours later than it actually came. Consequently he was at the Washington Airport when his vote was needed.

The promotion of optimum attendance can also involve some selectivity. On the day of the Area Redevelopment vote in 1963 the Air Force was scheduled to take 19 members to an air show in Paris. The whip's office called the Air Force to get assurances that the plane

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of the bill authorizing the President to purchase U. N. bonds.

The specific issues in 1963 were: (1) adoption of the resolution permanently enlarging the Rules Committee, (2) passage of an amendment to a supplemental appropriations bill adding $450 million to the accelerated public works program, (3) recommittal motion deleting medical student loan provisions from the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act, (4) final passage of an increase in the national debt limit, (5) final passage of a bill authorizing a voluntary feed-grains acreage diversion program for 1964–1965, (6) final passage of Area Redevelopment Act amendments, (7) final passage of a second debt-limit extension, (8) recommittal motion on the tax bill making a tax cut dependent on reduced governmental spending, (9) final passage of a third debt-limit extension, and (10) final passage of the cotton bill.

The recommittal motion on the 1963 tax bill did not fully meet the stated criteria, because part of the poll on the recommittal motion was taken through the Democratic members of the Commitee on Ways and Means. The 15 zones used by these men when acting as the Democratic Committee on Committees were also employed in this poll and the results were channeled first to Chairman Mills and then to the whip's office. Aside from this significant deviation, however—a display of Mills's independent power—the whip's office performed its normal functions during this struggle. Since the bill was one of the most important to the Administration and the House leadership in 1963, an accurate picture of the whip system could hardly be given without including it here.

A few examples in the text will come from whip operations on bills other than the 17 listed above.

[41] The three lost were Urban Affairs and the farm bill in 1962 and the Area Redevelopment Act amendments in 1963. The phrase "close margin" means roll calls on which a change of 25 votes or less would alter the result. Urban Affairs, the recommittal motion on the trade bill, and U. N. bonds were not "close" in 1962. Only the medical student loan provisions was not "close" in 1963. Nine of the 17 voting results could have been changed by a shift of 15 or fewer votes.

[42] The Majority Manager of Telephones on the floor also instructs his operators to call each member's office when a vote is near but the operators do not specify what is at issue.

would not leave until one hour after the final vote on the bill. Then it got word to the six Democratic members known to be friendly to the bill who were also scheduled to go on the trip and let them know this, so as to insure their presence on the floor.

In the August, 1963, debt-limit fight the whip's office was especially active in working on attendance. Democrats friendly to the bill and not answering the quorum call on the day before the vote received telegrams from Boggs urging them, in the Speaker's name, "to make every effort to be present Thursday . . . " for the vote. On the day of the vote the whip's office called the offices of 15 Democratic members who had not answered the quorum call that morning. Despite the previous stress on attendance seven of these members had absented themselves without informing the leadership.

In late August, 1963, there was a long, bitter floor fight over the foreign aid authorization bill. The whip organization made a concerted effort to get all Democrats to the floor and keep them there; a series of teller votes was anticipated on Wednesday and Thursday. On Tuesday a meeting held in the whip's office was attended by all but one of the assistant whips (or their representatives), the Democratic House leadership, Executive liaison personnel, Undersecretary of State Harriman and AID Administrator Bell. Harriman and Bell explained the provisions of the bill and the necessity of defeating crippling amendments. The leadership stressed that all assistant whips should be on the floor during the entire voting period (which consumed 10 to 12 hours) and should keep track of the members from their zones. The appeal was effective to the extent that all 18 assistant whips were on the floor during both days of teller votes. Yet two early votes were lost because of absentees and thus a whip call directed at friendly assistant whips (15 of the 18 on this issue) stressed the necessity of winning the first teller vote on the next day.

The attendance in voting on the tax bill in 1963 was almost perfect. On the most important vote (on the Republican recommittal motion) only one Democrat was unexpectedly absent. The other four Democratic absentees had been identified for several days; three of them were in the hospital. Special efforts were made to get everyone else. For example, two Democrats flew back from a conference abroad specifically for the vote.

No statistical measure can judge *precisely* the effect of the Democratic whip organization on attendance for roll call votes. Yet some inferences can be drawn from a few figures.[43] On the 17 bills in these two sessions on which the whip organization was fully active total Democratic voting attendance was 94 per cent. This can be compared with the Democratic attendance on all roll calls: 83 per cent in 1962 and 84 per cent in 1963.[44] This higher attendance was partially a function of the importance of the bills. Yet the specific instances recounted above suggest that the whip organization had some marginal effect in producing a high voting turnout.

The second function of the whip's office is providing information to Democratic members on pending measures. At the most mechanical level the whip's office is responsible for informing all Democrats what is scheduled for floor action week by week. But the office also provides information more directly related to legislation which is highly important to the Administration and to the House leadership. In May, 1963, during the struggle over the increase in the debt limit the whip organization distributed sheets of information on what the defeat of such an increase would mean to the country and to all Democratic members. A more neutral communication was sent to all Democrats directly from the whip's office with reference to the June, 1963, Area Redevelopment amendments. The content of this letter was an outline explanation of the provisions of the bill. A similar letter—signed by Albert and Boggs—was sent in connection with the cotton bill late in the 1963 session.

In 1963, prior to the passage of the foreign aid authorization bill, an effort at informing the assistant whips on specific features of the program was made at the meeting described above. As a result of the meeting, AID prepared two memoranda which were then distributed to the assistant whips through the whip's office.

Before the voting on the tax bill in 1963 the whip's office was instrumental in helping Chairman Mills distribute a short summary of the bill to all Democratic members. It was accompanied by a brief letter urging support for final passage and defeat of the recommittal motion because "this bill is essential to our national well-being." The letter was signed by Mills, the Speaker, Albert, and Boggs.

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[43] The *Congressional Quarterly* study of the first half of 1961, *op. cit.*, pp. 993–994, documents the high voting turnout in that session and suggests the whip organizations might be part of the cause.

[44] The assistant whips had attendance records much like those of all Democrats on all roll calls, but on the 17 key votes they did somewhat better than the rank and file. In 1962 the assistant whips voted 83.4 per cent of the time on all roll calls and 84.7 per cent in 1963. But on the 17 key votes their voting attendance rose to 96 per cent.

The third function of the whip's office is to ascertain how the Democratic members of the House will vote on certain pieces of legislation central to the Administration's program.[45] The principal device used to get this information is the poll. The whip's office does not take a poll until the leadership decides one is needed. This comes usually some time after the bill has been reported from the committee and before it is scheduled for floor action. Ordinarily, then, the poll must be completed within a period lasting from two days to two weeks. Naturally the longer time periods produce greater accuracy in results. Likewise, the more clear and specific the question asked of the members the more accurate the result. If the legislation is extremely complex a simple response for or against the bill may hide important feelings about amendments. The most effective assistant whips probe the sentiments of their membership about specific provisions. If a current of opinion develops against a certain feature, the legislation may be changed in time to save it from defeat. In 1963 a poll was started on a bill extending the Export-Import Bank and allowing it to continue direct or "backdoor" borrowing from the Treasury. The initial poll results revealed a strong feeling against backdoor financing and the Banking and Currency Committee changed the bill to eliminate it.

The question the assistant whips are to ask members is precisely framed, since ambiguous questions produce ambiguous answers. It is not always on the final passage of the legislation. Often it is on the recommittal motion to be offered by the Republicans, if the "instructions" in this motion can be discovered in advance of the vote. At other times a specific amendment is the subject of a poll.

The results of the poll are supplemented by and checked with officials from the White House and the Executive Department involved, and occasionally group lobbyists provide some information. Without a sensitive and knowledgeable interpreter of the poll data the results could be highly misleading. Fortunately for the Democratic leadership such an interpreter was in charge of the office during the period studied. He could tell when a report from a member was of dubious validity and when it could be accepted at face value.[46] He had a "feel" for contacting the proper members.

How accurate were the final poll results which were submitted to the leadership? Accuracy is important because decisions about provisions in the bill, scheduling the bill for floor action, and attempts to change Democratic votes are based partially on these results. To judge the accuracy of the whip poll the final complete poll presented to the leadership usually two days before the vote—which still left time for any of the actions indicated above—was checked, individual by individual, against the final roll call embodying the issue on which the poll had been taken. The results are summarized in Table V, to show the percentage of members reported correctly by the poll and also the number reported correctly and incorrectly and the number whose positions could not be ascertained. Evidently the whip's office increased in accuracy in 1963 as compared with 1962. Apparently the refinement of techniques and the lessons of experience were put to good use.

Probably the most important use for the poll results is in helping the leadership determine where to apply pressure. Meetings of the Speaker, Majority Leader, whip, Administrative Assistant to the whip, deputy whip, White House and Departmental liaison officials, and the relevant Committee Chairman begin during a period between three weeks and three days before a bill comes to the floor. At these meetings a division of labor is made, on the basis of the whip poll. Thus a more thorough and accurate poll produces fewer wasted contacts and enhances the probability that the contacts that are made will be with members who may be persuaded.

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[45] The Democratic whip's office also relays to the leadership whatever information it receives about Republican voting probabilities. Such information may come from lobbyists, Executive officials, or personal contacts between Democratic and Republican members. The Republican and Democratic whips' offices do not, of course, trade information.

Information on Republican voting tends to be quite unreliable when it reaches the Democratic whip's office. For example, during the debt-limit fight in May, 1963, it was supposed that at least eight to 10 Republicans would vote for the increase. Only one did. When the Administration lost the Area Redevelopment bill in June, 1963, the whip's office had received information that 21 Republicans would vote for the bill. Only 15 did. During the 1963 struggle over enlarging the Rules Committee six Republicans who finally voted with the Democratic leadership had been written off as lost to Halleck and Judge Smith.

[46] There are several reasons for a member's making an inaccurate report of his position. He might want to avoid leadership pressure by not alerting anyone to his opposition. He might be annoyed at the inconvenience of repeatedly reporting his position. Finally, he might use the report of opposition as a bargaining device. For example, on the poll on the debt limit increase in May, 1963, a loyal Administration supporter from the midwest reported "doubtful" and, at the same time, indicated his eagerness for final Treasury confirmation that a new Internal Revenue Service installation would be located in his district.

TABLE V. ACCURACY OF DEMOCRATIC WHIP POLLS, 1962–1963

	Per cent Correct	Number Correct	Number Incorrect	Number Unknown
1962:	(%)			
Urban Affairs	87	226	15	19
Tax Bill	81	212	26	23
Debt Limit	90.5	237	18	7
Farm Bill	82.5	216	36	10
Trade Expansion	92	241	15	6
Public Works	87.5	228	23	10
U. N. Bonds	87	227	24	10
1963:				
Rules Committee	97	247	2	8
Public Works Approp.	91	233	8	15
Medical Student Loans	94	240	0	16
Feed Grains	84	214	16	26
Debt Limit (May)	93	239	9	8
Area Redevelopment	91	232	17	6
Debt Limit (August)	85	218	32	6
Tax Bill*	96	246	6	4
Debt Limit (Nov.)	92	235	19	2
Cotton Bill	84	214	34	8

* Not formally a whip organization poll. See footnote 40, *supra*.

This fourth function of the whip's office—that of directing pressure—is, in some ways, the most important of the four. The goal of the office is, after all, to produce votes for the President's program. There is no precise systematic or statistical way of charting the effectiveness of this whip-guided pressure, since the ultimate test would compare what happened with what might otherwise have happened.[47] But an indication of some incidents involving the legislation studied in this article will give a sample of the work done and its effectiveness.

The whip's office was effective in 1962 in identifying the trouble spots on the tax bill of that year. One particularly dangerous area was the New York delegation, which was finally brought into line, with the loss of only three votes. Several Southern delegations were initially opposed to the bill but a caucus of the North Carolina delegation, together with the effective work of the assistant whip for Texas, helped hold Southern losses on the bill to 15 votes. At the last minute, during the floor debate, the secretary in the whip's office discovered that some of the members from a midwestern state might be wavering in their support for the bill. This message was transmitted to Boggs on the floor and he proceeded to escort one of the delgation's members to the Speaker's office where both the Speaker and the President (on the telephone) convinced him that he should support the bill.

During the 1962 prelude to the vote on increasing the national debt limit the whip's office was instrumental in enlisting Francis Walter of Pennsylvania to use some of his credit with the Southerners to convince one major Southern delegation to vote for the bill. As a result, only three Democrats from that state voted nay.

During the week of June 25, 1962, the whip poll began to show that the Republican motion to recommit the trade bill with instructions to continue the reciprocal trade agreements program for another year might attract as many as 80 Democratic votes. Frantic activity on the part of the President, Chairman Mills of the Ways and Means Committee, Secretaries Goldberg and Hodges and Undersecretaries Wirtz and Price, the Speaker, Majority Leader, whip, and others on Tuesday and Wednesday of that week reduced the eventual Democratic losses on the recommittal motion on Thursday to 44.

During the 1963 Rules Committee fight, after the whip poll was relatively complete, the Speaker, Majority Leader, and whip each took a list of doubtful members to call. Of the 17 called about their vote seven finally voted with the leadership.

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[47] Conceivably, some inferences might be drawn from a comparison of the winning percentage on roll calls used by *Congressional Quarterly* in computing its Presidential Support Index with the Administration's record of success on the key votes analyzed here. The question could be put whether the President won a greater percentage of the time when the Democratic whip organization was fully engaged in the battle. On the 17 key votes the President won 14 times—82 per cent support—as against an overall 85 per cent winning record (on 60 roll calls) in 1962. From this it might be argued that the whip organization made no material difference, since the winning percentages are about the same. But it might also be argued that since the roll calls used here represent the "toughest" of the more numerous roll calls chosen by *Congressional Quarterly* the winning percentage is higher than could be expected without concentrated whip activity.

The events leading up to the passage of the debt-limit increase in May, 1963, provide another illustration of the use made of the information supplied by the whip poll. At a meeting five days before the vote the results of the poll were discussed. During this meeting the Speaker, Majority Leader, and Larry O'Brien of the White House called and talked to several members about either their opposition or their possible absence. Those members still considered doubtful or open to persuasion were divided among the leadership for further work. Chairman Mills asked that the latest whip poll be given to him the day before the vote so that postponement of the bill could still be announced if it appeared that defeat were likely. A week before the final vote the Speaker had seen an early version of the poll and, on the basis of that, persuaded six members reporting doubtful to commit themselves to voting for the bill. By the time of the floor action the poll indicated that the vote would be extremely close. Armed with that information the leadership secured promises from 13 Democrats who were planning to vote against the legislation that they would vote for it if their votes were needed to change defeat into victory.[48]

The passage of the second debt-limit increase of 1963, in August, was the occasion for a substantial amount of whip-directed activity. The Secretary of the Treasury persuaded one Southern Democrat to vote for the increase after the whip poll had shown him to be vacillating. The Speaker contacted 15 wavering Democrats directly and, as a result, persuaded 10 of them to vote for the bill. Chairman Mills was especially effective in getting Southerners to vote for the bill. Again, as in May, the leadership had ten "pocket votes," that is, men who preferred to vote nay but would vote aye if necessary to pass the bill.[49]

In summary, the whip's office performs its four functions in such a way as to enhance the chances of Democratic victories on floor votes in the House. No absolute figures can be given on votes won that would otherwise be lost. Yet the weight of evidence is that the efforts to insure a maximum attendance, to inform the Democratic membership of undesirable effects on the country if an Administration proposal is defeated, to ascertain voting expectations with great accuracy in advance, and to direct pressure to the precise spots where it will do the most good, result in some small, yet definite, net gains for the Democratic majority in the House.

IV

David Truman has commented that "the persistent reality of party in the functioning of the [House] chamber is unmistakable."[50] Julius Turner stated that "Party pressure seems to be more effective than any other pressure on congressional voting."[51] Yet neither they nor any other commentators on Congress using primarily statistical indices based on roll call votes have been able to be more specific about the nature of party activity in the House. The indices describe the *results* of the activity. But the *activity itself*—the "reality" of Truman or the "pressure" of Turner—cannot be caught by indices of votes.

The whip organizations are at the core of party activity in the House, particularly on the Democratic side. Thus the data here presented on the whip organizations are also data on parties in the House. They can be analyzed to provide a considerable range of generalizations about party activity in the House. Some of the generalizations which follow are quite speculative and demand much more research. Others come closer to being fully supported by the data on the whips.

1. The Democratic whip organization has become the focus of a corporate or collegial leadership in the House. Truman concluded that the evidence provided by record votes shows no collegial leadership,[52] although he indicated that the individual elective leaders in each party showed somewhat more unity. But observation of the Democratic whip organization suggests that the pattern of leadership in 1962 and 1963 was for the Speaker, Majority Leader, whip, deputy whip, and relevant committee chairman to work closely together in the effort to pass a given piece of legislation. To expect a greater degree of corporate leadership—including *all* major committee chairmen on every separate piece of major legislation—is unrealistic. Each chair-

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[48] Three of the 13 voted with the leadership even though they were not ultimately needed. The other 10 voted nay but remained on the floor after voting, ready to change their votes if necessary.

[49] Seven of these 10, largely at the urging of Mills, voted aye even though not needed. Mills was anxious to have a respectably large margin of victory. He was trying to set a precedent for November, when another debt limit increase would be necessary.

[50] Truman, "The State Delegations . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 1045.

[51] Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[52] Truman, *The Congressional Party*, p. 245.

man has time to be concerned only about the legislation produced by his committee. The major missing participant during the period of this study, whom one would expect to find in a collegial leadership because he has a legitimate interest in all major legislation, is the Chairman of the Committee on Rules.[53]

2. Truman found that the voting structure of the parties in Congress "was focused upon one or a pair of positions: the Floor Leaders, joined at times, particularly on the Democratic side, by the Whips and, among the House Democrats, impliedly by the Speaker."[54] For House Democrats the operation of the whip organization helps explain why this focus is not mere coincidence. Even if the assistant whips do not uniformly "pressure" the members of their zones they do inform them of the voting preferences of the Speaker, Majority Leader, and whip. This information, as universally distributed to all Democrats, is one of the "triggers" which Bauer, Pool, and Dexter discuss.[55]

3. Truman suggests that the majority party has a natural basis for greater coherence than the minority party.[56] The Democratic whip organization, coordinated with the leadership offered by the President, helped the House Democrats to cohere on the major votes in 1962–1963. Similarly, the whip organization is an important institutional device for helping the House leadership perform a mediating role between the President and the rank and file Democratic membership. The elected legislative leaders of the President's party have a stake in his success in the House. The whip organization has a similar stake and also provides machinery for improving the President's chances.[57]

4. An important function of the Democratic whip organization is the carrying and recording of various bargains struck between party members on legislative matters. Within whip zones and even between whip zones both explicit and implicit bargains[58] are made between individual members. The whip organization then provides a framework for channeling the information on the bargains to a more central location—either the ship's office or the relevant Committee Chairman or one of the leaders individually. The transmission of information is incomplete but it is more complete than totally unorganized gossip.

5. The operations of the Democratic whip organization, especially of the sort noted in points 2 and 4 above, suggest that information can be as important and as effective as "pressure" of the classic mold. Information about legislation and about the intentions of individual legislators can be used to cue voting behavior favorable to the President and the leadership.[59]

6. The growth in the strength, complexity, and importance of both party whip organizations in this century suggests a growing sense of party solidarity within the House. The whip organizations now involve 16 Republicans and 20 Democrats directly. These 36 men and women have made a commitment of time—which members of the House must necessarily hoard—to work for their respective parties within the House. Unless they felt that party work was worth doing a sufficient number of such commitments, of a desirable calibre, might not be forthcoming.

7. The history of the party whip organizations suggests that the importance of the whip partly depends on the mode of leadership exercised by the Speaker or Minority Leader, and secondarily on the role of the Rules Committee Chairman. Strong, solitary leaders like Rayburn have relied less on the whip than leaders who seek and need the active help of others. Leaders with fewer resources, like McCormack and Halleck, necessarily rely more on others in the leadership circle—including the whip and his organization.

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[53] Truman's reference to "the ambiguity surrounding the term 'the leadership' " (*ibid.*, p. 282) is also to the point here. "The leadership" is a fairly precise term when used in connection with a specific piece of legislation. It always includes the Speaker, Majority Leader, whip, and Committee Chairman. It may include the deputy whip, a Subcommittee Chairman, or a senior Committee member who is going to act as floor manager of the bill.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

[55] Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York, 1963), p. 466.

[56] Truman, *The Congressional Party,* p. 278.

[57] See *ibid.*, ch. 8.

[58] On implicit bargaining see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *People and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962), pp. 55–56.

[59] Again this coincides with the findings of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, *op. cit.* The importance of information is highlighted by Charles Clapp, *The Congressman* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1963). He reports, p. 302, that criticism of both party whip organizations by House members centers "around the failure to perform the informing function." Lewis Anthony Dexter, in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 312 ff., discusses "the tyranny of information" in another context.

8. The contrast between the place of the Democratic whip organization and the Republican whip organization in 1962–1963 provides material for broader generalizations about the differences between the two parties in the House. The Democratic whip in these years was firmly lodged in a three-man leadership circle. His influence was great and his prospects for eventual advancement to Majority Leader were good. The Republican whip, however, would never obtain another leadership post. In addition, he had to work not only with the Minority Leader but also subject to the decisions of the 35-man Republican Policy Committee, of which he was but one member.[60] The majority leadership appeared to be substantially more compact than the minority leadership.

9. At the same time several features of the two party whip organizations suggest that the customary characterization of the Democratic Party in the House as a loose coalition of disparate groups without much central allegiance and of the Republican Party in the House as a closely-knit body of men dedicated to common principles may be at least partially correct. The Democratic assistant whips are regarded primarily as informing agents rather than as pressuring agents, although individual assistant whips may on occasion choose to pressure their zone members. The Democratic whip's office keeps no systematic voting records with which to confront the less loyal members. The Republican assistant whips, however, are expected to work for a solid Republican vote in accord with the dictates of the Policy Committee. The Republican whip's office keeps voting records, even on teller votes, so that the whip may berate the goats and praise the sheep when the occasion demands. The method of selection of the assistant whips is also an important difference. The Democratic whip is presented with assistants he may not want. The Republican whip picks his own assistants.[61]

In short, the data suggest that a change is necessary in the typical description of the House which attributes, in the words of Professor Bone, "no consistently great influence in policy directing or in establishing party accountability for legislative program" to the party machinery.[62] As important pieces of party machinery the whip organizations possess such influence. How great and how consistent the influence, are still open questions. This article has attempted to provide some tentative answers to those questions.

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[60] See the forthcoming book by Charles Jones on the House Republican Policy Committee.

[61] The voting records of the 1963 Republican and Democratic assistant whips over the previous two years indicate that each party organization had a similar number of "mavericks." Five Democratic assistant whips had a mean Larger Federal Role Support Score 22.6% lower than the mean Support Score of all 16 assistant whips who had been members of the 87th Congress. Five Republican regional and assistant whips had a mean Larger Federal Role Support Score 23% higher than the mean Support Score of all 14 regional and assistant whips who had been members of the 87th Congress. The Support Scores for individual members come from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* for 1962.

Both the Republican and Democratic assistant whips had served, on the average, slightly more than nine years in the House by the end of 1963.

[62] Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System* (New York, 1955), p. 597.

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON FOREIGN AID, 1939–1958

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Recent applications of more elaborate quantitative methods (*e.g.*, bloc cluster analysis and Guttman scale procedures) to legislative politics have sharply improved the ability of political scientists to specify significant dimensions of voting behavior.[1] Party affiliation, constituency characteristics and cohesion within state delegations have been correlated with the congressional vote in a number of subject matter areas. Because of the masses of data to be handled, however, even the best of these studies have been limited in scope to a single year or to one Congress.[2] This restriction has not prevented the authors of these works from demonstrating clearly the utility of their methodology, but it has limited correspondingly either the generality or the reliability of their conclusions.[3] The present study, limited to the single issue of congressional voting on foreign aid, is an attempt to discover, by the application of quantitative methods to votes over longer time periods, how far the relationships previously suggested persist over time or are peculiar to the individual sessions in which they occur.

I. THE STUDY DESIGN

To introduce a longer time perspective, four Congresses—the 76th (1939–40), the 80th (1947–48), the 83rd (1953–54), and the 85th (1957–58)—were examined originally. Since the issue posed for the 76th Congress, the repeal of the arms embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act, differs to a degree from the Mutual Security Act (or its successors) which confronted the three subsequent Congresses, the 77th Congress (1941–42), which saw the Lend-Lease Act passed, was also analyzed. Lend-Lease is more like the postwar foreign aid programs in that it directly committed American economic resources, at public expense, to the defense of the "free" world. Thus, a major "foreign aid" decision was taken in each of the Congresses selected for study.[4]

The second criterion for the selection of these particular Congresses was the relation of the presidency and Congress. A number of studies have suggested that the voting configurations in Congress are influenced by the status that a party enjoys as majority or minority there, with or without a President in the White House.[5] The Congresses enumerated above were chosen to take this factor into account; they exemplify the major alternatives among the possible relationships between White House and Congress. Thus the 76th and 77th Congresses faced a Democratic President with a Democratic majority on the Hill; in the 80th Congress, a Democratic President confronted a Republican congressional majority; and the 83rd and 85th Congresses found a GOP Chief Executive with his party first in the majority and then reduced to minority status. This sample should permit greater confidence in findings that withstand changes in the party balance and control of the presidency.

The foreign aid roll calls in the House of Representatives have been analyzed through the use of Guttman scale procedures. The House was chosen in preference to the Senate because the congressional districts, being demographically more homogeneous than entire states, seemed better suited to test the association between constituency characteristics and voting behavior. The Guttman techniques of cumulative scaling were employed because of their proven capacity to specify general evaluative dimensions upon which the representatives judge proposals as they come before the House.[6] On the basis of scale scores, the members of the House were classified as "isolationists" (*e.g.*, those whose votes indicate a reluctance to expand the size or scope of the American foreign aid program), "moderates," and "internationalists" (*e.g.*, those who, by their votes, supported the maintenance of the program at the most extensive possible levels).[7] The natural breaks in the frequency distribution of scale scores determined the cutting points between classes; in each case the distribution was tri-modal.

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[1] See David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959) and Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958).

[2] The Truman and MacRae studies both examined the 81st Congress (1949–50); in addition, each treated the parties separately.

[3] As Truman recognizes, *op. cit.*, pp. viii, 10–12.

[4] The 76th Congress will be retained in the analysis both because the arms embargo repeal is related in content to the issues of the other sessions and because the near unanimity of party positions during the 76th Congress permits utilization of the arms embargo repeal vote as a base against which to note the subsequent breakdown of party solidarity on foreign aid.

[5] See for example Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), pp. 54–58; and Mark Kesselman, "Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (1961), pp. 284–289.

The three groups of legislators were analyzed in terms of party affiliation and three types of demographic variables. First, the association of certain personal characteristics of the individual congressmen with their voting on foreign aid was examined. These attributes included educational attainment, occupation prior to election, religious affiliation, and prior service in the armed forces. Then, a set of "political" characteristics, including length of service in the House, committee service, and electoral margin, were related to votes on foreign aid. Finally, a number of constituency characteristics—region, ethnicity, ruralism, socio-economic status, and educational level—were correlated with positions on the foreign aid issue.[8] This paper will attempt to describe the isolationists and internationalists in terms of these types of variables.

II. THE FINDINGS

Since political party has been, in the words of Turner, "more closely associated with congressional voting behavior than any other discernible factor,"[9] it may be worth while at the outset to examine the relationship of party affiliation to the vote on foreign aid. The data in Table I indicate that the party factor is less constant than the observation just quoted suggests; in fact, over the period under consideration here, a striking change took place. In the 76th Congress, the parties were ranged with near unanimity on opposite sides of the question; in the 77th and 80th Congresses, a few members of each party broke ranks; and by 1958 no statistically significant difference (by the Chi Square test at the .05 level of confidence) between the parties remained. The Republicans in the 85th Congress provided a proportionately greater share of their votes to the internationalist cause.

This finding is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it shows that the collapse of party solidarity began before, rather than after, World War II. Immediately after the 1940 election, a few Republicans crossed party lines to vote for an internationalist program while at the same time a handful of Democrats bolted and opposed Lend-Lease. Thus, while the war and the end of the Roosevelt era may have accelerated the change, the break-down of party unanimity cannot be attributed solely to these factors. Second, while the long-run development can be explained in terms of a number of factors—for example, the election of a Republican President, of an internationalist bent, which increased the pressures on G.O.P. legislators to back the foreign aid program; the simultaneous decline in the effectiveness of pulls from the executive on the Democrats; and the changing character of the American South which in turn led to increased fiscal conservatism and isolationism among representatives

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS

Party and voting position*	Congress				
	76th	77th	80th	83d	85th
Republicans	%	%	%	%	%
Isolationists	81.9	84.0	24.4	36.7	36.8
Internationalists	0.0	6.2	14.4	55.2	54.9
Democrats					
Isolationists	0.0	4.1	3.1	13.4	29.8
Internationalists	79.8	89.1	65.6	72.2	47.1

* For the sake of simplicity, the moderate groups, and those who were not scalable, are omitted from the table. Thus the percentages for each party do not add to 100%. The percentage of moderates for each Congress is as follows: Republicans, 1.7, 8.6, 52.4, 4.5, 5.4; Democrats, 8.4, 0.0, 20.0, 11.1, 20.6. The percentages for the not scalable groups are: Republicans, 16.4, 1.2, 8.8, 3.6, 2.9; Democrats, 11.8, 6.7, 11.7, 3.2, 2.5. The latter category combines the non-scale types with those who could not be assigned because they were "on the record" too infrequently.

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[6] My "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, Vol. 14 (1960), pp. 291–306, discusses the relative advantages of scaling and other quantitative methods.

[7] The terms "isolationist" and "internationalist" are labels of convenience, not intended to carry normative baggage here.

[8] For a full discussion of the study design, including the items comprising the foreign aid scales and the methods of calculation of the measures of the demographic variables, see my *Congressional Isolationist Behavior* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1963), ch. 2 and appendices I, II, and III.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY AND RELIGION*

Party and religious affiliation	76th Congress			77th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Catholic	(50.0)†	(0.0)	2	(66.7)	(33.3)	3
Protestant	86.8	0.0	68	90.0	2.9	70
Democrats						
Catholic	0.0	68.6	35	4.9	92.7	41
Protestant	0.0	89.5	76	5.4	90.5	74
	80th Congress			83d Congess		
Republicans						
Catholic	28.6	21.4	14	17.4	78.3	23
Protestant	23.4	15.6	128	36.8	56.4	163
Democrats						
Catholic	2.8	86.1	36	3.9	94.1	51
Protestant	4.1	61.2	98	15.7	66.4	134
	85th Congress					
Republicans						
Catholic	19.2	69.2	26			
Protestant	39.2	52.9	176			
Democrats						
Catholic	6.6	80.3	61			
Protestant	39.8	31.9	166			

* The table includes only those congressmen for whom information on religious affiliation was obtainable. The data were obtained from the biographies in the *Congressional Directory* and from listings from the more recent period supplied by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.

† Percentages based on fewer than 10 cases are enclosed in parentheses in this and subsequent tables.

of that region[10]—the important point here is that with the passage of time the importance of single variables as correlates of voting behavior may ebb and flow. Specifically in this case, party was of considerably less importance as a determinant of foreign aid voting in the 85th Congress than it had been 20 years earlier.

Turning to the personal characteristics of individual legislators we find that only one of these, religious affiliation, was associated with the foreign aid voting patterns. The literature provides mixed counsel on this relationship,[11] but our data (Table II) show that in 16 of 18 possible comparisons congressmen of the Catholic faith were less isolationist or more internationalist than Protestants. This relationship does not appear to be an artifact of urban-rural or regional factors, for when controls were added for these variables, the association remained unaltered.[12] Thus, within urban areas and in the North, Catholics, controlled for party, consistently provided greater support for the foreign aid program than did non-Catholics.[13]

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[10] See Malcolm E. Jewell, "Evaluating the Decline of Southern Internationalism Through Senatorial Roll Call Votes," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21 (1959), pp. 624–646.

[11] For instance, Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., "The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 2 (June and December, 1958), pp. 111–138 and 280–309, finds Catholics in "the front ranks of the 'isolationists' " (at p. 136), while John H. Fenton, *The Catholic Vote* (New Orleans, Hauser Press, 1960) finds that in 1959 Catholic representatives were more likely to support foreign aid than non-Catholics (pp. 87–108).

[12] We applied controls only where there were a minimum of 10 congressmen in a party-religious

A number of possible explanations of this finding may be advanced. The position of the Catholic hierarchy may have been important, though it is difficult to assess the Church's influence because of its reluctance to announce positions on issues before Congress and because of inadequate knowledge of the degree to which the individual communicant follows the lead of the hierarchy. The support for foreign aid among Catholic representatives may have stemmed from the Church's position; it may have come in spite of the views of the Church as an institution. In the latter case, it may be that other factors—class, status, party affiliation, etc.—outweighed the counsel of Church elders. Then, congressmen may not have been typical of all church members; institutional factors peculiar to the House, or the responsibilities of public life, may have created a different set of pressures to which the legislator felt compelled to respond. Finally, since foreign aid went in large amounts to countries from which many Catholics emigrated to the United States, such programs may have appeared to Catholics as a means to assist their homelands in time of economic crisis. In any case, of the personal characteristics of the congressmen considered here only religious affiliation seems to have been associated with foreign aid voting alignments.

In addition to the personal attributes of the lawmakers, it seems likely that their "political" characteristics may have an impact on their vote decisions. A number of such variables were examined. Of these, only one, service on the Foreign Affairs Committee, survived controls for party and the passage of time, and appears to have been associated with voting alignments on foreign aid legislation.[14] The data in Table III show that in 15 of 18 instances members of the Committee were more internationalist or less isolationist than the remainder of their House colleagues.

One can argue, on the basis of this finding, that contact with foreign policy questions and officials in committee led members of Foreign Affairs to give an increased amount of support to international activity. If Carroll's conclusion is accurate, that "chance, modified occasionally by purposeful intrusions by the formal party leaders" determines the composition of House committees,[15] then it seems that the internationalism of Foreign Affairs members stemmed from something more than a self-selection process by which internationalists asked for and got seats on the Committee.

It is possible that the Committee, as it has legislative jurisdiction over foreign aid bills, was the focus of additional forces which inclined the members in the direction of internationalism. These forces include briefings, formal and informal, of legislators by the relevant executive agencies, direct contacts with the President or the Secretary of State, the exposures incident to foreign travel, and service as delegates to international conferences.[16]

This combination of specialization in the area of foreign policy and being subjected to the kinds of pressures suggested above may have led the Committee to develop a characteristic set of behavioral norms which persisted over time and by which new members of the Committee were "socialized."[17] Thus the internationalism of the Committee survived changes in the political situation. And the fact that membership on the Committee on Armed Services, also involved with matters of foreign policy though not with foreign aid legislation, was not related to foreign aid voting suggests that these sets of norms may be peculiar to individual committees.

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category (*e.g.*, there had to be at least 10 Republicans of each religious conviction before we used controls). In this instance, there were too few Catholic representatives from rural areas and from the South for additional controls to be used.

[13] This corroborates and strengthens Fenton's assertion (see note 11, supra), for it indicates that urban-rural controls, which Fenton omits, do not destroy the relationship. See *op. cit.*, pp. 105–108.

[14] For evidence of a similar relationship in the Senate, see David N. Farnsworth, "A Comparison of the Senate and Its Foreign Relations Committee on Selected Roll Call Votes," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (1961), pp. 168–175.

[15] Holbert N. Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 29–30.

[16] For a detailed discussion of the executive-legislative relationships, see *ibid*, pp, 320–350.

[17] Farnsworth, *op. cit.*, states this view clearly with regard to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "The most effective way to destroy the Anti-Internationalist sentiment in the Senate, other than defeat at the polls, is to make those Senators holding such attitudes members of the Committee." (p. 175) For an example of a similar mechanism on the House Appropriations Committee, see Richard F. Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee", this REVIEW, Vol 56 (1962), pp. 310–324.

TABLE III. COMPARISON OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND REST OF HOUSE ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY AND CONGRESS

Party and assignment	76th Congress			77th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Foreign Affairs	80.0	0.0	10	90.0	10.0	10
Rest of House	80.5	0.0	149	84.7	6.1	131
Democrats						
Foreign Affairs	0.0	80.0	15	6.7	93.3	15
Rest of House	0.0	81.2	218	4.5	88.6	220
	80th Congress			83d Congress		
Republicans						
Foreign Affairs	7.7	46.1	13	26.7	73.3	15
Rest of House	25.7	11.5	218	36.9	53.5	187
Democrats						
Foreign Affairs	0.0	81.8	11	0.0	84.6	13
Rest of House	3.5	64.9	171	13.4	71.5	186
	85th Congress					
Republicans						
Foreign Affairs	33.3	66.7	15			
Rest of House	38.4	51.7	172			
Democrats						
Foreign Affairs	17.6	76.4	17			
Rest of House	30.8	44.8	201			

The third category of variable examined, constituency characteristics, includes five factors—region, the urban-rural division, ethnicity, educational level, and socio-economic status—which appear to have been related to the vote patterns in the House on foreign aid. Consideration of constituency characteristics of course is predicated on the assumption that the individual legislator will be responsive to the wishes and desires of his constituents. However, some recent evidence has challenged the assumption.[18] Deferring for the moment any attempts to resolve the issue, we will look at the extent to which representatives from similar districts displayed similar voting records.

Region has perhaps been given most attention as a determinant of congressional voting. The literature suggests that the Midwest provided the greatest share of the isolationists and that the degree of Southern opposition to the aid program increased with the passage of time.[19] The data (Table IV) suggest that, while

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[18] For evidence and discussion in support of the assumption, see MacRae, *op. cit.*, p. 278; George B. Galloway, *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York, 1955), pp. 198–215; and Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D. Samuel, *Congress at Work* (New York, 1952), pp. 112–126. For evidence of the concern of state legislators for the views of their constituents, see Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 1046–1055 and Wilder Crane, Jr., "Do Representatives Represent?" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 295–299. On the other side, see Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 531–546 and Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.

[19] Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–163; George L. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), pp. 141–174; MacRae, *Dimensions . . .*,

TABLE IV. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY REGION AND PARTY

Party and region	76th Congress			77th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
East	76.7	0.0	73	64.4	16.9	59
South	(60.0)	(0.0)	5	(100.0)	(0.0)	4
Midwest	88.4	0.0	86	96.4	0.0	84
Mountain	(100.0)	(0.0)	3	(100.0)	(0.0)	4
Pacific	(77.8)	(0.0)	9	81.8	0.0	11
Democrats						
East	0.0	70.0	50	6.5	88.7	62
South	0.0	90.0	130	0.8	96.1	128
Midwest	0.0	68.5	54	10.2	81.6	49
Mountain	0.0	72.7	11	10.0	80.0	10
Pacific	0.0	73.7	19	0.0	64.7	17
	80th Congress			83d Congress		
Republicans						
East	5.5	31.9	91	12.0	84.0	75
South	28.6	7.1	14	21.4	71.4	14
Midwest	45.1	4.4	113	69.4	25.5	94
Mountain	(11.1)	(0.0)	9	(44.4)	(44.4)	9
Pacific	0.0	4.3	23	13.8	75.9	29
Democrats						
East	6.7	86.7	30	0.0	97.6	42
South	3.2	58.7	126	21.7	55.0	120
Midwest	0.0	86.4	22	5.7	91.4	35
Mountain	(0.0)	(28.6)	7	(14.3)	(71.4)	7
Pacific	0.0	70.0	10	0.0	91.8	12
	85th Congress					
Republicans						
East	10.8	85.1	74			
South	40.0	46.7	15			
Midwest	60.7	29.8	84			
Mountain	(28.6)	(14.3)	7			
Pacific	33.3	66.7	24			
Democrats						
East	0.0	93.5	46			
South	53.3	18.3	120			
Midwest	10.9	67.4	46			
Mountain	20.0	20.0	10			
Pacific	0.0	75.0	16			

there is much to be said for these views, the true significance of region can be seen only with the introduction of controls for party. Midwestern[20] isolationism, to the extent it did

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op. cit., pp. 276–278; Ralph H. Smuckler, "The Region of Isolationism," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (1953), pp. 386–401; Jewell, *op. cit.*

[20] We have used the following regional breakdowns:

EAST: Conn., Del., Me., Mass., N. H., N. J., N. Y., Pa., R. I., Vt. (10 states)

SOUTH: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Md., Miss., N. C., Okla., S. C., Tenn., Tex., Va., W. Va. (15 states).

exist, was peculiar to the Republican Party; G.O.P. congressmen from the central regions were more isolationist than those from the East and Pacific coasts in each Congress. On the other side of the aisle, however, Democrats from the Midwest were consistently more internationalist than those from the Southern and Mountain states, particularly after the 77th Congress.

With respect to the South, the data in Table IV again demonstrate the need to qualify regional generalizations by considering the parties separately. The decline in Southern internationalism was confined to the Democratic Party; Southern Republicans were, from the 77th Congress on, more isolationist than legislators from the East and Pacific coasts. Again, it is clear that regional groups within the two parties have behaved quite differently on foreign aid bills.

In truth, it may be that a region gets its political reputation from its dominant party. Thus the Midwest, the traditional center of Republican strength, became known as the isolationist capital of America because the G.O.P. lawmakers from the region were leading opponents of foreign aid. The regional label did not fit Midwestern Democrats. Southern Republicans also basked in reflected glory; they were consistently more isolationist than Republicans from the coastal regions. The upshot of all this is that explanations based on geography must be advanced with caution; we cannot simply assert that the Midwest because of its physical isolation was less conscious of the connections between the United States and foreign nations and thus less able to conceive of American interests as including an active role in world affairs.

The fact is that if any part of the country can be given a regional tag, it is the Mountain states area. Though the numbers involved are small, the data show that in 15 of 17 possible comparisons, Mountain congressmen of both parties were more isolationalist than those lawmakers representing the two coasts. On the Democratic side, when the break in party cohesion came, it was the Mountain representatives who emerged as the leading isolationists.

One other relationship in Table IV transcends party lines, though it is of shorter duration than the 20-year period which has been our concern. In the two most recent (83d and 85th) of our five Congresses, Eastern and Pacific coast legislators of both parties were the most internationalist groups. The emergence of this association coincided with the decline in party cohesion on foreign aid noted above. This was particularly clear among Republicans; beginning in the 77th Congress, Eastern Republicans were party leaders in internationalism. As the discipline of the parties loosened, it seems that constituency factors, like region, came to exert influence. Thus it appears that coastal representatives, perhaps inclined toward internationalism by the greater social, economic, and political contacts with the overseas world, responded to the relaxation of party pressures by giving greater support to the foreign aid program. In any case, it should be clear that the voting patterns of the House reflect a complex interplay of party and regional factors.

Examination of other constituency characteristics underscores these same points. As party unity disintegrated on the foreign aid issue, a set of constituency variables came to be associated with vote choice. For example, urban[21] representatives of both parties, in the three most recent Congresses, provided more support for, and less opposition to, the aid program than those from rural areas (Table V). This finding survived the introduction of controls for region.[22] In addition, the correlation coefficients relating ruralism to foreign aid scale scores, displayed in Table VI, buttress this argument. Only in the 80th Congress, after the pure partisan cleavage had ended, did a statistically significant relationship appear be-

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MIDWEST: Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. D., Ohio, S. D., Wis. (12 states).

MOUNTAIN: Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M., Utah, Wyo. (8 states).

PACIFIC: Calif., Ore., Wash. (3 states).

[21] Following MacRae, *Dimensions . . .*, *op. cit.*, we have used the per cent of the male working force employed in farm occupations as a measure of ruralism. The following breakdowns were used: 24.0% or more—rural district; 6.0–23.9%—mixed district; 5.9% or less—urban districts. The present writer is indebted to Professor MacRae for supplying occupational distributions for the period after the 1950 census. Since our purpose is to focus on the "pure" types, the data for the mixed districts have been omitted.

[22] A word is in order about the limitations on the controls used. In order to differentiate the extreme cases from the moderates, the variables were trichotomized. Given the skewed distributions of the constituency attributes, there were too few cases in some cells to permit meaningful controls. For example, with respect to ruralism, only in the Midwestern region were there sufficient numbers of representatives of both urban and rural districts to allow controls.

TABLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY PARTY AND RURALISM

Party and constituency type	80th Congress			83d Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Urban	10.0	27.8	90	14.7	78.7	75
Rural	42.4	0.0	59	70.2	23.4	47
Democrats						
Urban	2.9	82.6	69	2.4	92.9	85
Rural	4.8	52.4	84	23.3	59.3	86
	85th Congress					
Republicans						
Urban	26.4	70.8	72			
Rural	65.7	25.7	35			
Democrats						
Urban	3.3	80.2	91			
Rural	52.5	24.2	97			

tween ruralism and the vote on foreign aid. The negative correlations suggest that the representatives of rural areas tended to fall at the low (isolationist) end of the foreign aid scale. By way of explanation, it may be that in the absence of party unity, greater contacts with, and information about, foreign nations led to this greater receptivity of urban congressmen to appeals to back the aid program. In any case, the evidence suggests that the decline in the importance of party as a determinant of the congressional vote was accompanied by an increase in the importance of district characteristics.

Ethnicity is an additional factor which has received a good deal of attention, the thesis being that Americans of German and Irish background have been opposed to United States involvement in world affairs, lest this country come into conflict with Germany or alliance with Great Britain.[23] We have tested this notion by relating congressional voting records to the ethnic composition of the congressional districts. The data (Table VII) show that the negative association between high[24] ethnicity

TABLE VI. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS AND FOREIGN AID SCALE SCORES

Constituency characteristics	Congress				
	76th	77th	80th	83d	85th
Ruralism	−.05	.01	−.23*	−.43*	−.45*
Ethnicity	−.09	−.16*	.25*	.21*	.19*
Educational Level	−.16*	−.17*	.08	.15#	.16#
Socio-Economic Status	−.24*	−.24*	.11#	.26*	.27*

* Significantly greater than zero at .01 level.

# Significantly greater than zero at .05 level.

Note: The correlations are product-moment correlations and the test of significance is an F test; see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), pp. 285–305.

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[23] Samuel Lubell is a major proponent of this argument. See his *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952), pp. 121–132, and *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956), pp. 52–74.

[24] By ethnicity, we mean the proportion of the population of German and Irish ancestry. Using census data the districts have been categorized as

TABLE VII. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY ETHNICITY AND PARTY

Party and constituency characteristic	76th Congress			77th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Low Ethnicity	77.8	0.0	18	81.8	9.1	22
High Ethnicity	83.8	0.0	111	84.2	6.9	101
Democrats						
Low Ethnicity	0.0	88.8	80	1.6	96.0	126
High Ethnicity	0.0	63.8	94	8.0	80.0	100
	80th Congress			83d Congress		
Republicans						
Low Ethnicity	46.3	1.9	54	64.5	39.5	43
High Ethnicity	18.3	23.1	104	34.5	62.2	19
Democrats						
Low Ethnicity	8.3	41.7	12	18.8	68.8	16
High Ethnicity	2.6	86.8	38	0.0	100.0	54
	85th Congress					
Republicans						
Low Ethnicity	52.9	29.4	34			
High Ethnicity	33.0	61.4	88			
Democrats						
Low Ethnicity	28.0	44.0	25			
High Ethnicity	0.0	95.0	60			

and internationalism existed only in the pre-World War II period, *i.e.*, in the 76th and 77th Congresses. In each Congress thereafter, the reverse was true; representatives of high ethnic districts gave greater support to the aid program than those from low ethnic areas. Nor did the addition of the available controls, in this case for ruralism, alter the relationship. The correlations between ethnicity and foreign aid scale score lend further support to these notions, for as Table VI shows, in each Congress since the 80th there was a significant, though small, positive correlation between ethnicity and internationalism.

The reason for the reversal of the association of ethnicity and the congressional vote after World War II may lie in the altered international situation which characterized the period. In contrast to the pre-War era, the challenge of world communism and the alliance between Germany and the United States greatly reduced the potential for German-American conflict and, at the same time, the emotional conflicts of Americans of German ancestry. The Soviet threat and other factors may also have been sufficient to diminish Anglo-Irish hostility or to subordinate it to more immediate concerns, thus allowing Irish-Americans to see benefit in support of Great Britain by the United States. Further, both Germany and Ireland were recipients of American aid during the postwar years and this may have led citizens with attachments to these countries to see value in the aid program. In sum, the "cold war" may have created a world in which isola-

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follows: Low Ethnic: 0.0–0.4% of the population; Moderate Ethnic: 0.5–0.9% of the population; High Ethnic: 1.0% or more of the population born in Germany or Ireland. Though the numbers of foreign born are small, we have used them as an index of ethnicity on the assumption that those who emigrate to the U. S. tend to settle in parts of the nation where others from the "old country" have settled. Since the census omits the data for the Southern states, only those Southern districts composed entirely of census tracts are included in the analysis. Also, as with other variables, the moderate ethnic districts are omitted from Table VII.

TABLE VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND PARTY

Party and constituency characteristic	83d Congress			85th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Low Education	52.5	37.5	40	54.3	34.3	35
High Education	20.3	72.2	79	28.9	65.8	76
Democrats						
Low Education	16.5	69.9	103	33.6	46.3	110
High Education	8.1	75.7	37	17.5	50.0	40

tionist views were no longer functional for the German and Irish ethnic groups.[25]

Finally, we may briefly note a set of similar developments with respect to the educational level and the socio-economic status of congressional districts. Both education and status seem to impel individuals in the direction of internationalism,[26] and this raises the question whether the legislators who represent them are similarly inclined. The data (Tables VIII and IX) suggest that this came to be true, but only after a substantial decline in party unity on the foreign aid issue. The representatives of highly educated and high status[27] districts were, in the 83d and 85th Congresses, the strongest backers of the aid program. No consistent pattern appeared in the three earlier Congresses.

The addition of controls for region and rural-

TABLE IX. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN AID, BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND PARTY

Party and constituency characteristic	83d Congress			85th Congress		
	% Isol.	% Int.	N	% Isol.	% Int.	N
Republicans						
Low SES	66.0	24.5	53	68.9	24.4	45
High SES	13.8	80.0	80	26.0	68.8	77
Democrats						
Low SES	19.1	64.8	105	40.5	37.7	116
High SES	2.2	86.7	45	8.3	66.7	48

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[25] Lubell, *op. cit.*, relies mainly on pre-World War II data, specifically the behavior of the German-Americans in the 1940 presidential election, to support the ethnic-emotional argument. This may help account for the contrast between his view and that presented here.

[26] On education, see Fensterwald, *op. cit.*, p. 137 and Smuckler, *op. cit.*, p. 399. On status, see Alfred O. Hero, *Americans in World Affairs* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1959), pp. 43–68.

[27] The measure of education, compiled from the census, is the per cent of the district population who had attended college *at some time*. The following categories were used: Low Education: 0.0–9.9% of the population college trained; Moderate Education: 10.0–14.9% of the population college trained; High Education: 15.0% or more of the population college trained. For a measure of SES, we have used MacRae's occupational distributions, specifically the per cent of employed males engaged in managerial, technical, and professional occupations. Education is usually a concomitant of such activities; they are often rewarded by high income. The districts were categorized as follows: Low Status: 0.0–14.9% of population in managerial, technical and professional occupations; Moderate Status: 15.0–19.9% of population so engaged; High Status: 20.0% or more of population so engaged.

ism sustain the findings. Correlating the measures of education and status with internationalism (see Table VI) provides additional evidence in support of these relationships; significant, positive coefficients appeared in the two most recent Congresses.

From this we may conclude that education and status led to more information on, and concern about foreign policy, which, coupled with greater analytical powers, led to a greater receptivity to the arguments in behalf of enlarged international political activity. When released from the obligation to back his political party, the representative of such people may have tended to vote in keeping with the views of his constituents. Such a tendency may have been reinforced by the fact that those with education and status probably had high visibility in the community and may have constituted a substantial pool of interested and articulate citizens who held internationalist attitudes on American foreign policy.

In sum, the discussion of the relationship of constituency characteristics to voting alignments on foreign aid in the House has suggested that the importance of district attributes is inversely associated with the significance of political party as a determinant of the congressional vote. As the cleavage between the parties vanished, a number of constituency factors took on value as a means for distinguishing between the proponents and foes of foreign aid legislation.

In addition, whatever the relationship between the individual legislator and his constituents, the fact remains that in certain periods of history the representatives of like districts display similar voting records in Congress. If such behavior is not the result of communication or pressure from constituency to congressman—and there is some evidence that it is not[28] then some other explanation for the meaningfulness of constituency must be found. It may be that the lawmakers tended to overestimate the degree to which the "folks back home" scrutinized legislative activity, and thus voted in accordance with their perceptions of voters' wishes, however accurate or inaccurate these may have been. Or legislators, and particularly those from relatively homogeneous constituencies, may have shared (have "internalized") the basic outlook of those they represented, and thus received cues from the district in the absence of any direct communication. In some such mechanism as these lies the explanation of the relevance of constituency in the consideration of the forces impinging on the congressional vote.

III. CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis permits a few general conclusions to be drawn:

(1) On the methodological side, the value of longitudinal studies should be apparent. The evidence presented here shows pretty conclusively that the voting patterns shift with the passage of time. While there are a few constants (*e.g.*, religious affiliation and Committee assignment), it is also true that in one era one factor may be of crucial importance as a determinant of vote (*e.g.*, party affiliation) while later a different set of variables (*e.g.*, constituency characteristics) may take on explanatory value. Such alterations obviously would be difficult to discover in studies limited to a single Congress or legislative session.

(2) Substantively, it is clear that the isolationist-internationalist scale is complex. At any point in time a cluster of variables appears to be related to the vote patterns within the House of Representatives. Specifically, in the 76th Congress, when the issue was the arms embargo repeal, political party seemed to be the crucial factor in vote decisions. Two years later, when the question posed was the Lend-Lease Act, party discipline cracked and regional factors became relevant. Mountain states Democrats emerged as the chief isolationists and Eastern Republicans became the leading internationalists within their respective parties. After the war, in the 80th Congress, urban-rural and ethnic variables took on importance, and in the 1950s, after a more marked decline in party cohesion, coastal, high ethnic, high education, highly urban, and high socio-economic status districts tended to send to Washington men of both parties more likely to support foreign aid legislation while Southern, low ethnic, low education, rural, and low SES constituencies supplied the greatest share of the opposition to the program. And the available controls suggest that each of these variables exerted an influence independent of the others.

These shifts occurred simultaneously with changes in the political context within which the legislative process operates. The control of the presidency passed from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1953, and with the change came alterations in the kinds of pressures brought to bear on individual representatives. For example, Southern Democrats, representing a rapidly industrializing area and without an obligation to support an incumbent President, began to oppose the aid program in larger numbers while Republicans began to rally around their internationalist President. Thus, a new set of political forces produced a situation in which factors other than party came to contribute to the pattern of congressional voting, and the alignment which emerged was, in a sense, the resultant of the intersection of these two sets of variables.

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[28] See the works of Miller and Stokes, cited above, footnote 18.

We should note, also, that different types of demographic variables appear to be associated with foreign affairs behavior. This study has singled out three types—personal, political, and constituency—and each has pointed to elements which, at one time or another, were related to the vote on foreign aid. In sum, a large number of variables of different types interacting with the political situation of the moment produce a vote configuration which alters with the passage of time. And an examination of other variables would undoubtedly introduce additional complexities.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1933–1963: FISSION AND CONFUSION IN THEORY AND RESEARCH[1]

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In a revolutionary century political science as a discipline has been transformed along with its subject matter. In no more than a generation the discipline has gone through at least three theoretical ages, from a naive Jeffersonianism to a mongrelized Madisonianism to a kind of liberal Burkeanism. It has been going through still another transformation in methodology. The failure of one democratic institution after another has bred uncertainty, and uncertainty has encouraged a vast expansion of the apparatus of inquiry. Even if all the questions might be found in the Great Books, the quest is new—for conditions rather than truths, for degrees rather than absolutes.

The leading American government teaching books, the subject of this paper, reflect the general state of the field. In fact, this is the only justification for a large-scale review. There are many special weaknesses in these books, probably no fewer today than thirty years ago. But their central problem is also the central problem of contemporary political science: despite all the advances on the separate fronts of political theory and political research, there has been no equivalent advancement toward the integration of the two into one science of politics. The fission of theory and research is the thesis, and the necessity of their integration the fundamental standard of criticism in the following pages.

I. *Jus sanguinis* AND ALL THAT

After World War I, political analysis and assessment seemed to be no longer necessary in teaching, apparently because the American system had finally become an established fact and the problem of democracy had been solved —which of course solved the teaching problem as well. In the teaching books of the period, each element of government and politics was assumed to be "important," and the problem was merely to describe its formal structure and activity. Each chapter was a veritable grab bag of unconnected fact. Even the introductory chapters containing the theories of democracy were inventories, more catechism than argument. Woodrow Wilson's *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1907) seems to have been the temporary end of a line of political analysis inferior to but very much in the tradition of de Tocqueville. With all its faults this book must have contributed to an analytic rather than an absorptive mentality. The War seems to have been the dividing line.

Between the wars William B. Munro's *Government of the United States*,[2] probably the superior book of the period, reflects or helped establish a pattern that was altered only marginally throughout the period. Munro's initial thesis stands as a monument to faith in the final success of democracy:

> Government is the organization through which the body politic . . . expresses its will and endeavors to make this will effective. The public will is sometimes expressed by the people directly . . . but more often it is made manifest by action of their elected representatives. . . . Constitutions, laws, and ordinances are the formal records of the public will. (p. 1)

As a result of that faith, the remainder of the book attests to the total absence of need felt for analysis and assessment. Munro's five chapters on the constitutional and legal history of the United States and England are distinguished for clarity and learning but not by any particular relevance to the problem of presenting a consistent notion of government, democracy or politics. He broaches the subject of democratic politics in the next succeeding chapter (VII) with the proposition that the people are sovereign, "the source of all political power." (p. 108) But that is the last to be seen of the proposition, for, "It is fitting, therefore, that we should have some discussion of the sovereign citizen, his status, his rights, and his duties." (p. 108) Then Munro proceeds to list (by his count) the twenty-five basic rights and to say, that's not all. His final argument is that proper performance of civic duties is essential to good government.

At a time when both party in particular and modern government in general were coming under their severest attack in practice and in theory, Munro could answer Michels[3] in this manner: "To perform their functions satisfactorily, it is essential that parties be given a fair chance." (p. 160) Munro's approach to parties and to Congress is through sets of catalogs and lists that could not be more remote from theoretical perspective or mere point of view. The relation of all this to the public will is, one must suppose, as natural as it is unmentioned.

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[1] Revision of a paper by the same title presented to a panel of the APSA, 1963. I wish to thank Professors L. A. Froman, Nelson Polsby, Alan Altshuler and Randall Ripley for their attempts to improve the manuscript.

[2] Macmillan, New York, 1931 (3d ed.).

Ogg and Ray's *Introduction to American Government*[4] is a similar, even if inferior, collection of inventories. Its inventories are so encyclopedic that it remains one of the best elementary references in American government. People should study politics, they say at the very outset of this book and their three decades of revisions, because "In the United States and most other parts of the world today [1928] it is the people who govern. It is for the citizen himself to say, directly or through his representatives, what laws shall be made and who shall make them." (p. 5) Democracy is thereafter a listing, through *jus sanguinis,* of rights, an enumeration of activities and a collection of marginal characteristics about institutions.[5] But this is not to suggest anything special about Ogg and Ray or Munro. Their pattern holds detail for detail in book after book.

Even the crises of the 1930s and 1940s seem to have affected the teaching books very little. Charles Beard, in *American Government and Politics,*[6] takes account of the New Deal largely by bringing up to date his list of the "functions of government," and by adding new emphasis to the complexity and ambiguity of relations between public and private spheres. Beard fails to reflect any of the growing confusion about and urge for reassessment of democracy, the economic system, and government's relation to them. He offers instead an authoritative list of thirty-two "general principles of the American system" (by my count, Chapter III) which devotes more space to the narrowest notion of citizenship and how it is attained than to federalism and the separation of powers combined. He modernizes and makes more sophisticated his discussion of the separation of powers with a short review of the 100 Days, which might be acceptable if he had at some other point grappled with the questions of national power and the relation of constitutional provisions to it. But in his treatment of "Government and the National Economy" (Chapter XIV) he refers to these principles only to show that, with the exception of the abandonment of antitrust under NRA, the Roosevelt recovery programs display nothing novel but "that precedents for nearly all of them are to be found somewhere in the history of American government." (p. 326)

On institutions Beard runs true to the teaching books tradition. His chapter on Congress, for example, opens with: "Under the Constitution, the supreme power of making laws . . . is vested in Congress. The body is divided into two chambers. . . . " (p. 85) Obviously those two essential facts must be mentioned somewhere, but there is no effort here to make any of the succeeding passages breathe any more of the life of politics. There is mention that Congress has something to do with equalitarian democracy, but this is only as another passing fact. The chapters on Congress are devoted to the qualifications of members, apportionment, salaries, the offices and accoutrements of the committees, and lists of things done by Congress when at work. Earlier, the reader was given his "dynamics" through Beard's handy formulation of government as taking on "actuality" through "a body of men and women bound together in a party." (p. 68) In a later chapter one finds an early (perhaps the earliest) example of the President treated as Head of This and That. Among teaching book authors Beard was also probably the earliest possessor of the pluralist approach, which in this book can be found in a one-paragraph enunciation.[7] It is never used to analyze anything. Remarkable indeed is the contrast between Beard the scholar, with so pronounced a point of view, and Beard the teacher-apologist.

By 1943, like a refrain, there is another edition of Ogg and Ray, which is remarkable only for its complete imperviousness to changes in the world and in the political scientist's view of it.[8] The book is also an early example of a particular kind of response to uncertainty, which is not careful reassessment of established truths but an uncritical and unvigorous re-espousal. As for the complete overturn of public-private relations in the 1930s, Ogg and Ray rationalize it away with, ". . . the conviction grew that primary responsibility for ministering to the needs of agriculture in a large and coherent way rests with the federal government. . . . " (p. 361) In response to their own outline of charges against democracy—a formidable list indeed—the authors answer: "Nevertheless, at bottom ours *is* a government of the people, in the sense that the citizenry is the final authority. . . . " (p. 107, emphasis in the original.)

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[3] Michels is answered by name. The authors of the government teaching books of the '20s and '30s were apparently not unaware of sociology, of political analysis or of anti-democratic writings.

[4] Century, New York, 1928.

[5] The following example might, of course, have been taken from almost any more recent book: "Viewed comprehensively, the president's powers and functions fall into two main groups [executive or legislative]. . . . Executive powers fall, in turn, into five categories. . . . These several forms of presidential executive activity will be described briefly in the order indicated." (p. 236) And they are, for the remainder of the treatment on the presidency.

[6] Macmillan, New York (7th ed.).

[7] " . . . the Federal Government has restored an old idea . . . that American society is a collectivity of interests—agriculture, industry, banking and labor—not a mere aggregation of abstract individuals each struggling for his own interest." (p. 326).

Thus through the period of maximum danger to our institutions and of important advances in politican science, the teaching books remained the same. We can find plenty of authority on marginal things. Here is an inventory of what cannot be found: no preoccupation with theory for its own sake or in relation to facts; no awareness of new research or methods; and no use of data even for descriptive purposes, despite the fact that new and exciting data and forms of data were available on elections and electorates, on the changing composition of the parties, on the access of new interests, or on the intricacies of policy making. What is most disturbing is that no argument from any point of view, based upon any normative or empirical system, can be found; or, if found, sustained. The tip-off to this absence of real argument can be found in the typical transition sentence: "Next we turn to . . . "; "In the domain of . . . "; "The first major questions that present themselves . . . "; and so on. Faith in our system and in our knowledge about it was becoming harder and harder to sustain, but it remained so strong that the essential problem continued into the 1940s to be not one of analysis but of reform.

II. 1950–1964: "WE HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN TO FLASH THE SPOTLIGHT FROM ONE POINT TO ANOTHER."[9]

In the 1930s and 1940s, the concept of politics was already broadening, and the study of politics was becoming more systematic. At that time the prevailing theoretical notion had come to be "pluralism"; and the method was a crude behaviorism—the use of elaborate case-studies, observations and descriptions of political decisions or activities. For many, the "group approach" became observation for its own sake; but the approach has inspired a great deal of important research, and did establish once and for all the need for careful recording of ongoing political processes. By the end of the war decade the first of a line of systematic analyses and assessments of political parties had been published. Public opinion studies had made their first serious contributions to politics. In the 1950s theory began slowly to shift from "group laissez faire" toward the political system—toward more universal concepts and hypotheses that might do justice to masses and institutions (including governments) as well as groups, that might also allow for more consistent treatment of the more primitive, "groupless," as well as the articulated societies, and that in general might not be so bound up in democratic polities. In research, studies of masses, elites, political personality, representation, organization, structure and process, and so on, were beginning to validate a set of techniques that on the one hand expanded personal experience and insight and facilitated its communication, but on the other hand set limits upon the transformation of findings into truths.

An author can accommodate his work to new intellectual currents in his field in several ways. Teaching book authors of the 1930s and before seemed to disregard them altogether. More recently, some authors have recognized new contributions by providing a bibliographical place for them. A few others have been accommodating themselves by adding unintegrated chapters or sections. But no author has taken the one option most becoming the scholar, which is to incorporate *and* integrate new findings and insights as the acid test of his own point of view. In the teaching books, this last option is, like democracy, an ideal seldom attained though presumably widely pursued. Since 1950, a more determined effort than ever before has been made to keep up with the best contributions in all the social sciences. The result has been inclusion without integration. Some changes in theory and concept are evident, but these are accomplished largely through an accommodating first chapter. And there has been no change at all in the unwillingness of authors to take whatever theory and ideology they happen to hold and to *use* them in real analyses of facts. Insofar as new research findings are used, they are taken over eclectically as hard kernels of new authority.

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[8] *Essentials of American Government* (Appleton-Century, New York, 4th ed.). This is a condensation of the Seventh Edition of their *Introduction to American Government.*

[9] M. D. Irish and J. Prothro, *Politics of American Democracy* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1962), p. 507.

The most plausible explanation for the imperviousness of teaching books can be found in two complementary imperatives, both of which can be traced properly to an almost medieval concept of the teacher: *be authoritative* and *be comprehensive*.[10] Authoritativeness and searching inquiry are mutually exclusive goals. Authority has no place for the language of variables, hypotheses, in short, contingency. As all leading teaching books of recent years show, to be authoritative about political problems is to be forced quickly to the surface elements of the field. The requirement of comprehensiveness means simply that, if only for reasons of space, authors will be unable as well as unwilling to move away from the margins.

Binkley and Moos' *A Grammar of American Politics*,[11] the first major post-war text, is the beginning of the split personality in teaching books that is typical of all its successors. Beginning with an awareness of the need for comprehension instead of comprehensiveness, the authors' fall into the patterns of their predecessors is made all the more noticeable by their efforts to escape them. The escape route is an early effort in pluralism, which they proclaim with the enthusiasm of a renaissance: "The basic concept [?] needed for an understanding of the dynamics of government is the multi-group nature of modern society or the modern state." (p. 7) They find the hidden molecular energies of politics in Harwood Childs' "parallelogram of forces." (p. 8) What is more, the fact of a multi-group society becomes not only the truth of what *politics* is but what it ought to be as well:

> In our multi-group society, functioning as a democracy, there seems to be no way for the public interest to be determined and established other than through the free competition of interest groups. The necessary composing or compromising of their differences is the practical test of what constitutes the public interest. (p. 9)

Through the mongrelization of *Federalist* No. 10 a new way is found to be authoritative about the nature and workings of American government. The natural order of the group replaces that of the individual, party and formal government as the means by which analysis is rendered unnecessary.

But the true utility of their pluralism is seen ultimately in the fact that it is only invoked as an occasional refrain, to give an appearance of a thesis that is only a theme. It is never used as the basis for a line of argument about anything. The pluralist's claim that pluralism offers an escape from the formalism of the pre-War period sounds hallow indeed. Constitutional materials are presented without any reference at all to the authors' theme of Chapter I. The authors merely describe the "great compromises" without a word of social forces or of constitution-making as a political process. The Constitution continues to grow, as always, by "custom and usage," which in their hands is simply a meek defense of the particular constitutional decisions actually made. There is still no sign of a breakthrough in their later dealings with administration. For example, they commend the importance of administration to the student:

> As in any business enterprise with over two million employees, the personnel policies of government are matters of momentous consequence. . . . The government must devise recruitment programs, incentives, promotional policies, compensation scales . . . [etc.] and look after many other important details in mobilizing and managing the service which executes its functions. (p. 372)

Then they proceed to talk about the personnel policies rather than the "matters of momentous consequence," for example, control of citizens and by elective officials, responsibility, groups, public interest, and, for that matter, politics.

Even without benefit of their pluralist context, however, the authors might have had a valuable work if they had dealt somewhat more analytically than others with some of the specific questions raised by the research of their contemporaries. The only three clearly stated propositions to be found in their treatment of suffrage and elections—the most advanced of all areas in new research by 1949—show how poorly equipped these distinguished political scientists were in 1949 to be systematic: (1) "Voting is heavy where major parties are closely balanced. . . . " (p. 142) Based on one presidential election (1944), the authors group New Hampshire and Nebraska along with New York and Illinois as the only four states with "the vigorous two-party systems." (2) "The introduction [of compulsory voting] would revolutionize the primary function of the registration or election board." (p. 144) No comment on this is necessary. (3) "The structure of American government with its system of separation of powers, checks and balances and unitary executive has been a stabilizing factor in keeping a two-party system in the United States, *as most students of government will agree.*" (p. 154, emphasis added.) There is no awareness here of when a statement shifts from one of fact to one of hypothesis, no awareness that the statement involves relationships among institutional elements, relationships that are in need of some kind of further argument and support—or some admission of lack of evidence, which might suggest an exciting inquiry the reader might want to undertake for himself. The unrecognized proposition masquerades as an authoritative statement when at best it is unfounded and is usually, if only by overemphasis, incorrect.

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[10] It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue the case that these two imperatives also help explain the continuing fission of theory and research in political scholarship as well as teaching.

[11] Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, *A Grammar of American Politics—The National Government* (Knopf, New York, 1950).

Burns and Peltason's *Government by the People*[12] has for a long time been the Lucky Strike of teaching books. In its pages probably more students have been introduced to politics than in de Tocqueville, Bryce, Wilson and Beard combined. And more than any teaching book authors before them, they attempt to reflect the best of contemporary learning and to present the facts in some kind of conceptual order. Their initial definition of government as "*centralized organizations* that maintain systems of order over communities large and small" (p. 14, emphasis in original) suggests an attempt to reject crude pluralism as a "concept" of the political system in favor of some kind of a functional or systems approach. They offer a very good "Problem Guide" because "it is easy to get bogged down in detail and to lose perspective." (p. 1) But the book itself is a study in lost perspective. It is all the more a failure because the authors present the high standard for their own judgment. More self-conscious use of theory, now extended beyond a Chapter I into the introductions of nearly every chapter, makes the split personality, the fission of theory and facts, more clear than ever.

The seven chapters on constitutionalism constitute the superior part of the book; the treatment is actually superior to any others included in this survey. For, if one looks hard enough through the details, he will find an assessment of the structures of government in terms of ideal relations among them, and an assessment of constitutional history in terms of the fight to realize the ideal. But after this worthy section there is no longer any pretense at maintaining a perspective. On the concept, the problem and the significance of citizenship, for example, the authors devote the entire chapter to a description of the "rules that determine who may come to the United States, the rights that aliens enjoy when they get here, and how an immigrant is transformed into a citizen of the United States." (p. 216) The problem guide for this Part of the book is "How can we maintain the proper balance between liberty and order, between diversity and uniformity, between individual rights and collective needs?" Nothing could be further removed from that timeless question than the chapter on citizenship.

The problem quide for Part 4, freely translated, raises such questions as how widely political influence is distributed, and how the instruments of expression broaden or narrow the range of influence. In this part of the text the authors make an especially concerted effort to include the latest researches. But they cover both the new and the established without any regard to their own framework:

> . . . [M]illions of people follow the election fights, and decide who will win and who will lose. Yet the real nature of the game remains a mystery. Why does one candidate win and another lose? What causes some people to go to the polls and vote when others do not? How do we decide to vote the way we do? Why do the voting returns from some areas shift crazily from year to year, while other areas seem to be stable? Man is a political animal, yet man knows little about his own political behavior—or misbehavior. (p. 233)

Thus begins their chapter on "political behavior" and the five-chapter Part on politics. Note how through the introductory questions the line of approach shifts from the problem guide to the terms of the analysis of the original studies—social-psychological studies designed and executed by students whose primary interest in the vote was as a firm decision but not particularly as a political act with political consequences. They cite Lazarsfeld, Newcomb, Campbell, Berelson and Lipset. They identify family, group and economics as the "types of influence on voting," and they offer a one-page tabular summary taken from a 1950 *Saturday Review* article by Roper and Harris. Nowhere do they attempt (as they promised) to assess the influence of patterns of voting upon the parties or leaders, and nowhere in the political behavior chapter or elsewhere do they attempt to re-analyze any of the voting data to identify any of the political influences on the vote or consequences of the vote.

As contemporary political scientists they are very much aware of the need to ask questions like the latter, but here is what happens when the need to do so comes up against the demands of authority:

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[12] James MacGregor Burns and Jack W. Peltason, *Government by the People* (4th ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1960).

> Government by the people is supposed to be government in accordance with the will of the people. So it is, but what *is* the will of the people? What does government do when people disagree? What does it do when opinions change? . . . But governments must act. Decisions must be made. Somehow out of the confusion of raucous voices and dead silences, politicians must shape fairly precise and positive policies. *To see the relation between political opinions and governmental actions, we must look first at the variety of people involved.* (p. 263, emphasis added.)

This does indeed contrast with the rosy outlook of Munro and others quoted above, but the difference is of no consequence. Note here again how quickly the authors move from the core to the margins of the problem. The emphasized part of the quotation is a very far cry from the problem as identified up to that point. They move on to an inventory of news media and propaganda techniques ("name-calling," "card-stacking," etc.), and thence to the problems of polling and of forecasting votes. The interest groups chapter is another inventory of techniques. The treatment of parties is still another set of inventories without context; for example, "These are the main functions of the two major parties [listed on pp. 323–325]. What about the minor parties?" Not only is this a pat listing of conventional things; it hardly touches upon any of the new research or ideas. On elections they begin with the affirmation of "the indivisibility not only of politics in the narrow sense, but of our whole political, legal and institutional system" (p. 339) and then proceed immediately and exclusively to registration, "taking part in primaries," ballots long and short and so on, and financing campaigns.

In dealing with the formal institutions of government, the problem guide identifies the "main problem [as] *responsible leadership.*" (p. 377, emphasis in original) Considering that, it is hard to understand why they light immediately upon list after list of things when they turn to Congress. They spend a total of four pages on the committee system and seniority; but they see fit to devote almost half of their overall assessment of the House of Representatives to apportionment and districting, and without once relating this to representation, responsibility or anything else. There is so little analysis of political phenomena in Congress that none of the contemporaneous studies are used at all.[13] Instead, they repeat some of the old saws about the effects of seniority and the committees as "little legislatures." Nearly four pages are devoted to "a day with" the President, and the remainder of that chapter is comprised of sketches of the President's "five great roles." These roles, they warn, "must not be viewed as separate or compartmentalized" (p. 426), but the student is left to trace out the "interweaving of these roles" for himself. On "The Bureaucrats," Burns and Peltason see fit to disregard a whole new world of writings on modern public administration and administrative theory in favor of such "concepts of administration" as POSDCORB (p. 478), and such goals as "leading the team" and making "a mesh of things." (p. 479)

Carr, Bernstein and Murphy's *American Government in Theory and Practice*,[14] another perennial leader, is a good deal less self-conscious than Burns and Peltason, but otherwise the two books are very much alike. Apparently, competitive textbooks like competitive parties tend toward identity. Carr, Bernstein and Murphy share Burns and Peltason's definition of government, although the former do add a special liberal flavor: government reconciles conflict, but it also satisfies "man's need for service." (p. 6) And like Burns and Peltason, they shift the focus to American government by identifying as the "tasks of government" the clauses in the Preamble. They then list some of the salient ideas of democratic theory and prepare the reader for some sophisticated analysis by arguing that "Democracy must be institutionalized." (p. 30) How, then, do they pursue this initial argument? A few brief examples will suffice to show that they hardly can be said to pursue the argument at all.

Part Three, devoted to "the politics of democracy," promises to be an examination of the "political devices and procedures by which American democracy is given meaning in practice." (p. 123) In the very next paragraph, however, begins a twenty-page, conventional review of immigration (with more figures than usual), aliens and how to gain citizenship. The treatment of suffrage is through the facts of its attainment and expansion. The only reference to democratic theory in all this is their contention that democracy "requires the counting of heads." (p. 141) Their "evaluation" of the party system consists of a completely uncommitted weighing of both sides of reform issues; and their treatment of interest groups involves an equally uncommitted assessment of arguments pro and con.

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[13] It is possible that authors of teaching books do their worst on subjects for which they are recognized scholars. For another example, T. H. Eliot, *Governing America: The Politics of a Free People* (Dodd-Mead, New York, 1961), who had served in Congress prior to writing his text, is still more authoritative and more out of date than any of the recent authors. Eliot cites nothing from the literature later than 1947.

[14] Holt, New York, 1963 (4th ed.).

The analysis of "political behavior" shows that by 1963 the authors are still unprepared to be influenced by new research, more particularly to allow any new ideas to influence the basic structure of a book as it went into a fourth edition. Having a separate chapter on "political behavior" already suggests that the authors have no intention of integrating studies of mass phenomena into their analysis of democratic institutions or practices.[15] It is not that the authors are uncritical of the so-called findings of "political behavior"; but they are completely uncritical of the theory back of the studies. The demands of authority are just too great. The authors admit that too few elections have been studied "to form the basis for drawing final conclusions" (p. 260); but, "The following pages will take up some of the more *specific findings* of this kind of research." (p. 261, emphasis added.) The authors summarize *The American Voter's* four-fold classification of elections in order to suggest that the "determinants" of the vote vary in each election. But neither in this chapter nor in later chapters devoted to campaigns and elections, nor the chapter on parties, do they use these or any other data to assess the significance of campaigns or any other party activity. Rather, in the earlier chapter, they assess campaign influence by a definitive report from Lazarsfeld that in Erie County in 1940, 28 per cent of the voters were "crystallizers," 15 per cent were "waverers," and 8 per cent were "changers." (pp. 233–34) A summary table made up of data from Survey Research Center studies between 1948 and 1960 showing the timing of vote decisions is printed but never discussed. (p. 235)

In the treatment of Congress and of President and Congress, there is a signal disregard both of theoretical perspective and of new research and data. They begin with an excellent chapter on the problem of making choices, an excellent case-history of anti-trust to illustrate, and end it with a list of four "functions" (making policy, controlling purse strings, oversight and influencing public opinion) that are not anticipated by the case. Then the ground is shifted altogether, but to another promising problem: to what extent is Congress affected by the human element and to what extent by institutions? Somehow this question is supposed to be answered by their lists of the qualifications of congressmen, their perquisites and so on, ending with the proposition that the congressman is pretty much an "average man" and therefore Congress is fairly "representative." (p. 315) Truman's *Congressional Party* is used once to support Wilson's contention that relations among seniority leaders are weak. Aside from that one instance, Hugh Bone's *Party Committees and National Politics* is the only post-1950 study involving Congress cited at all. There is a summary table from *Congressional Quarterly* on the proportion of "party unity" roll calls, 1956–61, but it is not analyzed.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the book is weak only when it deals with newer and more quantitative materials. In their approach to the Budget Bureau, for example, they devote two pages in the Presidency chapter to an extremely dry review of the Bureau's "three main jobs." (pp. 435–36) Later in the "action" Part of the book, the Bureau is put into the appropriations process by a four-page treatment which affirms the importance of the budgetary process, describes its phases, states in one paragraph that Congress and the Appropriations Committees "control the purse-strings," and argues for a full page "how to improve" it. (pp. 637–40) Finally, nowhere in the entire "action" Part of the book (Part 8, approvingly called "Promoting the General Welfare") can one find any reflection on the problems and techniques of control or on the relation of all this to democracy. The authors might as well have followed the example of Binkley and Moos and assigned the writing of the "action" chapters to experts.

Little need be said of Ogg and Ray's Ninth Edition.[16] Professor Young has treated his charge with uncommon loyalty and respect. Except for a bit of bringing up to date here and there, the author makes no attempt at all to create a setting, and continues to turn from one inventory to another. Some sociology appears which earlier editions did not have, and occasional tables—though hardly a conversation piece among them. Ogg and Ray is an institution and follows a law of institutions, namely, that the more successful it is, the more resistance it will offer to changing conditions.

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[15] Only one statement is needed to keep these materials within the original social-psychological frame of reference and thus to hold them at the margins of politics: "Finding answers to such questions as how and why people vote the way they do is part of an approach to the study of government known as 'political behavior.' " (p. 257, the opening sentence of the chapter.)

[16] William H. Young, *Ogg and Ray's Essentials of American National Government* (Appleton, New York, 1963).

Irish and Prothro's book,[17] the most modern of the leading texts, presents the ultimate example of the split personality of teaching books. Alas, all its worthy attempts to integrate theory with conventional materials as well as new research are vitiated by the responsibility *to include everything* and *to be authoritative.* The authors quite self-consciously and carefully build up a context drawn from the best literature of comparative political analysis, positivism, sociology and contemporary political theory. They define politics and government in the universal terms of political systems language and identify American government as a particular case of a political system. In all this there is promise that for once a teaching book will attempt to analyze all the elements of government in terms of their relevance to political theory and to evaluate the workings of the various institutions in terms of their significance to *democratic* political theory. But, as with Burns and Peltason, this book is a failure according to its own standards.

The treatment of political opinions and voting behavior is again the prime example of the inconsistent demands of authority and serious inquiry. The authors are sophisticated political scientists with more experience in behavioral work than the usual teaching book authors, and yet they, too, incorporate the "findings" of survey research without integrating, nay, without any attempt at integrating, them. Instead, these are thrown into what has become the usual, the separate "political behavior" chapter. And, as usual, this means that none of the data on mass behavior are analyzed in the relevant places. They, too, have accepted uncritically the socio-psychological point of view, and have organized their separate chapter according to the "determinants of the vote," relying most heavily on the findings reported without data in the *Handbook of Social Psychology.*[18] The original studies made little attempt to relate their data to the political system; the authors of this teaching book made none at all. At the end of this chapter they spend half a page summarizing the salient points of the chapter, and they relate it all to the political system in the following manner: 'Given the nature of public opinion, officials enjoy considerable discretion in their policy choices. . . . On matters about which people do have beliefs, a given distribution of opinions among the public does not mean that the same distribution will be found among government officials." (p. 289) Neither in this chapter nor in the later chapters on officialdom is there any other assessment of the influence of opinion and the distribution of opinions.

Nor do the authors look at the voter and the distribution of opinions from the opposite angle—that is, from the standpoint of how officials, parties and groups influence the public—although they do promise to do so: "For a fuller understanding of public opinion in politics, we must examine political parties, pressure groups, and the official agencies of government. . . . " (p. 289) But this is not carried through. Although parties are defined as mobilizers of the vote and, by implication, organizers of public opinion, nowhere in the chapters on parties or elections do the authors make any attempt to analyze "political behavior" in these terms. They offer the usual short inventory of the "functions" of party (p. 294), but they do not treat these as hypotheses. Rather, they cover all the arguments about why two-party systems develop and offer an eight page dry-run on formal organization. A "table" on p. 312 listing all the social characteristics found predominantly in one party or the other, and a page of discussion of these "bases of party support" are as close as the authors get to analysis. Later (Chapter 11) they define elections as an "input function" (recruitment of leaders for the political system) but then proceed for over half the chapter on the formal aspects of suffrage, getting out the vote, and types of nomination (without any reference here to recruitment or to parties). In a section called "Elections and the Political System," they review without any clear purpose the "findings" of *The American Voter* on types of elections.

Treatment of the official agencies is brought current primarily through footnotes. Nowhere can there be found any relation to representation, elites, power, control, or any other generalized political concepts that fit into theories. The style of presentation is perhaps improved by analogies to drama (the "drama of politics in which the President is Director, Actor, Scriptwriter, Prompter"), but it is no less conventional. In sum, the authors may be allowed to disarm critics by reviewing themselves: "We have done no more than to flash the spotlight from one point to another."

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[17] *Op. cit.*

[18] Seymour M. Lipset, *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, 1954), Vol. II.

III. TOWARD A MORATORIUM ON TEACHING BOOKS

In 1964 the teaching books in American government fail in at least three of the same ways the teaching books of thirty and more years ago failed. They continue to fail as efforts to "make good citizens," because handbooks are not guides and guides are not inspiration. The continue to fail as books of ideology or indoctrination or of pure and simple debate, because they go to such lengths to avoid a point of view. Unquestioning acceptance, especially when it is implicit (for example, "How government aids the farmer"), is not good defense. But most important, there is no trend away from failure to encourage political inquiry and understanding. It is remarkable that so many American political scientists have survived so forbidding an introduction to the world of politics as that offered by the leading teaching books. All the more remarkable that each new generation of teachers persists in burdening each new generation of students with the same.

If the problem of the teaching books is the same as that of the discipline of political science itself, then the solution should be about the same for both. Recognition of the fission of theory and factuality and of the need for some kind of fusion is already a step toward a solution. The use of theory in dealing with every fact lends an excitement to facts which they do not possess alone. The intractability of political facts, in turn, exposes weaknesses of theory. This is what is most likely to encourage political inquiry. And it goes a long way as well toward rectifying the other two failings noted above, because a theory is, above all, a point of view that encourages argumentation and commitment as well as inquiry.

This is not an argument that every author become his own Aristotle. Fortunately, that is not called for. What most impresses the reviewer of teaching books is the breadth of consensus in the field at every point in time. Most political scientists work from some kind of a theoretical posture, at least from some general criteria, picked up on the way to the Ph.D, and these things tend to run in fashions. The argument here is that whatever theoretical posture is adopted should be exploited, not paraded; should be used, not merely possessed. It is the author's prime responsibility to make as clear and explicit as possible all his assumptions about the way government and politics work and all his standards about the way they ought to work. This the teaching book authors have been trying harder and harder to do. What they have never done, but is equally a part of their responsibility, is to deal with the particulars in terms of the assumptions, the standards, and the concepts which symbolize them.

In the absence of full-blown political theory fully applicable to today's institutions and problems, the best approach to political analysis and political teaching is a functional approach.[19] Approaching political phenomena from the standpoint of the functions performed by each and every political institution, value and practice leads to a more immediate and operative grasp of the context of facts. Within a context, facts become factors, and factors, not facts, are cumulative. To direct attention toward the function of any political thing is to require its assessment and its justification—or just as constructively in teaching, an admission of weaknesses of theory and data from which the author is working.

Functional language is all the more recommended because it is already very much a part of the language of political analysis. It has simply not been taken sufficiently seriously. For example, Irish and Prothro admirably define a functional statement: " . . . the *function* of a law—or of any institution or practice—is not necessarily the same as its *purpose;* the function of anything is understood more clearly in terms of its effect." (p. 555, emphasis in original) But take some of their own usages:

(1) "*The basic function of Congress is to represent the people in determining policy.*" (p. 412, emphasis in original)

(2) "The Constitution entrusts Congress with several other functions. . . . " (p. 414. These include amending, electing the President and Vice-President in case of a tie in the electoral college, impeachment, etc.)

(3) "The principal function of the national convention is to nominate candidates. . . ." (p. 368)

(4) (a) "The *central function* of political parties is to give the people a chance . . . to influence the direction of public policy. . . ." (b) "A second function of parties is to channelize public sentiment. . . ." (c) ". . . a third function [to] moderate the differences that exist between the various interests. . . ." (d) "Fourth, parties serve as an agency for the selection of public officials. . . ." (e) ". . . a fifth . . . is that parties help overcome the obstacles to government

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[19] See my "Toward Functionalism in Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems," this REVIEW, September, 1963, and also the citations therein.

> action that are thrown up by . . . the separation of powers." (p. 294, emphasis in original)

Here we have function as purpose (1), as imputed responsibility (4a), as activity (2, 3 and 4d), and, finally, as effect (4b, c, and e). The authors do in places distinguish between "manifest" and "latent" functions, but they do not do so in the cases cited here, nor do they ever explain the distinction in general so the reader can understand what type is which and why. My concern is not for the proper use of a word; it is, rather, for the lack of awareness implied by the misuse of the word. *Identifying functions is a signal for analysis, not a pause for an inventory.* In this lies the essence of my critique and the crux of my argument.

The writing of good teaching books is vital to the field. Middle-level theory in good teaching books contributes directly to the development of good general theory. And, more indirectly, the eventual integration of theory and research depends upon the development of a generation of scholars properly introduced from the very beginning to a well balanced view of politics, a generation with a proper understanding of and urge for political analysis and with a natural feel for research within theory. This is an introduction the teaching books have never been equipped to give.

Until the authors of teaching books can properly fuse theory and research—until, therefore, these authors can live by the standards they have set for themselves—I would propose a moratorium on teaching books, their creation and their use. There is a rich literature of more specialized studies of specific problems of politics or democracy, and bad texts read in place of good studies are worse than no texts at all. Any one of a number of these specialized works could serve as a good example for would-be authors of teaching books. William H. Riker's *Democracy in the United States*[20] will be used here because it is so close in all but length to the conventional teaching book. This small volume is a sign that the requirements for good teaching are not impossible to follow, and it is an intimation that there need be only a short moratorium.

Riker uses very little of systems or functional language—it was not yet in fashion—but there is no doubt that he had the appropriate operations in mind at every point. And the consequences are clear and encouraging. At the outset he states as his purpose "to interpret our political institutions on the basis of an internally consistent theory of the democratic ideal." (p. vii) And this is in large part exactly what he does. His book possesses a clear and strong point of view, one not likely to be taken passively by intelligent readers. It also possesses an elaborate theory of the type of real system he will address himself to, and a sense of the importance of keeping all these things somehow connected: " . . . I have tried to work out a coherent political ideal and . . . I have analyzed our political institutions, asking always how they can be made to realize it." (p. viii)

Following an essay on elements of the ideal and an assessment of the function of suffrage and the significance of majority rule, Riker subordinates all his coverage of the elements of the system to the general problem of majority rule. On registration, usually the driest of subjects, Riker presents a goodly supply of nuts and bolts, but he does so through an evaluation of the differential political impact of various concepts, practices and laws of registration. As no others have done, Riker deals with districting, gerrymandering, and so on as a way of introducing the problem of representation. His treatment of civil liberties is not by an "inventory of principles" but an argument in terms of the requirements of conflict, of party and of party conflict for representative democracy. He does not list the "functions of party," nor does he provide the conventional outline of party organization. Rather he evaluates parties in regard to the function of the "artificial majority." (pp. 108–109) He does not always use the data available to him, but having a focus makes exhaustive facts less necessary. And when he does use data, it is for purposes of analysis. For example, his book is the first I have found to use the roll calls of legislative assemblies in an analysis of the function of parties and the meaning of majorities.

It is also quite interesting and revealing how the materials on constitutionalism follow rather than precede suffrage and party. Again the nuts and bolts as well as the Great Books have meaning because they are used together in an argument relating constitutions to democratic systems. No student could fail to grasp the essential facts of federalism presented by Riker's analysis of the impact of federalism on politics and the party system, yet he does so much more with these facts at the same time. The Purge of 1938 is used here and not in the Presidency chapter as it usually is merely because it involves the President.

Likewise with his treatment of Congress and President. To Riker, Congress is one of the "institutions for majority-making." (p. 164) Formal structure comes out clearly and meaningfully within an argument that the splitting of formal and informal leadership is related to the nature of majorities in Congress. Writing in 1952, Riker had benefit of little of the renewed interest in and new research on Congress. But he made superb use of documents, cases and impressions.

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[20] Macmillan, New York, 1953.

Riker's book is hardly half the size of the typical leading texts, yet certainly more than half the usual nuts and bolts are contained somewhere in its pages. Moreover, a teaching book like Riker's would be superior even if it could not perform also as an exhaustive handbook. In place of coverage, it offers analysis, good middle level theory and, therefore, incitement to controversy and inquiry. Let the authors of conventional texts themselves defend their authoritative coverage against these attributes.

This is not an argument for Riker's ideology or for Riker's political theory. It is an argument, using Riker as an example, for all authors to take their own ideologies and theories seriously enough to test the world with them. Ultimately it is an argument that the field of political science should live up to its own pretensions.

PRAGMATISM AND THE GROUP THEORY OF POLITICS*

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Pragmatism and the group theory of politics are closely related both historically and philosophically; and both have a continuing importance for contemporary political science. Yet these two intellectual traditions have seldom been related in a systematic fashion.[1] This failure to examine both the tree and the branch—the parent tradition of pragmatism and its offshoot, group theory—has foreshortened and distorted theoretical perspective. In this article I have tried to amend this situation by relating the two traditions, setting both in a larger historical and theoretical perspective, and examining their common philosophical suppositions.

I. COMMON PROPOSITIONS AND COMMITMENTS

Among pragmatists and group theorists some have emphasized the "group," others the political "process." Despite this difference of emphasis, a broad common ground of agreement remains. Follett, Mayo, and Homans on the one side, Bentley, Dewey, and Truman on the other, used similar language, shared many interests and objectives, and agreed in philosophical approach.

One shared interest was scientific, though possibly "operationalism" or "realism" would be more descriptive terms. Dewey and Bentley both inveighed against the "spooks" and "soul-stuff" in the current theories of public life,[2] not solely, but in part because these concepts were neither pragmatically "useful" nor directly "observable." Homans made the same point more elegantly with his distinction between first-order abstractions (*e.g.*, "interaction") and second-order abstractions (*e.g.*, status). First-order abstractions are helpful and desirable because they are directly observable; second-order abstractions are not. Second-order abstractions mislead theorists because "they spare us the pain of analysis when we should not be spared."[3] How precisely to describe the point of view fortunately need not be resolved here. The broad common objective is pretty clear: to cut through the layers of abstractions and get down to the observable and therefore, presumably, the real.

The "public"—as that term was habitually used to speak of the "public interest" or to say that "the public demands"—was one of the "spooks" rejected. The point of view was anti-metaphysical and, in a sense, anti-idealist. Opinion does not descend from mind to mind, from philosopher to the farmer or the workman, as traditional political theorists often supposed. In the first place, as Dewey observed, there is not one public, but a universe of publics.[4] Also, opinion and intelligence are not "diffused," they have to be communicated and "known."[5] Dewey was especially concerned about the ways in which effective communication took place, and therefore interested in the activities that went on in this process. Bentley and Follett went even farther, denying that opinion had "meaning" except as understood through "activities" or as part of "the whole social process."[6]

Pragmatists, and group theorists after them, may have substituted a will-of-the-wisp for a

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[1] Truman mentions the debt of group theory to pragmatism. See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), p. 14. The relations of these two traditions are also discussed in Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 91–94, and by Charles E. Gilbert, "Operative Doctrines of Representation," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 604–618. For an early and important discussion of pragmatism and politics, see William Y. Elliott, *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (New York 1928). Bibliographies of recent discussions of group theory can be found in Stanley Rothman, "Systematic Political Theory," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (1960), p. 15, and Peter Loveday and Ian Campbell, *Groups in Theory and Practice* (Sydney, 1962).

[2] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 154; John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927), p. 8.

[3] George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), p. 12.

[4] Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[6] Bentley, op. cit., p. 177; Mary Parker Follett, *Creative Experience* (London, 1924), p. 209; also, *cf.* Harold J. Laski, "Sovereignty of the State," in *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (London, 1916).

"spook"; but there were important insights in this approach. Much nonsense had been and continues to be talked with such language as "public" and "opinion." For practical political situations, the generation, intensities, and changes of opinion are more important than the prevalent modes of philosophy or the literary statements made by pundits at a distant remove from the actual processes of politics. To understand politics, start with people's activities in communication, their shared attitudes, and the "crossed groups" to which they belong rather than the methodology suggested by such statements as "opinion rules the world" and "the real is rational."

In rejecting received notions of public opinion, pragmatist social theory also discarded the metaphysics and epistemology that went with the concept of the "public interest." As people ordinarily used such words, Bentley, Follett and Dewey agreed, interest or interests did not *exist*, they were *generated* by activities and the activities were interpreted symbolically, that is, recognized.[7] The activities were the "objective" stuff of the interests, insofar as something tangible or objective existed, while views communicated and "known" were the subjective stuff of interest. To quote from one of the modern group theorists, " . . . from interaction in groups arise certain common habits of response which may be called norms, or shared attitudes." "The shared attitudes . . . constitute the interests."[8]

A restatement of the thesis may make the main argument stand out more sharply. Whatever, one may say, men's interests "really are," interests as they will be concretely *expressed* and specifically *understood* by those men will be a different thing. Therefore, the social scientist must get at the "stuff" and process, out of which actual political interests are immediately generated and in which they are perceived. The interest generated and expressed *in the political process* will not be a metaphysical abstraction; it will be a thing evolved in the group and the governmental process itself. As Dewey put the matter, "When . . . consequences are intellectually and emotionally appreciated, a shared interest is generated and the nature of the interconnected behavior is thereby transformed."[9] The shared interest *is* itself, and not another thing.

Pragmatism was also a revolt against formalism, a restatement of the abstractions of forms and procedure in the terms of process. Law, said Bentley, is an "activity"; and as for the "system characteristics," they are "reducible to activity, just as are the laws separately considered."[10] The state, said Dewey and Follett, is a "public articulated and operating through representative officers," something "continually searched for," especially something to be "discovered experimentally."[11] Truman and Latham add to these notions the "potential groups" that enforce the "rules of the game" and the "official groups" that write and carry out the treaties;[12] but they concur as well in this substitution of *process* for juridical and political *organization*.

The political process itself is conceived in a similar way by the early pragmatists and latter-day group theorists, though pragmatism emphasized the normative while group theorists have a more positive and explanatory aim. Dewey and Follett described the process entailed in the "confronting and integrating of desires" and the outcome of "healthful functioning" or homeostasis. Bentley and Truman speak of resultants and equilibrium, and group theorists generally of the "consensus" that results from the process. In the two schools of thought is to be found much of the modern language and thought about "the group struggle" and "consensus" that are—or seem to be—so important in "The American System of Government."[13]

To this point, pragmatism and the group theory are much alike. Truman and others have carried explicit theory much farther. Applications of group theory to politics have also been enriched by studies of voting behavior, by social psychology, and the sociology of small groups. I do not believe that these developments qualify the essential propositions or philosophical commitments which group theory derived from its pragmatist heritage; hence the pertinence of further inquiry into the philosophical foundations of the two traditions.

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[7] Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 204; Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–22; Follett, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[8] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34.

[9] Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[10] Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[11] Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 67; Follett, *op. cit.*, pp. 202, 274.

[12] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 159, 512–514; Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (1951), pp. 390, 391.

[13] Bentley, *op. cit.*, pp. 258, 259, and 288; Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Follett, *op. cit.*, p. 209; Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 505 *et seq. Cf.* also, E. Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940) and Ernest S. Griffith, *The American System of Government* (New York, 1954).

II. WHAT IS A PUBLIC?*

According to Dewey, a "public" is brought into being by the indirect consequences of action, by the perception of those consequences, and the ensuing conjoint activity. For this language, Truman's can be readily substituted: tangent relations, disturbance of equilibrium, and interaction.[14] So, too, the treatment by Dewey and Follett of "communication," of the "public articulated" and of the connection of the people *in* a situation with the people that *pass on* a situation, seem to correspond closely with such constructs of group theory as "access," overlapping memberships "up-and-down-the-line," and the "two-step flow of communication."[15]

To pursue the argument of pragmatism, we can imagine a simple political process. At a busy street corner, pedestrians and motorists find that their informal, on-the-spot adjustments are no longer sufficient to regulate the flow of traffic. Enduring indirect consequences are the result—traffic congestion and accidents. Signals are installed. That which intervenes between the perceived problem and the governmental outcome is a *public*, a group of affected parties—aroused, engaged in conjoint activity, growing conscious of itself, organizing and seeking to influence officials. The terminus of the process is the *populus*, a "public organized by means of officials and material agencies," or as Follett says, "the connection of the will of the people which is in the situation with the will of the people which passes on the situation."[16]

Dewey and Follett were asserting two things. The first was that publics got going this way: that political opinion developed in this fashion. The second thesis was a normative proposition: that the metaphysics of sovereignty, the state, and "formalism" should not prevent the recognition of newly perceived indirect consequences. They were pointing to an activity, specifically a *process* which produced response and to a *duty* of officials to respond. The difficulty with pragmatism, and *a fortiori* with group theory, is the step from *public* to *populus:* in other words, why the public is a *legitimate* concern, and the *reasons* for response to it.

Pragmatism, by erecting a continuum with communication and interaction covering all terms from social and economic power to political authority obscures this problem of legitimacy, of how to get from the public to the populus. Legitimacy is a matter of the social contract, of *determinate relations*, never of process. As a notion, it stands for modes of discrimination by which we sort out one process from another, and one "public" from another. As a political term, specifically, the referent is representation: how created and who and what are represented.

Pragmatism and group theory describe formation and communication of opinion in terms of group dynamics—of interaction within groups. One consequence is that terms like "conjoint activity" and "interaction" are made to cover all forms of communication: those mediated by face-to-face relations, those travelling up and down an organizational hierarchy, and those that spill unnoticed out of the mail boxes of putative opinion leaders several days of any given week. In each one of these situations, there are publics aroused and becoming conscious of themselves, increasing interaction and greater cohesion; but the publics are very different things. Some are propaganda "groups," some the association lobbyist reporting to the dues payers—others are large and formally organized publics. One ground of distinction between these publics depends upon the lines of communication involved: in one instance from the lobbyist's mimeograph machine to your mail box; in another from the desk of a staff research employee or a local officer through a series of responsible officials and committees to the membership. The channels through which communications flow differ. Also, in some instances the communications flow effectively in two ways; in others the flow is one-way and the members express their wishes mainly by "voting with their feet." The point of the latter distinction is not simply or primarily that mutuality is a good thing. The real point is that only some publics are potentially either *representative* bodies or *thought* organizations.[17]

Flows of communication are important for the group itself; they are also important in relating the group to something outside and in linking it with that something outside in a way that carries with it the stamp of legitimacy. For this purpose, *both* formal organization and *formal interaction* are needed. Forms and organization by themselves may *stand for* "thought" and representativeness; formal interaction, the official relation, provides the assurance that the forms are what they purport to be.[18]

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* The term "public" is used rather than "group" because it was Dewey's language; it is also a less generic term and relates the discussion more closely to political issues.

[14] Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 12 and ch. I. *passim*; Truman, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

[15] Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 208, 209; Follett, *op. cit.*, pp. 202, 206; Homans, *op. cit.*, and Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on a Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 21 (1957), p. 61.

[16] Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 16; Follett, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

[17] The concept of "thought organization" is borrowed from Graham Wallas.

The different ways of behaving entailed in formal and informal interaction are part of deliberation, and thus of "thought," insofar as thought is consciously evoked, stated and communicated with a deliberate organizational purpose. Thus, there are the proposals of the board, minutes of the council, resolutions of the annual conference, etc. One major group objective for such situations is to prevent interaction from producing a group with too much cohesion. Organization plus formal interaction does this, supplying thereby the *credentials* of deliberation. These credentials, important specially for elaborate associations, depend upon the integrity of those groups which organize collective thought: the boards of foundations, committees, and councils; the staff experts, lawyers and economists of trade unions; the committees and subcommittees of trade associations. Confidence in their product is related, on many occasions, to evidences of impartial and expert knowledge having been sought and considered.

The distinction between formal and informal interaction is also important for the democratic component of representation. The members interacting and the frequency of interaction are, no doubt, related to the procedures of democracy; but they are not the same thing; and members, people, and officials do not regard them as the same thing. Few care that a lobby be "representative" or democratic. In other cases, "democracy" and "representativeness" do matter: for trade unions, farmers' committees, cooperatives, medical and bar associations, the many "guilds" and councils of contemporary society that wield power of varying degrees of importance and are clothed with privileges or rights to be heard and consulted. Their act of resolution into a constituency to create the capacity of representation makes sense *only* as part of an attempt to establish a *legitimate* relation between the group and an outside public, or between the group and a functional scheme of rights and duties.

Finally, in accounting for the difference between a public and the populus, not only the who and how of representation is important, but *what* gets represented as well. Representation is more than a plea that many are concerned and that the many have deliberated. It is a plea that *what* they are concerned about is *entitled* to recognition; it is an attempt to establish a legitimate relation between the people that is in a situation and a functional scheme of rights and duties commonly recognized.

Consider the following dialogue:

Member: "X is a fine labor leader. He was elected a second time with an even bigger majority."

Citizen: "With the help of captive locals, goons, and bribery."

Member: "No. The boys like him. He brings home the bacon."

Citizen: "I would say the 'boys' reasons for liking him aren't very good ones."

Member: "Well, you people outside don't know what it was like to be a gear-buster ten years ago."

Citizen: "You're pretty well paid now, aren't you?"

Member: "Why are you complaining so much? The stuff gets there fast and for a good price, doesn't it?"

Citizen: "But I thought we were talking about whether X was a good labor leader or not."

Member: "Let me ask you this: how many restaurants, warehouses, or cab companies do you think would have been organized without X?"

The dialogue, distilled from a video-tape interview with members of Hoffa's Teamsters, runs the gamut of arguments: democratic consent, group interests, functionalism, the representative quality of leadership.[19] Incidentally, it illustrates a fact given relatively little attention by pragmatism and by most group theory: that many groups have power and "alternate resources"[20] of various kinds other than those directly political and that these groups are themselves subject to regulation. The dialogue also shows, more importantly for present purposes, that many groups are expected to account for the exercise of their powers not only to the state but also, in a measure, to the public. These groups are, in varying degrees, representative bodies, "thought organizations," and systems for exercising and ensuring stewardship. Members, populace, and officials expect and require something more than group egoism. The group itself earns a part of its legitimate claim for consideration by a compliance with these requisites. In fact, as the dialogue above suggests, the group is often, and expected to be, a *populus* with the connotations that term carried in its classical usage.

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[18] For a discussion of this point see Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Power in Modern Society* (Glencoe, 1960), esp. chs. 1, 2. 8.

[19] Note here the treatment by group theorists of leadership as an "affair of the group," discerning, articulating, and promoting the attitudes and interests the group shares. (Truman, *op. cit.*, 190; Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 223).

[20] On the concept of alternate resources see Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961) esp. Bk. IV, and "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities" in C. R. Adrian, ed., *Social Science and Community Action* (Ann Arbor, 1960).

III. PUBLICS AND THE PUBLIC

John Dewey was neither explicit nor clear in his statement of the relation between publics and the great public or the community. On the one hand, the pragmatist conception of politics had revolutionary overtones. Dewey and Follett looked at a public largely unorganized, apathetic and unaware of itself, and wanted to summon it to a successful campaign. Their views suggested ferment and conflict, opinion of intensity and a public of explosive and populistic qualities.[21] On the other hand, for Dewey, an organized public of many self-conscious, effective groups was the path toward the Great Community.[22] Also, for him, group memberships promoted contentment and political sanity. These separate views suggest both an unresolved tension and a missing term in pragmatist political theory.

A more precise examination of pragmatist theory is instructive in discovering what should be added to the account. Pragmatism closely identifies means and ends, method and outcome. The objective of this merging of concepts was to make normative theory "operational," or, as Dewey said, "instrumental." As a consequence, pragmatists tend to confuse the way in which we get to a certain political outcome with the established situation itself. The articulated public that for Dewey was the method to achieve the Great Community, becomes in pragmatist theory also the force that assures a continuing revolution and the guardian of the revolution once completed. What gets slighted in such an account is the dynamism of the new forces created by the revolution itself. The missing term in the political dialectic is the politics of established programs, as opposed to that of groups. The New State, perhaps created experimentally and pragmatically, is itself another thing than the processes that brought it into being.

Take the case of Dewey's Great Community as the force powering a continuing revolution. He apparently believed that the Great Community would continue to expand, giving expression to an increasing number of "publics." The proposition is *prima facie* implausible. Beneficiaries of revolutions generally become the conservators of a new *status quo* and seek to defend privileged positions as well. Truman and other group theorists have taken account of this fact and still preserved the notion of a continuing group revolution but without, in my judgment, assigning an adequate importance to the politics of the New State itself.

According to Truman, one of the reasons why American group politics remains fairly healthy—does not become "morbific"—is the ease of access to the governmental process and the readiness of political response to those that have achieved access. Another reason is the facility with which potential groups can secede from parent organizations or organize to represent a separate interest.[23] Groups tend, thus, to form and reform freely rather than become a caste or class. The theses are unexceptionable, at least to describe some activities that occur. They describe, however, only a part of the group process. In particular they do not provide an adequate account of the politics of programs.

The group revolution is, in an important way, a self-limiting one. The development and especially the growth of administrative programs supplies a major explanation. Access means influence; but often—and especially for a new group—it is valued because it leads to the establishment of new *programs* of government. Thus, for leaders and for governors there is the problem not only of adjusting the demands of many groups, but of reconciling competing and expanding programs of government. Much of the open land has already been taken up. And in the crowded area of public policy, competing and expanding programs produce costs and side-effects,[24] often increasing ones, that point to a common interest in coordination and consolidation. These same consequences also reach beyond the traditional coordination-consolidation objectives of executives and administrators, requiring new combinations of group interest and group leadership, of public and private collaboration. Some examples of such policy areas, important in recent years, are: health, education, and welfare; transportation and communications; housing and water resources; the regulation of business and labor relations. Access, influence in determining the outcomes, is one thing; but a claim for recognition and response that ignores the common good becomes increasingly difficult to entertain.

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[21] Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–137; Follett, *op. cit.*, p. 242. Pluralists such as Laski also spoke of "group competing against group in a ceaseless striving for progressive expansion."

[22] Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–155.

[23] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 596 ff. Truman uses the term "morbific politics" to describe the pathology of the group process.

[24] Including not only the administrator's "diseconomies" and "externalities" but political difficulties as well.

If the group revolution is self-limiting, then politics tends—according to pragmatist political philosophy and group theory—to become morbific. Access is less available given the contemporary situation of occupied ground. Here again, however, the concept of a politics of programs is useful. The argument can be advanced by inquiring into changes, in recent years, within several large, cohesive groups. Among the reasons for such group developments as the dissolution of the farm bloc, for the recent quarrels within the A.M.A. and between it, the nurses, and the A.H.A., or the tensions within the labor movement, one item that stands out especially is changes in the relation between members and their professional or occupational environment. Since the professional situations are also partly a creation of the state, programs have been a major item in affecting them. As examples, one could cite developments in labor relations and labor contract administration, the increasing importance of medical research and problems of hospital administration, the independent stance of the agricultural educator and technological developments in agriculture.[25] Organizational opportunities and ease of access to government contribute to the healthy state of a pluralistic society. So does the dynamism of the welfare economy. But it should be equally obvious that the *programs* of the welfare state themselves, by modifying continually and often automatically the relations between group membership and the environment, is one of the greatest remedies for morbidity.

The New State begets a new politics, requiring particular conditions if that politics is to operate sanely and temperately. In describing the New State, Dewey and Follett presented a picture of relative contentment and social harmony because all or most could distribute their personal resources satisfactorily and achieve effective expression through a variety of group memberships. They did not explain in detail why the metamorphosis from angry group protest to social peace should occur; nor did they describe the mechanisms that would continue the state of social peace. Their omissions leave unexplained, especially, the fact that our political system *now* appears to work fairly comfortably within the extreme limits of populism and syndicalism.

Truman and other group theorists have supplied the missing concepts to connect the pre-revolutionary state with the post-revolutionary one. Truman cites as the guardians of the constitution and the defenders of the polity "the effects of overlapping memberships, particularly the vitality of membership in those potential groups based upon interests widely held throughout the society."[26] In this account, two notions may be singled out: (1) the large potential publics (including majority groups); and (2) the overlapping memberships of individual persons. Neither is, in my judgment, adequate to explain fully the defense of the "rules of the game" in the sense that most people have in mind when they use that expression. Neither is adequate, again in my judgment, to resolve the tension between process and result in pragmatist theory.

Large, highly organized publics or groups afford one plausible example of the influence of overlapping memberships. The leaders of the larger organizations that are the major beneficiaries of the modern polity are especially subject to cross-pressures. Similarly, within these organizations, overlapping memberships operate both "up-and-down-the-line" and between the member as such and the member as citizen. This conceptual apparatus does provide one method of stating the constraints operating on leaders and members. It explains the phenomenon of group access to government, in some circumstances. Also it affords a good description of one mechanism by which the exchange between group memberships on the one hand and values and interests on the other hand is mediated. However, it supplies only two terms of the dialectic. What especially the apparatus will not serve to explain are transformations in the relations of the public and the private where the group process itself produces new indirect consequences. To meet these situations and to compete for access the group must both "think" and represent a common interest: in some measure transcend the group process.

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[25] See, for example, William J. Block, *The Separation of the Farm Bureau and The Extension Service* (Urbana, 1960); Joel Hardman and Maurice Neufeld, *The House of Labor* (New York, 1951); "The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 63 (1954), p. 938; A. W. Willcox, "Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (1960), p. 432.

[26] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

Before considering the role of overlapping memberships among the more numerous publics, we should note two things. One is that these memberships—in terms of formal affiliations—are few.[27] If primary groups such as the family and reference groups such as an ethnic identification are included, then the average man does have a significant number of "group" memberships. These affiliations, however, represent a special class of memberships. Many or most of them are not dissolvable at will: they are part of heritage, nurture, and life situation. They represent loyalties that run especially deep.

Where memberships of the latter type are directly threatened or engaged, people are not likely to be either restrained or sober in their political expressions. One of the distinctive features of American politics since the "group revolution" is that prudent politicians often avoid the triggering of such loyalties and especially forcing constituents to choose between them. Thus, it appears that what may have been at one time a restraining mechanism has grown into a constitutional tradition. The political leaders—or many of them, at least—are not restrained by the overlapping memberships of their following, by a kind of higgling in the market with group loyalties traded against each other. Rather, they appear to have concluded a treaty or arrived at a compact of mutual forbearance: they agree not to engage in such practices lest the stirring up of populist or syndicalist publics erupt into destructive competition damaging to all.[28]

The compact of mutual forbearance suggests also a reason for seeking to restrict the role of majority groups and large potential publics. Tocqueville observed long ago that such groups speak out on issues like patriotism, social rights, and matters of fair play if they arouse sufficient *völkisch* sentiment. But to uphold the Fifth Amendment or academic freedom, as the Stouffer report indicates, we must look to the few and hope precisely that these issues do not arouse the wide potential groups too much or too frequently.[29] The populace usually prefers equality to liberty unless statesmen are able to find some method of reconciling these values.

At times, something like Dewey's Great Community or a majority group does become active in defense of the "rule of the game" when through leadership, communication, and an appropriate linking of symbols various kinds of publics are joined. Thus, "Ike's Budget" may be supported by economists and business leaders, and also with the aid of the President's leadership and effective use of popular similes win a large following. Similarly, following President Truman's seizure of the steel plants, the Supreme Court justices and the steel companies were supported by a large and aroused public.

In forming such a majority various types of publics may be joined or they may fuse; but the notion of a majority group or a Great Community by itself does not suggest *which* rules of the game they will defend: whether they will seek to overturn the polity or uphold it. Thus, one community arises in populist wrath when faced by a resettlement plan under Title I of the Housing Act while another defends urban renewal and the "comprehensive plan."[30] There is the political constellation aroused by "Communism, Corruption, and Korea" and that which supports free trade or the decision in *Yates et al* v. *United States*.[31] Either kind of alternative seems equally probable unless the standards of polity are joined by leadership to the group process.

Pragmatism, especially as represented by Dewey and Follett, was both a brilliant amendment of traditional political theory and a fairly accurate prophecy of future developments. Elaborated by group theory, it has proven to have great value for explaining and describing political behavior. As this account has tried to suggest, however, Dewey's own incomplete explanation of how matters stood between the public and the publics provides an important clue to other forces operating on the political scene. One is the cumulative power of those individuals who, at least on occasion, *do not* identify with the group process, but stand outside it for the stake—material or ideological—that they have in the New State. Another is the leadership and authority of "representative officers" who are more than group leaders and who seek answers that can reconcile the affairs of the group with the community of goods and of right that pertain to the whole.

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[27] About 50 per cent of the population has no other formal membership than the church. Of the remainder, the largest part belong additionally only to a trade union, a farmers' organization or a fraternal lodge. Only a small percentage (and that about the same as those who would be classified as leaders in one capacity or another) belong to four or more organizations. For a citation of the relevant literature, see Rothman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

[28] *Cf.* Key's discussion of the "restraining dikes" that serve to moderate populist and syndicalist opinion in the American polity. V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York, 1960), esp. ch. 21.

[29] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955).

[30] *Cf.* W. H. Form and D. C. Miller, *Industry, Labor, and Community* (New York 1960).

[31] 354 U. S. 298 (1957).

IV. THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS

As noted above, pragmatism and group theory describe those activities usually referred to as "the formation of public policy" in approximately the same ways. The objective was, largely, to avoid formalistic ideas and to talk more sensibly about what actually seemed to be happening. People—so this interpretation goes—discover what their problems are in the process of government and political activity, generating opinions or publics of varying intensities and degrees of crystallization and organization. The government or "state" itself responds not to a "brooding omnipresence" or to some facts "out there," but to the facts and desires as expressed and effectively brought home to the legislator or administrator. In particular, pragmatists wished to argue that concepts like the state, expert opinion, or the public interest were not separate things to be set over against the public and the solution of *its* problems.[32]

The word "problem" is important in most statements about the formation of policy, particularly in pragmatist political theory. The term and its uses deserve more examination than they usually receive: what is the "nature" of a problem? how is it discovered? how are the facts about a problem communicated? how is the scope of a problem defined or enlarged? and finally, what are "solutions" to problems?

What does it mean, in the formulation of policy, to say "becoming aware of a problem," or to speak of "the discovery of a problem?" "Discovery" and "problem" could mean the whole process leading up to an authoritative ratification of a "solution." But this usage robs the word of distinct meaning. Assume for the moment that discovery is restricted to that point at which a problem begins its official career. Then it is plausible to say that one way a problem is discovered is by publics "connected with," that is, having access to and interacting with officials. The agenda of decision is often scheduled this way: that is, an activity becomes a problem *now*, rather than last year or next.[33] Also, *what* is discovered, concretely, is often a matter of publics and officials interacting; *i.e.*, which problems pertaining to public health, the aged, or dependent children receive enough attention to matter.

There is also another and radically different technique of discovery, one which employs officials who are in no way linked with publics or responding to them, but connected with the flow of information and the cumulated lore of administration itself. Nowadays, it is safe to say that we live in an age of the administrative state. A large part of administration is the continual flow of information, not only from publics, but in the form of financial reports, statistics, engineering surveys, and technical data and discoveries. In different words: one way problems are discovered is by administrators and elected officials, not so much responding to clienteles as reflecting upon reported data and the lore of the profession and initiating responses or possible solutions—for example, to the problems of the agricultural worker, to actual or anticipated increases in traffic loads, or actual or anticipated changes in the technology of aviation. The doctrine of administrative "expertise" is based upon the recognition of these facts. Similarly, upon these grounds and the recognition of the value of the procedures of administration, and only for these reasons, are delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies sustained. The concept "access" becomes itself intelligible only by recognizing the distinction between these two modes of discovery, for only on the assumption of alternate modes of discovery is it clear why various publics seek to have their problems recognized and solved through other channels. Neither method, in fact, makes sense without the other; they are form and matter; they are two sides of the coin.

Within the context of pragmatism or group theory, one might argue that the "facts" are chimerical and finally too elusive except when expressed through delivered political opinion and by means of access to officials. On the other hand, depending upon how important the "facts" are, "access" may not lead to influence, but the reverse. The views of officials linked to publics that have really achieved effective access are discounted. To the degree that the

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[32] Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 30–32, 47, 177, 207–208; Follett, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 206.

[33] For example, in capital budgeting. *Cf.* W. H. Brown, Jr. and C. E. Gilbert, *Planning Municipal Investment: A Case Study of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1961), esp. ch. 9.

Interstate Commerce Commission is under the influence of the "interests," in the measure that the Federal Reserve Board is a "tool" of the Treasury, their usefulness and their political power decline. Even that *bete noir* of the public administration fraternity, the Army Corps of Engineers, and clientele agencies such as the Extension Service suffer if their reputation for professionalism and objectivity is seriously impugned.[34] For that matter, Congressmen too battle continually, in their manner, for objectivity and for the facts. They try to get behind the plausible image, to seek other sources of information, partly because of the access which many groups have established.[35] If problems had only their subjective aspect, if it were impossible to establish the objective component, if access to officials were a major part in the formulation of public policy, the communication of "problems" and thereby the policy process itself would break down. Communication in government requires a knowledge of the "relevant facts" and "a consensus that there is integrity in procedures";[36] otherwise the road does not go through, the hospital or dam is not built. True, consensus and political agreement often produce results despite the "objective" nature of the problem; it can sometimes, and sometimes must, substitute for facts and a rational understanding of the nature of the problem. In other cases, they ought not to carry the day. Government is discrimination between these two situations.

To ask the next question, "In what way does the 'consensus that there is integrity in procedures' acquire the important element of conviction or certainty?" leads farther yet from the concepts of group theory and pragmatism, beyond process and even procedure, to the formal external checks placed on the process and the procedures by Congressional committees and the courts of law.[37] We can if we wish, following pragmatism, call a procedure a process and even bury the idea of a formal check on both procedure and process under the common notion of the "process" by which we solve problems.[38] To do so, however, produces theoretical confusion, and a faulty explanation of the political process itself.

Problems can also be big problems or small problems—big dams or little dams, house-painting or redevelopment. As Bentham (or Hegel, for that matter) argued, a community—its nature and its size—is partly a matter of how people define their problems, or how those problems are defined for them. Bentham's point of view has relevance here, for one difficulty with group theory and with pragmatism is the discussion of the way in which the *scope* of a problem is determined.

Once government or the governmental process is looked at from this perspective, one of the striking things about it is the enormous authority, discretion, and power given to officials (as opposed to publics) to control the scope of problems in the interests of equity and rationality. They decide the scope of the problem and derivatively of the public by the twin powers to determine the alternatives among which choice is made and to say who will be heard. Courts decide who has standing to sue.

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[34] Block, *op. cit.*; Brunner and Yang, *Rural America and the Extension Service* (New York, 1949); W. R. Parks, *Soil Conservation Districts in Action* (Ames, 1952); Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters* (Cambridge, 1951), esp. chs. 4, 5; also the "marasmus" controversy on the independent regulatory commissions: Samuel Huntington, "The Marasmus of the I.C.C.," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 61 (1952), p. 467; C. Morgan, "A Critique of 'The Marasmus of the I.C.C.' " *Ibid.*, Vol. 62 (1953), p. 171.

[35] Compare for instance the behavior of different committees in the House and Senate such as the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and the House Committee on Labor and Education.

[36] Norton E. Long, "Public Policy and Administration: The Goals of Rationality and Responsibility," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 14 (1954), p. 28.

[37] For this insight, I am indebted to Charles E. Gilbert. See his "The Framework of Administrative Responsibility," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21 (1959), p. 373.

[38] "Process" is central to the pragmatist description of politics, as it is to group theory. Indeed, Bentley, Follett, and Dewey have had a great deal to do with directing the attention of political scientists toward the "process" and away from organization, rules, procedure, and competence. The difficulty with the word "process" is that it tends to include, unless used carefully, not only the idea of a sequence of activities but also (1) the procedures applied to the process; and (2) the grounds upon which we know what we are doing. People sometimes say that law or science are "processes." Often it is useful to study them simply as activities. On the other hand, law for instance can also be regarded as (1) a collection of tested doctrines and rules; or (2) the criteria by which some things are called law and others are not. Thus, we have our casebooks. Also, there are officers who, by some rules and criteria, separate "judge-questions" from "jury-questions," and other officers who say that the court of first instance declared, but what they declared is not law.

Administrators decide whether the hearing will be upon a segment of an air route, involve several major trunk lines, or a whole region. Committees set the propositions for a hearing and invite the witnesses. Even the political parties have varying quantities of assigned authority in nominating candidates and choosing the issues for elections. These decisions are not matters for the public; they represent a deliberate loading of the scales, partly to deal equitably ("objectively") with those who have an interest, partly to prevent "effective opinion" or access from carrying the day, and partly in order to provide deliberately for the exercise of equity, prudence, or leadership.[39]

An emphasis upon the scope of problems (the community affected by a problem), upon the "relevant facts," and upon the techniques of calculation and control that do service for "the facts" when they are unknown or unknowable corresponds to our present situation of a densely populated group universe.[40] That same situation, entailing as it does "occupied ground" in the sphere of public policy, suggests an amendment of the concept of the official as described by pragmatism and by group theory. Today's official is more than the "broker of interests," and more than an exploiter of "potential publics."

The official is only in part a broker of group interests, because brokerage is not the only way the governmental process goes on. The "broker of interests" perhaps makes sense to describe the era of "invisible government" or the present-day professional party politician. In his strictly political capacity the official may promise and bargain, when he runs for election. But he must pay off as an official, that is, by setting the government in motion or stopping it. In this respect, he can hold himself out as an entrepreneur, but he cannot be merely a broker for the simple reason that the exchange must be effected via the state, and the contract is subject to many uncertainties and implied clauses. For that matter, brokers have a way of getting replaced in this day and age by good entrepreneurs.[41]

The official today must generally be more, too, than an entrepreneur investing *in* potential publics or seeking to interact with *them.* He must for two reasons: because the group's concern is the community's concern; and because of today's situation of occupied ground and of organized and sophisticated publics. When Dewey and Follett were writing—in the heyday of Seaman Knapp, of the trade association movement, and of state labor legislation—publics needed to be taught an awareness of *their* interests, not, as the idealist formula would have it, of a good held in common. Populist and syndicalist publics can be roused, even today, but they have been pretty well exploited. The new "potential public" is not so easy to discover or to win, especially since now the official has to choose more than discover, and to justify his stand rather than contract for delivery.

The official, nowadays, is less an entrepreneur dealing in publics; he is more of a "statesman," one who links or joins the objective and subjective aspects of problems. The sanctity of the administrative state and its programs tend to impose such a role. Also, his effectiveness depends largely upon the measure in which he is able to join power with the standards of a polity: winning the support of other officials, formal agencies of government, and leaders from private life, to bring into being new communities of interest and to promote solutions to problems that these publics hold in common with others. To capitalize investments in this area the official needs the state—to get at the facts, to secure representation for interests not easily articulated, and to communicate his objectives with maximum effect. He needs the approbation and the cooperation of "representative officers," of those leaders from private life who see beyond the group process. He needs, in short, to set a style of action appropriate to the contemporary situation.

If it makes sense to speak of a polity and not merely of process, then the pragmatist conception of "solutions," or the outcome of the process, needs also to be re-examined.

To describe the outcome of the governmental process as an equilibrium, arriving at consensus, "integrating desires" or "avoiding waste" may achieve one of two objectives or both. It dispenses with "spooks" and directs inquiry away from questions of organization and procedure. It can also impart the flavor of scientific endeavor to inquiry. It conjures up the image of a stable mechanical system or a market at equilibrium. Presumably, then, one can talk about the group process as part of "political behavior" and formulate laws about it. This way of stating things, however, leaves several questions unanswered.

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[39] Schattschneider has made this point forcefully. See *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960).

[40] *Cf.* Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), chs. 3, 4.

[41] The conception of the politician as entrepreneur has, of course, a long history in political theory, from Weber and Schumpeter down to Robert A. Dahl.

One problem not solved—in fact, hardly stated by Dewey or in group-theory—is that of assuring a return to equilibrium. Another way of asking about this problem is, "Why do we manage to achieve a 'moving consensus' and not merely a series of unique resultants?" And still another way of putting the issue is to ask, "Why doesn't the 'game of politics' disrupt the polity?" "Consensus" might mean many things but judging from the way political scientists use the term, they seem to mean (1) widely diffused agreement on many issues; (2) low intensity of disagreement; and (3) the absence of potentially explosive publics. Pluralism and pragmatism have a lot to do with maintaining this consensus, no doubt. But so also does the amount of contentment (or apathy), the public responsibility of leaders, and the possibilities of developing special publics for particular jobs. Equally important are the procedures by which the group process is restrained and the formal checks that reinforce the sense of rationality and of due process. By throwing away the notion of a whole—useful though that step may be up to a point—pragmatism makes explanation itself difficult.

Also, to break through the ideologies of a regime or of a period, to set men on a different footing, in different words to destroy equilibrium and establish a radically new equilibrium and consensus is part of government. For Dewey and Follett, the problem of a radically different equilibrium and how to get there presented no real difficulty. The tasks of the day for them were to establish access to government, promote experimentalism, and tear down outworn abstractions. Now the pragmatic revolution is pretty much over, at least for the time being. And the group process, taken by itself, seems to be especially productive of conservatism and *stasis*. Sometimes it generates leadership, as a kind of antithesis to itself, for someone or some body must break the chains of custom, the outworn rights, and the dead myths. Courts do this job, so do legislatures, and so do leaders, especially those with authority of office. The American Constitution divides sovereignty. And American politics reveals in its operation the fact of that division. Still, our politics shows also, at times in a great act and at times in the longing for a great act, elements for which the notion of sovereignty stood, that grandfather of all the spooks on the political scene, the office and officers that existed to overcome groups and destroy customs for the sake of a new equilibrium.

V. CONCLUSION

One way of summarizing the argument of this article is to say that the pragmatists discarded too much of the "soul-stuff," "spooks," and formal mechanisms in their discussion of politics and government and that group theorists have followed their lead too closely. When Dewey, Bentley, and Follett were writing they said much that was important about what was happening then. Their interpretations are less important now.

Pragmatism and group theories of politics are often misleading intellectual constructs for the interpretation or description of political or governmental situations since they direct attention in principle to what men are *doing* rather than to their intentions and dilemmas as well. When intentions are included, they are interpreted with the concepts of group theory. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that government and responsibility are more than an "affair of the group" or of groups—that is to say, officials are different from leaders and representation is more than interaction.

One consequence of such an omission is that there are a good many activities of men—men in government and the political process—that group theories of politics do not explain. They explain little where the "facts" are especially important, where "rights" and due process of law or "forms" are at stake in a serious way, where leadership comes into play, or when the machinery of government is engaged extensively. From this observation follows a rather important point, that group theories have little to say about the routine of government (the administrative process) or about important changes of policy or of "rights." Another point is that group theory fails to explain adequately the politics of programs, especially of programs that provide common or community goods and that require extensive representation and "thought."

Theorists and especially their theories ought, however, to be given their due. To say that pragmatism and group theory may seem less important—especially in understanding the politics of the 1960s—is not to say that they have been superseded. Much of our politics goes on in situations where neither a common representation, nor "style," nor "forms," nor the "facts" are especially relevant. Also, the politics of today is not that of yesterday nor necessarily that of tomorrow. Pragmatism and the group theory represent a good description of *one* kind of political action. The importance of that kind of political action varies with time and circumstances.

TOCQUEVILLE: NEUTRALITY AND THE USE OF HISTORY*

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It is not uncommon for a major writer to be seen by his critics in widely divergent, even contradictory terms; Alexis de Tocqueville shares this fate. To the familiar causes of controversy, Tocqueville added his own—a veil of neutrality or objectivity concealing his deepest views. The publication in 1835 of the first part of *Democracy in America* thus gave rise to an effort, still continuing, to discover Tocqueville's true intent: behind the façade of neutrality does he favor one social system, aristocracy or democracy, over the other?

On the one hand, does he not reveal in his writings the ineradicable bias of his aristocratic origins? Was he not hostile to the open-ended, unformed, and unforeseeable consequences of the democratic revolution? Did he not intend by his criticisms of the democratic system to "carry the reader to the point of wishing for its destruction?"[1] Was not the liberty he defended a "restricted liberty, protecting a small group of privileged people who were really independent so far as economic circumstances went?"[2] Was it not "a liberty for believers, [a] liberty for owners . . . an aristocratic liberalism?"[3] Did he not believe that "the mass of men should remain bereft of political power?"[4]

Or, on the other hand, did he not wish that contemporary liberalism would "cease to be bourgeois and become democratic by admitting the masses to the suffrage?"[5] Did he not regard the rise of a capitalist oligarchy as "the most revolting of all governments . . . a system offensive to his aristocratic instincts and to his democratic sympathies?"[6] Did he not, after all, "appreciate democracy as a form of progress in the providential control of history, the new political pattern [which] would be a blessing for most people?"[7] Would not democratic political and social conditions "bring about the slow advance of the intellectual and cultural standards of modern societies through education, political action, and the application of religious ethics to the problems of social action?"[8]

Just as it is impossible to ignore Tocqueville's purported neutrality, so there can be no thought of denying his commitment to freedom, or his indefatigable promotion of those practices and institutions upon which, he thought, a well ordered democracy must rest. He saw no incompatibility in refusing to judge the superiority of one social condition over the other and, at the same time, striving to perfect the one destined to triumph. His neutrality is our present concern.

I

So different are democracy and aristocracy, according to Tocqueville, that no common measure can serve as a standard of evaluation:

> [Democracy and aristocracy] are like two distinct orders of human beings, each of which has its own merits and defects, its own advantages and its own evils. Care must therefore be taken not to judge the state of society that is now coming into existence by notions derived from a state of society that no longer exists; for as these states of society are exceedingly different in their structure, they cannot be submitted to a just or fair comparison.[9]

Instances in which he catalogs the advantages and disadvantages of each regime and so appears to lay the foundation for intelligent choice do not mark a departure from his neutrality, for it is characteristic of him to remind the reader at such times that deliberation over the respective merits of aristocracy or democracy is superfluous and even irrelevant. What has, of course, made the deliberation irrelevant is the triumph of democracy, a triumph awesomely described in the introduction to the *Democracy:*

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* The present article is adapted from the writer's forthcoming book, *The Political Philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville*, to be published by Stanford University Press.

[1] Maxime Leroy, "Alexis de Tocqueville," in William Ebenstein, *Political Thought in Perspective* (New York, 1957), p. 489.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 482.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] James Keeney, "Tocqueville and the New Politics," *New Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1962), p. 62.

[5] J. S. Schapiro, "Alexis de Tocqueville, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in France," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 57 (1942), pp. 550–51.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Albert Salomon, "Tocqueville, 1959," *Social Research*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter, 1959), p. 465.

[8] *Ibid.* See, in addition, Wyndham Lewis, "De Tocqueville and Democracy," *Sewanee Review*, Vol. 54 (1946), pp. 557–75, and reply by Edward Gargan, *ibid.*, Vol. 55 (1947), pp. 6–7 (sup.).

[9] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. Phillips Bradley (2 vols.; New York, 1958), II, 351. All references to the *Democracy* are to this edition.

> The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to the advantage of democracy: all men have aided it by their exertions, both those who have intentionally labored in its cause and those who have served it unwittingly; those who have fought for it and even those who have declared themselves its opponents have all been driven along in the same direction, have all labored to one end; some unknowingly and some despite themselves, all have been blind instruments in the hands of God.[10]

It would be erroneous to dismiss these sentiments as the product of youthful hyperbole. Not only are they retained in the twelfth edition (1848), the last to be corrected by Tocqueville himself, but they are also specifically called to the reader's attention in the preface that Tocqueville added to that edition.[11] Moreover, the same theme is repeated in the *Ancien Régime* (1856), published some twenty years after the initial appearance of the *Democracy:* "All our contemporaries are driven on by a force that we may hope to regulate or curb, but cannot overcome, and it is a force impelling them, sometimes gently, sometimes at headlong speed, to the destruction of aristocracy."[12] His refusal to judge between aristocracy and democracy thus appears as an act of deference to history; once history has pronounced judgment (success or inevitability constituting the criterion), we may by our efforts encourage one or the other of the alternatives compatible with the victorious social condition—democratic freedom or, if we are not mindful, democratic despotism.

Although Tocqueville attaches the utmost importance to the ineluctable triumph of democracy and even makes it function as a first cause from which almost everything else springs, he does not formulate his thesis in a way which is at once clear, comprehensive and free from difficulty. Because he gave no fully articulated account to support the inevitability thesis, the search for something equivalent to a philosophy of history in his writings has been carried on as avidly as the search for his true intent. The results have been no more uniform.

Thus Mill, in his review of the *Democracy,* confidently writes that Tocqueville "considers it an established truth, on the proof of which it is no longer necessary to insist, that the progress of democracy neither can nor ought to be stopped," and that "that comprehensive survey of the series of changes composing the history of our race . . . has taught to M. de Tocqueville, that the movement towards democracy dates from the dawn of modern civilization, and has continued steadily advancing from that time."[13] But, a century afterward, Jack Lively maintains that it was not from history or some concept of progress that Tocqueville derived the necessity of democracy:

> Never did [Tocqueville] draw up some schematic history based on a scientific law or metaphysical pattern which would explain and justify the inevitable course of the future into democracy by pointing out the evident course of the past: nor did he see in the emergent democracy the proper destiny of man, the teleological function of humanity, brought into being by some all-conquering Progress. . . . It was not History or Progress which rendered the emergence of some form of social democracy necessary, but certain psychological, social and economic conditions of contemporary society.[14]

Similar disagreements have arisen over the weight and significance to be attached to the role of providence, linked as it is with Tocqueville's view of the triumph of democracy. To what extent does he subscribe to the idea that man's history is subject, in the decisive respect, to a supra-human agency? Albert Salomon argues that, for Tocqueville, man is the responsible agent for the fulfillment of God's will as revealed in history:

> This historical and social actuality of man is the will and the wisdom of a Divine Providence. The rise and the growth of the democratic movement points to the will of the Almighty in its irreversible process. . . . The wisdom of Providence illuminates the direction in which mankind moves. It leaves freedom of action for the fulfillment of

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[10] *Ibid.,* I, 6.

[11] *Ibid.,* ix.

[12] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution,* trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, 1955), p. xii. Tocqueville precedes this by remarking that "there can be no certainty about the future." The significance of this acknowledgment of the limits of prediction is discussed below.

[13] John Stuart Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America," republished in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (2 vols.; New York, Schocken Books, 1961), I, vi.

[14] Jack Lively, *The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 33.

these providential ends. The realization of these providential goals is entrusted to the responsibility of the human co-worker in the eternal process of creation.[15]

To Edward Gargan, however, Tocqueville's appeal to providence is more pragmatic than sacred: Tocqueville gave to the universal results of history a "providential cast," and "even when Tocqueville sought the sacred support of Providence to give force to his observations, the test that he employed was a profane one: the presence in any historical process of that which is constant and cumulative in impact, the extensive evidence that a process in history was unfolding toward an ascertainable present and dimly known future."[16]

These are but a few of the diverse interpretations of Tocqueville's view of history. To determine which, if any, accurately expresses his thought is as difficult as deciding upon the extent of his neutrality in the conflict between aristocracy and democracy. The parallelism may go even deeper. Whatever it is that has given rise to the multiplicity of opinions about the one may be equally responsible for the variety of opinions about the other. If, as suggested earlier, Tocqueville's professed neutrality is ultimately responsible for our indecision about his true intent, this same neutrality may also be responsible for the imprecision with which his view of history is presented, and, hence, for our failure to agree upon its meaning. Tocqueville's understanding of history (the function it is made to serve as well as its meaning) may not, then, be unrelated to his neutrality *vis-à-vis* democracy and aristocracy. The two, in fact, are scarcely separable, and the failure to recognize their interrelation has often led to confusion about both. It is the hypothesis of the present article that an understanding of the role history plays in Tocqueville's thought supplies the clue which discloses his unambiguous intent.

II

Consider the proof of the inevitablity thesis offered in the opening pages of the *Democracy*. It is familiar enough. In support of his contention that in every century since the modern era (*i.e.*, from about the twelfth century A.D.) the gap between lord and commoner has narrowed and is on the way to extinction, Tocqueville chronicles the forces which have been at work promoting equality of conditions: the opening of the ranks of the clergy to all alike, to the poor as well as to the rich; the growth of a legal system and the rise to positions of prominence of those who made it their special study; the spread of enlightenment and of commercial activity; the leveling effects of the kings themselves in their struggles with the nobles; the decline of feudal tenure. Far from containing anything remotely resembling a universal world history, the evidence Tocqueville offers is drawn solely from the history of France from the time of the Crusades; it takes on a quasi-universality through this appeal to everyday observation: "Nor is this [revolution] peculiar to France. Wherever we look, we perceive the same revolution going on throughout the Christian world."[17]

It is clearly the task of the political analyst to ground his assessment of a situation upon his grasp of things as they are, and, where possible, upon his estimate of how they came to be that way; Tocqueville begins his analysis with a profound awareness of a revolutionary phenomenon in the affairs of men. He also acknowledges that everyone is aware, at least in a vague way, of the democratic revolution, but that not everyone sees it in the same light: "To some it appears to be novel but accidental, and, as such, they hope it may still be checked; to others it seems irresistible, because it is the most uniform, the most ancient, and the most permanent tendency that is to be found in history."[18] To the former, Tocqueville advances the evidence already cited to prove that the revolution is neither novel nor accidental, thus confirming the findings of the latter. In addition, Tocqueville contributes one finding of his own: the recognition of the providential character of the revolution.

> The gradual development of the principle of equality is, therefore, a providential fact. It has

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[15] Albert Salomon, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom: A Trend Towards Concrete Sociology," *Review of Politics*, Vol. I, No. 4 (October, 1939), p. 410. In a later article, "Tocqueville 1959," cited above, Salomon notes (pp. 467–68) that after 1848 Tocqueville "began to question the truth of providential history."

[16] Edward T. Gargan, "Tocqueville and the Problem of Historical Prognosis," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (January, 1963), p. 335. In addition, see R. P. Marcel, *Essai politique sur Alexis de Tocqueville* (Paris, Alcan, 1940), pp. 86–87; Raymond Aron, *Les Grandes Doctrines de Sociologie Historique* (Paris, Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1961), p. 202; Emile Faguet, *Politicians and Moralists of the Nineteenth Century* (Boston, Little, Brown, n.d.), pp. 79–80.

[17] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, I, 6.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

> all the chief characteristics of such a fact: it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress. . . .
>
> If the men of our time should be convinced, by attentive observation and sincere reflection, that the gradual and progressive development of social equality is at once the past and the future of their history, this discovery alone would confer upon the change the sacred character of a divine decree. To attempt to check democracy would be in that case to resist the will of God; and the nations would be constrained to make the best of the social lot awarded to them by Providence.[19]

This assimilation of facts to a moral and religious purpose illustrates the inseparability of content and function in Tocqueville's historical analysis. It is accomplished, moreover, without any departure from his neutral posture. So zealously does he guard his neutrality that in his enumeration of the "chief characteristics" of a providential fact he omits any mention of either the wisdom or goodness of providence; had these been included, a presumption in favor of democracy would necessarily have been indicated.[20] Their omission makes it all the more striking that he should equate resistance to this inevitable trend with resistance to the will of God. The human response appropriate to such a phenomenon is by no means self-evident. Should men bow graciously before the inevitable whether it is beneficent or not? Could it not be construed as a punishment for their sins, and ought they then to pray for their forgiveness and for its removal? Should they, perhaps, struggle valiantly in favor of a noble albeit moribund cause? Significantly, Tocqueville does not here address himself to these questions; nothing is allowed to weaken the force of his contention that obstructiveness in the face of the democratic revolution is an act of impiety. His neutrality does not preclude his arriving at a conclusion which positively promotes democracy.

The ways of the Lord are, or rather were once thought to be, inscrutable except through direct revelation. Yet, in Tocqueville's formulation the providential character of the march toward equality plays a decisive role in lending credence to the inevitability thesis. In the absence of any sacred disclosure, Tocqueville uncovers the divine intention in human affairs by drawing upon an analogy with the natural sciences: "It is not necessary that God himself should speak in order that we may discover the unquestionable signs of his will. It is enough to ascertain what is the habitual course of nature and the constant tendency of events. I know, without special revelation, that the planets move in the orbits traced by the Creator's hand."[21] Tocqueville was not, of course, the first to make this analogy. Even if we disregard the common objections to it arising from the recognition of the heterogeneity of the natural and human spheres, we may still have reservations about the applicability of the analogy to Tocqueville's understanding of the course of history. The planets have traversed the same orbits over the entire period of man's recorded observations, thus providing a base of continuity upon which prediction may rest; human affairs have, on the contrary struck out in a wholly new direction with the beginning of the modern era. If the future is not to present us with similar discontinuities, we need some assurance that nothing in the period preceding the present militates against the eventual triumph of equality; we also need assurance that the causes of discontinuity in the past have been overcome.

Specifically, we need answers to such questions as these: In the pre-egalitarian epoch was no preparation being laid for the development into equality which was to follow? Was it a period with its own laws (perhaps with no laws?) unrelated to the modern period? Tocqueville does not tell us. His reticence may be pardonable if, as Lively maintains, Tocqueville's "concern with history was secondary to his analysis of contemporary politics,"[22] but it does not dispel our misgivings when the inevitability thesis itself is at issue. A trend toward equality of conditions which has arisen in modern times may terminate in modern times. It may, moreover, be succeeded either by a hitherto unknown social condition, or even by a return to one that is pre-modern. History, if it displays any pattern at all, may be cyclical rather than linear. Tocqueville himself, at one point in the *Democracy*, warns the "friends of democracy" to be wary lest the growth of a manufacturing class be accompanied by a return to a social condition marked by "a permanent inequality of conditions and aristocracy."[23] With this as a latent possibility in modern times, the inevitability and permanence of equality of conditions, of democracy, can scarcely be said to have been demonstrated.

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

[20] At the end of the *Democracy* (II, 351), Tocqueville emphasizes God's justice.

[21] *Ibid.*, I, 7.

[22] Lively, p. 33.

[23] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, II, 171. Whether the new social order will feature a traditional class structure is not clear; but it will be a condition of inequality and of aristocracy.

Tocqueville does not claim prescience in regard to the whole of the future. Instances abound, even within the *Democracy*, in which he disclaims any such competence. For example, speaking of the likelihood that the American federal government will increase its powers *vis-à-vis* the state governments, he remarks, "The future conceals the final result of this tendency and the events which may check, retard, or accelerate the changes I have described; I do not pretend to be able to remove the veil that hides them."[24] On the difficulty of determining whether a large republic can long endure, he notes, "For my own part, I think it imprudent for men who are every day deceived in relation to the actual and the present, and often taken by surprise in the circumstances with which they are most familiar, to attempt to limit what is possible and to judge the future."[25] Again, while discussing the final outcome of the struggle between the whites and the negroes in the South, Tocqueville comments, "The human mind may succeed in tracing a wide circle, as it were, which includes the future; but within that circle chance rules, and eludes all our foresight. In every picture of the future there is a dim spot which the eye of the understanding cannot penetrate."[26] We may question whether these examples controvert his thesis. At first sight they do not, for they refer only to that opaque area within a sphere whose circumference is defined by the limits of the historical process. Even the reintroduction of slavery after a lapse of a thousand years may be viewed as a temporary aberration, incapable in itself to affect or forestall the ultimate triumph of equality.[27] This may strike some as more than just ironic. Surely the decisive problem centers around the dimensions of, or rather the human possibilities within, the opaque area of which he speaks. If the range of possibilities excludes anything which goes beyond accelerating or retarding the course of history, the inevitability thesis may still stand, albeit somewhat shaken. But if, as in his example of the restoration of inequality of conditions through the effects of a capitalist revolution, the future contains surprises of a radical nature whose effects reach to the contours of the "fatal circle" itself, the thesis suffers a mortal blow.

Some hesitancy about the finality of the revolution toward equality is perceptible, then, even in the *Democracy*. When we turn to Tocqueville's memoirs and correspondence (as distinct from his public writings) the hesitancy becomes open and unreserved. To Mrs. Grote, in 1850, Tocqueville makes this confession:

> I learn from history, that not one of the men who witnessed the downfall of the religious and social organizations that have passed away, was able to guess or even to imagine what would ensue. Yet, this did not prevent Christianity from succeeding to idolatry, servitude to slavery, the barbarians from taking the place of Roman civilization, and feudalism in turn ejecting the barbarians. Each of these changes occurred without having been anticipated by any of the writers in the times immediately preceding these total revolutions. Who then can affirm that any one social system is essential, and that another is impossible?[28]

In the famous passage in the *Recollections* on the permanence of the institution of private property, it grieves Tocqueville to admit that "what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed, and that in matters of social constitution the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine."[29] And, in his anguished correspondence with Gobineau, Tocqueville unfolds a view of history having no reference to any inexorable march of social conditions:

> Do you really believe that by tracing the destiny of peoples along these [*i.e.*, racist] lines you can truly clarify history? And that our knowledge about humans becomes more certain as we abandon the practice followed since the beginning of time by the great minds who have searched to find the cause of human events in the influence of certain men, of certain emotions, of certain thoughts, and of certain beliefs?
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> If only your doctrine, without being better established than theirs, could serve mankind better! . . . After, for some time, one has ob-

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[24] *Ibid.*, I, 433.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 390–91.

[27] See, *e.g.*, *ibid.*, p. 371 and especially p. 397, "Slavery, now confined to a single tract of the civilized earth, attacked by Christianity as unjust and by political economy as prejudicial, and now contrasted with democratic liberty and the intelligence of our age, cannot survive."

[28] Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850, in *Memoir, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville* (2 vols.; Boston, Ticknor and Fields, 1862), II, 105.

[29] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville*, trans. Alexander de Mattos (New York, Meridian Books, 1959), p. 81.

served the way in which public affairs are conducted, do you think one can avoid the impression . . . that, in one word, the destiny of men, whether of individuals or of nations, depends on what they want to be?[30]

While such sentiments occur increasingly in the private papers of his later years, Tocqueville nevertheless maintains the inevitability thesis in his published works to the very last, through every opportunity of amending or rescinding it.

III

This is not the only paradox which confronts us in his thought. Tocqueville's public view, the inevitability thesis (that all have been blind instruments for the fulfillment of God's design), coexists uneasily with his abhorrence, equally public, of those "absolute systems, which represent all the events of history as depending upon great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, suppress men from the history of the human race."[31] Where he sought to reconcile these warring opinions, he resorted to the kind of formulation which with he concludes the *Democracy:*

> Providence has not created mankind entirely independent or entirely free. It is true that around every man a fatal circle is traced beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with man, so with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions of men from becoming equal, but it depends upon themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or wretchedness.[32]

This position is deceptively convincing if it is mistaken for the commonplace that man is never altogether free, imprisoned as he is within the confines and limitations imposed upon him, for example, by the form and structure of his body. For the cage of the body, however, Tocqueville substitutes the cage of history or of providence, and he does not advance our knowledge of how men and nations may be both blind instruments in the hands of God, and, within limits, free agents.

Nowhere in Tocqueville's work do we find an exposition which more than superficially explains how men may be both free and not free. The closest approximation occurs in the chapter in the *Democracy* on the distinguishing features of historians in democratic times.[33] Tocqueville contrasts two very different errors to which historians are prone: the exaggeration of the role of human freedom (common to both ancient and aristocratic writers) and, contrariwise, the reduction of freedom to a mere illusion (characteristic of democratic historians). Thus Tocqueville reproves the ancients for their failure to make sufficient use of general theories or historical systems, and historians of aristocratic eras for writing as if the actions of individuals were alone sufficient to account for the course of history; but the brunt of his criticism is directed against the democratic historians of his own time. These are the writers who, unable to "discern and analyze the reasons that, acting separately on the will of each member of the community, concur in the end to produce movement in the whole mass . . . are led to believe that this movement is involuntary, and that societies unconsciously obey some superior force."[34] Tocqueville is indifferent whether the insuperable force to which they have recourse as the driving agency is a transcendent one standing above society (an "inflexible Providence") or some "blind necessity" having its roots on earth, such as the origins of a people, or racial or climatic factors. In either case, "a cause sufficiently extensive to affect millions of men at once and sufficiently strong to bend them all together in the same direction may well seem irresistible; having seen that mankind do yield to it, the mind is close upon the inference that mankind cannot resist it."[35]

Refusing to draw this inference, Tocqueville maintains that in both aristocratic and democratic times general causes (*e.g.*, the march of democracy) and particular ones (*e.g.*, the will of individuals) are always operative, although their proportion varies; in democratic times, for example, although individual influences may be weaker they do exercise some influence upon a nation's history. Nevertheless, all that he can plausibly assert is that a genuine exercise of individual free will may come to be a reality at some future time. In the period associated with the democratic revolution all men have, by his own admission, been but agents of God's will; to attribute free will to men during this period is meaningless.[36] Tocqueville gives no reason for assuming that what has been true up to the present will cease to be so in the future; it would be strange to suppose that God would manipulate men for some six or seven hundred years in order to bring about a particular social condition, after which He would once again permit them to exercise their human freedom. Nor does Tocqueville make this assumption. If, then, we take seriously the inevitability thesis, the status of freedom in his thought is problematic, and, in this respect, Tocqueville does not differ from other historians of democratic times.

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[30] Tocqueville to Gobineau, Nov. 17, 1853, in Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineau*, ed. and trans. John Lukacs (Garden City, 1959), pp. 228–29.

[31] Tocqueville, *Recollections*, p. 64. The same sentiment is expressed in the *Democracy*, II, 90–93.

[32] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, II, 352.

[33] This chapter (II, Bk. 1, Ch. xx), in which Tocqueville criticizes tendencies in other writers from which he himself is not altogether free, is illustrative of a characteristic trait, perhaps deliberate, inducing the reader to reflect upon Tocqueville's own procedures. In the *Old Régime* (p. 161), for example, Tocqueville rebukes those who, following the fashion, see the hand of providence in everything, a fashion he had already foreseen in the *Democracy* (II, 79). He is similarly critical of the French addiction to general ideas (*ibid.*, p. 15), and even casts some doubt upon his own (*i.e.*, democratic) usage of the term "equality," (*ibid.*, pp. 73–74).

[34] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, II, 92.

[35] *Ibid.*

Yet the final significance of this chapter does not lie either in the merits of Tocqueville's arguments with democratic historians, or in his crude attempts to justify his own position. In truth, there are no arguments. In the chapter, he does little more than reject the consequences of a view of history in which there is no room for free will:

> If this doctrine of necessity, which is so attractive to those who write history in democratic ages, passes from authors to their readers till it infects the whole mass of the community and gets possession of the public mind, it will soon paralyze the activity of modern society and reduce Christians to the level of the Turks.[37]

If ancient historians failed to appreciate the significance of general causes, at least they are to be commended for teaching men "how to command"; democratic historians, on the contrary, teach only "how to obey."[38] The doctrines of the historians of Tocqueville's own day are particularly pernicious since they serve to reinforce the omnipresent feeling of helplessness characterizing modern man, and if they are not combatted they will frustrate the chief moral object of the time, namely, "to raise the faculties of men, not to complete their prostration."[39] Nevertheless, the deleterious effect upon society of a particular conception of history is not a sufficient proof of its inherent falsity; it may be true in spite of being harmful. Tocqueville, however, is satisfied to let his judgment of such a conception be derived from, or be equivalent to, his judgment of its consequences; he does not undertake to demonstrate the falsity of the view itself. To have done so would either have called into question his own inevitability thesis, or at least called more attention to its ambiguities and inconsistencies than he was willing to hazard.

It may be objected that it was the unresolved tension in his thought between the implications of the inevitability thesis, on the one hand, and of the insistence upon human freedom, on the other, which led Tocqueville to adopt Mill's explication of the problem of free will and necessity in the *System of Logic,* published just three years after the second and final part of the *Democracy,* as a solution to his own quandary. Indeed, upon reading the *Logic,* Tocqueville wrote to Mill, "The distinction you make between necessity as you understand it and *irresistibleness*, fatalism, is a burst of light. It seems to me that you open there a neutral ground upon which the two opposing schools or at least reasonable men from the two schools could easily meet and understand each other."[40] Mill had distinguished what he called the doctrine of necessity (one compatible with human freedom) from fatalism: "A Fatalist believes . . . not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of the causes which produce it (which is the true Necessitarian doctrine) but, moreover, that there is no use struggling against it; that it will happen however we may strive to prevent it."[41] That is to say, while the necessitarian acknowledges that every effect has a cause, he is prepared to argue that freedom, or the exercise of free choice, is itself a cause of the same rank as any other. Yet, whatever the merits of Mill's solution, it seems clear that Tocqueville's own account of the march of democracy is fatalistic (according to Mill's criteria) rather than necessitarian, at least as it is formulated in the introduction to the *Democracy*, and reaffirmed, as we have already noted, in the *Ancien Régime*. It is the essence of the fatalistic view that no human action can prevail against the course of things, and we may wonder if it is possible to place any other interpretation upon Tocqueville's view of the development of equality. He even confides that he is writing the *Democracy* under a kind of "religious awe" produced by the view of that "irresistible revolution that has advanced for centuries in spite of every obstacle and which is still advancing in the midst of the ruins it has caused."[42] Just as he had not availed himself of the opportunity offered by the several editions of the *Democracy* to reconcile his private doubt with his public profession of the inevitability thesis, so Tocqueville did not choose this means to purge from his formulation of the thesis its fatalistic overtones. On the contrary, five years after Mill's *Logic* appeared, he chose rather to reaffirm them in a new edition of the *Democracy*, and noted that the original work had been written "with a mind constantly occupied by a single thought—that the advent of democracy as a governing power in the world's affairs, *universal and irresistible*, was at hand."[43]

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[36] *Cf.* the following footnote, *ibid.*, pp. 386–87, "Men place the greatness of their idea of unity in the means, God in the ends; hence this idea of greatness, as men conceive it, leads us to infinite littleness. To compel all men to follow the same course towards the same object is a human conception; to introduce infinite variety of action, *but so combined that all these acts lead in a thousand different ways to the accomplishment of one great design, is a divine conception.*" (Italics mine.)

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] Tocqueville to Mill, Oct. 27, 1843, in Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. J. P. Mayer (Paris, Gallimard, 1951—), vol. VI, part I, p. 345.

[41] John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic* (London, Longmans, Green, 1919), p. 549.

IV

From the foregoing it appears that the paradoxes to which we have alluded cannot be accounted for by an appeal to a "change of view" that Tocqueville may have undergone over the course of the years;[44] nor can it be maintained that Tocqueville was not cognizant of them. Whatever his ultimate rationale, Tocqueville asserts the inevitability of the triumph of democracy in his major published works, the *Democracy* and the *Ancien Régime*, the one a work of his youth, the other, of his maturity. In addition, whatever doubts he expresses concerning this same victory of democracy appear principally either in works not intended for publication, such as his *Recollections*, or in private correspondence. We cannot, then, exclude the possibility that his failure to amend his published views was deliberate, and that he did not wish simply to clear up the ambiguities within his thought. We cannot escape the inference that the view he advances for public consumption is meant to edify; that, whatever its truth, it is a view in which it is good for men to believe; that, believing in it as an inescapable fact, they will direct their energies toward improving their lot within the context of democratic conditions, rather than dissipate their energies in a struggle to revivify an unjust social system.

Tocqueville's apparent neutrality between democracy and aristocracy did not preclude, as John Stuart Mill expressed it, "the deepest and steadiest concern for all the great interests, material and spiritual, of the human race."[45] Tocqueville is "anything but indifferent to the ends, to which all forms of government profess to be means."[46] His achievement was to have combined this deep concern with a perfectly balanced sense of scientific objectivity:

> When M. de Tocqueville says, that he studied America, not in order to disparage or to vindicate democracy, but in order to understand it, he makes no false claim to impartiality. Not a trace of prejudice, or so much as a previous leaning either to the side of democracy or aristocracy, shows itself in his work . . . between aristocracy and democracy he holds the balance straight, with all the impassibility of a mere scientific observer.[47]

Considering this achievement, it is precisely Tocqueville's devotion to the "great interests" which makes his neutrality all the more incomprehensible. Unless democracy and aristocracy were equally compatible with the enduring material and spiritual requirements of mankind (something he does not attempt to prove), it is difficult to see how his neutrality could be maintained, much less defended. To know the proper ends of man, to ascertain which social condition facilitates and which frustrates the fulfillment of this or that end, and then to adopt an air of indifference would reveal not only an extraordinary degree of scientific impassibility but also an equal degree of moral obtuseness. It seems safe to say that such a charge ought not to be presumptuously leveled at Tocqueville. In fact, it has been charged that his moral sensibilities threatened, rather, his dispassionate search after truth. His correspondence with Gobineau is sufficiently well known so that we need not refer to it here in support of the view that Tocqueville was less interested in the "philosophical merits of an idea" than in its "moral or political effects."[48] Moreover, to emphasize the truth of an idea at the expense of its moral and political effects was to confuse the requirements of theory with those of practice, of which we shall have more to say below.

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[42] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, I, 7.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. ix. (Italics mine).

[44] In the *Old Régime* (pp. xiv–xv), after reproducing views he held at the time of the *Democracy*, Tocqueville adds, "Such were my views and thus I wrote twenty years ago, and nothing that has taken place in the world since then has led me to change my mind." If he *had* changed his mind, at least he was not anxious to publicize that fact.

[45] Mill, "De Tocqueville on Democracy in America," p. xiii.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.*

To allege that Tocqueville was prepared to urge men to acquiesce in the democratic revolution simply because it had succeeded or was in the process of succeeding the aristocratic social system would be to charge him not only with still another inconsistency but with gross moral hypocrisy besides. Consider the objections that Tocqueville himself makes against the Hegelian identification of what is with what is right:

> [Hegel's] doctrines asserted that, in a political sense, all established facts ought to be submitted to as legitimate; and that the very circumstance of their existence was sufficient to make obedience to them a duty. . . . From this Pandora's box have escaped all sorts of moral diseases from which the people is still suffering.[49]

Moreover, from other portions of his correspondence we learn that even if the evidence to support the inevitability of equality of conditions were altogether incontrovertible, this in itself would not determine for Tocqueville *his* posture with respect to the inevitable event—he might still prefer to sacrifice himself for a noble, if moribund, cause. Thus, he writes to Mrs. Grote, "It is no less the duty of honest people to stand up for the only system which they understand and even to die for it, if a better be not shown to them."[50] And, to Corcelle, Tocqueville wholly rejects success as a criterion for obedience: "I rejoice to find, as time goes on, that I am not one of those who naturally bow before success. The more a cause seems to be abandoned, the more passionately I become attached to it."[51] Yet, how may we reconcile these sentiments with the text of the *Democracy* where Tocqueville equates piety with obedience to the unfolding course of human history? What Tocqueville is not prepared to do himself, he recommends, even makes mandatory, for others. The charge of hypocrisy cannot be obviated unless it can be shown that the cause before which he would have men bow was itself just, and if just, then salutary also. If the end was just, then the propagation of a thesis designed to facilitate its realization was beneficent, even if the thesis itself was false. So, we believe, Tocqueville thought.

It is only on the hypothesis that the thesis is meant to serve a just end that the various paradoxes which surround it may be resolved, or Tocqueville's deliberate failure to resolve them find an explanation.[52] His inevitability thesis was free from the evils associated with the Hegelian Pandora's box because a democratic revolution would, if properly controlled and directed, eventuate in a social and political system which was intrinsically just, independent of any vindication through the historical process. The inevitability thesis has, then, the status of a salutary myth; the propagation of such a salutary myth is wholly consistent with other strains of his thought, most notably with his defense of spiritualistic myths designed to restrain certain unwholesome features of democracy.[53] Tocqueville saw no inconsistency in the advocacy of both democracy and "democratic" myths when he considered that democracy unavoidably places sovereignty in the hands of those who, in his view, "will either believe they know not wherefore, or will not know what to believe."[54]

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[48] Tocqueville to Gobineau, Dec. 20, 1853, in *The European Revolution,* p. 232.

[49] Tocqueville to M. de Corcelle, July 22, 1854, in *Memoir,* II, 260.

[50] Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850, in *Memoir,* II, 105.

[51] Tocqueville to M. de Corcelle, Oct. 23, 1854, in *Memoir,* II, 271.

[52] A demonstration that Tocqueville regarded democracy as the only just regime cannot occupy us here. In addition to what is offered below, consider, among others, the chapter on "honor" in the *Democracy* (II, 242–255), and *e.g.*, the following from Tocqueville's "France Before the Revolution," (*Memoir,* I, 246):

> "According to the modern concept, the democratic, and, I venture to say, the true concept of liberty, each man, being presumed to have received from nature the necessary intelligence to conduct his own life, derives from birth an equal and indefeasible right to live uncontrolled by his fellows in all that concerns his own affairs, and to regulate as he wishes his own destiny.
>
> From the moment when this notion of liberty has penetrated deeply into the minds of the people, and has solidly established itself there, absolute and arbitrary power is thenceforth but a usurpation or an accident; for, if no one is under any moral obligation to submit to another, it follows that the sovereign will can rightfully emanate only from the union of the wills of the whole." (Translation slightly amended.)

[53] See, *e.g.*, Lively, p. 199, and the present writer's "Alexis de Tocqueville," in *History of Political Philosophy,* ed. Strauss and Cropsey (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 674–75.

V

Tocqueville writes with full consciousness of the requirements of political practice; his first consideration is always the salutary effect upon society of his thought. It is as a statesman writing for statesmen that Tocqueville is to be understood. If he does not develop his position to the degree and precision appropriate to a philosophic treatise, it is because of his deep awareness of the disproportion between the requirements of a contemplative life and those of a life of action:

> The habits of mind that are suited to an active life are not always suited to a contemplative one. The man of action is frequently obliged to content himself with the best he can get because he would never accomplish his purpose if he chose to carry every detail to perfection. He has occasion perpetually to rely on ideas that he has not had leisure to search to the bottom: *for he is much more frequently aided by the seasonableness of an idea than by its strict accuracy; and in the long run he risks less in making use of some false principles than in spending his time in establishing all his principles on the basis of truth.* The world is not led by long and learned demonstrations; a rapid glance at particular incidents, the daily study of the fleeting passions of the multitude, the accidents of the moment, and the art of turning them to account decide all its affairs.[55]

Tocqueville, we suggest, brings to his contemplative tasks the habits of mind suited to an active life; or, rather, it is in the light of the requirements of political life, primarily, that he undertakes his own contemplative tasks. Seen in this light, we may say that he sought to resolve the political conflict of his own time (perhaps the political conflict of all time), the question of the just social order—rule by the few or the many—and to resolve it in such a way as to disengage political passions already at a feverish, unyielding pitch. To attempt a frontal defense of democracy as the only just social system would, in such circumstances, only have exacerbated the differences between the democrats or liberals and the aristocrats, those who constituted the most immediate addressees of his work. Assigning the defense of democracy to history or providence removes Tocqueville from the partisan fray.

The inevitability thesis is, then, the screen behind which he maintains his neutrality, while his neutrality is not only compatible with, but actively promotes the cause of democracy. Whatever undermines the inevitability thesis undermines his neutrality and the cause of democracy as well. For these reasons, Tocqueville saw fit not to remove from his formulation of the thesis such ambiguities as we have explored; for these reasons, also, the inevitability thesis persists as the most conspicuous premise of his published works. By this procedure, he hoped to accomplish two additional ends: the energies of those already committed to the principle of equality were to be channeled into the constructive tasks necessitated by the new social condition, while the partisans of the old order were to be converted, if not into zealous proselytes, then into begrudging aides in the cause of perfected democracy. Perhaps we have only to take seriously what Tocqueville himself said of his enterprise in a letter to his friend Eugéne Stoffels, a month after the publication of the first part of the *Democracy*:

> I tried to diminish the ardor of [the Republican party], and without discouraging them, to show them the only road to take. I attempted to diminish the terrors of [the aristocrats] *and to bend their will to the idea of the inevitable future,* in such a way that the one being less impetuous and the others offering less resistance, society could advance more perfectly toward the necessary realization of its destiny. Here is the master idea of the work.[56]

We may add one final observation. Tocqueville's neutral stance between democracy and aristocracy did not strike every observer as favorably as it did Mill. Paul Janet, writing just after Tocqueville's death, criticizes Tocqueville for having occupied himself overmuch with questions of fact and with brushing aside questions of right: "He [Tocqueville] examined what are historically the good or bad consequences, happy or unhappy, of Democracy. He did not try to find out if democracy, taken by itself, is a just cause."[57] On the contrary, it can be shown that Tocqueville did undertake to answer the "question of right," that his answer did not lie in obsequious deference to the verdict of history (almost all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding), and, curiously, that his judgment was not significantly different from the one Janet himself makes:

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[54] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, I, 196.

[55] *Ibid.*, II, 44. (Italics mine.)

[56] Tocqueville to Eugène Stoffels, Feb. 21, 1835, in *Oeuvres Complètes*, pub. par Mme. de Tocqueville, ed. Beaumont (9 vols.; Paris, Michel Levy, 1864–67), V, 426–27. The original is perhaps stronger than the translation conveys: "J' ai cherché à diminuer les terreurs des seconds et *à plier leur volonté sous l'idée d'un avenir inévitable.*" (Italics mine.)

[57] Paul Janet, "Alexis de Tocqueville et la science politique aux xix^e siecle," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 34 (1861), p. 117.

> Democracy, taken by itself, is a just cause. Popular sovereignty and equality of conditions are principles which can be abused, corrupted, badly understood, badly applied, but in the end legitimate principles, good by themselves, and a society founded on these principles is superior, everything else being equal, to those which are founded on opposite principles.[58]

It can be argued that however much Tocqueville tended to conceal this judgment through the apparatus of historical inevitability (for the reasons cited above), the legitimacy of the principle of equality was the starting point of his reflections, and the occasion for his concern about the abiding needs of mankind. It is indicative of the caution with which he wrote that he reserved his most forthright indictment of aristocracy for the chapter with which he concludes the first part of the *Democracy*, a chapter which almost seems to be an appendix to the main body of the work, and one which bears the unwieldy and misleading title, "The Present and Probable Future Condition of the Three Races that Inhabit the Territory of the United States":

> An aristocratic body is composed of a certain number of citizens who, without being very far removed from the mass of the people, are nevertheless permanently stationed above them; a body which it is easy to touch, and difficult to strike with which the people are in daily contact, but with which they can never combine. *Nothing can be imagined more contrary to nature and to the secret instincts of the human heart than a subjection of this kind*. . . . Aristocratic institutions cannot exist without laying down the inequality of man as a fundamental principle, legalizing it beforehand and introducing it into the family as well as into society; *but these are things so repugnant to natural equity that they can only be extorted from men by force*.[59]

Democracy was just, in fact the only just social condition, but it did not necessarily coincide with a condition of human excellence or with what is highest in man. The recognition of this fact did not alter Tocqueville's judgment of the intrinsic rightfulness of democracy. Traditionally, it is true, justice was seen as equivalent to or as an expression of human excellence. But, in a striking passage at the end of the *Democracy*, Tocqueville acknowledges his acquiescence in the modern separation of justice and excellence and his acceptance of the claim of justice to autonomous status in spite of the separation: "A state of equality is perhaps less elevated, but it is more just: and its justice constitutes its greatness and its beauty."[60] This state of things "afflicts" him and all of his efforts may be said to begin with the judgment Janet says he fails to make, and to be directed toward the reintegration of justice and human excellence within the framework of modern democracy.

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[58] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[59] Tocqueville, *Democracy*, I, 438. (Italics mine.)

[60] *Ibid.*, II, 351.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT[1]

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between two concepts which have lately enjoyed an increasing popularity among students of the politics of the developing areas. A couple of arbitrary definitions might dispose of the problem in facile fashion, but our present interest is neither in systematic abstraction nor in generalizing the significance of narrow-gauge empirical research. The method pursued rests upon the assumption that both national integration and political development are situationally bound phenomena. Hence, the conclusions drawn from the present exploration are meant to have a temporary, but practical relevance. Because of this assumption, arriving at an appropriate understanding of the problem of national integration in relation to political development is the goal rather than the starting point of this paper. As in the case of any concrete problem, this one too is multi-faceted so that any simple definition can only convey one aspect of it. Yet various aspects need to be presented. Once these are in view, the problem of definition may then be described as that of putting all these aspects into a coherent relationship. That relationship, if successful, should offer us a theoretical framework for further analysis. In this sense all the pieces of our puzzle should fall into place at the end. Of these, in our view, the most troublesome are the search for administrative effectiveness, the relationship between national identity and personal identity, and the role of special elites in social mobilization. In attempting to learn what the words national integration and political development mean, the works of many authors have been consulted, but those of Rupert Emerson, Lucian Pye, and Edward Shils have been found especially helpful. Nevertheless, for purposes of general formulation and basic approach Gaetano Mosca's *The Ruling Class* has proved most valuable.

I

The growth of mass political parties, the proliferation of secondary interest associations, the emergence of a mass electorate and the great expansion of government activities have characterized political development in Europe and in North America. In other parts of the world, these changes have been paralleled by the single mobilizing party and its mass-line organizations, by the subordination of occupational and regional groups to similarly differentiated administrative structures, and by the creation of organs for central planning and direct management of industrial and commercial enterprises.

These salient features of recent political change in both the developed and underdeveloped areas do not encompass the whole description of the changes, but they suggest two things which may serve as starting points for our inquiry. They indicate, first, that change has occurred in many areas of political concern; and second, that, despite divergences of style, ideological orientation, and circumstances, there may be common features to the political changes occurring. If there are common features, it should be possible to characterize more concisely what is inherently similar about diversely changing situations. It should also be possible to state more clearly the direction of such changes. Insofar as it may be agreed that political change has "direction" during any historical period, it is then valid to use the term political development as a more appropriate specification of the more general term "political change."

At present there is little agreement among scholars as to the meaning or direction of political development. Already, at this early stage of concern about it, a number of quite individualistic central concepts have been put forward as characterizing the essence of political development. Some of these are the restructuring of society, the acquisition of new political capabilities, adaptations of mass-theory to pre-industrial societies, ontological change, improvements in organizational technology, social mobilization, and a communications revolution. The one feature common to all these attempts to define political development is the teleological emphasis. It is assumed in all these cases that we know what political development, as a terminal state, looks like. But direction may be given by an open-ended social process as well as by some irresistibly magnetic pole. It is preferable to search for the meaning of political development in terms of an open-ended process that we know is going on rather than in terms of some speculative terminal state.

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[1] A preliminary version of this paper was read before the seminar on the Comparative Study of New Nations at the University of Chicago. A revised version was read before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City, September, 1963.

II

Two ongoing processes claim our attention as guides to the study of political development: the first is the effort of bureaucratized organizations to improve the material conditions of their countries, and the second is the process of national integration. Often enough, both processes are seen as one, but which is the prerequisite of the other is not a matter of complete indifference.

Despite great concern with development, progress in development is hardly measured except in terms of the statistical annuals of the UN. The unproven assumption has been that the more the new nations come to look like us in terms of these statistics the more they will be like us in the things that count. What it is that counts is left quite obscure, but is doubtless a matter of values. At the same time, once national integration is justified as a means toward these greater ends we may proceed to examine the activies of a variety of organizations with a view to studying the process of integration.

When we examine the role of armies in underdeveloped countries, the role of bureaucracies, the role of single party systems, and the role of charismatic leadership, all tend to be evaluated in terms of a functionalist theory which draws less on Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown than it does on Mannheim and the theory of complex organizations. We can justify too much here. Armies, bureaucracies, and single mobilizational parties are praised because they take over activities which are otherwise poorly carried out. It is as an adjunct of such activities that they also carry out integrative activities. Integration thus becomes a means to certain well defined ends. These ends are not the vague one of development but the organizationally determined goals of running the trains on time, collecting taxes, and preventing citizens from urinating on the walls of government buildings. Integration may become no more than a predictable responsiveness to initiatives from certain bureaucratized organizations. Legitimacy may become no more than an extension of organizational norms or, alternatively, of the values of those recruited into organizational roles. The question may then arise as to whether integration is a function performed by such organizations because of the absence of environmental circumstances congenial to the successful operation of the government or whether such extra-organizational responsibilities may not be assumed in order to make sure that no rival structures come into being. Are we justified in assuming the working of another unseen hand here, in the sense that any modern, bureaucratized organization seeking to protect its own interest in an extremely fluid situation will benefit the society of which it is a part by enhancing the society's integration while at the same time pursuing its own interest?

If it is true that development depends upon integration then it follows that the pattern of development, its success and its failure, are similarly dependent. As there are significant differences among developed states so can we expect that development for the new nations will have a variety of outcomes. This is why it is well to bear in mind that the problem of development is interesting only if we assert that both the United States and the Soviet Union are developed states. Political development is not only dependent upon integration in the sense that the possible types of political systems which may emerge are the consequence of degrees of failure in integration; successful integration may also result in diverse types of developed political systems. It may even be possible that integration will take place without material or administrative development.

This discussion of the relationship between two notions of political development, between national integration and the effective working of bureaucratized organizations, raises a deeper question. The problem is not merely one of sequence and causality. In fact, to state the issue as one of which must come first may be distorting. In any given historical situation it may be impossible to disentangle the two processes. The effort to achieve administrative efficiency affects national integration and vice versa. Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize an effective bureaucracy and an integrated nation independently of one another. If the two are interdependent as processes, they are not yet directly and wholly dependent. The deeper question raised by this discussion is whether the end product—an integrated nation—is variable. Can an efficient, rational, bureaucratic elite determine a national ideology, the pattern of elite-mass relationship, and the set of national goals, without regard to the pattern of traditional values and traditional social structure? Can an efficient bureaucracy be established without concessions to those values and that structure? How badly must traditional patterns have been mauled by imperialism before they become completely inoperative in the process of development?

This question touches upon the relationship between two kinds of theory, between the theory of bureaucracy and the theory of nationalism; but in more concrete terms, it concerns the political relationship between a modernizing elite and a traditional mass, one of the key political issues in all developing countries. This is the issue of national integration.

III

In the Punjab three opposing communities, each of which offers some aspects of nationality to the observer, may be differentiated according to religion. There was a common language. Why did not a Punjab nationalism emerge? Why do some Christian and Muslim Arabs decide that they are Arabs and others decide that they are Syrians or Lebanese? Is a South Indian a Tamil or a Dravidian? Can any but the Baganda be real Ugandans? Will Azeris feel that they are Persian when they become modernized? Why did the Jews in Germany think they were Germans while the Jews in Canada had doubts about their Canadianness? There are specific historical answers to each of these questions, but is there any room for more general statements? If there is none, then national identity is simply the sum of individual identity decisions. To put the issue in more general form: is it possible to discern any objective limits to the size and composition of a community which can share a particular national identity, or does the national community vary with the formulation of definitions of national identity?

Studies of western nationalism are not usually concerned with this question. Concern with nationalism as an ideology has raised the question of why nationalism emerges; but it has rarely been noticed that the group to which a nationalistic formula might be applied is itself variable. It has usually been assumed that nations were real, tangible, and limited things; that they had social if not territorial boundaries. Whatever might have been the case in Europe, the assumption of well defined nations outside of Europe is certainly not warranted. It is precisely for this reason that the open-endedness of the process of national integration has been stressed.

Of all the writers on European politics, Gaetano Mosca has thrown the most light on the effect of political development on national integration and on the general relationship between these two processes.[2] Our question regarding the objective limitation of the national community may be easily translated into Mosca's terminology. In those terms, we have asked whether the "social type" determines the nature of the "political formula," or whether the "political formula" determines the "social type." Mosca's social type is the dominant social group (or class or demographic category) in the political community. His political formula is a legitimizing doctrine. Diverse social types may coexist within a single system, but usually not without some tension. There can ordinarily be no more than one political formula which is both legitimate and effective (in the sense of corresponding to some substantial extent with the distribution of power in the system). A closer examination of Mosca's views will demonstrate two important points.

The first is that while political formula and social type are related in all systems, each combination of the two has unique qualities. It is possible and useful to classify social structural types and patterns of political legitimacy and hence to find parallels among various countries. On the other hand, an over-emphasis upon these similarities diverts our attention from the diverse paths by which these combinations come into being and obscures the special meaning which the political formula may have for each social type. The second point is that the relationship between political formula and social type has changed over time. It is in regard to this change that political development and national integration are directly related.

On the relationship between the political formula and the social type Mosca wrote:

> Mankind is divided into social groups each of which is set apart from other groups by beliefs, sentiments, habits, and interests that are peculiar to it . . . the political formula must be based upon the special beliefs and the strongest sentiments of the social group in which it is current, or at least upon the beliefs and sentiments of the particular portion of that group which holds political preeminence.[3]

The major difficulty with this passage is the too flat assertion that mankind is divided into social types. One of the most attractive features of the term social type, in my view, is that in avoiding the term nation it is possible to suggest that there are all kinds of social types, some of them overlapping, and only some of which will express their solidarity and interests in a political formula. The question of which social types will become politically relevant, especially in an underdeveloped polity, is a question for study. The second difficulty in the passage cited is that the relationship of the political formula to the beliefs and sentiments of those *not* politically preeminent is for the time being ignored. As in the case of the term social type, the usefulness of the term political formula resides in its lack of sharp definition. It is not merely a theory of legitimacy but may be a whole theory of the polity. This point is particularly important when the definition of the political formula is up for grabs, as at the time of decolonization.

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[2] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York, 1958). Originally published in 1896.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

Returning now to Mosca, we find that he did not long neglect the problem of the relationship of the political formula to the beliefs and sentiments of non-elites. He first writes of how subject peoples are assimilated to the dominant political formula: transplantation, religious propaganda, offering a higher level of culture. But these devices do not always work, and when they do not we may have a state in which several social types coexist. Each of these social types will develop a politically aspirant elite. To avoid political difficulty, Mosca holds that the ruling class must be drawn from the dominant social type. Exactly what he means by dominant is, however, obscured by his discussion. He makes much more sense when he goes on to discuss cases in which differences in social type are not so obvious. These occur

> whenever the political formula, . . . is not accessible to the lower classes, or when the complex of beliefs and moral and philosophical principles that underlie the formula have not sunk deeply enough into the consciousness of the more populous and less well educated strata of society. The same thing occurs when there is any considerable difference between the customs, culture and habits of the ruling class and those of the governed class.[4]

The aristocratic and anti-Marxist predilections of Mosca are well known; nevertheless his European concerns and his own social context need not deflect us from noticing that he is here concerned with the same problem that we have before us. He is concerned with the same kind of social gap.

A particular political formula may or may not represent modernity, but its capacity to bring into being a new social type cannot be based upon that which is objectively common to all similar political formulas. What does Mosca say?

> The political formula can hardly be the same in two or more different societies; and fundamental or even notable similarities between two or more political formulas appear only where the peoples professing them have the same type of civilization (or to use an expression which we shall shortly define—belong to the same social type). According to the level of civilization in the peoples among whom they are current, the various political formulas may be based either upon supernatural beliefs or upon concepts which, if they do not correspond to positive realities, at least appear to be rational . . . that does not mean that political formulas are mere quackeries . . . . The truth is they answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need . . . of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force . . . .[5]

Mosca would, therefore, have the political formula fulfill three requirements: it must conform to the cultural peculiarities of the political community; it must accord with the level of civilization of that community or with the ontological character of its *Weltanschauung;* and it must accord with prevailing ideas concerning the ethical basis of political obligation. In many ways modern nationalism has done away with the need to be concerned with the ethical basis of political obligation, because it postulates the legitimacy of a political community which coincides with a social type. The real tension must, therefore, arise between the cultural peculiarity of the political formula and its culturally neutral ontological foundation. In Mosca's terms, the tension in the formula is between its reflections of the type and of the level of civilization which characterize the dominant social type.

Mosca's concept of the social type was broad enough to include not only nationality but also social class. If, as Shils points out, social class differences are paralleled by cultural differences, or as Mosca might say differences in civilization, is it not sensible to expect that not only habits and sentiments will differ (as in the case of bourgeois and working class patterns of life) and not only will material interests differ (as in the case of the interest of landowners and tenants) but that beliefs about the nature of authority and the duties of government will differ also? More important for our present inquiry, is it not possible that the definitions of the nation or community or social type will differ?

Mosca believed that modernization had enhanced the tension between the type and the level of civilization. In his view, that aspect of modernization which sociologists call "structural differentiation" has resulted in the creation of new social types. The more modern social types will doubtless produce rational political formulas, but these will fail to bridge the gap between the dominant social type and the rest of society. It is apparent that Mosca believed that class differences would supersede cultural ties. He also believed that the culture of the urban elites would never adequately penetrate the rural and underdeveloped regions. He believed that the culture and hence the political formula of the dominant classes would be more rational than it has been. Especially in the underdeveloped areas, the link between political formula and *Weltanschauung* may therefore be tenuous.

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 106–7.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Mosca's theory of the effect of sociological modernization on national integration may be reconstructed from the following quotations:

> As a rule it is the very ancient political formulas, complexes of beliefs and sentiments which have the sanction of the ages, that succeed in making their way into the lowest strata of human societies. On the other hand, when rapid flows of ideas agitate the higher classes, or the more active intellectual centers, which are generally located in the large cities, the lower classes and the outlying districts of a state are likely to be left behind, and differing social types tend to form inside the society.[6]

> . . . disparities in intellectual cultivation and difference in language, habits, and family customs also have their importance.[7]

> Disparities in upbringing among various social classes are likely to become more marked in bureaucratized societies. In societies of feudal type the individual members of the ruling class are generally sprinkled about among their followers. They live in constant contact with them and have to be in a sense, their natural leaders.[8]

> When the elementary needs of life are to an extent satisfied, what mostly contributes to creating and maintaining friction and ill-feeling between the various classes is . . . membership in two different environments.[9]

> In a society that is broken up into virtually independent fragments, the heads of the individual groups have to be energetic, resourceful men.[10]

In these quotations we have the gist of Mosca's theory.

Let us take note of certain peculiarities in that theory. In the first place Mosca, like other elite and mass society theorists, holds that the gap is a product of modernization. In the second place, while asserting that there was no gap between the rulers and the ruled in a traditional or feudalistic society, he also weakens the notion of a single social type by talking of the virtually independent fragments of that traditional society. Thirdly, he does not appear to believe that the gap can ever be closed. This is in keeping with the view that the gap is the product of modernity and not of a transitional state. His solution is to provide the state with a ruling class which has *virtu* and to keep that class up to its tasks by admitting members of the lower classes to its ranks.

Mosca chose to glorify the feudal elite rather than the simple peasant, and this goes far to explain why he was not too concerned over closing the gap. This same aristocratic emphasis led him to ignore the fact that the necessary coincidence of political formula and social type was not a scientific law of politics but an historical phenomenon of modern times, the product of the politicization of the masses which he himself noted to be characteristic of revolution.[11] To put this point somewhat differently we may argue that the social type which determines the political formula is the dominant social type, but the political formula so determined need not be an exclusive one. It need not have exclusive reference to the ruling class, but may link the political elite and the mass.

It bears repeating that Mosca did not believe that the gap could be closed. If he urged the admission of members of the lower classes into the ruling class, that was to invigorate the ruling class and to remind it that the masses were not merely simple, good-hearted fellows. The ruling class has to have an accurate idea of what the masses are like.

At the end, therefore, Mosca's is not a theory of the creation of a polity through the gradual forging of a social type. In all modern states the ruling class is itself a social type and the political formula the rationalization of its dominance over other social types. We can only take certain things from Mosca, therefore, that will help us in our investigation. We can accept the loosely defined ideas of the political formula and social type, the close relationship of elite and mass in traditional society, the emergence of a gap in bureaucratized society, the lack of integration in traditional society which is the result of structural compartmentalization. We note also that social structural compartmentalization cuts across and does not necessarily widen the gap produced by modernization. We note further that modernization produces the need for political formula and social type to coincide in some way; and finally we see that a modern society needs some special means of connection between the elite and the mass.

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[11] *Idem.*

IV

Extrapolating from our analysis of Mosca's views, we might conclude that it is characteristic of recent history that political elites have become more homogeneous while the masses have remained relatively heterogeneous. This development has made it more difficult to maintain the links between elite and mass, and can be compensated for only by providing for the circulation of elites. Despite Mosca's admission of social class as the basis of social type, his emphasis is rather on the functional specialization of the ruling class. Thus, the consequence of the circulation of elites is not that members of diverse social types rule, but that social type and political function change with the entry of new personnel into the ruling class. Mosca, therefore, differs from Marx, who held that with the decline of feudalism the functional specialization of the ruling class as rulers also declined. According to Marx the modern ruling class is something else in addition to being the rulers. This something else may be defined in terms of the mode of production, but why not in terms of other characteristics such as language, religion, geographical origin, and ethnic background? Insofar as the ruling class is prone to (ideological) false consciousness, might its members not as easily respond to vertical linkages with parts of a traditionally oriented mass as to horizontal linkages to other members of the ruling class? Mosca would describe such a situation as representing a multiplicity of social types within a single polity. The problem of national integration is thus one of the forging of a single social type out of this multiplicity.

Karl Deutsch does not view the increasing homogeneity of elites as the outstanding characteristic of recent political history. He argues rather from the tendency of latent nationalities to emerge and seek appropriate leadership.[12] In his view, new social types are developing among the mass as a consequence of the process of social mobilization. His elites compete in attempting to express the aspirations of the latent nation; and those which succeed simply hasten, by making manifest, a social process which is essentially autonomous of government control. Elites are the instrument of history, they do not make it. Nor are elites characterized in terms of the process of social mobilization; they are rather seen in Mosca's terms as functionally specialized and juxtaposed to the mass. Significantly, Deutsch does not seriously consider the possibility that an elite may so control the network and content of social communications that it may forge a social type according to its own predilection.

At any rate, so long as the mass remains tied to tradition and heterogeneous in social type the possible direction of national integration (or social typification) is limited. Mosca did not say much about "social typification" because he held that where there was a state, there was necessarily a single dominant social type. For him the elite is that dominant social type. Deutsch might argue that the dominant social type seeks out and chooses the ruling class. Lenin theorized that a properly organized elite could forge a social type. The most extreme view is that of Kornhauser, who holds that the tendency of recent history is for both mass and elite to be completely loosened from any fixed social, ideological or economic moorings.[13] Industrialization, urbanization and the inevitable passing of tradition render "masses available" and "elites accessible." Under such circumstances, the study of the process of social typification is like sailing rudderless in an uncharted sea. Kornhauser's theory of mass society, though describing a political condition which challenges credibility, provides yet another definition of political development. Happily, however, this theory is not yet applicable to the emerging nations whose masses are still heterogeneously traditional and whose elites are still ambivalently modern. The key assertion of the theory of mass society is that industrialization, urbanization and modern war can destroy social type identifications. We are rather concerned with the creation of modern social types and coincident political formulas where they have not heretofore existed.

V

National integration, then, requires that the gap between elites and non-elites be closed. The production of a political formula which will define the new social type comprised of both elites and non-elites may help in closing this gap. But a modern polity requires a political formula which is apparently rational as well as effective in linking leaders and followers. Social type and political formula are neither completely fluid nor rigidly predictable. Within the framework of a given culture and given historical circumstances there are probably several alternatives open. The critical test is whether the formula defines a national group which is meaningful in terms of the experience of the people concerned. Since nationalism has become *the* rationale of the modern developing state, the primary issue to be resolved is one of identity. Individual identity resolutions will affect definitions of national identity. Hence the sociological characteristics of elites are most important, not in determining who gets what, but in predicting the kind of political formula that will be produced and the possibilities for national integration. To pursue these points, we shall briefly examine the ways in which Pye and Emerson deal with the problem of identity.

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[12] K. W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), pp. 75–6.

[13] W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, 1959).

Lucian Pye cuts deeply into the subject, but does not draw conclusions from all of the points he sets forth.[14] His emphasis is upon the problem of identity and his insistence that the problem of modernization depends upon people learning how to get along in bureaucratized organizations. He sees Burmese politicians as exponents of integration, and bureaucrats as exponents of development, but both are considered from the viewpoint of identity and personality adjustment. Politicians are unsympathetic to the role of bureaucracies while bureaucrats, for a variety of reasons, are unable to adapt themselves fully to the norms of their own organizations. The consequence, insofar as bureaucrats relax into traditional ways, is that modern style organizations may become mutants of other traditional, feudalistic, structures. Certainly in Egypt something of the sort has occurred in certain government enterprises. If Pye is correct we may ask whether or not it makes any real difference whether leadership is captured by bureaucrats or held by the leaders of the national party. Development, after all, is not simply a matter of pulling up one's socks.

Pye seems not to be centrally concerned about whether the resolution of identity problems will result in *national* integration, which will then permit easier goal determination, which will in turn permit effective bureaucratic operation. In general, his approach is interesting because he treats identity as an individual problem, the resolution of which has nothing to do with national integration but rather concerns integration of the individual's own personality. Personal integration permits the individual to become more effective, and enables him to act more efficiently in a bureaucratic organization.

Pye's emphasis upon organizational norms, while precise and limited enough on the surface, has its roots in Parsonian theory as derived from Weber. Manifestly, organizational norms can only be sustained in a rational-instrumental culture. Starting from the contemporary justification of the acts of bureaucracies, armies and single parties, Pye argues that modernization can only be achieved through organizations which are already in some sense modern. Then he notes that these organizations have not been very effective. The reason is because individual members suffer from identity problems. They are not wholly modern either. But the society they wish to modernize is also not modern, and therefore is not wholly malleable. The major conclusion we get from Pye is that national integration follows rather than precedes political development or modernization. Personality integration precedes both.

We may contrast Emerson's treatment of the identity crisis with that of Pye.[15] For Emerson, whose primary academic interest has always been nationalism, identity is essentially a problem of nationalism; or at least nationalism is a problem of identity. This conclusion results from his long and conscientious searching of nationalist theories, which left him convinced of their emptiness of any common content other than the psychological. For Emerson, the sudden emergence of transplanted nationalist doctrine is the central feature of all the variety of problems associated with political development. His argument is compelling, if only because nationalism sets the framework of the political system—and consequently—of the economy and of the society which are to be developed. Legitimacy and the moral justification of authority are similarly conditioned.

Emerson argues that nationalism is the psychological response of the people of the new nations to the impact of the west. This response is a sense of being different. When he looks to the consequences of this identity crisis, Emerson is not concerned with the ability of the individual to perform the tasks involved in development, as is Pye. These consequences are, however, stated in terms common to most observers of the underdeveloped scene. The consequences are policy consequences, policies which are common to nearly all of the political leaders of the new nations. Pye, Emerson, and Shils all agree that these leaders are bent on development and modernization. Despite his emphasis upon national rather than personal identity, Emerson is so disenchanted with nationalist strivings as to imply that there is no important unique content to specific nationalisms. The identity which is to be achieved, in other words, is not differentiated from all similar national identities. Nor is this positition arbitrary. It is argued as the basis of Emerson's whole position on the consequences of nationalism for political development. Emerson vigorously denies that there may be any *a priori* determination of the political or territorial consequences of nationalism. Nationalism may have certain objective referents but historically cannot be shown to have had operative objective criteria. Neither language, religion, history, traditional culture, nor the implicit assumption of democracy have been shown to be the empirical source of nationalism. This is an essential point and one to which we must return.

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[14] L. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building* (New Haven, 1962).

[15] R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, 1962.)

VI

Shils starts out with the generally agreed assertion that the elites of new nations are committed to development and modernization. He holds, perhaps too flatly, that the model of modernity is the civil society of the constitutional, democratic west. His view of the prospects for development is overwhelmingly pessimistic. "Under these conditions, some *adaptation* of the system of political democracy is made inevitable."[16] On the matters we have earlier discussed he is all too brief, and by implication (a not altogether fair procedure) we believe that he does not place much importance upon them. Personality is treated only under the very restricted heading of individuality, and that is put in contrast to western notions of the dignity of the individual. *E.g.*, "Traditionality and hierarchy: These deprive the human being of opportunities to exercise his capacities for individual choice."[17] Or, "The religious orientation . . . involves . . . the annihilation of the concrete self."[18] In a cultural system such as that described, one may question whether or not the problem of identity arises at all. On the question of nationalism, Shils is even more pessimistic: "Nationalism will not overcome parochialism except transiently, at moments of crises."[19]

The main thrust of Shils's analysis is that national integration will not take place, but that the demand for modernization is so great that bureaucratized organizations will diverge from the goal of the civil polity in order to achieve some measure of modernity. He is not concerned with whether or not they will succeed in developing; he is more interested in the type of regime that will be produced by failures to integrate and failures to modernize. Nevertheless, we may agree that he certainly does strongly urge the essential connection between national integration and political development. "The closing of this gap between the modernizing elite and the mass of the population is the prerequisite of the creation of a political society, of a society which is modern not only in its economy and administration but in its moral order as well."[20] But by a curious circularity Shils goes on to render political development a prerequisite of national integration: "The actual closure of the gap probably can occur only in a regime of civilian rule, representative institutions, and public liberties . . ."[21] Shils has more to say on this particular point but none of it really clarifies the dilemma he has posed.

Nevertheless, it is Shils more than anyone else who stresses the importance of the "gap" that exists in society, culture, polity and economy in the new nations. This is perhaps too simple a view of the divisions which Shils himself holds to characterize the societies in question. The cleavages are multiple and the society multiple and not dual. Indeed, we might ask, since the central doctrine Shils presents is the gap, why was not the succeeding typology he offered, of possible outcomes, based upon types of gaps?

But enough of criticizing Shils for not concentrating his analysis sufficiently on the problem of identity. In two other passages he made suggestions which, it seems to me, far outrun the insights of those who have been more directly concerned with the identity problem. In furtherance of his emphasis upon the gap he first characterizes the intellectuals of the new states as wholly modern, in what is clearly a poetic form of exaggeration.[22] A little later, however, the situation is righted, even if somewhat unsympathetically:

> Nonetheless, the modern intellectual in the new states often does yearn for a deeper contact with the indigenous culture in which he was brought up and of which he is, not unfrequently, only fragmentarily informed. These two dispositions produce a form of "populism" which, alleging to

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[16] E. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (s'Gravenhage, 1962), p. 60.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

> speak on behalf of the "people," deals with political opponents as alien to the essence of the traditional culture, as enemies of the "people," and as hostile to the interests of the nation. It results, too, in the generation of a "nativist" ideology, *half-sincere and half-insincere, that praises* the wisdom of the simple and humble while being fundamentally distrustful of them.[23]

At least it is only half-insincere.

In a later passage Shils drives home the critical connection between integration, political development, the gap, and his own approach through elite theory:

> The burden for the transformation rests upon the elite; its chances for success rest on its capacity for self-restraint and its effectiveness in legitimating itself through modernizing achievement, through a due respect for the claims of traditional beliefs, and through its recruitment of a stratum of intellectuals of intermediate level who can reinterpret traditional beliefs, adapt them to modern needs, and translate them into a modern idiom.[24]

This is a view to which we wholly subscribe.

It is further possible to conclude from the passages cited that not much respect is due the "claims of traditional beliefs." Traditional beliefs are to be adapted, but not the prevailing concepts of modernity. This attitude is the more surprising, because Shils is not insisting essentially upon modernity as rationality and the acceptance of science, nor on the acceptance of the norms of large-scale impersonal organizations, nor on structural differentiation and functional specificity. Shils emphasizes the importance of the civic culture, civility, for modernity. Apparently, all traditional belief systems equally deny these values. But this very emphasis explains why Shils is not overconcerned with the problem of identity and the possible consequences of its resolution. For him, modernity has a single configuration in the Anglo-American political model. The modernizing elite will not falter, as Pye suggests, because they have not solved their personal identity problems, but because of the intractability of the people beyond the gap. Nor will the political definition of the nation as produced by the vicissitudes of decolonization have any important effect upon the type of government which results.

I would rather argue the opposite, that the nature of the government and polity of the new states and the level of modernity which they are able to achieve in society, polity, economy and culture, will depend upon the way in which the gap is closed; that is, upon the performance of the mediating middle-level elites. Modernity may not be achieved without mobilizing the support of the human resources of the new states. These resources will not be mobilized unless the goals of modernization are made meaningful to those now beyond the gap, in terms of their own beliefs and experiences. The adaptation of beliefs will have to work two ways. This is probably a simple matter of arithmetic, given the number of tasks that have to be performed and the number of modernized intellectuals available to do them. Furthermore, Pye is right about the identity problems of the modernized and Emerson is right about the identity problem of the nation. Shils can be read as an answer to both. Ask from which strata will be recruited those who must perform the tasks of modernization and communication beyond the gap and you identify the nature of the personal identity problem the solution of which will provide the resolution of the problem of national identity. But this is only the beginning of the larger problem of national integration and political development and not its solution. We must ask then what are the consequences of this identity resolution for political development. It seems to me that the *remainder of the problem turns on which elements* of which traditions within a single polity will be preserved and which elements will be subverted or threatened.

VII

To sum up, the view of national integration and political development which has been proposed, depends upon the following assumptions:

(1) That national integration requires the creation of a cultural-ideological consensus of a degree of comprehensiveness that has not yet been seen in these countries.

(2) That the demands upon the political systems of these countries will be greater during the period of forging such a new consensus than they were in the past, and than they will be if the process is successful; but that, ultimately, stable political forms will be shaped by the integrative process, if at all.

(3) That the success of the process depends upon the almost chance creation of social strata which are, by virtue of the peculiarities of their socialization and education, both willing and capable of presenting a behavioral and ideological synthesis of historical values and the values associated with modernity.

While these assumptions refer respectively to the cultural, political, and social spheres, our general conception of the problem is shaped by yet further assumptions concerning the psychological context which lends meaning to individual behavior in all three spheres. Following Rupert Emerson, we hold that the most general response to the intrusion of the more powerful western Christian world into Africa and Asia has been the rise of nationalism, but in the special sense of a multitude of individual and collective searches for a new identity which denies the traditional fragmentation of pre-modern society. Following Edward Shils, we hold that the most conspicuous manifestation of the impact of the West has been the creation of gaps in social communication, in stratification, in values, in economic orientation, and in political techniques among the various sectors of society. It does not necessarily follow that there are two and only two cultural systems separated by such gaps—the fragmentation of traditional culture and society is well known, while the unity of modernity is at best a dubious pre-conception. At the psychological level those most aware of these gaps reflect the polar attraction of traditional and modern norms in a behavioral and attitudinal ambivalence which has been described by Lucian Pye. This ambivalence may either frustrate and lead to inefficient or irrational political action, or it may lead to significant integrative effort at both the intellectual and political levels. Since we assume that both tradition and modernity are variable, it follows that the success of such integrative efforts will depend upon such situational factors as:

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

(a) The social and political loci of the mediating individuals.

(b) The relationship between the particular interpretation of traditional values these individuals adopt and the whole spectrum of traditionality in a particular country.

(c) The degree to which the mediators' conception of modernity, rooted in part in their own experience, can accommodate the instrumental requirements of a modern state and a modern economy.

Finally, and to complete the model, it will be necessary to assess the political capability of such a group in mobilizing substantial popular sentiment for their own integrative formula. This formula will doubtless provide a new foundation for political legitimacy and a more stable base from which to contend with the stubborn realities of economics and of international relations. This, in our view, is the core of the process of political development.

CHANGING PATTERNS OF AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Whatever happened to the "radical," "moderate," and "conservative" African states we used to talk about not so long ago—say in early 1961? One wonders if the snapshot of African orientations, then in fair focus, has not become badly blurred.

President Sekou Touré, once the radical foe of neo-colonialist African regimes, has more recently offered assurances that his nation opposed intervention in the internal affairs of other states and thus tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the states he had formerly condemned. Touré helped to prepare the way for the reconciliation of "radical" and "conservative" states at Addis Ababa, in May 1963, where the Organization of African Unity was formed. At that conference, another stormy petrel of West African radicalism, President Modibo Keita of Mali, observed that though the colonial system divided Africa, "it permitted nations to be born." "African unity," he declared, "requires full respect for the frontiers we have inherited from the colonial system." And reporting to his National Assembly following the Addis conference, Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah avowed that political refugees seeking asylum in Ghana from other African states would be welcome so long as they are willing to respect "the government and the institutions which have been established by the will of the people in their respective territories." "As long as the refugees remain in Ghana," he made clear, "they are forbidden to do anything whatsoever against the government and the institutions of their country."

New themes have emerged within the more conservative camp as well. Underlining these changes (which had been in process for some time), President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta paid tribute at Addis Ababa to the work of Nkrumah, Keita, and Touré in fostering the evolution of Africa, while another representative of the French-oriented Union of African and Malagasy states, President Tombalbaye of Chad, attacked the present division of Africa into French- and English-speaking states. "This division is superficial," he declared. "The masses are African without the veneer of English or French culture, and it is in terms of the masses that we must think."

The fuzzing of differences among the new states has occurred in three critical areas of African foreign policy: in relations among the new states themselves; in their relations with the former metropoles; and in their relation to the cold war and the communist world. We will examine the evolving pattern in each of these areas. First, however, a reminder of the three camps as they seemed to be emerging less than four years ago.

I. RADICALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND MODERATES

The Congo crisis and the advent of independence for the bulk of France's tropical territories occurred simultaneously in the summer of 1960. Each event made a profound impact on the pattern of African international relations at that time. The former French areas of sub-Saharan Africa introduced a new and very different orientation in African postcolonial perspectives. The pervasive Congo crisis demanded a response by the new African states to many of the most fundamental post-independence issues; the Congo both mirrored and magnified the differing assumptions underlying the approach of the African states to the problems of post-colonial politics.

Our labels for these different views were necessarily inadequate because they derived more from Western than from African political experience. We have yet to develop a vocabulary fully descriptive of African orientations—which is not surprising for they are still in flux.

In fact, the use of any label or category suggests a certain hardness and permanence of the point of view it is meant to describe, and so tends to obscure the fluidity of the phenomena we are trying to understand and to belie the pragmatism that often dominates the approach of African leaders to the enormous problems they face. Nonetheless, during the latter half of 1960, there was ample justification for attempting to differentiate among the several views of the newly independent states of Africa, at least insofar as their foreign policies were concerned.[1]

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[1] The summary which follows was developed in considerable detail in my chapter, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial Politics," *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in*

The radicals—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—sought what may be called a systemic change in the order inherited from the colonial era which they deemed "neo-colonial" and illegitimate. They looked forward to the liquidation of artificial colonial boundaries and the creation of a "pan-African" state or states. Morocco, claiming jurisdiction over Mauritania and a handsome slice of western Sahara, allied her territorial revisionism with the systemic revisionism of the sub-Saharan radicals (though Rabat frequently took exception to the radical world view). The UAR, seeking avenues of influence into black Africa, joined too. These states, whose association was formalized at Casablanca in January 1961, shared deep suspicions of the colonial West. Only by establishing positions of strength independent of the erstwhile metropolitan powers would it be possible to foil neo-imperial plots to Balkanize Africa, and to thwart Western intentions to manipulate the new states through puppet leaders.

This revolutionary view not only excused, but could be employed to justify, intervention in the affairs of "neocolonial" regimes. From the point of view of the radicals this was not intervention at all but the continuation of the struggle against colonialism on a new front. The radical view produced a concurrence of interests with the communist world, for Moscow too was anxious to hasten the disengagement of the new states from the West and to relate itself to the socialist theories and centralist thrust advanced by the leaders of most of the radical states.

The 12 former French states, which in 1961 associated in the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM), introduced a conservative note in African international affairs. The term "conservative" is used in a very specific and limited sense. It is meant to suggest a strong tendency on the part of most of these states to preserve the *status quo:* (1) maintaining, not disrupting, ties with the former metropole; (2) continuing close cooperation with Europe rather than developing as swiftly as possible an autonomous continent; (3) legitimizing the state system inherited from the colonial era, and, while giving lip service to African unity, dismissing the notion of a pan-African "super-state."

Differences between radicals and conservatives were reflected in the tendency of the radicals to find the greatest source of external danger in the imperial West, while at least some of the conservatives expressed equal concern about the imperialism of the communist bloc. In the Congo crisis, members of both groups were often against UN involvement but for very different reasons. The radicals believed the UN defended a wholly unsatisfactory *status quo* (the Kasavubu-Mobutu-Ileo regime rather than that of Lumumba or Gizenga); many conservatives had reservations about the UN because they believed it might act to upset a *status quo* that, free from outside intervention, would permit a slow movement toward a settlement favorable to their interests. Finally, the radicals were certain that the break with Belgium was the prerequisite to genuine independence for the Congo, while the conservatives, mindful of their own close and fruitful relations with Paris, were equally convinced that it would be in the Congo's interest to heal the breach with Brussels.

The moderates, harder to define than the other two, constituted something of an in-between group. They were linked more by what they were not (they were *not* interested in affiliation with either the conservative or radical groups) than by what they shared in common. Historically, Ethiopia and Liberia had remained aloof, though that was rapidly changing. Political considerations prompted Tunisia and Togo to keep their distance from the radicals. Togo's delicate relationship to Ghana demanded this, as did the relationship of Tunisia to the UAR. At the same time, Tunisia and Togo, though formerly associated with France, had little sense of identity with the French-speaking UAM states. History, geography, and immediate political preoccupations conspired to keep Sudan and Somalia from active engagement in pan-African politics. Nigeria was self-possessed, content with her size and potential, and intent on playing an independent role. Libya, like Morocco, had at times been radical in diplomatic discourse, while remaining conservative at home; but unlike Morocco with its claim to Mauritania, Libya had no compelling interest in sub-Saharan politics.

Many of these "in-between states" took the initiative in seeking to establish an all-inclusive organization transcending existing divisions in Africa but based on cooperation among sovereign entities rather than the unification or even federation of these sovereignties in a super-state. Their relations with the former colonial powers and with the West were in general characterized by neither the animus of the radicals nor the hyper-dependence and sense of identity which was common among members of the UAM. Relations between the moderates and the communist countries were in the winter and spring of 1961 still minimal, except for Ethi-

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World Affairs, ed. Laurence W. Martin (New York, 1962).

opia. Concerning the Congo, there was, on the part of the moderates, a tendency to be less emotional than either the radicals or conservatives, less concerned with personalities and symbols, and more concerned with institutions and the maintenance of law and order. In general, the moderates gave more consistent support to the UN Congo operation than either the radicals or conservatives.

If these distinctions between radical, conservative, and moderate orientations have blurred in the intervening years and if there has been some erosion of extreme positions and, to a limited degree, a convergence toward a common center, it is because the new African states have had to accommodate their preconceptions and their preferences (arising in part from their differing backgrounds and the "formation" of their leaders) to the constricting realities of the postcolonial situation. The sameness of these realities for most states and the necessity sooner or later to own up to them has brought about a certain similarity of response. This has by no means obscured all differences, but we are now more than ever obliged to be tentative in our ascription of labels and exceedingly cautious in projecting trends.

The realities faced in greater or lesser degree by virtually all the new African states relate partly to some of the more obvious legacies of colonialism, such as the paucity of contacts and lack of economic complementarity among the new states, and the lack of trained cadres to assume the responsibilities which sovereignty implies. But they relate as well to the less obvious bequests of the West to the new countries: the notion of modernity and the concept of the nation-state—replete with the ideas of national cohesion, pervasive authority, and efficient administration responsive to the will and the needs of the population.

The gap between this ideal and the present reality was once described dramatically by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser: "We live in a society that has not yet taken form," he wrote. "It is still fluid and agitated and has not yet settled down or taken a stabilized shape." The unformed society at home, the frailty of its polity, and the vulnerability of its economy deeply affect all the policies of the new state—including foreign policy. Indeed, the foreign policy of the new state is frequently a function of this nation-building process at home. The omnipresence of these problems, affecting alike both internal and international developments among the new states, makes it justifiable, as I have argued elsewhere, to speak of "postcolonial politics" and indeed to generalize about the "postcolonial era."[2]

II. RELATIONS AMONG THE NEW STATES

The vocabulary of the postcolonial era is cluttered with place-names where attempts have been made to weld the new states into politically significant groups. To Bandung and Belgrade have now been added a list of African towns: Brazzaville, Casablanca, Monrovia, Lagos, and most recently Addis Ababa. The impetus is understandable: to relate the new states to one another and, more importantly, to create new international systems to take the place of the defunct colonial order.

Africa's search for a new pattern of relationships has had a somewhat different tone from that of other areas. In Asia, a prolonged colonial rule combined with indigenous cultures possessing vivid and separate historical recollections extending back to antiquity have given many (though by no means all) post-colonial states a relatively strong claim to nationhood. In South and Southeast Asia, accordingly, one speaks of Asiatic cooperation or perhaps "solidarity." The expressions imply the historical legitimacy of most of the units as presently constituted. There is no pan-Asiatic movement. In the Middle East, on the other hand, a significant legacy from the past is the memory of a unity antecedent to the divisions imposed by European and Ottoman rule. The state system inherited from the colonial order does not accord with this memory. For many Arabs, therefore, there is considerable doubt as to the legitimacy of contemporary Arab states. This doubt is expressed in the movement for pan-Arab unity.

In sub-Saharan Africa, there is no memory of widespread pre-colonial unity. Precolonial political life, with a few major exceptions, was relatively decentralized. Moreover, the colonial era, if by this one means the period of effective occupation, was relatively brief. The legitimacy of the political communities defined by colonial administrators, consequently, is in general more suspect than in much of Asia. Particularly south of the Sahara, the notion of pan-Africanism is a lively force. It differs from pan-Arabism in being based not upon the memory of historical unity, but upon the unity of color and resentment of racial prejudice; but it is similar to pan-Arabism in that—in its extremist form—it seeks a fundamental revision of the state system inherited from the colonial era. However, the obstacles which must be overcome are formidable.

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[2] *Ibid.* In the same volume, see also my chapter, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States."

The first of these has to do with the frailty of the links joining the new states to one another. The colonial system created a network of relationships and established the principal bonds of order vertically, so to speak, not horizontally—that is, between the colony and the metropole, not between neighboring colonies. Each colonial system existed in relative isolation. Dakar knew Paris, Accra knew London, Leopoldville knew Brussels far more intimately than Dakar, Accra and Leopoldville ever knew one another.

Some regions were more fragmented than others. The colonization of West Africa, for example, imposed on that area a most unlikely conglomeration of states. Traveling along the coast prior to 1960 from Dakar in Senegal to Douala in Cameroon, one crossed the boundaries of 12 territories; no two adjoining units, excepting only Dahomey and Togo, were controlled by the same metropole. At the same time, however, only two metropoles were principally involved, Britain and France, and among the French states in particular, contacts grew steadily. Moreover, both the French and British in West Africa (the former more than the latter) developed common services and institutions for their colonies. But because British and French territories were interspersed all along the coast, these efforts often resulted in more effectively separating neighbors from one another. (Common services were developed by the British in East and Central Africa too; here the territories were contiguous and the effect was consequently more constructive.)

Almost everywhere the retreat of empire left behind neighboring countries which had yet to discover one another or to develop meaningful mutual interests. This is the case even though it is frequently denied by postcolonial leaders. An example from another part of the postcolonial world will illustrate. Speaking to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru referred to "that deeper urge of mind and spirit which has persisted in spite of . . . the years of European domination. As that domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we . . . meet as old friends long separated." Nehru expressed an emotion, not an historical fact. Colonialism did not create the walls. The struggle against colonialism, however, created an awareness of their existence.

Anti-colonialism is perhaps the most substantial link among the new states. It has brought them together in frequent international conferences; their bond to one another has been sealed in innumerable anticolonial resolutions. Though important in building links among the new states, anticolonialism is a tenuous bond, defining unity only negatively. (There is force in Charles Malik's complaint that the new states suffer from "chronic negatives.") Anticolonialism creates consensus around the assertion that the old order must go; it does nothing to define the structure of the new.

Superimposed on this general problem of the absence of meaningful links among the new states are two specific difficulties. The first is well-known and needs only to be mentioned—the territorial disputes involving the postcolonial states. These derive from either the vagueness or arbitrariness of colonial boundaries (for example, Somali irredentist claims against Kenya and Ethiopia), or the revival in the postcolonial era of what purport to be precolonial claims (thus, Morocco's demand for Mauritania).

A second specific difficulty involves the many contradictions between making the individual state a going concern and creating effective regional or continental unity. The economic dimensions of this problem are often rehearsed. The new states are competitors for limited markets and for scarce development capital. The world market could not absorb the resulting aluminum if all presently projected schemes for the extraction and processing of bauxite in West and Equatorial Africa were implemented; nor is there enough development capital to construct in that area all the dams and power grids now on the drawing boards. Those states with bauxite reserves and hydro-power potential are placed therefore in acute competition. The point could be elaborated for other regions and for other products—coffee, cocoa, peanuts, palm products, and cotton. At the economic level, the real "unity" of the new countries resides in the oneness of their needs: each wants what the others want and none has what the others need. The exceptions are so few that they confirm the rule.

Regional common markets and development banks may place a veneer of cooperation over this reality. But within these institutions, the competition for scarce resources will continue. This is not to discount the advisability of regional economic programming. It is only to suggest that the development of each state, *qua* state, tends to contravene the rationalization of regional economic development. *Each* state wants expanded markets abroad; *each* state wants maximum capital development at home.

The impediments to unity, or even to co-operation, among postcolonial states are multiplied if the projected scheme combines resource-poor and resource-rich states. The relatively affluent Ivory Coast resisted federation with its poorer associates in French West Africa. Resource-rich Gabon, which seems capable of self-sufficiency, has avoided every proposal for integration with the other states of former French Equatorial Africa. The wealthy province of Katanga resisted the governance of Leopoldville in roughly the same way that the comparatively wealthy and underpopulated islands of the Indonesian archipelago have resisted the central authority of overpopulated and impoverished Java. But these situations are different from earlier examples because the amalgamation of well endowed and poorly endowed areas had already been accomplished by colonial fiat. The subsequent resistance of the affluent areas is thus treated as a problem of civil disorder. However, these instances ought to remind us once again how difficult is the coalescence of areas—or even meaningful co-operation between them—that not only have little sense of community but are subject to the tensions that almost always arise between haves and have-nots.

The accommodation of the requirements of individual state development and plans for regional or continental unity would be difficult enough if the problem were restricted to economic factors. But it is not. Each state wishes to establish the visible foundations of a modern economy, not alone for economic reasons, but because a dam, a steel mill, a bauxite refinery adds tangible proof to the assertion that the new state is a going concern. The appearance of smokestacks on the postcolonial horizon relates as much to political as to economic necessity.

Indeed the political problems impeding regional development, let alone the effective coalescence of states into larger entities, are far more serious than the economic. The task of calling a nation into being requires a "national" focus: a national leader, national institutions, and a national interest clearly distinguished from subnational and—more to the point—multinational or supranational interests. Particularly important, the problem of consolidating power and extending the radius of order within the new state tends to work against the development of regional unity. Relations between Ghana and Togo will illustrate.

Until 1952 there were powerful incentives for the unification of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Togo (an area divided between Britain and France and administered as separate UN Trust Territories). *Évolué* leaders from the large and capable Ewe tribe, which occupied adjoining areas in both the Gold Coast and Togo, identified themselves with the aim of reuniting the Ewe people. The colonial pattern, however, dictated the strategy of the independence struggle, and led increasingly to a divergence of aims between Ewe nationalist leaders on either side of the border. Each colony was obliged to contend with its own metropole; each therefore would gain independence first and unification would take place later.

Ghana became independent in 1957. (In the preceding year, the Trust Territory of British Togoland had decided by referendum to amalgamate with Ghana on the latter's independence.) Three years later, French Togoland became independent. In the meantime, however, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah had been contending with the problem of consolidating power at home. The limited decentralization to which he had agreed just before independence, in order to mollify the opposition (and the British), was progressively whittled away in favor of a unitary state with effective authority concentrated in the hands of a preeminent, all-pervasive party, and with the possibility of dissent curtailed by statutes limiting civil rights. Togo's Sylvanus Olympio meanwhile was also confronting difficult problems in consolidating his party's leadership in Togo. Under these circumstances the possibility of merger was reduced to nil.

It is not simply that the positions and ambitions of eminent leaders now collided, serious as that no doubt was. More basically, the requirements of consolidating state power moved directly against the prerequisites for federating with neighboring states. Togo could not consider becoming "the seventh region" of a Ghana centrally controlled by a monolithic party where opportunities for regional self-expression were severely restricted. Ironically, Nkrumah's actions to establish his regime within Ghana worked against his larger goal—unity with Togo as the basis of eventual unity throughout West Africa.

These then are among the formidable difficulties affecting relations among the new states. All African states, quite apart from the aims and predispositions of their leaders, have been affected by the poverty of their historical ties with one another, the lack of economic complementarity, and the many points at which the process of state-building impedes the emergence of regional consciousness and unity.

An additional factor has emerged more recently, which tends to press these countries toward a common orientation respecting their mutual relations. It is the growing problem of internal security for incumbent regimes in Africa's new states. Since January, 1963, five heads of state or government have been forcibly deposed (one was assassinated). During the same period, there have been allegations of treasonable plots in more than a dozen other states. Dissent—likely to grow if unemployment problems cannot be solved and if outlets cannot be given to the aspirations of younger, more radical elements—is easily nurtured from across international frontiers in the plastic societies of Africa where tribal groupings are no respecters of international boundaries and where the authority of the regime is exercised unevenly within its assigned jurisdiction.

Here is a hazard which African leaders of all persuasions share alike. It is one around which they have, in a limited degree, coalesced. The Addis Ababa conclave and the resulting Organization of African Unity were strongly legitimist in tone. Almost in unison, the African leaders sought the adoption of non-aggression pacts; denounced attempts at intervention in one another's affairs; recommended respect for African boundaries, arbitrary though they might be; and emphasized the need for the peaceful settlement of intramural disputes.

This of course has not assured an end to interference in the affairs of other states. (While there has probably been a decrease in the efforts of radical African states to unseat by various forms of intervention what they believe to be puppet or neo-colonial regimes, instances of intervention arising from more traditional interstate rivalries or regional African problems have probably increased.) Equally the unity of Addis Ababa was not unity in the sense that radical pan-Africanism has envisaged it. Far from doing away with the "illicit" state system inherited from the colonial era, the pact of Addis Ababa, if adhered to, legitimizes that state system and, upon the foundation it affords, promises to build institutions of international cooperation. This in itself is no mean accomplishment. After the creation of rival blocs and after several abortive attempts to bridge the differences between them, the Charter gained the adherence of all of Africa's independent states, including the conservatively inclined Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM).

The organizational future of the French-oriented group is presently unclear. What is clear is a trend on the part of many of these states to give increased support to continental pan-Africanism and to play down the UAM as a political grouping, for as such it is held to be inconsistent with the spirit of unity (or what President Leopold Senghor of Senegal calls "Africanity") evidenced at Addis. Indeed, the UAM has officially been replaced by a "non-political" variant called the Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Cooperation (UAMCE), whose charter has been initialled by a majority, though not all, of the UAM states. This emphasis is calculated to cope with a political trend found in many of these states—the increasing demand on the part of younger and more radical elements to participate in the pan-African *elan* and to emphasize African rather than Eurafrican associations.

III. RELATIONS WITH THE FORMER METROPOLES

The same tendency to vacate extreme positions—whether radical or conservative—is also discernible in the second area of African international relationships, those with the former metropoles. Again this tendency reflects, in part at least, the necessity to respond to the realities and problems of postcolonial political life. Many of these problems are internal and bear directly upon the state-building process—for example, the high degree of dependence of the new states on technical aid, development funds, and expatriate personnel, and the many tensions to which these dependent relationships give rise. Others relate to the international environment within which the new states find themselves—thus, the availability of markets or the range of opportunities which may or may not be present to diversify their dependence on external sources of aid.

The readjustments consequent on independence are critically important for all new states. Colonial-metropolitan relations, once conducted within the nexus of the imperial system, now must be reestablished according to procedures of diplomacy and the canons of "equal sovereignty," even though the former metropole and the former colony are dramatically unequal in power, so that the latter generally remain highly dependent upon the former. Even under the most favorable circumstances, this transition is difficult. Rights that obtained under a colonial dispensation are challenged by the new government. Conflicts of interest, once settled by colonial decree, now strain relations between juridically independent nations. Financial subsidies and trade preferences, upon which the viability of the colony depended, may be abrogated, while trade privileges enjoyed by the former metropole are equally in danger of termination. The status of skilled expatriate personnel, formerly on colonial payrolls, must now be fundamentally revised. New states must demonstrate that the juridic status of independence, particularly when negotiated with the former metropole and accompanied by elaborate "accords of co-operation," is in fact genuine independence. Sometimes the most effective demonstration is to take dramatic actions against citizens of the former metropole residing in the new state, or to side against the metropole in international forums, and these actions impose further strains upon the postcolonial relationship.

We are tempted to use categories like "friendly" and "unfriendly" to characterize these relationships and readjustments. The words lack rigor. They define the normal spectrum of relations between sovereign states which vary from amity to tension. The striking thing about relations between the postcolonial states and their erstwhile mother countries is that often, these relations are *not* "normal" during the first years following independence.

At one end of the spectrum are the symbiotic states for which independence is only a formal act that does not alter, in any basic sense, an almost totally dependent relationship. At the other end of the spectrum are the postcolonial states whose relations with the mother country have been ruptured—Indonesia, to cite a non-African example, where the rupture became complete both substantively and diplomatically, and Guinea where dependence on the former metropole dropped in many critical sectors to almost zero in an atmosphere of mutual hostility, but where diplomatic ties remained.

The majority of postcolonial states are found somewhere in between the extremes of symbiosis and rupture. Their relations with the former colonial power are in transition from what is held to be excessive dependence, to that degree of independence regarded as consistent with the principles of reciprocity and juridic equality. There is a useful analogy with the behavior of a state immediately following defeat in war. Foreign policy is then directed toward "normalizing" relations with the victor—disentangling itself from the harassment of alien garrisons and from the restraints imposed on its freedom of action, and overcoming the complexes that arise from impotence, inferiority, and insecurity. The foreign policies of many new states toward their former metropoles may be regarded in much the same way. The postcolonial states pursue this transition to "normality" in an atmosphere that varies from relative amity to relative antagonism. A complete spectrum then would include: symbiosis, amicable transition, antagonistic transition, and rupture.

As the spectrum of relationships between the new states and their metropoles is complex, so equally are the factors that determine these patterns. The mixture includes the following:

1. The duration of the colonial experience and the nature and objectives of the colonial regime, particularly in its terminal phase.
2. The character of the transition to independence.
3. The presence or absence of regional conflicts of interest involving the former colony and the former metropole.
4. The threat or absence of threat from neighboring post-colonial states.
5. The personality and the background of the leaders of the new states, together with cultural and historical influences peculiar to the societies involved.
6. The nature of the domestic and regional political situation to which the leader of the new state must respond.
7. The absence or availability of alternate sources of assistance to those deriving from the former metropole.

The great range of these determinants and the almost infinite variety of ways in which they may interrelate make clear the difficulties of apt generalization. These difficulties are compounded when one reviews the relation between the new state and the former metropole over a span of time. A case from former French West Africa will illustrate.

The two French colonies, Senegal and Soudan, merged in 1959 to form the Federation of Mali. Senegalese and Soudanese leaders signed the same set of accords with France granting independence to the Federation and defining with great precision the character of future relations with the former metropole. A year later the Federation collapsed. Senegal and Soudan (now renamed the Republic of Mali) subsequently established very different relations with France. Both are "transitional" but Franco-Senegalese relations have been more amicable than those between Mali and France. In fact, disagreement as to the proper relation of the ex-colony to the ex-metropole was one of the elements leading to the dissolution of the Federation. A complex mixture of factors is involved. The most important of these relates to profound differences in the history of colonialism in the two areas.

Senegal has known the influence of France for centuries. Residents of her four major communes have enjoyed special political privileges for many generations. Africans from Senegal have occupied seats in the French Parliament since 1914. Many of her leaders have grown influential in the service of France and French Africa. Soudan, on the other hand, never was colonized in the same sense. Rather, it was pacified—and only about fifty years ago. In Soudan, the spirit of rebellion was fiercer, the sense of identity more distinct, than in Senegal. (Soudan, not Senegal, was the heart of the Mali "empire" of antiquity.) Radicalism flourished in Bamako following the rupture with Senegal, and Mali sought to cut back sharply its dependence on France, probing the possibility of alternatives in the East. Senegal on the other hand maintained its close ties with Paris, preferring a gradual and more cautious evolution toward full self-reliance to Mali's revolutionary radicalism.

More recently, however, Mali has sought somewhat more amicable relations with France. Meanwhile, Senegal has cautiously moved to become the first UAM state to open diplomatic relations with the communist world. At the same time, Dakar has been searching for ways to reduce somewhat its very great reliance upon France. Real independence, it is argued by many, demands multiple contacts in the international community.

Trends in Senegal and Mali are roughly representative. Tendencies toward the extremes of symbiosis and rupture (which admittedly were never widespread) have disappeared in Africa. While, with few exceptions, their relations with Paris remain cordial, all UAM states seek broader international contacts and in many cases are anxious to diversify their reliance on external assistance. On the other hand, states which have chafed under what they have considered excessive reliance on the former metropole have discovered the impossibility of soon achieving full self-sufficiency; some have also discovered the high price of expanding their reliance on the communist countries. In those African capitals where relations with the former metropoles have in the past been under the most serious stress, there is less derogatory talk today of puppet African regimes than there was two or three years ago.

Even the flurry of military uprisings in East Africa and Gabon, combined with the willingness of the affected governments to reinvolve the former metropoles in internal security responsibilities, seem to have produced responses from most African states that no longer can clearly be classified "radical" or "conservative." The East African case will illustrate. Tanganyika chose to invite other African states to take on the policing duties which earlier Julius Nyerere had asked British forces to assume. In neighboring Kenya and Uganda, however, equally vigorous nationalist leaders asked the British troops to remain. Significantly no African state has condemned this action.

IV. THE COLD WAR AND RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD

The political tone of Africa in world politics is neutralist. While the term is imprecise and subject to multiple meanings, all neutrals want to "keep the cold war out of Africa" and profess to follow an independent or nonaligned foreign policy. This means that positions on cold war issues are not predetermined by alliances or ideological commitments to either side, but rather are taken autonomously by the governments of the new states in terms of their own interests as they see them. African neutralism is not so much a consistent policy as a frame of mind—and at times a tactical posture. It arises partly from a preoccupation with things African and partly from a disposition to remain clear of commitments which would curtail maneuverability.

Within this general orientation, however, there have been important differences, though, in a now familiar pattern, these have become blurred over the last year or two. In some cases, self-interest, long habit, intimate association with one of the Western powers, and occasionally a fear of communism, combined to produce an inclination toward the West. Western-inclined neutrals have included principally those ex-French states that have maintained bilateral defense guarantees with the former metropole.

In other cases, deep suspicions of Western intentions, a desire rapidly to remove reliance on Western countries, and occasionally a fascination with communist formulas for economic and political development have led to a tactical alliance with the East—principally on the part of those states we have been accustomed to call radical.

Of Africa's 34 independent states (South Africa excluded), 26 have diplomatic relations with at least some states in the communist world as of June 1964. The 8 which do not are all UAM states.

Calculations concerning the scope, intensity, and hence the significance of relations with the communist world may be made according to the following ten criteria: (1) economic technicians in residence, (2) credits and grants actually drawn down, (3) students (technical and academic) being trained in the East with the consent of their home governments, (4) military agreements involving equipment and technicians, (5) military personnel being trained behind the iron curtain, (6) trade, (7) subscriptions to one or more communist news services, (8) air agreements with the communist world, (9) votes with the Soviet bloc in the UN, and (10) diplomatic representation.

These criteria must be handled with care. For example, a coincidence of UN voting patterns between African states and the Soviet bloc needs cautious appraisal, remembering that the bloc as frequently sides with the African position as *vice versa*. Even for those states with the most extensive communist contacts, reliance on the West in almost every sector remains much more imposing than the communist presence thus far established.

Random relations with the communist world—such as *pro forma* exchanges of diplomatic representation with one or two countries or a handful of students studying behind the curtain—are so common as to provoke little curiosity. On the other hand, clusters of relationships with the East, particularly when these include a number of relatively high intensity relationships, may be significant—thus, for example, a large rather than small number of communist missions in residence in an African capital; a fairly substantial drawdown of grants and credits; large numbers of government-endorsed students behind the curtain or a high percentage of votes with the Soviets (say, 70 per cent or above) on issues where the bloc and the US divide.

States with the greatest range and intensity of contacts with the East are Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Algeria, the Somali Republic, and Zanzibar (now a component of the new Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar). Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Kenya also have significant, though not as extensive, relations with the communist world. Links between communist countries and all other African states are either random or non-existent.

The countries having significant relations with the East are of two kinds. They include, as we have already noted, those radically oriented states which, upon the outset of their independence, were deeply suspicious of Western motives, anxious as quickly as possible to divest themselves of reliance on the West, and convinced that the communist world offered an alliance of mutual interests as well as a source of much needed assistance for building African socialism, ridding the continent of colonialism, and achieving pan-African unity.

A second group of countries has not been associated with the radical African camp, except Morocco. That country has been a special case, for it never really participated in the radical world view. Rather its search for support for its irredentist claims and its concern to placate radical opposition groups at home led it into a marriage-of-convenience with the Casablanca powers. Morocco's links with the East are more of a pattern with those of Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia—all countries which we earlier identified as in the moderate group. For these states, relations with the East have served more specific and local functions. The East is viewed, not as an ally in the achievement of mutual objectives, but as an instrument (often acknowledged as one to be handled with care) to achieve some parochial interest. The interest may be that of demonstrating to radical elements at home one's independence of the West; or it may be quite simply to receive assistance unavailable in the West; or, as frequently is the case, it may be, not the retrenchment of relations with the West, but the encouragement of greater Western support by demonstrating that alternatives to Western assistance do indeed exist. In either case—whether we speak of sweeping radical aims or parochial and highly expediential motives—it is worth pointing out that no African country has sought to identify itself with *communist* objectives.

Guinea was once the prototype of the radical point of view respecting relations with the East. It was also the first to suffer disillusionment with communist performance and motives, a fact of considerable importance. The evidence is less clear as to the future pattern and motivation underlying the relations with the communist world of the other radically oriented African states.

Meanwhile, a modest tactical shift is underway among the UAM states. Following visits behind the curtain in 1962 by the Senegalese Prime Minister and Dahomey's Vice President, the first diplomatic exchanges between the communist world and UAM states were arranged. A Soviet embassy was opened in Senegal in the fall of 1962; it was followed in the spring of 1963 by a Polish mission. Also in 1963 Dahomey established diplomatic relations with Moscow. Congo (Brazzaville) recognized Moscow and Peking after the overthrow of the government of Foulber Youlou. Other UAM states have given indications that diplomatic exchanges with communist countries might be considered at a later date.

These relations may be designed to compensate for continuing massive reliance on France and to permit UAM leaders to assume, for the benefit of younger, more radical groups, a posture more becoming African neutralism. At the same time, particularly in the light of Guinea's experience as well as repeated instances of Soviet interference in the affairs of Congo (Leopoldville), approaches to the East for many of these states will remain tentative and cautious lest communist representation serve to fuel the opposition and so threaten the establishment in UAM countries.

In summary, trends in African foreign policy orientations that appeared fixed and strong only two or three years ago have become badly frayed. "Radical," "moderate," and "conservative" dispositions have not entirely vanished but have been overlaid by pragmatic responses to the problems of state-building—maintaining the flow of external assistance while developing the polity and securing the regime at home. The very magnitude of the problems narrows the range of realistic responses and in so doing encourages a rough consensus among the several African states.

Acceptable alternatives to the assistance available from the former metropoles are not easily developed, surely not for the highly dependent economies of the former French states. This fact may be winning somewhat wider appreciation as each new state faces the hard economic facts of national life. The fragile quality of regimes struggling to develop the institutions of authority and to maintain the perquisites of power in still fragmented and impoverished societies has produced a common concern to assure the legitimacy of the present state system (though not necessarily the legitimacy of each regime). This indeed has become one of the principal realities around which inter-African organizational efforts thus far have coalesced.

At the same time, many of the more conservatively inclined states, though still deeply involved with regional or Eurafrican associations, have increasingly identified with all-African aspirations including, in some cases, visible evidence of non-alignment. This identification is a response, at least in part, to the problem of containing the more radically oriented younger members of the elite, who form in many French-speaking states the potential opposition to the establishment.

A further coalescence of African views appears likely as developments unfold in the southern part of the continent, for white minority regimes of that area provide a common target for all independent African states to the north. We may expect among these states serious differences of emphasis and of timing, particularly as the attempt is made to move from declaratory to action policy. Nonetheless, it was symbolically significant that the host of a recent meeting of UAM states chose to say: "We are known as a moderate group but when it comes to attacking the last vestiges of colonialism and the medieval racists, there are no moderates, only zealots."

DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY*

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Although there has been considerable work on voting patterns in the United Nations,[1] almost none of it has contributed cumulatively to existing theories of international relations. Methodological problems or a descriptive intent have often stood in the way of such advancement. For example, the main findings of Thomas Hovet, Jr.'s *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, the most comprehensive work to date, are based on trends in the voting cohesion of regional and caucusing groups in the Assembly and time-series data on how often these groups vote with the majority.

Voting with the majority, as used by Hovet—and Riggs before him—is a poor measure of national power in the General Assembly because of the problems associated with discovering the extent to which nations are "satellites" or "chameleons."[2] Hovet himself has recognized the chameleon-like nature of the Soviet Union:

> It would be a serious misjudgment . . . to conclude that the high degree of cohesion of these African groups and factions with the Soviet Union means that the Soviet Union dominates their voting behavior. . . . The policy of the Soviet Union is to associate itself with the proposals and statements of the African states, especially when these issues are of vital interest to Africa, and at the same time to stress the fact that the United States is not a friend of Africa.[3]

If this is true, voting with the majority cannot be used as a measure of Soviet power. The trouble with an alternative inference, that the Africans have influenced the Russians, is that the Russians *want* to be persuaded. If exercising power means getting someone else to do something he otherwise would not do, neither the Soviets nor the Africans have appreciably influenced each other. Within the majority, then, it is not clear who is more powerful; nor do voting percentages indicate very clearly the deprivations suffered by the minority.

This problem aside, Hovet and Riggs have made a significant contribution to the study of power and of group cohesion in distinguishing among the various kinds of issues before the Assembly. As Dahl has clearly shown,[4] groups have more power on some kinds of issues than on others. In terms of such Charter-based issue-categories as "collective measures, including regulations of armaments, etc.," "peaceful settlement," "economic questions," "human rights," "self-determination" or "administrative, procedural or structural" questions, comparative and trend studies of the functional areas of group cohesion and influence are possible.[5]

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[1] For example, M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *International Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February, 1951), pp. 3–31; Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?" *Review of Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April, 1959), pp. 417–55; Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Expanding UN; I-Voting Patterns," *International Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April, 1960), pp. 174–87; Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly," *International Organization*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1960), pp. 297–304; Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this REVIEW, Vol. 57, No. 4 (December, 1963), pp. 902–17; Robert E. Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958); Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), and *Africa in the United Nations* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1963).

[2] These distinctions are made by Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July, 1957), pp. 201–15.

[3] *Africa in the United Nations*, pp. 181–85.

[4] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1963).

[5] See Hovet, *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–88. Ernst B. Haas has used to advantage a somewhat more specific set of issue-

Conclusions from such analyses, however, are often controversial. One problem is that of making reproducible and widely acceptable assignments of roll calls to the "correct" issue category. Some observers, for instance, would like to consider Tibet a question involving self-determination and human rights.[6] Others might refer to it as a basically political controversy, related to the cold war. To take another example, is a resolution recommending negotiations on West Irian primarily one about "peaceful settlement," "self-determination" or a structural attempt to establish a certain kind of negotiating committee? Perhaps it is all of these. But *multiple* assignments on the basis of the language of the resolution raises another problem: the relative "importance" of the various parts and implications of a particular roll call. In fact most of the disagreement expressed in the General Assembly is about just this question: which Charter norms should be applied in what manner in a particular situation? "What kind of self-determination and for whom?" has been a basic controversy in both the Tibetan and the West Irian questions. Whether or not "self-determination" or "domestic jurisdiction" or the need for "peaceful settlement" is most appropriate to an African conflict situation is always a matter of debate.

If agreement on the relevant Charter *norms* is often difficult, perhaps one can be more objective in describing the political *conflicts* which a voting alignment contains. These conflict categories can be used in combination with objective verbal, structural or functional classifications to test various theories about the substance and causes of international conflict.

Thinking in terms of international conflicts brings up another question which is unanswered in most studies of group cohesion: in what voting context did these positions occur? Telling us that Latin Americans were divided on "self-determination" questions like West Irian or South Africa does not tell us about the positions of the other main participants such as the United States, Russia, Indonesia, the Netherlands or South Africa. We would need to know how these and other states voted before we can say that Cold War or anti-colonial perceptions dominated the voting. Simply measuring group cohesion on heterogeneous issue-categories, we cannot be very sure who disagreed with whom, to what extent, and about what kinds of issues.[7]

Another major omission in previous analyses of voting patterns in the General Assembly has been a comparative analysis of the various proposed influences on Assembly voting. One can argue with Hovet that group loyalties and pressures are important determinants of voting behavior, but unless one has a measure of the actual voting *positions* of different states on such major conflicts as the Cold War in the UN, the relative impact of caucusing-group influences and domestic social, economic and political considerations cannot be compared. Many current theories of international politics suggest that racial, economic, geographic and military variables are also at work in influencing voting positions. Ernst Haas, for example, has characterized the UN as a multi-phase system "whose characteristics and evolutionary potential must be specified in terms of the changing environment in which it operates."[8]

This paper will concentrate on two aspects of contemporary politics in the General Assembly. Factor analysis will be used in an attempt to uncover the principal dimensions of conflict underlying votes at the Sixteenth General Assembly and the location of states on these main issues. The relative importance of the various determinants of voting behavior sug-

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groupings in an analysis of the "coverage" of different conventions ratified by members of the International Labor Organization. See his "System and Process in the International Labor Organization, A Statistical Afterthought," *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (January, 1962), pp. 339–52.

[6] Sydney Bailey has presented an interesting discussion of the different tactical approaches to this issue in "The Question of Tibet," *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York, 1961), ch. 10.

[7] Hovet, *Bloc. Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 112, feels it "premature" to attempt any formal conclusions about the implications of the total phenomenon. He does suggest, however, that with its mixed blessings the "bloc" phenomenon is likely to increase and should be better understood. Fortunately in *Africa in the United Nations* considerably more attention is given to the specific issues on which group members disagree and how their votes are related to the American and Soviet positions. This methodology is much more useful than the *ad hoc* verbal descriptions of group differences that supplemented the bar graphs in *Bloc Politics*. Arend Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 913–17, has also studied voting cohesion with the positions of other states in mind. His Figure 2 seems quite clearly two-dimensional. The proper dimensionality of UN voting patterns is discussed in detail below.

[8] Ernst B. Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations," in Morton Kaplan (ed.), *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York, 1962), p. 278. Italics omitted.

gested above will then be assessed, using correlation and regression techniques.[9] Findings from these analyses will serve both as a test of several hypotheses in international relations theory and as a basis for further studies of conflict and consensus, cohesion and power in the General Assembly.[10]

I. CONFLICTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Sixteenth General Assembly met intermittently, from September 1961 through June 1962. Seventy important votes from this session were chosen for intensive analysis. They include all distinct, non-unanimous, non-procedural, plenary roll calls, as well as 26 of the most important committee votes. Grouped according to the main committee of the Assembly in which they were originally discussed, these votes are briefly described on the left-hand sides of Tables I and II.[11]

Each conflict underlying more than one of these votes could be described by *a set of correlations* between the conflict and each of the 70 selected rolls calls (r_{jk} for roll call j and voting component k). If two such sets of correlations were themselves uncorrelated, we could say these conflicts were distinct. Each roll call could then be analyzed in terms of a set of its own correlations with separate voting components. Tables I and II contain these kinds of correlations: the *vertical* sets of correlations describe distinct conflicts in the General Assembly; the *horizontal* rows give each roll call's correlations with the conflict alignments.

Table entries were calculated in the following manner. Voting positions on each roll call ("Yeses," "Abstains" and "Nos") were quantified as ranks with zero means and unit standard deviations. These positions (V_{ji} for roll call j and country i) were assumed to result from a summation of underlying conflict positions (C_{ik} for conflict k) after multiplication by a *set of coefficients* (a_{jk}) indicating the relevance of each conflict to each roll call. These coefficients, called "conflict loadings" or "factor loadings" can be presented in as many rows as there are roll calls and in as many columns as there are general conflicts in Assembly voting.[12] For the case of standardized voting scores and uncorrelated voting components, $r_{jk}=a_{jk}$; *thus Tables I and II can be interpreted both as correlations be-*

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[9] Neither of these techniques is new to political science. Glendon Schubert has factor-analyzed judicial votes in "The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis," this REVIEW, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March, 1962), pp. 90–107; see also Duncan MacRae, Jr., and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888–1958," this REVIEW, Vol. 54, No. 3 (September, 1960), pp. 669–83. Regression is a basic deductive technique in *The American Voter*. See Stokes, Campbell and Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," this REVIEW, Vol. 52, No. 2 (June, 1958), pp. 367–87. A readable summary of both techniques may be found in Hubert Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), chs. 17–19 and 21. What is new about these techniques is the ease with which they may be applied. The seventy roll call factor analyses reported here took eleven minutes on the IBM 7090. The regressions took less than a minute each on the IBM 709.

[10] Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (forthcoming). Power measurements are facilitated by the use of both the conflict dimensions presented below and additional information on the sponsorship of resolutions and the intensity of involvement of different groups on these conflicts. Voting cohesion may satisfactorily be measured in terms of mean deviations on the factor scores presented below.

[11] Designating plenary meetings as the "Eighth Committee" and the Special Political Committee as the "0th Committee," the first digit of the identification numbers for each roll call in the Tables corresponds to the Committee in which the vote occurred; the numbers after this digit refer to the order of occurrence of the roll call within the Committee. "S.C.E.A.R." stands for the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation; "P.D.R." symbolizes the People's Democratic Republic of Korea; and "S.C.17" refers to the Special Committee of 17 set up at the Fifteenth Session to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. "UNCURK" is the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, while "CINSGT" is the author's label for the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

[12] Symbolically the model of voting positions used in factor analysis is

$$V_{ji} = \sum_k a_{jk}C_{ik} + u_{ji},$$

where u_{ji} is the unexplained voting position of country i on roll call j. For more details on the roll calls and methods described above, see Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Dimensions of Voting in the General Assembly* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1963). Harry H. Harmon, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960), ch. 9, derives the "principal component" method of factor analysis used in this article.

TABLE I. DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AT THE 16TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY: UNROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

Roll Calls		Factor								
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
8004.	Censure South Africa	.63	.33	−.36	.02	.09	−.03	−.11	−.11	−.00
8022.	Sanction South Africa	.84	.25	−.28	−.13	.01	−.01	.05	.06	−.03
8023.	Security Council & S. Africa	.88	.28	−.22	−.13	−.04	−.03	.00	.01	.07
8024.	No arms to South Africa	.83	.22	−.15	−.21	−.05	.04	.18	.07	−.02
8025.	No petroleum to S. Africa	.85	.21	−.20	−.16	−.03	.00	.20	.11	−.05
8027.	Oman self-determination	.84	.06	−.16	.26	−.11	−.05	−.02	−.01	.10
0018.	Reconstitute Pal. Con. Com.	.38	−.03	−.00	.04	−.11	−.57	.32	.49	−.14
8045.	Reconstitute Pal. Con. Com.	.72	−.01	.01	.39	−.07	−.24	.01	.14	−.20
8046.	Protect Arab refugees	.77	−.02	.07	.38	−.13	−.18	−.00	.03	−.17
8047.	U.N.R.W.A.	−.64	.20	−.03	−.32	.33	−.22	.11	.16	.17
8048.	U. S. Palestine Resolution	−.70	.22	−.02	−.28	.26	−.17	.11	.22	.08
0003.	Czech Res. on S.C.E.A.R.	.81	−.09	.01	−.12	−.12	−.02	−.07	−.04	−.06
8006.	Czech Res. important?	−.87	.05	.02	.03	−.03	−.02	.16	.00	.00
8007.	Admit Mauritania	−.77	.17	−.14	−.28	.16	−.04	.05	−.16	−.00
8029.	China question important?	−.74	.19	−.49	.04	−.21	−.10	.09	−.16	.00
8030.	China Declaration	.67	.15	.54	−.25	.05	.17	−.17	.16	.07
8031.	Seat Peoples' Rep. of China	.63	.16	.55	−.32	.02	.11	−.15	.14	−.00
8032.	Representation of China	.74	−.13	.45	−.27	.15	.12	−.12	.15	.02
8008.	Stop 50 megaton bomb	−.55	.64	.17	−.03	−.34	.04	−.14	.09	−.02
1010.	General & complete Disarm.	.88	.04	.03	−.11	−.08	.05	−.03	−.09	−.16
8009.	Regrets tests; need treaty	−.01	.86	.12	.15	.10	.18	−.04	−.06	.07
8010.	Regrets rejection of US-UK	−.70	.50	−.07	−.04	−.17	−.08	.11	−.07	.02
8012.	De-nuclearize Africa	.70	.06	.43	.17	.06	.10	.24	−.14	.07
8016.	Nuclear vs. Humanity	.87	.31	−.11	−.11	.04	.05	.06	−.07	.04
1023.	Non-nuclear club	.67	.10	.41	.17	.19	.12	.22	−.19	.01
8044.	Question of Algeria	.68	.16	.43	.12	.14	.03	.27	−.20	.04
1026.	P.D.R. & UNCURK	−.75	.32	−.25	.02	−.22	−.05	.11	−.11	.13
8054.	Report of UNCURK	−.88	.25	−.18	−.01	−.08	−.00	.14	.08	−.01
8055.	Deplores Hungary	−.92	.07	.04	.20	−.04	−.04	.05	.04	.05
8064.	Non interference (Cuba)	.86	−.08	.23	.09	−.01	−.06	−.10	.09	−.06
8065.	Friendly relations with Cuba	.92	.05	.10	−.11	−.00	−.02	.00	.12	−.09
2002.	Trade Conference	.88	.23	−.06	−.17	−.09	−.03	.15	−.06	−.03
2005.	Primary commodities	.44	.41	−.10	.25	.41	.08	.14	.16	.37
8038.	Study trade conference	−.74	.37	−.03	−.17	−.14	.00	.07	−.06	.11
2010.	Special int. devel. agency	.57	.38	−.42	.34	.21	−.02	−.12	.12	−.04
2015.	Conference on patents	−.58	−.21	.36	−.37	−.16	.05	.28	.00	−.21
8039.	Capital & technical assist.	−.25	.74	.09	.01	−.14	−.03	−.28	.16	.05
8041.	Population & econ. devel.	.53	−.13	.38	−.23	.00	−.17	.27	.04	.25
8001.	Tibet on agenda	−.83	.31	−.03	.04	.10	.02	.15	−.04	−.01
8043.	Resolution on Tibet	−.79	.44	−.17	−.06	.06	−.03	.19	−.02	.00
3001.	Absentee marriage	−.02	−.38	−.33	−.17	.50	−.28	−.11	−.16	−.33
3007.	"Hatred and hostility"	.78	.17	−.31	−.15	.03	−.05	−.16	.04	−.02
3013.	Safeguard right of reply	.68	−.17	.10	−.07	−.29	−.07	.17	−.26	−.16
8011.	Algerian prisoners	.78	.30	.10	−.15	.04	.08	.34	−.04	.06
8017.	1962 end of colonialism	.91	−.05	−.05	−.19	.07	−.01	.03	−.01	−.04
8019.	W. Irian self-determination	−.74	.11	−.25	−.34	.13	.17	−.04	−.03	−.08
8020.	Commission on W. Irian	−.78	.09	−.26	−.31	.09	.14	−.10	.01	−.07
8021.	Indian res. on W. Irian	.76	.01	.24	.40	.08	−.08	.05	−.10	.09
8035.	Regrets Port. non-compliance	−.83	−.29	.20	.09	.04	.02	−.07	.00	−.15
8037.	Renew CINSGT	−.26	.84	.15	.08	−.04	.14	−.03	.07	−.07
4009.	Swedish res. on South Africa	−.80	−.12	.34	.18	−.05	.01	.17	.03	−.07
8066.	Ask SC 17: S. Rhodesia SGTP	.87	.32	−.27	−.05	−.03	−.00	.03	−.01	.04
8068.	S. Rhodesia on agenda	.84	.34	−.25	−.04	−.04	−.06	.05	−.07	.03
8073.	"1 man 1 vote" S. Rhodesia	.86	.24	−.16	−.14	−.10	.02	.09	−.07	−.01
8075.	Regret UK on S. Rhodesia	.73	.40	−.30	.10	.06	.03	.04	−.10	.02
8056.	Condemn Portugal	.92	.04	−.05	−.13	.02	−.07	.03	−.01	−.07
8058.	Report on Angola	.80	.03	−.03	−.08	.04	−.10	−.07	−.02	.11
8059.	Angola & SC 17	.89	.16	−.08	−.00	−.00	−.10	−.05	−.06	.02
4001.	Burundi Prime Minister	−.88	−.24	.18	.01	.04	.02	.06	.11	−.05
4021.	Rwanda & Burundi sovereign	−.82	.01	−.12	.09	−.05	.11	.12	.09	−.09
8069.	Evacuate R. & B. by 1 Jul. 62	.95	.02	−.01	−.11	.00	−.10	.00	−.04	−.03
8070.	Rwanda & Burundi Evacuation	.30	.40	−.05	.21	.46	.29	.16	.03	−.49
4023.	Rwanda & Burundi Evacuation	−.30	.73	.06	.20	.04	.19	.01	.31	−.18
8071.	$2 million to S.G. for R. & B.	−.24	.66	.26	−.16	−.22	−.00	.03	−.08	−.30
5004.	5 Secretariat members/country	.57	.56	.07	−.02	−.33	.01	−.13	.02	−.03
8049.	Congo expenses and I.C.J.	−.74	.39	.20	.14	.14	−.19	.05	−.08	.00
8051.	Congo cost	−.42	.55	.43	.07	.12	−.37	−.22	−.20	−.01
8052.	U.N.E.F. expenses	−.50	.45	.43	−.02	.13	−.33	−.24	−.19	.06
8053.	Budget for year 1962	−.39	.60	.29	−.21	.16	−.28	−.02	−.15	−.14
8033.	Conf. on consular relations	.91	−.06	.06	−.15	.01	−.04	−.18	.03	−.02

TABLE II: DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT AT THE 16TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY: ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

Roll Call		Factor								
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
8004.	Censure South Africa	.77	.02	.00	.17	.16	.08	−.11	.03	−.09
8022.	Sanction South Africa	.88	−.10	.19	.13	.05	−.11	.03	−.03	−.11
8023.	Security Council & S. Africa	.91	−.06	.25	.16	.06	−.07	.06	−.06	−.00
8024.	No arms to South Africa	.82	−.12	.28	.08	−.05	−.15	.14	−.15	−.11
8025.	No petroleum to S. Africa	.84	−.14	.24	.11	−.02	−.20	.11	−.13	−.14
8027.	Oman self-determination	.67	−.19	.15	.51	.17	−.06	.09	−.07	.02
0018.	Reconstitute Pal. Con. Com.	.24	−.08	.09	.19	−.01	−.85	−.02	−.03	.03
8045.	Reconstitute Pal. Con. Com.	.43	−.12	.19	.65	.08	−.33	−.06	−.02	−.13
8046.	Protect Arab refugees	.45	−.12	.23	.71	.03	−.22	−.03	−.07	−.08
8047.	U.N.R.W.A.	−.33	.28	−.18	−.67	.18	−.18	−.18	−.01	.09
8048.	U.S. Palestine Resolution	−.38	.32	−.21	−.65	.13	−.21	−.10	.06	.01
0003.	Czech Res. on S.C.E.A.R.	.60	−.25	.40	.30	−.14	−.03	−.01	−.04	.06
8006.	Czech Res. important	−.64	.25	−.44	−.33	−.05	−.02	.05	−.01	.00
8007.	Admit Mauritania	−.37	.28	−.40	−.59	−.08	.13	−.18	.02	.03
8029.	China question important?	−.22	.20	−.83	−.30	−.10	.05	.01	.15	.09
8030.	China Declaration	.34	.13	.86	.12	.00	.03	.15	−.09	.00
8031.	Seat People's Rep. of China	.33	.16	.84	.08	−.09	−.01	.11	−.09	.01
8032.	Representation of China	.33	−.17	.87	.12	−.01	−.03	.01	−.11	−.01
8008.	Stop 50 megaton bomb	−.22	.79	−.21	−.16	−.12	.04	.30	.20	.06
1010.	General & Complete Disarm.	.69	−.16	.42	.33	−.18	.01	−.01	−.10	−.08
8009.	Regrets tests; need treaty	.24	.76	−.04	−.02	.25	.20	.17	−.13	−.23
8010.	Regrets rejection of US-UK	−.26	.59	−.51	−.32	−.09	.00	.12	.01	.05
8012.	De-nuclearize Africa	.31	−.03	.48	.42	.05	.01	.11	−.52	−.10
8016.	Nuclear vs. humanity	.85	−.02	.29	.17	.07	.01	.04	−.19	−.09
1023.	Non-nuclear club	.31	.00	.47	.38	.09	.06	.01	−.53	−.19
8044.	Question of Algeria	.35	.07	.46	.23	.05	−.00	.02	−.58	−.12
1026.	P.D.R. & UNCURK	−.29	.37	−.67	−.32	−.04	.07	.15	.05	.14
8054.	Report of UNCURK	−.47	.35	−.58	−.43	−.03	−.04	.11	.12	−.05
8055.	Deplores Hungary	−.72	.31	−.47	−.22	.07	−.00	.07	.08	.03
8064.	Non-interference (Cuba)	.48	−.17	.57	.49	.03	−.13	−.01	−.07	−.02
8065.	Friendly relations with Cuba	.67	−.15	.54	.29	−.04	−.17	.02	−.09	−.08
2002.	Trade conference	.83	−.06	.31	.19	−.11	−.11	.07	−.23	−.04
2005.	Primary commodities	.44	.11	.11	.03	.67	−.04	.11	−.25	−.19
8038.	Study trade conference	−.34	.48	−.41	−.45	−.09	.07	.14	.03	.12
2010.	Special int. devel. agency	.67	.06	−.09	.30	.43	−.05	−.08	.13	−.29
2015.	Conference on patents	−.60	.05	.03	−.38	−.51	−.10	.09	−.14	.01
8039.	Capital & technical assist.	.06	.78	−.07	−.10	.12	.02	.18	.26	.03
8041.	Population & econ. devel.	.23	−.16	.51	.05	−.02	−.26	.07	−.43	.25
8001.	Tibet on agenda	−.49	.43	−.47	−.39	.05	.05	.01	−.04	−.12
8043.	Resolution on Tibet	−.32	.48	−.56	−.49	.03	−.01	.03	−.02	−.10
3001.	Absentee marriage	.01	−.38	−.08	−.18	−.03	−.03	−.74	.12	−.14
3007.	"Hatred and hostility"	.82	−.13	.22	.13	.06	−.03	−.08	.13	−.02
3013.	Safeguard right of reply	.45	−.26	.23	.40	−.39	−.05	.01	−.27	.09
8011.	Algerian prisoners	.69	.01	.35	.09	−.01	−.11	.17	−.44	−.13
8017.	1962 end of colonialism	.72	−.30	.45	.19	−.04	−.08	−.07	−.13	−.05
8019.	W. Irian self-determination	−.32	.16	−.35	−.65	−.12	.20	−.07	.22	−.10
8020.	Commission on W. Irian	−.36	.16	−.38	−.63	−.10	.18	−.06	.29	−.06
8021.	Indian res. on W. Irian	.37	−.09	.35	.63	.23	−.05	−.02	−.33	−.03
8035.	Regrets Port non-compliance	−.85	.05	−.20	−.15	−.12	.06	−.11	.14	−.02
8037.	Renew CINSGT	.04	.84	−.11	−.11	.08	.07	.23	.02	−.24
4009.	Swedish res. on S. Africa	−.84	.19	−.21	−.10	−.10	−.05	.08	−.09	−.04
8066.	Ask SC 17: S. Rhodesia SGT?	.91	−.04	.16	.21	.09	−.05	.06	−.07	−.06
8068.	S. Rhodesia on agenda	.90	−.00	.13	.22	.06	−.06	.02	−.12	−.04
8073.	"1 man 1 vote" S. Rhodesia	.86	−.07	.23	.20	−.07	−.04	.09	−.15	−.05
8075.	Regret UK on S. Rhodesia	.82	.05	.02	.23	.18	.04	.01	−.12	−.16
8056.	Condemn Portugal	.76	−.21	.40	.25	−.05	−.12	−.07	−.12	−.04
8058.	Report on Angola	.65	−.17	.37	.24	.10	−.05	−.07	−.10	.10
8059.	Angola & SC 17	.77	−.09	.31	.34	.06	−.05	−.06	−.11	.02
4001.	Burundi Prime Minister	−.85	.06	−.22	−.30	−.07	−.04	.00	.09	−.01
4021.	Rwanda & Burundi sovereign	−.58	.14	−.49	−.30	−.05	.00	.11	.14	−.14
8069.	Evacuate R. & B. by 1 Jul. 62	.75	−.20	.42	.31	−.03	−.11	−.08	−.15	.02
8070.	Rwanda & Burundi Evacuation	.30	.19	.09	.10	.12	.04	−.15	−.13	−.81
4023.	Rwanda & Burundi Evacuation	−.05	.70	−.14	−.09	.16	−.08	.26	.15	−.44
8071.	$2 million to S.G. for R. & B.	.01	.75	−.04	−.11	−.35	−.01	.10	−.03	−.14
5004.	5 Secretariat members/country	.64	.41	.21	.28	−.10	−.02	.24	.04	.03
8049.	Congo expenses and I.C.J.	−.51	.61	−.32	−.20	.11	−.02	−.13	−.10	−.01
8051.	Congo cost	−.28	.83	−.01	−.00	.07	.01	−.30	−.08	.17
8052.	U.N.E.F. expenses	−.36	.76	.02	−.11	.07	.06	−.29	−.06	.23
8053.	Budget for year 1962	−.12	.76	−.03	−.29	−.10	−.06	−.27	−.13	.01
8033.	Conf. on consular relations	.65	−.23	.56	.29	−.02	−.04	−.08	.01	.06

tween roll calls and voting components, and as factor loadings.

Factor analysts have traditionally sought to extract distinct sets of factor loadings, each explaining a maximum proportion of the correlations among variables (in our case, roll calls). A sequential procedure for determining uncorrelated columns of as many high factor loadings as possible can be derived using the calculus. In Table I the resulting columns of a_{jk}'s are presented in the same order as the amount of voting variance they explain. For any particular column, factor loadings will have the same signs when "Yeses" represent the same point of view.

In this kind of analysis some analysts who believe that a Cold War alignment is paramount in all voting at the United Nations would expect correlations between all Assembly roll calls and this factor to be nearly unity. More sophisticated students of UN affairs suggest that at least two distinct voting conflicts underlie particular roll calls in differing degrees. Ernst Haas has interpreted Assembly politics in terms of a "balancing" process between Cold War demands and the political economic and anti-colonial demands of the underdeveloped countries.[13] John Stoessinger considers the two principal conflicts of our time to be the struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, and between the "new nationalism" of Asia, Africa and the Middle East and the waning empires of Europe.[14] In a similar way, Lincoln Bloomfield has described the General Assembly as

> . . . a prime political forum for the nations which remain outside the East-West camps and pursue their own goals of political independence, economic improvement and racial dignity. In this situation what might be called the North-South conflict cuts across the East-West issues and makes its own powerful demands on American diplomacy at the same time offering frequent opportunities for the Soviets to seize the political initiative.[15]

The most frequent conflicts in Assembly voting behavior. Looking at what is called the unrotated factor matrix in Table I, we see that a single conflict, which we shall call "East vs. West," did in fact dominate most issues before the United Nations, with the exception of budgetary concerns. By adding up squared correlations in the first column of Table I, we can say that this one factor accounts for the equivalent of 37 entire roll calls. This represents about 53 per cent of all votes cast on the seventy roll calls being analyzed or about 64 per cent of "explainable" voting alignments.[16] Prominent among the variety of issues loading above 0.60 on this "East-West" factor are South Africa, Palestine, Chinese membership, disarmament, Hungary, Korea, West Irian, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and Rwanda and Burundi.

A second conflict, "explaining" about 13 per cent of the "interpretable" voting variation, was paramount on several resolutions dealing with nuclear testing, economic aid, the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, other votes on Rwanda and Burundi, and most of the questions regarding the financing of the Congo Operation.

The inferred alignments of the main states and regional groupings in the Assembly on these two factors are plotted in Figure 1.[17] Looking at Figure 1 helps to suggest why Bloomfield's "North-South" and "East-West" labels have been chosen from among various possibilities to identify the two most frequent conflicts in the Assembly. With only a few obvious exceptions, the similarity between inferred voting positions of states and regional groupings and their geographical locations in a two-dimensional map of the world are rather striking. West Europeans, Latin Americans, Afro-Asians and the Soviet Bloc are almost entirely in their correct quadrants. The most notable exceptions are that South Africa and France are farther "North" than the other "colonial" countries; non-colonial Scandinavians are farther "South"; and pro-West Asians are farther

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[13] Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," *World Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (January, 1956), pp. 238–63.

[14] John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations* (New York, 1961).

[15] Lincoln Bloomfield, *The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1960), p. 10.

[16] All uncorrelated factors underlying or "explaining" more than the variance of a single roll-call were extracted and are presented in Table I. For the rationale for stopping factoring at this point, see Harry H. Harmon, *op. cit.*, ch. 14. The variances "explained" by these nine dimensions of conflict are 37.0, 7.8, 4.2, 2.4, 1.8, 1.4, 1.4, 1.1, 1.0, leaving only 17% of all voting "unexplained."

[17] In matrix notation the equation(s) in footnote 12 can be written as $\hat{V}=AC$. When A is not a square matrix, component scores are given by the equation $C=(A^1A)^{-1}A'V$. See Henry Kaiser, "Formulas for Component Scores," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 27 (March, 1962), pp. 83–8. As calculated here, these sets of factor scores are very nearly uncorrelated with each other.



FIGURE 1. Unrotated factor scores on the East-West and North-South conflicts at the Sixteenth General Assembly.

"West" because of their ties with the United States. Note how the Soviet Union was very "Northern" on the 50-megaton bomb issue; she joined a few extreme colonial powers on the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, and agreed further with these states on economic aid, and financing UN operations in the Congo and Rwanda and Burundi.

Another significant finding, however, is that besides these two major voting alignments, the matrix in Table I suggests that other conflicts and disagreements underlay voting positions at the Sixteenth Assembly. In fact, seven other alignments were found in the factor analysis, accounting for about 23 per cent of the "interpretable" voting variation. Like those noticed above, they can perhaps be interpreted by looking at the votes loading heavily on them in the factor matrix and by looking at the inferred policy positions (factor scores) of states on them. The third principal conflict, for instance, contains aspects of the Cold War, including Chinese membership in the United Nations, uncaptured by the first two factors.

A substantive interpretation of Assembly conflicts. One way to get a "better look" at the specific content of the first two as well as the remaining factors would be somehow to adjust the factor matrix, keeping the factors uncorrelated, so that each roll call would load very highly on *just one* factor. Such a new factor would be purely and simply interpretable in terms of the common content of, and voting positions on, the roll calls correlating heavily with it. Keeping the same number of voting dimensions, it is possible to find new sets of factor loadings approximating such an ideal factor matrix containing only zeros or ones. This can be done objectively by the use of Kaiser's "normal varimax" rotation technique for obtaining a factor matrix with a "simple structure."[18]

Geometrically, this technique can be visualized in terms of a space of dimensionality sufficient to explain all the main components of Assembly voting. Keeping the same configuration of roll calls in this space, its perpendicular axes can be rotated until the roll calls have the desired loadings (coordinates) on the factor axes. Although the rotated sets of coordinates would still be uncorrelated, they would no longer come in the order of maximum additional voting behavior "explained." Rather, the axes are rotated to a position where their substantive, as opposed to their behavioral, meaning should be most clear. Whether or not these newly perceived conflicts will have any relation to the functional committees where they occurred should also be more clearly discernible than was possible in the unrotated factor matrix.

Before turning to the rotated factor matrix, it may be helpful to recall several existing theoretical conceptions of the multi-dimensional conflict process in the General Assembly. George Liska has suggested that international organization may be treated as part of a "dynamic interplay of institutional military-political, and socio-economic factors and pressures," constituting to a greater or lesser degree, a "multiple equilibrium."[19] Writing in 1956, Ernst Haas suggested that the functional and security claims of the different regional systems have emerged as "the source of the actual functioning of universal international organizations" and that a "balancing" or equilibrium process in both regional groups and the international system connect the two together.[20] Something of the specifics of how a variety of controversies interact in UN votes is suggested by the following prescription of an experienced diplomat for predicting voting behavior:

> Apart from genuine satellites, . . . there are other cases where reasonably safe predictions may be made, but on the basis of a more complex calculus. Thus Pakistan . . . as a member of CENTO [likes] to vote with the West, but is also sensitive to Afro-Asian opinion, particularly sensitive to opinion in Moslem countries and strong on self-determination (Kashmir). A Western canvasser can therefore safely count on Pakistan's vote in a direct East-West controversy (Cuba, Hungary) but must make separate calculations if relevant racial, religious or colonial factors are involved. For example, in a "colonialist" issue where the "Moslem" factor tells on the "colonialist" side (Cyprus), or where the Kashmir issue comes into play (Goa), the West may reasonably expect Pakistan's support. On the other hand, on a straight racial issue (*apartheid*), or an issue where a Western power is, or has been, in conflict with Moslem populations (Suez, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel) Pakistan will be . . . the most anti-colonialist Afro-Asian. On such issues where both anti-colonialism and the Cold War are involved—for example the Soviet moves on the liquidation of colonialism—accurate prediction of a Pakistan vote becomes impossible.[21]

While not dealing explicitly with the different functional nature of these conflicts, this quotation, as we shall see, is very suggestive of a set of adequate political categories for describing substantive conflicts in the General Assembly.

Turning to the rotated factor matrix in Table II, we see that most factors are quite simply structured and also remarkably clear in their substantive content. The first four of them, all relatively frequent conflicts in the General Assembly, will receive more detailed consideration.[22] It should be made clear that these interpretations are based on the author's judgment, with which others may disagree; under the assumptions of the model being used, however, the factors themselves are objectively derived from actual voting behavior.

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[18] See Harmon, *loc. cit.* A further step, not taken in this article, would be to find the simplest factor structure using correlated (oblique) factors.

[19] George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957).

[20] Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism," *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 238–41, 260–63.

[21] Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (London, Hutchinson, 1962), p. 18.

[22] These rotated factors "explain" the equivalent of 22.7, 8.7, 10.2, 7.6, 1.8, 1.4, 1.6, 2.4, and 1.6 roll calls respectively.

New factors need new names; we shall call the first *"self-determination"* because it consists of most of the anti-colonial demands of the Afro-Asian states regarding South Africa, Angola, Southern Rhodesia and Rwanda-Burundi. Boxing the factor loadings greater than 0.60 in magnitude helps substantiate this description. The economic component of Afro-Asian "self-determination" demands is also brought out clearly by the high loadings of votes 2002, 2010 and 2015 on trade, aid and patent inquiries. Their desire for more jobs and a greater voice in the Secretariat explains why vote 5004 also loads on this factor. Vote 3007 found a similar group of states opposing the advocacy of racial hatred, as an incitement to discrimination and hostility.

Although it is important to distinguish "self-determination" questions from "East-West" alignments, it is clear from comparing the first columns of Table I and Table II that our new perspective is not yet very different from the earlier one. Almost all of the votes loading highly on the "self-determination" conflict also were closely correlated with characteristic "East-West" voting positions as summarized in Figure 1. The main difference is that quite a few Cold War controversies—Tibet, Cuba, Korea and especially Chinese membership—load more heavily on the new third rotated factor which we shall now examine.

It is quite clear from the boxed entries in the third column of the rotated factor matrix that the proper representation of China forms the largest part of a second distinct conflict in the General Assembly. We shall therefore identify the third factor as *Cold war membership* controversies. The usual alignment on this question at the Sixteenth Assembly pitted the United States, Latin America (except Cuba), most of the Brazzaville group, pro-Western Asians and most Western Europeans against India, Scandinavians, the Soviet bloc and most other Afro-Asians. A slightly confounding feature of the voting was that it was not clear on votes 8030 and 8031 that a declaration to remove Nationalist China was also binding. On these two votes the Soviet bloc, Cuba and several other states in favor of admission abstained; on vote 8032, however, they took their customary positions.

One of the most interesting results of this analysis is the degree to which such *bona fide* Cold War issues as Hungary, Cuba, disarmament and Korea overlapped the self-determination and Cold War membership conflicts. Granting "recognition" to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea at UNCURK meetings (vote 1026) was mostly a Cold War membership question; inviting everyone to a conference on consular relations (vote 8033), however, looks slightly more like a self-determination issue. As we have already noted, one reason for this phenomenon has to do with the similarity between East-West and self-determination controversies. Their relations to the Cold War membership controversy may be brought out more clearly by examining more closely the behavior of the Soviet Bloc, of the Latin Americans and of the Brazzaville group of Africans. It is clear that Soviet disarmament moves were designed to invoke an increasingly East-West or anti-European response: votes 8006 and 1010 called for a modest approval of the work of the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and for "general and complete disarmament;" vote 8016 summarizes the plenary voting on several paragraphs to the effect that the use of thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the laws of humanity and the Charter. Russia joined an almost solid Afro-Asian caucus in supporting the resolution. Most Afro-Asians also supported a preambular paragraph invoking the principles of non-intervention and self-determination regarding Cuba (vote 8064). On the other hand, almost solid Arab-African abstentions greeted a Western resolution (8055) deploring the disregard of Assembly resolutions regarding Hungary. The distinctive feature of the Chinese membership votes was that the Brazzaville group of states either abstained or backed the American position, while Scandinavians, the Casablanca group and non-aligned Asians did not.

Another reason why "self-determination" and some Cold War alignments have become similar is that Latin Americans, who in previous years have often voted in favor of "self-determination," were much less inclined to do so at the Sixteenth Assembly. They were probably reacting both to increased Soviet initiatives on "self-determination" questions and to the new, powerful and more radical African members of the Assembly. Thus they abstained on vote 8066 requesting the Committee of 17 to consider Southern Rhodesia and opposed a Soviet initiative (8069) on troop evacuations from Rwanda-Burundi.

Mongi Slim, the President of the Sixteenth General Assembly, has called the United Nations a "supranational framework within which conflicts of interest between nations could be at least attenuated, if not solved."[23] The main reasons for identifying the second rotated factor as "*UN supranationalism*" are the heavy loadings of crucial UNEF and Congo budgetary questions on it. The increasingly supranational role the United Nations has played in the Suez situation and the Congo crisis has been a major subject of controversy in the General Assembly, related to self-determination and the Cold War, but also distinct from them. Along with the enhancement of United Nations authority in these and related areas as a result of her activities there, some colonial states, such as France, Portugal, Belgium and South Africa have joined with the Soviet Bloc in obstructing the supranationalist strivings of the smaller UN members. Alone among the Great Powers, the United States has usually backed such initiatives. As such, these conflicts cut squarely across the East-West struggle. States normally close to the Soviet Union, such as Yugoslavia, Ghana, Guinea, India and Indonesia, voted against her on the apportionment of UNEF costs (vote 8052), the Congo authorization for 1962 (8051), a request for the Soviet Union to refrain from exploding her fifty megaton bomb (8008) and an expression of regret at the resumption of nuclear tests (8009). Belgium, France, South Africa, Portugal, and even the United States (on nuclear testing) opposed at least some of these resolutions. Votes 4023, 8071 and 8072 discussed above, also represent a successful "supranational" effort by the majority of UN members, despite Soviet objections and certain colonial hesitations, to ease the birth pains of Rwanda and Burundi in what might have become another Congo situation. Finally, votes 8039, requesting one percent of National Products in "capital" and technical assistance, and 8037, renewing the Committee of Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories, represent similar small-power aspirations and Great Power objections.

The fourth major component of UN voting, which we might call the "*Moslem factor*" after Conor Cruise O'Brien, is composed of Palestine and West Irian mediation attempts.[24] On these questions the Soviet Bloc supported Arab demands, Old Europeans and Latin Americans were somewhat divided, and most importantly, the Brazzaville states, objecting to Arab and Indonesian notions of "self-determination," refused to support the majority of Afro-Asians.[25]

We may describe the remaining five voting components in lesser detail. Factor VI reflects certain Latin, Benelux and Scandinavian misgivings about the composition of the Conciliation Commission (vote 0018, discussed above). The ninth rotated factor is limited to residual colonial misgivings about intervention in Rwanda and Burundi (vote 8070). These same European colonial states have usually been the ones refusing to support anti-colonial domestic intervention by the United Nations in condemning *apartheid* (perhaps what O'Brien would call a "race factor"). About half of the West European and Old Commonwealth states were isolated on vote 2005 concerning commodity regulations, probably because of the definite anti-Common Market flavor of Second Committee discussions (Factor V). A more peculiar coalition of the Soviet Bloc and several Latin Americans appeared in voting on marriage rules in the Third Committee (vote 3001, Factor VII). Finally, the coalition of conservative Westerners with conservative Afro-Asians (the Brazzaville group) on votes 8012, 1023 and 8044 is probably due to special "French concerns" on nuclear testing and Algerian problems (Factor VIII).

Some comparisons. This paper has empirically characterized the principal conflicts in the General Assembly. The results of the unrotated and the rotated factor analyses shed some light on current interpretations of international politics. Looking at frequent voting alignments, one-factor theories were found at best to describe 64 per cent of explainable Assembly voting. Again focusing on voting behavior more than substantive interpretations, a two-dimensional geopolitical picture was offered that corresponded quite closely to several previous descriptions of current international politics. East-West and North-South alignments (as shown in Figure 1) together underlie about 77 per cent of interpretable Assembly voting behavior. Because the unrotated factors were more easily identified by looking at voting alignments, the geopolitical interpretation was given a behavioral label.

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[23] Cited in N. J. Padelford and R. Emerson, *Africa and World Order* (New York, 1963), p. 45

[24] The West Irian roll calls were all in plenary meetings but are listed in Tables I and II with other colonial questions because they were discussed in terms of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

[25] An important argument for both this fourfold substantive classification and the two-dimensional geopolitical interpretation offered earlier is that similar analyses seem appropriate for the Second, Seventh and Twelfth General Assemblies. *Cf.* Alker, *op. cit.*, or Alker and Russett, *op. cit.* (forthcoming).

In looking at the same spatial configuration of roll calls from a different perspective (the simply structured factor matrix in Table II), *four* different substantive issues were found: self-determination, Cold War and related membership questions, UN supranationalism, and Moslem questions (in the Near and Far East). Going beyond an increasingly popular two-dimensional view of world politics, this four-dimensional perspective helps to explain 85 per cent of generally interpretable Assembly voting. It also has the advantages of clearer substantive meaning than the unrotated factor matrix[26] and of labels corresponding quite closely to several interpretations of Assembly politics offered by diplomatic participants. O'Brien, for example, missed only supranationalism among these four factors, while he also distinguished one of the most important remaining conflicts.

Several of the rotated factors also turn out to be more functionally specific than the East-West and North-South divisions. From the rotated factor matrix (Table II) it is clear that self-determination issues pervade the General Assembly. Supranationalist votes are found in disarmament, economic, and especially Trusteeship and Fifth Committee contexts. The Special Political and Fourth Committees were the scene of Moslem demands evoking alignments unlike the usual anti-European or anti-West self-determination response; Cold War issues, including Chinese membership, have been largely "political" questions.

To some extent controversies in the Assembly with particular functional bases have produced "cross-cutting conflicts" as suggested by Chadwick Alger and others.[27] Problems of enlarging the scope of UN activities in these areas have divided both East and West. Negative agreements between colonial powers and the Soviet bloc on North-South or supranationalist issues have temporarily brought opponents in the East-West struggle closer together. But on major political conflicts issues such as ONUC and UNEF, increments to UN authority have come not so much from an indirect functional approach to world peace, as from American policy decisions to cooperate with the developing countries in opposition to other colonial powers and the Soviet bloc. Russian commitment to the symbols of self-determination has to some extent influenced the anti-colonial states; but this commitment has also restricted Soviet movements with supranationalist consequences. With anti-colonial Afro-Asians against Soviet or American intervention in the Congo, the Soviet Union had gradually and belatedly to withdraw from her support of the UN Congo operation.[28] Subsequent Russian financial vetoes have been only partly successful in preventing the UN from performing its peace-keeping role.

II. CORRELATES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ASSEMBLY CONFLICTS

The suggestion that *political* conflicts preoccupy members of the United Nations implies that the national interests of UN members, shaped as they are by domestic, regional, political, economic and ethnic considerations, are more causally determinative of UN policy positions than caucusing-group pressures at the UN. There is, for instance, a considerable degree of overlap between geographic regions and active groups at the United Nations in the case of Africans, Latin Americans, West Europeans and the Soviet bloc. The Commonwealth and Casablanca groups are those with the least geographical basis. The analysis below is directed toward testing just how well caucusing-group memberships and national political variables, the "environment" of the UN system, correlate with voting positions there. Hovet, for example, in *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, has suggested that environmentally based "common interest groups" operate in the UN in addition to the more formalized caucuses. Among these groups he includes "underdeveloped countries," "colonial powers," "anti-colonial states" and "Moslem states."[29] In another context, Ernst Haas has suggested that the nature of a state's political system (democracy, oligarchy or totalitarianism), its region, its state of economic development and its Cold War allegiance might be helpful foci for studying international voting and ratification behavior.[30] Bruce Russett has found that military cooperation (alliances and the stationing of troops), economic interdependence (as measured by shares of export and import trade) and foreign aid are partial determinants of conflict policies in international relations.[31]

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[26] Analyses of the East-West conflict in simple behavioral terms often run into the same confussion that Hovet notes regarding similar Soviet and Afro-Asian voting behavior: they do not distinguish Cold War from self-determination issues. Empirically, the "substantive" and "behavioral" viewpoints are complementary. Each roll call can be checked as to both its rotated and unrotated components. Correlating factor loadings or factor scores makes this relationship explicit. The East-West and North-South correlations of self-determination factor scores are 0.74 and 0.43. The same numbers for the Cold War alignment are 0.50 and −0.20; for Moslem questions they are 0.39 and −0.12; and for supranationalism factor scores −0.25 and −0.86.

[27] Chadwick Alger, "Non-Resolutional Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June, 1961), pp. 128–47.

[28] Early Soviet support of Security Council resolutions on the Congo is sometimes overlooked. See Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York, 1962), ch. 10.

Turning to Table III, we see that group memberships do correlate quite highly with factor scores on all but the Cold War membership controversy in the General Assembly. The table brings out quite clearly the regional identification of the protagonists in all conflicts but that one. We can thus confirm, from the higher entries in the table, our earlier interpretations that the East-West controversy is most clearly a contest between Old Europeans and the Soviet bloc; that the North-South conflict pits Africans, Arabs and Asians against the Soviet bloc and, to a lesser extent, against Old Europeans; but these Africans, particularly the Casablanca states, oppose Old Europeans on self-determination issues. Casablanca, Arabs and Brazzaville states took very different positions on Moslem questions (Palestine and West Irian); while on the supranationalist alignment the Soviet bloc and to a lesser extent Old Europeans opposed an Afro-Asian majority.[32]

The search for a more adequate explanation

TABLE III. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GROUP MEMBERSHIPS AND FACTOR SCORES ON THE MAIN CONFLICTS IN THE 16TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY†

Group Memberships	Unrotated Factor Scores		Rotated Factor Scores			
	East vs. West	North vs. South	Self-determination	Cold War	Moslem questions	UN Supranationalism
1. Old Europeans	−.58*	−.43	−.74*	.10	−.25	−.08
2. Latin caucus	−.38	.07	−.21	−.36	.00	.06
3. Soviet Bloc	.50*	−.63*	.20	.27	.13	−.79*
4. Arab caucus	.36	.17	.19	.05	.55*	.12
5. Casablanca group	.05	.37	.53*	−.22	−.56*	.09
6. Brazzaville group	.32	.18	.18	.24	.33	.20
7. Africans	.22	.49	.62*	−.02	−.45	.26
8. Asians	.10	.23	.03	.01	.20	.27

† Point biserial correlations over 0.50 in magnitude have been asterisked for convenience. The rotated factor scores referred to in this table and elsewhere in this paper are slightly intercorrelated (below 0.10) because Russian abstentions on Chinese membership have been considered affirmative votes and because self-determination scores have been revised to take into account the positions of extreme colonial powers on two nearly unanimous roll calls not included in the factor analysis.

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[29] The chart on page 126 summarizes membership in both kinds of groupings in 1959.

[30] Ernst Haas, "System and Process in the International Labor Organization: A Statistical Afterthought," *loc. cit.*

[31] Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 1963), pp. 97–109, and *Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 1963), ch. IV.

[32] Arend Lijphart, *op. cit*, has correctly pointed out the limitations of arbitrarily chosen groups in the study of Assembly politics. The groupings of states used in Table III represent combinations of regular and *ad hoc* caucusing units and regional interest groups. They serve as a convenient compromise between inductively found groupings (as in Figure 1) and Hovet's list of regular caucusing groups (*Africa in the United Nations*, p. 74.). Old Europeans are a frequently united group of West Europeans, Old Commonwealth members, the United States and South Africa; Mongolia is considered only a member of the Soviet bloc; Turkey and Cyprus are considered Asian states. Arabs, Africans and Asians have been exclusively defined with respect to each other, Old Europeans and the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, Israel and Nationalist China have not been listed with any group.

TABLE IV. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND VOTING POSITIONS ON THE MAIN CONFLICTS IN THE 16TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY†

	Unrotated Factor Scores		Rotated Factor Scores			
Environmental Variables	East vs. West	North vs. South	Self-determination	Cold War	Moslem questions	UN Supranationalism
Economic Variables						
9. Recent U. S. aid	−.18	.17	−.13	−.26	.16	.19
10. Postwar U. S. aid	−.44	−.13	−.48	.05	−.12	.05
11. % trade with U. S.	−.49	.18	−.29	−.45	.00	.20
12. % trade with U. S., U. K., France	−.28	.63*	.22	−.39	−.33	.53*
13. Recent Soviet aid	.50*	−.05	.18	.46	.21	−.09
14. Postwar Soviet aid	.54*	−.03	.19	.47	.28	−.03
15. % trade with Soviet Bloc	.57*	−.63*	.19	.38	.20	−.76*
16. Per capita G.N.P (1955)	−.43	−.46	−.59*	.09	−.19	−.20
17. G.N.P. (1955)	−.01	−.34	−.11	.03	.02	−.25
Political Variables						
18. U. S. military ally	−.77*	.13	−.68*	−.35	−.17	.08
19. Communist state	.59*	−.56*	.24	.38	.20	−.68*
20. Democracy	−.52*	.04	−.47	−.09	−.17	.27
21. Totalitarian regime	.45	−.44	.22	.29	.11	−.53*
22. Colonial Power (since 1917)	−.43	−.46	−.50*	−.11	−.05	−.16
23. Ex-colony (since 1917)	.51*	.58*	.67*	.11	.06	.37
Sociological Variables						
24. % European descent	−.28	−.65*	−.57*	.20	−.12	−.42
25. % Negro	.15	.41	.52*	−.04	−.45	.19
26. % Moslem	.41	.29	.34	.04	.41	.19

† Aid figures are in per capita U. S. dollars; recent aid is from 1957 to 1961 or 1962 (in the Soviet case); trade figures are based on 1961 data. The numbering of variables is continued from Table III. Sources, definitions of variables, data, and estimates of inaccuracies are available from the Yale Political Data Program. N for this table and the previous one is 101, except for correlations with variables 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 where *a priori* missing data reduced it to 100 or 91. Throughout this and previous tables, Honduras, Gabon and Tanganyika have been omitted because of their high voting absenteeism.

of the "reasons for" or the "environmental determinants of" Cold War voting brings us to Table IV. The large number of asterisked entries suggest immediately that, except for Moslem questions, we can explain each of the major conflicts in the United Nations with "environmental variables" at least as accurately and probably more cogently than with caucusing group variables. Thus on East-West voting a military alliance with the United States is an extremely good predictor of voting behavior (the correlation is 0.77). Describing this conflict (but not the Cold War and Chinese membership issue) as "democracies versus totalitarians" also has some truth to it. An ex-colonial past is also relevant, particularly regarding the self-determination aspects of the East-West alignment. Soviet aid and trade and to a lesser extent similar variables for the Western Big Three are also correlated with East-West voting. A significant finding is that in each of the two main geopolitical conflicts, *trade, not aid,* is the better predictor of voting behavior. As we shall see below, the "environmental" approach to UN voting using such key variables in world politics as trade, aid and military alliances will predict East-West voting positions with just as much accuracy as caucusing group memberships more immediate to the actual voting.

Trade, colonial past, per capita Gross National Product (an indicator of economic development) and the percentage of a nation's population that is of European descent, probably with similar sympathies, are suggestive correlates of North-South voting, but they raise the important question of their relative explanatory importance when the remaining variables are controlled for, a question regression analysis can be used to answer.

Turning to the substantive conflicts in the Assembly, racial variables, economic development, colonial history and American military alliances all influence policy positions (factor scores) on self-determination. Trade and aid, as indicators of what might be best described as a two-way process of interdependence rather than just "buying votes," help improve our understanding of the reasons for Cold War membership alignments. Even from the simple correlations in Table IV it is evident that *Soviet* (not American) aid either in years since 1957 or in the entire post-World War II period is a good predictor of voting for Communist Chinese membership in the United Nations. Whether the Soviets should be regarded as influential in "buying votes" or as only "rewarding" their friends is a more difficult question which will not be discussed here. On Moslem questions, racial and religious variables do seem to underly the voting pattern, but these have also been modified by caucusing group policy decisions, as we saw in Table III. As an indicator of economic interdependence, trade with the Big Three (but not Western military alliances this time) correlates highly with supranationalism. Even though data for within-Bloc trade seem to underestimate Bloc solidarity, trade with the Soviet Bloc is as high a correlate of the anti-supranationalist position as was Soviet Bloc membership. From Table IV it also appears that both democracies and ex-colonial states have contributed to the growth of the United Nations in the present era.

Correlations cannot be considered causal explanations until the observer has controlled for the effects of other possibly relevant variables. Multiple regression analysis takes an important step in that direction: it provides a linear model for explaining a "dependent" variable, such as East-West voting positions, as the sum of distinctive contributions from several "independent" variables, such as foreign aid and military alliances. For individual nations, residual differences between actual and predicted values of the dependent variable can be calculated and subjected to further analysis; for the entire UN membership, squared multiple correlation coefficients indicate the percentage of voting variation explained by the model.[33]

In a regression equation each coefficient of an independent variable tells the direction and the amount of the average change in the dependent variable associated with a unit change in only that one independent variable. The units of the independent variables may be either *concrete*, in policy terms such as dollars of aid or membership in the Latin American caucusing group, or *standardized* to reflect what on a worldwide scale appear as equiprobable changes.[34] When several logically prior variables are each distinctively related to Assembly voting positions on a particular conflict, a linear regression equation provides a simple but attractive theoretical statement of a multivariate explanatory relationship.

In regression equations (1) through (4), abbreviated alphabetic labels taken from Table IV denote both the independent and the dependent variables. The dependent variables, standardized voting ranks, can be interpreted as distances (roughly, inches) along either axis of Figure 1 or of a similar picture for rotated Cold War and supranationalism alignments. Taken from among the most promising explanatory variables in Table IV, the combinations of independent variables are not exhaustive, but only intended to test several explanations of UN voting reviewed earlier in this paper.[35]

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[33] The R^2s for equations (1)–(4) below are exceptionally high ones in social research. The multiple correlation coefficient of the East-West model is 0.88. The equation explains 78% of the major voting alignment in the General Assembly. Similarly, the North-South Model explains 70%, the Cold War and supranationalism models 48% and 44% respectively. Even for factor scores in their present largely uncorrelated form (see note to Table III), high correlations with the rotated self-determination conflict indicate that influences affecting these policy positions differ from those which determine Cold War membership alignments.

Using regional and caucusing-group variables that are much more immediate to the voting (see Table III), the corresponding R^2s are roughly similar: 0.79, 0.78, 0.30 and 0.72. Cold War membership alignments can be explained better by more distant environmental variables, like aid and trade, than by caucusing-group memberships. Supranationalism and self-determination (with group membership regressions explaining 72% and 85% respectively) definitely reflect a good deal of group cohesion. Group cohesion by itself, however, is a poor predictor of what a group has agreed on, for which additional explanations, like equations (1)–(4), are required.

[34] In the case of a standardized dependent variable, standardized β-coefficients are obtained by multiplying a concrete b-coefficient times the standard deviation of its independent variable. β-coefficients are comparable; b-weights are not.

$$\mathrm{EW} = \underset{(-0.31)}{-.29\mathrm{PUSA}} + \underset{(0.02)}{.74\mathrm{RUSA}} + \underset{(0.05)}{.23\mathrm{TWUUF}} - \underset{(-0.47)}{.96\mathrm{USALY}} + \underset{(0.24)}{2.00\mathrm{PSBA}} - \underset{(-0.02)}{.23\mathrm{RSBA}} + \underset{(0.28)}{1.35\mathrm{TWSB}} + \underset{(0.20)}{.58\mathrm{COMM}} \tag{1}$$

$$\mathrm{CWM} = \underset{(0.54)}{.50\mathrm{PUSA}} - \underset{(-0.04)}{1.44\mathrm{RUSA}} - \underset{(-0.03)}{.15\mathrm{TWUUF}} - \underset{(-0.31)}{.63\mathrm{USALY}} + \underset{(0.22)}{1.85\mathrm{PSBA}} + \underset{(0.14)}{1.46\mathrm{RSBA}} + \underset{(0.21)}{1.01\mathrm{TWSB}} + \underset{(0.07)}{.20\mathrm{COMM}} \tag{2}$$

$$\mathrm{NS} = \underset{(0.15)}{.71\mathrm{TWUUF}} + \underset{(0.25)}{.50\mathrm{EXECY}} - \underset{(-0.31)}{1.50\mathrm{TWSB}} - \underset{(-0.13)}{.38\mathrm{COMM}} - \underset{(-0.18)}{.40\mathrm{EURDS}} - \underset{(-0.16)}{.39\mathrm{PCGNP}} \tag{3}$$

$$\mathrm{UNSUP} = \underset{(0.28)}{.57\mathrm{EXECY}} + \underset{(0.22)}{.44\mathrm{DEM}} - \underset{(-0.41)}{.96\mathrm{TOT}} - \underset{(-0.04)}{.11\mathrm{COLP}} - \underset{(-0.19)}{.49\mathrm{PCGNP}} \tag{4}$$

Equation (1) tells us, for instance, that either a Western military alliance or one hundred dollars of postwar Soviet Bloc per capita aid (Syria, Guinea and Ghana have received about half this amount) would polarize UN voting patterns on the East-West controversy. Since 1957, however, both Soviet and American aid have moved toward the uncommitted, away from their own camps. The effect of an increase in trade with the Big Three is roughly one-fifth as large as for a similar Soviet-bloc trade increase. Although the standardized coefficients are similar, dollar for dollar, Soviet aid has been much more strongly related to East-West voting alignments in the United Nations. An "alliance" of communist political-economic systems in Cuba, Guinea, Mali and the Soviet Bloc also had a considerable Eastern influence in 1961 and 1962. Looking specifically at the Cold War membership aspects of the East-West alignment, equation (2) states the opposite tendencies of long-term and short-term American aid, the anti-communist pull of an American military alliance, and consistent relationships between long term *and* recent Soviet aid and voting on Chinese representation in the Assembly.

The third equation tells us that being 100 percent of European descent makes for only about a fourth as much Northern voting as would total trade with the Soviet Bloc. Being a communist state creates about as much Northern voting as a per capita G.N.P. of a thousand dollars. Being an ex-European colony and trading about 70 percent of the time with the Western Big Three would together move a state about an "inch" (on Figure 1) in the Southern direction. On the related supranationalism conflict, ex-colonial status and political democracy are both about equally strong "causes" of supranationalist voting, while totalitarian and developed states tend to demur. An analysis of residuals shows that even equation (4) underestimates the supranationalist tendencies of the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups, as well as the anti-supranationalist tendencies of the Soviet bloc.

Deterministic as the coefficients in the factor matrix and the regression equations just given may seem, they represent opportunities for domestic politicians and foreign service diplomats to reshape international politics by changing these relationships. In the last two decades "issues" on the world scene have been perceived differently (loaded on different factors in succeeding years) with dramatically different consequences; and environmental variables (like military alliances) have become increasingly or decreasingly "influential" in determining policy positions. American foreign aid has increased in its relevance to the Cold War struggle in the UN, but still remains fairly uncorrelated on a world-wide basis with this conflict. If it were to become highly correlated in this manner, an effective neutral and supranationalist role for the anti-colonial countries would be increasingly difficult. South African racial policies have become increasingly East-West and self-determination issues with foreboding consequences; West Irian remained distinct enough from these contests for some progress to be made. The Soviet Union failed significantly to make the Congo crisis into an anti-European and anti-American self-determination issue, although she and the Casablanca states tried to do so. Many of the elements of such a conflict were certainly there; but fortunately (for us) Russia misperceived Afro-Asian and American supranationalist predispositions. The danger with Cold War issues like Hungary and Tibet is that they will become increasingly perceived as anti-Western self-determination conflicts; the American opportunity—and challenge for our policy-makers—is to persuade others and ourselves of the United Nations' universal supranationalist possibilities.

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[35] In these equations b-coefficients are given with the independent variables, β-weights are given below them in parentheses. The concrete units for dichotomous variables (*e.g.*, alliances) are 1 or 0; for aid figures they are \$100 per capita; for per capita G.N.P. \$1,000; and for all percentage figures, 100%. It should be noted that the communist "independent" variables are highly intercorrelated, enough so that further analysis using a single index of communist ties might be desirable.

RESEARCH NOTES

MONTESQUIEU ON LOVE: NOTES ON *THE PERSIAN LETTERS*

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Among students of political philosophy, Montesquieu is chiefly honored as author of *The Spirit of the Laws*. His earlier important work, *The Persian Letters,* is more often cited than read and is considered primarily as a collection of fragments, some of which may be useful for clearing up some disputed point or other in the interpretation of the *magnum opus*. In these notes I propose to treat it as a meaningful whole—as a book which in fact has the theme which it purports to have, the theme of love and its relation to social institutions. This is not an altogether novel approach, even among political scientists. The late Franz Neumann, for example, has pointed out the importance of this theme in his introduction to the Hafner edition of *The Spirit of the Laws*.[1] Nevertheless, I believe that Montesquieu's conception of love is sufficiently important and the implications of his conception sufficiently interesting, so that a closer analysis will not be redundant.

In brief, I will argue that Montesquieu treats love as a decisive manifestation of humanity. The lover is more truly human than other men; his potentialities as man are then more fully realized. Both virtue and wisdom are opened to him in this happy state. But love is not always possible. In fact, it is truer to say that almost never can men find true love, for the *institutions of society* deprive man of the capability for love. This is a crucial point; Montesquieu tells us not only that social conditions may preclude the fruition of love, but that men's perception of themselves and others is so decisively influenced by the habits they acquire in society that the very emotion of love will be denied them, or be transformed into a parody of that love which fulfills man. A proper treatment of the theme of love, then, requires more than an examination of the immediate and personal feelings of individuals; it requires also a study of the social context in which individuals move, the conditions which will affect both the character and fate of love. In this way, the writer or artist who truly understands love, whose sensibilities are developed, becomes at once a student of social reality and, perforce, a social critic. Furthermore, since no one himself incapable of love can know it, he shares at once the blessing and curse of the lover in a corrupted society. He alone can feel and know truly, but he must also be alone—a stranger and outcast in society. This last, on the role of the artist, is implicit rather than explicit in Montesquieu's work. The point emerges more openly in the work of Rousseau. It is, nevertheless, important to see it in relationship to Montesquieu because he is much clearer than Rousseau in pointing out that the love and sensibility which give special insight are not merely any strong passion, but "true" love and sensibility. This, I believe, was also Rousseau's position. The German *Sturm und Drang*, with admiration, and the anti-Romantic, with invective, misread him on precisely this point. But regardless of the strict validity of this last extension of Montesquieu's doctrine of love, this much emerges clearly: for Montesquieu, the theme of love is intimately tied to the problems of society, and specifically, to the problem of dehumanization.

What, then, is Montesquieu's conception of true love? In the first place, its object is frankly sexual. Montesquieu breaks decisively with the classical and Christian philosophical traditions, as well as with what I understand to be the dominant tradition in serious literature. Man's love is not directed toward Platonic ideas or the Christian God; its object is woman. Nor is love for woman sublimated into an ephemeral adulation; it seeks sexual gratification. There is nothing necessarily heinous in the life of the passions. When Montesquieu seeks to ascertain the quality of love in a society, he first directs his attention to the relationship between the sexes. He investigates the emotions attendant to courtship and marriage.

But obviously, not all sexual passion is true love, which involves fidelity and respect also. The lover must direct his desire solely at the object of his love, and remain steadfast in his dedication. (Incidentally, this does not rule out polygamy automatically. There is nothing in this which precludes love of more than one. The point is that the lover does not follow random sexual inclinations.) Steadfastness, however, is not a sufficient condition for true love. The lover must respect his beloved, value her feelings and intelligence. She is no mere sexual object. Love implies at least the possibility of reciprocity and an essential equality between men and women. The love which enhances humanity presupposes a modicum of humanity, and this is at the mercy of society.

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[1] Franz L. Neumann, "Montesquieu," *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (Glencoe, 1957), pp. 103–4; *cf.* J. Robert Loy, "Introduction," to Montesquieu, *Persian Letters* (New York, Meridian Books, Inc., 1961).

To see how social institutions may preclude love, we now turn to the story of *The Persian Letters*. The romance is written in the form of letters, and the tale is simple. Two Persian gentlemen, Usbek and Rica, decide to travel to the West in search of knowledge. They correspond with their friends about their impressions and meditations. Rica's letters are primarily satirical. He points up sharply the pretense of the French; and yet he is also changed by what he sees, and apparently decides to remain, particularly because of the freedom and attractiveness of women. The main protagonist, however, has no mind for such attractions. His observations, in general, are more speculative than satirical, and—most importantly—his attention is sharply divided between his new experiences and the events in his seraglio at home, which form the subject matter of many of his letters. During his absence, the discipline of the seraglio disintegrates and the process culminates in the discovery that Roxana, his favorite wife, bears him hate rather than love and has betrayed him with another man.

In the *Persian Letters,* Montesquieu tests the quality of love in two social contexts, the Persian seraglio and the Parisian *haut-monde,* adding some comments on Russia and Spain, as well as a tale of true love between brother and sister. Except for the last, all appearances of love disintegrate either under close scrutiny or under the pressure of the environment. They are illusory or doomed not because of "fate" or individual failings, but because social circumstances forbid them reality.

Seraglio love fails, despite its guarantee of gratification and at least external fidelity, because the seraglio rests on the principle of terror, force and general denial of individual dignity. Usbek, the master of the seraglio, admits "It is not so much that I love them: in this respect, I find in myself an insensible mood which leaves me empty of desires. In the well-stocked seraglio where I lived, I anticipated love and destroyed it by [the act of] love itself; yet, out of my very coldness, springs up a secret jealousy that consumes me."[2] His love is little more than pride of possession. The objects which he possesses will be more valuable if they are beautiful, and more enjoyable if they love him. They are not human. The sole exception is his feeling for Roxana which has the element of desire because she has fought him, but it cannot be love because she too must be treated as a slave in the discipline of the seraglio. He is a humane and cultured man, who would rather persuade than terrorize, but his situation denies him the opportunity—and presumably the capacity—to love. Usbek is, then, after all not so different from the eunuchs whom at times he pities. For them, desire has been transformed into lust for power and bitter hatred. And if one should seek love despite his impotence, he must experience bitter frustration. But Usbek's situation parallels this exactly. They are all caught up in the logic of the system.

In some ways, the victims fare better than their master or his ministers. At least, the physical pleasure of gratifying real desires is not denied them. For Zachi, a former favorite of great beauty, this is almost enough. Yet if she can be contented in her slavery, she cannot be truly human. In punishment for some minor transgression she is spanked by a eunuch, and relates: "My soul, at first annihilated by shame, was rediscovering the feeling of its own existence and was growing indignant, at which time my cries made the vaults of my apartment resound. I could be heard beseeching mercy from the most abject of all humans."[3] A self-awareness so located and so manifested betokens a complete dehumanization. Zelis, another wife, is less degraded. She consoles herself with her husband's fears, priding herself on his dependence on the wives. In many ways, she is the counterpart of the eunuchs. But the facts of power deprive her of this consolation. She shares Zechi's fate, and her sadistic pleasure turns into a hatred which must destroy her. Destruction is also the necessary punishment for Roxana, the most fortunate of the wives. By whatever chance, she is the one person in the seraglio capable of love. She bestows it adulterously, with good cheer and hate deceiving Usbek. When she is discovered, and her lover slain, she kills herself, flaunting her freedom to her husband. The iron law of the seraglio is summarized in Zelis' last letter to Usbek: "You have degraded your soul and become inhuman."[4] At best, this inhumanity may take the form of the happy assemblage of mares serviced by an angelic and superpotent stud, as set forth in Rica's idyllic tale; at worst, it will take the form of total terror described in glowing terms by the Black Eunuch. Love enters the seraglio only by accident, and those who can partake of it must die. Rule based on fear must destroy the humanity of both ruler and ruled.

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[2] Montesquieu, *Lettres Persanes*, ed. Antoine Adam (Geneva and Lille, 1954), Lettre VI, p. 20. The translations used here are greatly indebted to Anne Dobbs, although final responsibility for the text rests with the author. There are two English translations of the *Persian Letters*: the first, by an anonymous translator, was published in a limited edition in London in 1897; it is charming in style, but often quite inaccurate; the second, by J. Robert Loy (cited in the note above) is very accurate, but tends to let a concern for literalness obscure the sense conveyed by overtones and style.

[3] Montesquieu, *op. cit.*, Lettre CLVII, p. 400.

But a society characterized by relative freedom and equality may crush humanity as well as a slave state. This emerges from Montesquieu's survey of love in France. As the seraglio promised much because of its sensuality and fidelity, France promises much because of the independence and equality of women there. But despite Rica's decision to remain, the import of Montesquieu's judgment is that love is impossible there too. Life is so artificial—directed by mode, opinion and pretense—that men do not trust their feelings for real love. Love becomes a matter of love-affairs, pursued for the sake of reputation as gallant and lady of mode. Rica jibes: "Here, a husband who loves his wife is a man who has not enough merit to make himself loved by another woman; who abuses the necessity of the law to make up for the charms he lacks."[5] "A husband, who would want to be the only one to possess his wife would be considered a perturber of the public happiness, and a madman who would want to enjoy the light of the sun by himself, to the exclusion of all others."[6] In interpreting such passages as these, there is always the risk of killing an exaggeration meant merely to amuse and sell books, but I do not believe that the risk is too great in this instance. Montesquieu sought to do all those things, but he also paints a consistent and widely detailed picture of a polished society in which men have lost self-respect, and with all conceivable freedom cannot arrive at a human condition of love.

Not only the lionized adulterer signals the bankruptcy of French marital institutions. Montesquieu also has Rica deride the legal structure of marriage (he says of a domestic relations court: "Love makes this court resound: here, nothing is spoken of but angered fathers, seduced daughters, unfaithful lovers, and unfortunate husbands."[7]) And, more seriously, he has Usbek analyze the Christian laws forbidding divorce in order to point out that this cuts the sexual core out of marriage by compelling parties who have no love for one another to remain married. French love is sterile rather than impotent, and it does not achieve the level of true love—again, not because of the individual faults of the would-be lovers, but because the habits engendered by a whole way of life and the demands made by the system preclude a human life.

In the romance of *Apheridon and Astarte*, a story told Usbek by one of his correspondents, Montesquieu presents a picture of true love. The pair are brother and sister, permitted by their religion to marry. The brother must surmount many obstacles to gain his sister who had been converted to Mohammedanism and placed in a seraglio (the seraglio of a eunuch, in fact). The first step is her reconversion to Zoroastrianism. Love achieves this task; she says to him: "You are loved, my brother, and by a Zoroastrian. I struggled long: But, O Gods! how love lifts difficulties! How relieved I am! I can no longer set bounds to my love; its very excess is legitimate."[8] With truth revealed to her by the power of love, she throws herself wholeheartedly into a plan for her abduction. All obstacles are overcome and complications resolved, and the two live happily as man and wife.

This story is, in many ways, indistinguishable from countless tales of romance. Yet, if our analysis of the book is correct, its appearance there may tell much about Montesquieu's conception of love. First, it is an incestuous love: perhaps it is only between brother and sister that the equality and intimate respect requisite for true love can appear. (Montesquieu declared elsewhere that he could not believe that incest was a sin.) What is almost equally striking is that the brother and sister are *strangers* to the society in which they love. They belong to a small remnant of the original inhabitants of Persia, and are now outsiders. In their flight after marriage they wander far through the world, helped everywhere by other outsiders—either Guebres, like themselves or, in one crucial case, by an Armenian merchant. (Montesquieu remarks elsewhere on the separateness of the Armenians' state.) With some trepidation, one might push this analysis further to suggest that it is significant that the "outsiders" in each case are the original natives.

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[4] *Ibid.*, Lettre CLVIII, p. 402.

[5] *Ibid.*, Lettre LV, p. 143.

[6] *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

[7] *Ibid.*, Lettre LXXXVI, p. 223.

[8] *Ibid.*, Lettre LXVII, p. 175.

Is it farfetched to infer that Montesquieu intends to suggest the irony of love becoming an outcast in human life to which it is natural? But it is not necessary to push this point to see that something significantly new is here emerging. That lovers live in a world of their own has been standard fare for comedies, and the basic framework of tales of love. The difference in Montesquieu's treatment is that the aloneness of the lovers has a social definition and is as much a condition for their love as of it. Again, we are forcefully reminded of the Romantic image not only of love, but of the artist as well.

In his analysis of Schiller's *Luise Millerin*, Erich Auerbach observes:

> . . . middle-class tragedy was a genre wedded to the person, the domestic, the touching, and the sentimental, and it could not relinquish them. And this, through the tone and level of style which it implied, was unfavorable to a broadening of the social setting and the inclusion of general political and social problems. And yet it was in just this way that the breakthrough to things political and generally social was achieved: for the touching and, in essence, wholly personal love-alliance now no longer clashed with the opposition of ill-willed relatives, parents, and guardians or with private moral obstacles, but instead with a public enemy, with the unnatural class structure of society. In earlier chapters we have described how, in French classicism of the seventeenth century, love rose to rank highest among tragic subjects withdrawn from everyday reality, and how subsequently, in the Western European beginnings of the novel of manners and of the *comedie larmoyante*, love reestablished contact with the ordinary reality of life, but lost some of its dignity in the process. It became clearly erotic and at the same time touching and sentimental. It was in this form that the revolutionaries of the *Sturm und Drang* seized upon it, and following in Rousseau's footsteps, again gave it the highest tragic dignity, without abandoning any of its bourgeois, realistic, and sentimental elements. As the most natural and the most immediate of all things, it came to be sublime, in any life and in any setting. Its simplest and purest form appeared to be a condition of natural virtue, and its freedom in the face of mere convention was considered an inalienable natural right.[9]

Our examination of Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* has shown us an early stage of the development Auerbach described. (Apheridon is even precisely identified as a bourgeois tradesman.) The striking thing is that this view of love leads at one and the same time to careful attention to social reality, and to the most bitter rejection of that reality in the name of humanity. As a real human potentiality which exists in some form, however distorted, in every man, love, when used as a criterion of social organization, raises in the most immediate way the relationship between actuality and potentiality, between real and ideal. I do not maintain that this is completely worked out in Montesquieu. In fact, his realism in this work is very incomplete, even in contrast with Schiller. Rica and Usbek limit their examination of French society pretty much to the upper strata, and there is far less awareness of the total social picture (including the economic) than in Montesquieu's later theoretical work. Similarly, the seraglio is not really placed in its social context, except for a few sketchy remarks on the general spirit of Persian society. But the questions are asked. This is the crucial breakthrough.

Montesquieu's critique of the dehumanization of society eventuates in pessimism rather than radical reform. For him it is probably impossible ever to devise social institutions which will not take a significant toll of that full freedom and respect essential to a full humanity. All that can be done is to prevent further degradation. Perhaps some institutions are less harmful than others; it is clear, for example, that the terroristic rule of the seraglio is more destructive than the flighty freedom of French society—but it is equally clear that the previous experiences of men limit their capability of surviving in a different situation. This is the problem to which Montesquieu addresses himself in the *Spirit of the Laws*. Hence it is not surprising that the conception of love plays no further role in his work. The search for love has enabled him to define his basic problem. Having discovered true love to be an accidental phenomenon on the margin of modern society, he abandons it as a tool of analysis or as a goal to be sought. To evaluate society by the criterion of love reveals too much. More relative criteria are needed to discern the possible.

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[9] Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (New York, 1953), p. 389.

FIRST-TIME WINNERS IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS SINCE 1918

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During the last few years the standard guides to elections, and the Nuffield studies of elections, have given attention to candidates' experience in elections. Nevertheless, the number of unsuccessful contests before a seat was finally won has been reported only since 1951.[1]

During 1963 I talked with a number of M.P.s, and also with national, regional, and constituency agents of both major parties, and encountered a frequently expressed presumption that most careers in the House of Commons began with one or two unsuccessful contests. Chairmen of constituency committees stated this view in a way which implied that most M.P.s earned their way into the House, so to speak, by gaining experience in the course of losing an election or two. If they lost gallantly in an adverse constituency, they might then seek adoption in a more favorable community, having established their right to be considered for candidacy where the chances of winning would be better.[2]

There is some practical basis for this view, for it has been very hard for beginners to win seats in the last four elections. Less than a tenth of the candidates who were fighting their first contests were successful. Heavy losses by the Liberals, most of them new contestants, skewed the curve downward in 1950 and thereafter, but hardly more than a tenth of the Conservative and Labour beginners were elected. In the eleven elections, 1922–59, beginners showed a higher percentage of success in only three (1924, 1931, and 1935) than contestants who had a previous record of nothing but defeat—usually not more than two, but sometimes three or more.[3] This would give some justification for saying that the pathway into the Commons lies through one or two unsuccessful contests, fought with sufficient energy and ability to attract the attention of committees of selection in more favorable constituencies. All the people to whom I talked granted that some fortunate candidates win their first contest; but it seems to be widely believed that most people get into the Commons the hard way. Indeed, it was often implied that the hard way is also the right way—such experience is a qualification which entitles the new entrant to consideration where he has a chance of winning.

Nevertheless, when the records of M.P.s are traced from election to election, it becomes evident that the percentage of first-time winners in any particular House of Commons is larger than the opinions just summarized would lead one to expect. The reason, of course, is that contestants who do win their first contest are likely to go on winning from one election to the next, and thus cumulate into a substantial part of the Commons.

In fact, a large part of the members of the Commons have fought previous elections; they have had experience of winning, or losing, or both. In 1922 and 1945 nearly forty per cent of the M.P.s in the House were newcomers; but

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[1] One of the best guides to general elections, *The Times House of Commons* (London), covers the general elections of 1918, 1929, 1931, 1935, 1945, 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1959. In 1950 the candidate's first election to a seat was given; and since 1951 his earlier contests have been given.

The Nuffield election studies, which carefully analyse elections since 1945, have classified candidates according to the year of their first candidature since 1951. D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951* (London, 1951), gives such a tabulation, p. 36; and this is continued in his *The British General Election of 1955* (London and New York, 1955), p. 39, and in D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London and New York, 1960), p. 125. These tabulations show years of experience, but not the number of unsuccessful contests which preceded the final winning of a seat.

The figures on contests before election, given in this article, are the result of researches carried on since 1956; see my *Amateurs and Professionals in British Politics, 1918–59* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963), to which this note is a supplement. I wish to acknowledge the aid of the Ford Foundation.

[2] This impression comes from interviews carried on while I was investigating the process of adoption for candidacy in 1962–63; and also in 1955–56 while I studied the general pattern of political careers.

[3] See Buck, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15, for a chart which shows percentage of success in elections achieved by contestants with various types of previous experience 1922 through 1959.

TABLE I. CONTESTS BEFORE WINNING A SEAT: M.P.S WITH EXPERIENCE OF FIGHTING ELECTIONS, COMMENCING 1918 OR LATER

Number of contests before election	1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1918–55
	N = 380 %	N = 552 %	N = 609 %	N = 602 %	N = 577 %	N = 2155 %
None	48.4	60.3	62.1	56.0	50.4	64.4
One	29.0	24.8	24.9	26.9	29.8	22.6
Two	13.4	9.8	8.4	11.9	14.2	8.7
Three	5.5	3.6	3.3	4.0	4.7	2.6
Four or more	3.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	0.9	1.7
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

every other election since 1922 has yielded a House in which barely ten per cent of the beginners of that year won a seat, and the average for 1950 through 1959 is less than that. Stated the other way round, more than ninety per cent of each House of Commons, 1950–59, has been made up of members who have had previous election experience; and the average for the years from 1922 through 1959 stands at just over sixty per cent. It is of interest, therefore, to see how many of these experienced M.P.s are first-time winners. Table I shows percentages according to the number of contests before election.

The structure of the table should be explained briefly. For the Commons of 1945, for example, it shows the percentages of M.P.s whose past record shows no unsuccessful contests before 1945 ("None" in the table), or one, or two, and so on. The new first-time winners, and naturally the first-time losers, are not tabulated. If they later get into the Commons of 1950, or 1951, and so on, they will show there as having had none, or some, earlier contests in their record. And it is worth remembering, as the table is read, that it covers sixty per cent of the 1945 House, and ninety per cent or more of the following ones.

The table shows that more than half of the experienced M.P.s of these years got into the House of Commons at their first try. In 1945 the percentage is just under a half, and in 1959 hardly more; but in other years it is higher, and sometimes approaches two-thirds. The long-term figure, which covers eleven general elections, 1918 through 1955, stands at almost two-thirds.

The percentages decline sharply after the

TABLE II. CONTESTS BEFORE WINNING A SEAT: PARTIES COMPARED, 1959 AND 1918–55

Contests before election	Conservatives		Labour		Liberal & others	
	1959 N = 332 %	1918–55 N = 1103 %	1959 N = 237 %	1918–55 N = 756 %	1959 N = 8 %	1918–55 N = 296 %
None	44.0	74.6	58.2	62.6	87.5	30.6
One	33.1	18.3	25.7	19.6	12.5	46.7
Two	17.2	5.7	10.6	9.1	—	18.3
Three	5.1	1.2	4.2	4.8	—	2.0
Four	*	*	1.3	2.9	—	1.4
Five	—	*	—	*	—	1.0
Six	—	—	—	*	—	—
Seven	—	—	—	*	—	—
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Less than 1.0 per cent.

first try. About a fourth of these M.P.s fought one unsuccessful contest before winning a seat; but the percentages drop rapidly for those who tried two times or more. For recent elections the figures contain a number of repetitions; first-time winners of 1945 and 1950 reappear in subsequent elections, having retained the seats they won. Perhaps the most significant comparison is that of 1959 with the long-term figure of 1918–55. Differences appear between the two major parties in such a comparison.

Only 44 per cent of the experienced Conservative M.P.s of the 1959 House of Commons started their careers with an initial victory; but over the period from 1918 through 1955 nearly three-fourths were first-time winners. Labour's figures show less change: nearly 60 per cent of the experienced Labour M.P.s of 1959 were first-time winners, while hardly more than 60 percent were initially successful during the years from 1918 through 1955. The election of 1945 had a powerful effect upon the percentages for 1959. Quite a large number of Conservatives lost in 1945 and 1950, but managed to win a seat in 1959, or a little earlier. The 1945 election had an opposite effect for Labour. A large part of the 58.2 per cent shown as first-time winners in

TABLE III. CONTESTS BEFORE ELECTION OF EXPERIENCED M.P.S, 1945 THROUGH 1959

Number of contests	1945			1950		
	Cons. N = 145 %	Lab. N = 215 %	Others N = 20 %	Cons. N = 236 %	Lab. N = 302 %	Others N = 14 %
None	70.3	32.6	60.0	63.6	58.0	57.2
One	22.1	35.4	10.0	28.4	22.3	21.4
Two	6.2	17.7	20.9	6.8	11.8	14.3
Three	1.4	8.3	5.0	1.2	5.6	—
Four & more	—	6.0	5.0	—	2.3	7.1
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1951			1955		
	N = 299 %	N = 299 %	N = 11 %	N = 320 %	N = 275 %	N = 7 %
None	62.8	61.2	63.6	52.5	60.4	57.1
One	29.1	20.7	27.3	30.0	22.9	28.6
Two	5.7	11.1	9.1	12.8	10.9	14.3
Three	2.4	4.3	—	5.1	4.0	—
Four & more	—	2.7	—	*	1.8	—
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

	1959		
	N = 332 %	N = 237 %	N = 8 %
None	44.0	58.2	62.5
One	33.1	25.7	37.5
Two	17.2	10.6	—
Three	5.1	4.2	—
Four & More	*	1.3	—
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Less than 1.0 per cent.

1959 won their initial contest in 1945. The record of the years from 1918 through 1955 is quite different. Labour lost most of those elections, and their percentage of first-time winners is substantially less than that of the Conservatives. Still, the fact of greatest significance is the large percentage of first-time winners in both major parties, in 1959 and in preceding years. (See Table II) Table III goes on to give a detailed breakdown by parties, 1945–59.

The two preceding tables show that a high percentage of M.P.s of the two major parties in the years 1918–55 were first-time winners; and that this percentage is consistently high for the Commons in the years 1945 through 1959. But these M.P.s can demonstrate an equally impressive record for consecutive re-elections. Since they cumulate from one House to the next, this can be shown by a breakdown of the 1959 Commons, as in Table IV.

It might be presumed that most of these consecutive winners were being returned from safe seats. This is true in part, but some of them changed constituencies, and some of them established themselves in a constituency which was marginal at the time of their first victory. A breakdown of the records of the first-time winners in 1955 and in 1959 serves to show these aspects of their careers.

These percentages conceal a certain amount of approximation. For purposes of counting, safe constituencies were defined as having been won by a 3000 majority or more at the election preceding the adoption of each first-time winner as a candidate. Frequently there had been two or more preceding wins, and most of the time the majority was in excess of 3000. The record shows a high proportion of starts in favorable localities; but it also shows a moderate percentage of constituency changes. Sometimes these changes arose from redistricting; sometimes they were no more than a shift from one safe constituency to another. Nevertheless, there is enough substance in these percentages to indicate that while the safe seat accounts for a good deal of election at first candidacy, and continuance thereafter, a number of these careers start and continue in only moderately favorable conditions.

A brief summary of the share of the 1959 House made up of first-time winners will serve to bring out the import of the figures given so far. It should be noted first that nine-tenths of the Commons, 1950 through 1959, is made up of M.P.s who have been through more than one election contest. More than half of these experienced M.P.s won a seat at their first contest; and they make up only a little less than half the total membership of the 1959 House. Nearly nine-tenths of these first-time winners have never lost; and they make up just over forty per cent of the House. Percentages for each of the major parties are about the same as those for the whole House.

First-time winners hold slightly higher percentages of Cabinet and ministerial positions than of seats in the Commons. In April 1963, 61.9 per cent of the Macmillan Cabinet had won their first contest, and 52.4 per cent had never lost. The corresponding percentages for

TABLE IV. PERCENTAGE OF FIRST-TIME WINNERS IN THE 1959 COMMONS WINNING CONSECUTIVE ELECTIONS, BY PARTY AND YEAR OF ENTRANCE

Year of entry	Conservative		Labour		Others	
	No. of first-time winners	Per cent winning consecutively	No. of first-time winners	Per cent winning consecutively	No. of first-time winners	Per cent winning consecutively
Pre-1945	18	44.4	10	50.0	1	100.0
1945	54	92.6	84	83.3	3	100.0
1950	36	100.0	23	95.7	1	100.0
1951	5	100.0	8	100.0	—	—
1955	21	100.0	12	100.0	—	—
By-elections, 1955–59	12	100.0	7	100.0	—	—
Total, pre-1945 through 1959	146	90.4	144	86.8	5	100.0

TABLE V. RECORDS OF FIRST-TIME WINNERS, 1955 AND 1959 HOUSE OF COMMONS

Record	% of first-time Conservative winners	% of total Conservatives in House	% of Labour first-time winners	% of total Labour in House
		1955*		
From safe constituencies	82.5	41.1	50.9	30.7
Uninterrupted winners	83.6	41.7	88.6	53.4
Changed constituency	31.6	15.7	49.7	30.0
		1959†		
From safe constituencies	79.9	32.7	84.0	47.1
Uninterrupted winners	87.9	36.0	85.4	47.9
Changed constituency	24.2	9.9	41.0	23.0

* Conservative first-time winners, 171; Labour first-time winners, 167.

† Conservative first-time winners, 146; Labour first-time winners, 144.

ministers not in the Cabinet were 50.0 and 42.9, and 37.2 and 20.5 for junior ministers.[4] In the years from 1918 through 1955, 63.3 per cent of Conservative Cabinet ministers were first-time winners, and 43.3 per cent never lost a contest. The corresponding percentages for Labour governments were 41.9 and 32.3, respectively. Of Conservative ministers (not in the Cabinet) during these years, 58.3 per cent were first-time winners, and 35.4 per cent never lost a contest; the corresponding percentages for Labour are 66.6 and 41.9, respectively. The momentum of a prompt election to the Commons is the chief explantion, in all probability, of these percentages, which are higher than corresponding percentages for all M.P.s during this same period.

A rough, quick summary of the substance of all these figures shows the importance of first-time winners in the Commons. One one-tenth, or less, of each House of Commons, 1950–59, was made up of newcomers with no previous election experience. Of the experienced nine-tenths in each House, more than half have been first-time winners; and all but a tenth of them have won consecutive elections. This is quite clearly shown by the composition of the 1959 Commons, into which their successive victories ultimately carried most of them. The record of just over two thousand (2155) M.P.s, 1918–55, reveals that nearly two-thirds of them started with an initial victory, and thereafter never lost a contest. As might be expected, these proportions are reflected in the membership of Cabinets and ministries.

As any student of practical politics in Britain would expect, these high percentages are the result of the procedures of adoption of candidates in favorable or safe constituencies, of the two major parties. A large part of all M.P.s and Cabinet ministers have had careers which began with adoption by a selection committee in a favorable constituency, and continued by winning a seat in the election which followed their adoption. This was their first experience of fighting an election anywhere; and after it came a series of elections in that constituency—or, in a little less than a third of these careers, in another favorable constituency.

Contrary to an impression held by many party agents and chairmen of committees of selection, an applicant who has not had prior experience of an election contest is frequently adopted in these favorable constituencies. Competition for such an adoption is understandably keen. When a vacancy is to be filled, the committee reviews letters of reference and information furnished in response to its own inquiries, concerning fifty to a hundred applicants. On the basis of letters and other information, the field is narrowed to ten or fifteen of the most promising applicants; and these then are interviewed by the committee. Four or five survivors of these interviews finally appear before an executive committee meeting, or a general meeting, of the constituency party, and one is adopted as the candidate. Once adopted, he is likely to be elected; and once elected, he is practically certain to be readopted for as long a time as he is willing to serve.

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[4] *Her Majesty's Ministers and Heads of Public Departments*, London, H.M.S.O., no. 82, April 1963.

In effect, then, a substantial proportion of the members of the Commons obtain their seats through a rigorous competition for adoption, and retain the seat for a long time thereafter. In these constituencies, the voters of their party accept and elect the choice made by their committee of selection. A surprisingly large number of these candidates, as revealed in the foregoing tables, have had no experience of election contests before their first success. Finally, it should be noticed that the number of first-time winners reaching the front bench is large, chiefly by virtue of the assured prospect of long tenure of a seat which is conferred by election from a favorable constituency.

A little more than half of the members of the Commons, 1950–59 and earlier, won their seats after one or more contests, seldom more than two. Their experience of competition has been quite different from that of the first-time winners. They first applied for adoption in less favorable constituencies than their more fortunate colleagues; but they were exposed to less severe competition from fewer applicants than they would have encountered if the seat were more winnable. Having been adopted, they fought and lost the ensuing election. Sometimes they fought in the same place a second time. Ultimately they won a seat in the House by being adopted by a selection committee in a constituency where the chances of winning were fairly good. To accomplish this they appeared before a number of selection committees; and, as has been pointed out above, they were also tested in the fire of one or two election campaigns.

The data here reviewed do not furnish a basis for saying which method of entrance into the House might yield the most desirable personnel. What is clear is that about half the M.P.s reach a seat by strenuous competition for adoption in favorable constituencies, and half come in after application for adoption in several marginal constituencies, and after fighting one or two elections. It is clear also that the number of first-time winners is a good deal larger than it is commonly believed to be, even by experienced party agents and committee chairmen.

Considering the attention given to nominating methods in this country, it may seem a little surprising that there has not been more systematic research into the procedures of selection and adoption of candidates for the House of Commons.[5] The absence of any substantial amount of public criticism of these procedures suggests that the party organizations are satisfied with what they are getting; and the voting public accepts the candidates put forward by the parties. Certainly, competition for adoption is keen; and this is an important factor in maintaining a satisfactory level of energy and effectiveness among candidates and M.P.'s.

[5] It is discussed in D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *op. cit.*, pp. 122–24; Peter G. Richards, *Honourable Members, A Study of the British Backbencher* (London, 1959), pp. 14–20; Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Party System in Great Britain* (London, 1953), pp. 204–10; Nigel Nicolson, *People and Parliament* (London, 1958); and Martin Harrison, *Trade Unions and the Labour Party since 1945* (London, 1960), pp. 262–306. These are general discussions of the subject; but I know of no study which concentrates on the process of selection and adoption of candidates.

The Conservative and Unionist Central Office in London published, not long ago, *Notes on Procedure for the Adoption of Conservative Candidates in England and Wales* (no date given). This is clearly designed to set standards for constituency organizations. Affiliated organizations within the federal structure of the Labour Party use various methods for the nomination of candidates, which are discussed by Martin Harrison, *op. cit.*

COMMUNICATIONS

BENTLEY'S DESTRUCTIVE GENIUS

To THE EDITOR:

In his "Causality and Time in Political Process" (disarmingly subtitled "a speculation"), Professor Norman Jacobson gives us an interpretation of Arthur F. Bentley which is so right and yet so exasperatingly incomplete that it begs for comment.

We now know—Jacobson has pointed it out—that Bentley's assault on traditional political research has been deflected by battalions of American group theorists who have stopped short of cutting through the group to a deeper reality, who embrace Bentley only after arresting the thrust of his thinking. Jacobson rightly prods us onward and asks us to return to Bentley's destructive genius, "to lift his powerful sling and break a few windows of our own."

But as we resolve to annihilate and smash and splinter, where will we land? What will we behold? What *can* we possibly make intelligible to ourselves? There is no denying the exhilaration of a free fall. Jacobson is right: fresh air *is* bracing to the spirit. Yet, I would add, we must impose some sort of meaning on our experience, capture it, control it, express it. And that, of course, means arresting it once again—in a new language, to be sure, but still in language. All the great romantics Jacobson enlists to point the way toward a free fall were classicists as well. While falling they articulated. Gauguin, Van Gogh, Malraux, Yeats, Dostoevsky, Joyce, Lawrence, Ibsen, Strindberg, Schoenberg, Kierkegaard—all these were stylists, masters of form. Yeats did not merely "lie down where all ladders start,/In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart." He also composed these lines and thereby climbed a new ladder. Nietzsche, after all, wrote. Schoenberg composed. Van Gogh framed his paintings, governed his strokes, imposed his vision. More is involved here than what is often simply thought of as "discharging" or "releasing" or "falling free." To see language merely as congealing reality is a romantic fallacy: language, order, structure, form, discipline, and death are also liberating. They too are part of life. And if we wish to sustain life we need more than process. We need to make sense of it.

But here too Bentley may help, though Jacobson's nihilism and our own impatience do not allow us to see it. Jacobson merely notes that in the end Bentley became incomprehensible. Perhaps. In any case, this needs to be carefully shown, for it is not true that for Bentley "all is movement and flux, all is *process*." Were there not his own style, his own obstinate stance, his maddening idiom? Possibly we should try to comprehend his way of presenting himself, to see it as part of the man, to save *him* from process, to redeem *him* for language, for rationality and civility, for life mastered and controlled.

To be sure, Bentley is no Nietzsche. But this may be just as well. Being authentically American, he may yet make us aware of ourselves, of our own cranky style, our own perverse "methodologies," our own unspeakable language. In short, Jacobson's is a stunning introduction. If it takes Bentley as point of departure, this is reasonable enough, for he is ours.

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SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS AND TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS

To THE EDITOR:

Congratulations on publishing Leon Epstein's "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties" (this REVIEW, March 1964). Once again he has shown us how to investigate an empirical problem in such a way as to throw maximum light on theoretical questions of strategic importance.

Exception must be taken, however, to one of his arguments: that the dynamics of single-member elections cannot explain two-partyism. This seems to be the case with regard to Canada, as in other socio-economically diverse countries, only because a series of local two-party systems adds up to something other than a two-party system at the national level. The correlation between the uninomial election and the two-party system nevertheless holds *for each electoral unit.*

This is, after all, what Epstein is saying when he writes—correctly, I believe—that the parliamentary system accounts for party discipline in the legislature. For every vote that is considered a vote of confidence is itself a uninomial election; every vote in the House of Commons is implicitly a reelection of the Prime

Minister, and thus impels a polarization of Members' votes.

This becomes even clearer when we recall that there are votes in each session of Congress on which American legislative parties exhibit as much discipline as their British or Canadian counterparts—the votes to elect a Speaker, and to organize the House, that is, in effect, to elect a slate of committee chairmen.

I think Epstein makes his point very effectively: the nature of the parliamentary system accounts for the existence of legislative party discipline. Correctly understood, this does not invalidate the putative connection between uninomial elections and two-partyism, however, but rather strengthens it.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. By Karl W. Deutsch. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. xviii, 316. $6.50.)

Professor Deutsch is one of the important figures in modern political science and this is his most significant book. The arguments and insights of *Nerves* . . . are so compelling that the reviewer constantly had the impression that the author was beckoning from a Kitchener-like poster emblazoned with the imperative "SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL SCIENCE NEEDS RESEARCH, SIGN UP HERE!" In a discipline where books tend to be either appallingly complex or seductively simple it is encouraging to read a seductively complex book —it needs to be read and reread.

The stature of this book comes from the author's attempt to build an operational model of political systems. Professor Deutsch's keen attention to suggesting measures for the concepts which frame his model signals its utility to a discipline with a concern for the accumulation of confirmed hypotheses as the best route to general theory. That few of this rich set of theorems (deductions from the model) are confirmed within the covers of *Nerves* . . . can hardly be held against the author; this is a task which will keep Professor Deutsch and his associates occupied for many years.

Beyond even this step in theory building, the reader also gains from sharing with the author the intellectual process from which the theory emanates.

In the first section of the book we are given a series of glimpses at the history of the metaphors around which men have organized their scientific thinking and a discussion of the role that models play in the development of science. The specialist in the history and philosophy of science will find this familiar territory and might take issue with specific points, e.g., the "matching" criterion to test the relevance of a model. (What does it mean to "match" a complex phenomenon? At the extreme, under this criterion, only the system itself could serve as its model.) The discussion in this section serves to lead the reader to a comprehension of Professor Deutsch's own choice among the metaphors—servo-cybernetic, feedback-systems theory.

The author has selected this model for the best of reasons, not because it is fashionable or because it comes ready made with a mathematical apparatus, but because it links communication and control—the two basic processes of political decision-making. The cybernetic model, moreover, in the concepts of "feedback" and "information," provides both the means and the measure of the adaptiveness or non-adaptiveness of a system to a changing critical environment.

Professor Deutsch, in the second section, uses these concepts to construct rigorous definitions of terms familiar to social scientists, e.g., "consciousness," "will," "integrity," and "dignity." His discussion of "power," as a scientific concept, has such force and erudition that the term may be rescued from the banishment suggested in recent papers by Professor March and others. This enterprise is not, however, without hazard. The author's desire to construct his model out of terms with a familiar ring may well erode the precision of communication he seeks by rigorous construction. Many private meanings exist for the terms to which special meanings are given in this book; these private meanings are likely to affect the reception of these terms defined anew within the language of the model.

The alternative approach is equally hazardous. The development of a special set of terms (which label the identical processes to which the author applies familiar labels), would probably raise cries of "jargon!"

The third section of the book brings to bear, on a discussion of system health and pathology, the model of communication and control and the concepts developed in Section Two. This discussion, while it is highly provocative of thought, yields mixed results from the point of view of operational (i.e., researchable) theory. Here we are given lists of sources of system pathology and strength, but few of the suggested sources of data, which contributed so much to the significance of the second section.

The real measure of this book is the state of preparation it provides the reader for the paradigm in the appendix. Before reading the book this paradigm was as incomprehensible to the reviewer as a Heathkit wiring diagram; however, approaching it (as it should be approached) through the text and with Professor Deutsch's patient guidance, it provides a lucid summary of this extended discussion of the complex communication circuitry of political decision systems.

In 1948, Professor Deutsch's friend and collaborator, the late Norbert Wiener, said of applying cybernetic models to social phenomena, "I mention this matter, because of the considerable, and I think false, hopes which some of my friends have built for the social efficacy of whatever new ways of thinking this book [*Cybernetics*] may contain. . . . they consider the main task of the immediate future is to extend to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences, in the hope of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this necessary, they come to believe it possible. In this, I maintain, they show an excessive optimism. . . . " [p. 189]. The reviewer believes that Professor Wiener must have changed his mind with the appearance of *Nerves of Government*.

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The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society. BY FLOYD W. MATSON. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1964. Pp. 355. $6.95.)

The Broken Image is an imaginative, scholarly, provocative, informative, controversial, and, above all, very interesting book. Matson's topic is the impact of science on the twentieth-century understanding of man and society. The book is probably best described as intellectual history. It is, however, by no means dispassionate intellectual history. Matson is sharply critical of behavioral science, but his argument is no mere rehash of the condemnation from classical philosophy. His perspective is that of contemporary natural science. In short, he is "anti-behavioral" but "pro-science." Matson argues, in effect, that behavioral science is, from the point of view of the development of modern science, about 75 years out of date. Science, as understood by behavioral social scientists, is defined and epitomized by Newtonian mechanics. While it is surely true that Newtonian mechanics has in itself not been wholly superseded, the notion that science is literally defined in its terms has long ago been discarded. But in Matson's view behavioral scientists continue blandly to proceed as if science simply *was* the discovery of mechanical explanations. By implication the most guilty are the behavioral political scientists because they are the most behind the times.

Probably the best summation of the theme and tone of the book is the following quotation from the preface:

> It is the primary thesis of this book that the historic reliance of the social sciences upon root metaphors and routine methods appropriated from classical mechanics has eclipsed the ancestral liberal vision of 'the whole man, man in person' (to use Lewis Mumford's phrase), and has given us instead a radically broken self-image. The tragic history of the breaking of the human image parallels the disintegration of the inner sense of identity, the flight from autonomous conduct to automaton behavior, in the modern world.
>
> The story need not, and in fact does not, end there. Our own century has witnessed the rise of an opposite and potentially equal force, a positive countermovement whose wellspring is in natural science itself and whose fundamental motive is a passionate concern with the mending of the broken image and the recovery of an integral vision. Out of the wreckage of displaced allegiances and abandoned human values which the mechanization of social science has left in its wake this insurgent movement of reconstruction has steadily been taking form and gaining voice. Its advent has not, to be sure, passed unnoticed; in each of the special fields in which it has found expression it is still the subject of active controversy. And yet, as a general movement of thought, it has remained curiously unacknowledged and widely unappreciated with respect to the revolutionary changes it portends for the proper study of mankind—for, that is to say, what man may make of man.

As examples of the "positive countermovement" Matson, after having discussed relativity and quantum physics, cites the work of Jung, Allport, Binswanger, and biologists like Huxley and Waddington. While he is able to discuss Lasswell and Bentley in the earlier critical section, no political scientists show up as part of the countermovement. This, I think, is not surprising, for as far as I know there are none. *The Broken Image* translated into a practical question for political scientists might, it seems to me, be put this way: If *the* pressing problem for contemporary political science is the devising of an adequate theory of political change and development, can we afford to continue operating in terms of the consummately mechanical S-O-R model and a mechanically interpreted structural-functional model or should we begin to look for our notions of science in fields like developmental and evolutionary biology?

The book, interesting and significant as I think it is, has a serious weakness. It scarcely touches the all-important underlying philosophical problem. Behavioral science, it is true, operates with a mechanical explanatory paradigm, but it relies also on a rather crude, and I would argue equally out-dated, epistemology. The two, of course, go hand-in-hand. Behavioral science tends to stress prediction while natural science stresses explanation. It is inductive while natural science is abductive. Matson gets to none of this. My recommendation, therefore, to all who are concerned with scientific political science is by all means read Matson, but read Toulmin's *Foresight and Understanding*, Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Hanson's *Patterns of Discovery* and *The Concept of the Positron* along with it.

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Congressional Control of Administration. By JOSEPH P. HARRIS. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. Pp. 306. $5.75.)

The American Congress has long suffered the fate of having books written about it by political scientists who are suspicious of the capacities as well as the motives of its individual members, and also unsympathetic toward their attempts collectively to increase their power in the American political system. This is another such book. It has considerable merit as a convenient, careful summary of the familiar forms of legislative control—via substantive statutes, appropriations, audit, personnel, legislative veto and investigations. And it is not to detract from its real usefulness as a scholarly compilation of forms that attention is focused here on its more general line of argument. Since Professor Harris himself is preoccupied throughout the book with evaluative questions of reform, it does seem useful to discuss the standards which inform both his descriptions and his prescriptions. This procedure is the more useful since his subtly pro-executive, anti-Congress standards have for so long passed as conventional wisdom among large numbers of political scientists.

Professor Harris' argument proceeds as follows: Congressional control over administration is increasing. In the main, this increase has been marked by excessively detailed supervision of and excessive interference in executive decision-making. The problem, then, which faces us now is not to increase congressional control but to make sure that Congress exercises "appropriate kinds of authority and influence without impeding administration or weakening executive authority." Appropriate congressional controls involve first, making the broadest kind of policy decisions and, secondly, holding executives accountable for the exercise of their discretion in carrying them out. The most appropriate and effective way to implement congressional oversight is to "galvanize the internal disciplines of the executive branch" rather than to intervene directly in specific instances. Two congressional shortcomings evident in their direct, detailed, specific attempts at supervision are first, the tendency to act without sufficient information and knowledge and, secondly, the tendency to act through a profusion of committees or individuals, who are prone to "advance personal, local and provincial interests without regard to the public interest." These dangers will be minimized to the degree that executive officials are left relatively free to exercise their discretion in decision-making.

Professor Harris does, of course, acknowledge the need for congressional control of the executive; but what really concerns him is that Congress may hobble the executive, not that the executive may dominate Congress. Where Congress has tried new ways to assert its influence, Harris is worried. He objects to annual authorizations as detrimental to executive planning. He objects to the legislative veto on the grounds that it enables committees to bring disruptive "political pressures" to bear on administration. He objects to giving the Appropriations Committee a larger staff on the grounds that its influence might come to rival that of the Budget Bureau. He objects to the use of GAO investigative reports by individual Congressmen as impediments to smooth administration. (He approves, naturally, of the item veto, since that will increase presidential influence at the expense of congressionally sponsored spending—"the pork barrel.") The book is filled with specific examples of the wrong kind of control activity; but it contains almost no detailed and specific examples of the right kind of congressional control. Similarly, the criticisms cited and examined all pertain to congressional activity; no comparable list of criticisms of executive decision-making (the other side of the two-sided control process) is to be found. One is left, therefore, with few, if any, specific illustrations of precisely what Congress can and should do to exercise a positive influence over what specific kinds of "bad" executive action.

Occasonially, the dominant impression becomes one of hopelessness. For example, throughout his lengthy discussions of budgetary control, Professor Harris emphasizes that Congress should take a comprehensive view of the budget as a whole, and that "the glaring weakness" of the appropriations process consists in its failure to provide this overview. But he concludes, "It is doubtful that Congress can ever effectively consider the budget as a whole and hence have a basis for considering broad fiscal policies." Congressional control should come by way of broad policy decisions; yet in the admittedly most important area of control

—appropriations—Congress is incapable of making such decisions. Where, then, do we go from here? Professor Harris has two suggestions. One, implicit in the "comparisons" with British procedures which pop up here and there throughout the book, is to adopt variations on British control practices. The second, more explicit, is to set up a select committee like the Hoover Commission to study budgetary reform.

For the sake of discussion the following line of argument, leading to different conclusions, might be juxtaposed to that of Professor Harris' book. The relationship between legislature and executive is a power relationship. Relatively, it is the power of the executive branch that is growing. Congress finds it increasingly difficult to exercise any real influence over executive decision-making. The problem which faces us in this area is that of preserving the influence of Congress as a check on the power of the executive branch. What needs to be done, therefore, is to determine empirically which modes of congressional control now in existence do, in fact, guarantee it the largest possible share of influence and then seek to buttress those modes against ever greater executive dominance.

To relegate Congress to the making of broad policy decisions and to oversight in terms of broad program management is to prescribe precisely those tasks which Congress is least capable of performing. To criticize Congress for intervening in a specific and detailed fashion is to attack it for doing the only thing it can do to effectively assert its influence. Specifics and details are the indispensable handles which Congressmen use to work inductively toward broader kinds of oversight judgments. Specifics and details are what concern the constituents on whose behalf Congressmen must intervene with the bureaucracy. Specific and detailed requests from an interested Congressman to a bureau head or division chief do more to "galvanize the internal disciplines of administration" (Arthur Macmahon's phrase) than any broad statement of policy. The profusion of committees and subcommittees make possible a degree of specialization which gives to Congressmen the detailed and specific information they find most useful in influencing executive behavior.

Specific and detailed controls by individuals and small committees give Congressmen their maximum influence because these controls are best adapted to the realities of executive decision-making. If executive decision-making is basically piecemeal, incremental and marginal, then congressional control, if it is to be effective, must be basically piecemeal, incremental and marginal. What is or is not "appropriate" congressional control cannot be prescribed *a priori* as it is in this book. Congressional control is or is not appropriate in the context of the realities of legislative and executive decision-making. The legislator ought not to be criticized for using those controls which are available to him and which his experience tells him bring the greatest influence over executive activity. If we do not recognize this, we will continue to prescribe impossible control tasks, criticize the lack of accomplishment and thus whipsaw the Congress into further subordination to the executive.

This line of argument is deliberately sympathetic to Congress, in an attempt to highlight the opposite bias of Professor Harris' book. The juxtaposition leads not to the conclusion that we should examine British practices or set up a select committee on reform. It suggests that we would be wise to shelve all these premature nostrums until we have done some empirical research. In the end, it is the lack of fresh research into legislative expectations, perceptions and attitudes (following Arthur Macmahon's brilliant lead), the failure even to discuss executive decision-making and the lack of hard evidence to substantiate statements about trends that keep this book from advancing our understanding of actual congressional control relationships. This book stands as the summing up of a familiar, executive-oriented view of congressional control. Unless it stands also as an incitement to entertain other lines of argument and to do some empirical research, it will have succeeded in steering the analysis of the subject toward a dead end.

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Judicial Decision-Making. EDITED BY GLENDON SCHUBERT. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Pp. 278.)

Once upon a time reading and writing were sufficient skills to teach and to do research in the field of public law. This is no longer so. Without mathematical literacy, at least in elementary statistics, there is a growing body of literature that cannot be digested, as is illustrated by many of the articles in this excellent collection. These articles reflect the *avant garde* work of fourteen scholars. Each deserves detailed consideration. They range from analysis of leadership in the Michigan Supreme Court by S. Sidney Ulmer through studies of the Norwegian courts by Vilhelm Aubert and Ulf Torgersen, but most of the work focuses on the correlation of the decisions of individual

Supreme Court justices with their imputed attitudes, what has come to be known as jurimetrics. Contrary to the charges of some of his followers, Glendon Schubert, editor of this volume and pioneer of the technique, is well aware that jurimetrics is not the only alternative to traditional public law research. In his perceptive introduction he places it in its proper context and assesses the several other approaches that follow.

Schubert's own substantive article and those of Harold J. Spaeth and Fred Kort are brilliant examples of the best work being done by the jurimetricists. It is difficult to understand the intensity of the attack upon their research by those who champion conventional scholarship, for there is not much difference between the basic assumptions and goals underlying the two approaches. Like traditional scholars, jurimetricians are concerned with explaining the decisional choices of particular judges. They have the same non-political orientation toward judicial decision-making, the same holding constant of all factors except those that are part of the formal processes. There are differences: jurimetricians do not think it inappropriate to use the same techniques to study decisions of men who are judges that are used to study decisions of men who are not judges; their variables are attitudes and facts rather than legal rules (or precedents) and facts; their dependent variables are decisions rather than opinions, and they clearly identify the criteria they use to classify decisions.

To point to the similarities between the assumptions of Schubert and associates with those of the "legalistic scholars" is not to belittle the important contributions they have made and are making. Their contribution is not, however, as Schubert once said, to demonstrate that the personal values of the jurists are significant in determining their decisions, for this is a truism that few find of much interest even to discuss. Rather, they have shown more convincingly than have the traditionalists that there are patterns to a judge's decisions. Once they have determined a judge's basic attitude toward a specific policy choice, and once they have identified the facts that he considers relevant—and they can do both of these things—these scholars can predict his decisional behavior with much greater precision than can those who rely on precedent and "legal reasoning." Of course the explanatory categories they use are not the same as those contained in the judge's opinion. Justice Frankfurter and some of his defenders, for example, insist that his decisions cannot be understood in terms of his basic attitude toward policy conflicts, but that they reflect his democratic philosophy which calls for judicial deference to the principles of federalism, to decisions of legislators, administrators, and to past judicial decisions. Jurimetric analysis of Frankfurter's decisions, however, show a high correlation with the favorable or unfavorable consequence of his decisions for certain values—from which the jurimetricians impute an attitudinal continuum—but that his decisions are not correlated with the variables the Justice insists control his decisions. This is not to suggest hypocrisy, as some of Frankfurter's defenders seem to insist; it merely furnishes another example of the obvious fact that the explanations of decision-makers—which have their own significance and function—are often different from the explanatory schemes used by those who study their decisions. But since the purpose of studying the judicial decision-making process, presumably, is not to champion or attack a particular jurist, this side issue seems of little moment.

One of the more interesting examples of the advantages of statistical analysis is the work of Joseph Tonenhaus and associates who are able to identify more accurately than is possible by applying the formal Supreme Court rules, the conditions under which the Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari petitions. Stuart Nagel shows how questionnaire sampling can be used and reports the results of his study of the off-the-bench attitudes of state court judges. He finds that as a group they are more conservative than are legislators or administrators and that there is a correlation between the degree of their conservatism and their decisions, though evidence to support this important finding is not reported here. Nagel's work invites additional investigation to determine whether judicial decisions are significantly different from the legislative and administrative decisions from the same political community. It may be, for example, that the fact of being a judge is less significant than the fact of being a Mississippian.

In the third part of the volume, devoted to examples of political sociology, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines call for studies of the state courts and diagnose the basic weakness of "previous studies" to be an inadequate conceptualization of the judicial system because of a failure to treat the judiciary as part of the political system, a weakness that is just as relevant to most of the articles that appear in this volume as to "previous studies."

In his preface, Heinz Eulau, general editor of the *International Yearbooks of Political Behavior Research*, of which this volume is one, suggests that behavioral research on judicial decisions has grown more rapidly than such research in the field of public administration because scholars interested in public law, unlike those concerned with public administration, "never considered it their major business to tell the practitioners what to do or what not to do. In public law, unlike public administration, research and writing have always been predominately and genuinely academic." But there has not been any noticeably greater behavioral research in the field of public law than in the field of public administration. There has been and remains a flourishing market in articles that evaluate Supreme Court decisions and whose purpose is to persuade the reader, and hopefully the judicial practitioners, of the error of judicial ways. More to the point, I believe, to explain why there has been a flurry of one particular type of what has come to be known as judicial behavior research—but which might be more accurately described as the application of statistical techniques to judicial decisions—is the same explanation of why there has always been so much of concentration of attention on the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court: each year the Court produces hundreds of new decisions, these decisions are readily available and provide a constant flow of data that can be dealt with without having to leave one's office. The application of statistical techniques to this old task is to be applauded and as a result of the hard and imaginative efforts of the pioneering scholars whose work is sampled in this volume our literature has been much enriched. But there is a danger that those aspects of the judicial process that cannot be analyzed from the documents conveniently provided by the Government Printing Office will be ignored, and analysis of decisions will be continued to the point of diminished returns.

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The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. BY GABRIEL A. ALMOND AND SIDNEY VERBA. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 562. $8.50.)

This book represents an innovation in the literature of comparative politics: it opens up new perspectives on the theory of democratic politics; it demonstrates the potentialities of a new method of data gathering and analysis; it points to a series of problems for further research and theorizing on the sources of national differences in the character of the relationships between government and the governed. It is a great book and it is a measure of its greatness that it raises as many queries and objections as it produces insights and confirmations.

In bare outline, the study reported in this volume seems simple enough: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba wanted to find out what sorts of people were active, articulate and "responsive" and what sorts of people were passive, inarticulate and unconcerned in a number of full-suffrage democracies and they wanted to study similarities and differences in the backgrounds, the orientations and the motivations of actives and passives in such polities. Indeed, what is surprising is that it took so long before any one did just that. We have had full-suffrage democracies in the West for decades, and the contrasts between the active few and the passive but mobilized mass have been endlessly discussed, and sometimes even investigated, in country after country. A few scattered attempts were made in the twenties and the thirties to assemble some of the statistics and to compare them across a few countries, but these attempts stayed at a very low level of theoretical sophistication. The advent of the poll and the sample survey opened up new possibilities for comparative political statistics, but these possibilities were first seen by sociologists such as Lazarsfeld, Lerner and Lipset and only much later by scholars reared in the traditional disciplines of political theory and institutional analysis. It is indeed significant that the most comprehensive of all anthologies of contributions to the study of comparative politics, the Eckstein-Apter reader (Princeton University Press, 1963), does not include a single example of systematic cross-national analysis of poll or survey data. Almond and Verba have broken new ground: they have introduced into the study of comparative politics methods so far primarily developed by social psychologists and sociologists and they have demonstrated that these methods can yield results of relevance not only in the description of differences and similarities between polities but also in the exploration of central hypotheses in a theory of political development.

The Civic Culture is indeed not just another compilation of comparative statistics. We have travelled a long distance from the crude empirical tabulations assembled by Gosnell and Tingsten in their pioneering works of the twenties and thirties. Almond and Verba designed their five-country survey to explore, if not to test, some of the empirical implications of the general theoretical formulations developed within the Committee on Comparative Politics set up by the Social Science Research Council. The key terms in the vocabulary of this group of scholars are "political development," "political culture," "political inputs" and "political outputs." The choice of countries to be studied reflects their central concern with processes of change from traditional to modern modes of politics: on the one hand two still heavily tradition-bound but rapidly modernizing polities, Mexico and Italy, on the other hand three advanced but still very different systems, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States. Each of these five has its distinctive "political cultures," its particular mix of dominant orientations to the objects of politics in the different strata and sectors of its population. To map out such variations in dominant modes of orientation Almond and Verba introduce an intriguing typology: they distinguish the "*parochial*" mode of the inhabitants psychologically most remote from the administrative apparatus of the nation-state, the "*subject*" mode of the obedient or only passively recalcitrant followers of the orders and regulations of the field bureaucracy, and the "*participant*" mode of the citizens who are not only aware of the "outputs" of the governmental machinery, but also are ready to contribute to the "inputs" of pressures on those who control the machinery. The five countries chosen for study were taken to represent so many distinctive mixes of such modes of orientation to politics and government: Mexico still largely "parochial" but with strong participant aspirations, Italy also heavily "parochial" but essentially distinguished by the high level of alienation in its "subject" orientations, Germany a more positive "subject" culture but with only minimal emphasis on participation and the United Kingdom and the United States finally exhibiting flexible equilibria between "subject" and "participant" orientations, the British tending to tilt heavier toward deferential subject roles, the Americans more likely to emphasize the virtues of activity than the duties of civic obedience.

This conceptualization of types of relationships between the governed and their government was fundamental in the study: it decided the priorities of the survey design, it was reflected in the actual sequences of questions in the interview schedule, it also governed the procedures of analysis.

The focus is on the individual adult and his interaction with constituted governmental authorities: how much does he know about them? how does he feel toward them? how far does he trust them? how competent does he feel in dealing with them? what does he actually do counteract or influence them? The questions used to map out these interrelations and interactions are admirably conceived and the interpretation of the resulting response distributions is often illuminating. Yet one may well ask whether this concentration on the direct links between individual and nation has not tended to distort the maps given us of the five polities and their differences. There is very little analysis of the sources of cleavage and dissension within each polity: regional differences, even in the very obvious cases of Italy and the United States, are not discussed, differences among denominations and between the religiously active and passive are only touched on, and differences between social classes are largely ignored. The authors offer a perceptive introductory note on the need to consider political subcultures but their data do not go far toward a description of variations in the strength of such alternative foci of political identification as the regional culture, the church, the class, the union, the political party. The five-country study was deliberately centered on one of many axes in the political system and the design was parsimoniously organized to produce data and analysis possibilities in this one direction. The authors state this very clearly (pp. 378–9 and 401) and I can only admire their stubbornness in resisting temptations to broaden the design to offer analysis possibilities in alternative directions In a first attempt at systematic comparative data gathering my own preference would have been for a multi-focussed design, fewer questions in each area of variation and a larger number of respondents in each country. This is not just cautious eclecticism: given the fact that we still lack even the simplest comparative compilation of political survey statistics for these countries it would seem to me preferable to start out with a broad mapping of sources of within-nation variation before proceeding to refined analyses along one single axis.

The strong nation-orientation of the survey design is also reflected in the analysis procedures and the tabulations in the report. Of the 127 tables and graphs scattered through the volume I count as many as 52 presenting straight comparisons between total national cross-sections without any structural differentiations. This is essentially an expository device but it does raise problems when contrasting such differently designed samples as the Italian and the Mexican: in the one case all communities of the nation, even the smallest rural ones, had a chance to be selected, but in the other only the cities of 10,000 or more inhabitants. The reader is reminded of the necessity to take this into account in a footnote

(p. 90), but there is only a single graph setting out differences by size of community (p. 235). In general, given the contrasts in geographic and socio-economic structure among countries at such different levels of economic growth, it would have seemed an elementary precaution to alert the reader at every major point in the presentation to the need for such basic controls for within-nation variation. The great majority of the controls used in the tables and graphs presented are for formal education. This is an essential control in any analysis of elicited expressions of opinion or attitudes: we have moved far away from the straightforward plebiscitarianism of the early pollsters. Formal education proves an excellent predictor both of awareness of government outputs and of willingness to take action to influence authorities. This message comes through with great clarity from all the countries and reminds us of a basic problem for all full-suffrage democracies: votes may be equal, but opinions are only likely to be articulated and pressures only likely to be initiated by small minorities. That these minorities tend to be better educated than the average voters is a finding confirmed by political statisticians in country after country, but this does not mean that there are not other, and sometimes as important, channels of recruitment. Politics may be taught in the family, in youth movements, in unions and clubs, and for citizens with only a minimum of formal schooling such stimulations and experiences may prove decisive. The samples of such citizens were very large in all the countries and further differentiations by the most likely sources of early political stimulation might easily have been introduced: 35% in the U.S., the most educated of the nations, 63% in the U.K., 84% in Germany, 70% in Italy and 88% in Mexico. These least educated categories must of necessity be highly heterogeneous: they will include farmers, tenants and labourers in the primary economy as well as unemployed, wage earners and some artisans and shopkeepers in the urbanized communities. Such further differentiations might not only help to map out in detail the typical channels for the recruitment of active citizens but also open up the way for analyses of the *direction* of their activity.

This, perhaps, is the point where the political sociologist is most likely to object to the Almond-Verba analysis. There are a variety of ingenious indexes of levels of activity, but there is hardly any direct analysis of the political *context* and the policy *direction* of the activity: is it directed against or in support of the local or the national authorities, is it essentially an expression of *party commitment* or is it an outflow of *community position*? Historically this is one of the crucial questions to be asked in any comparative discussion of the consequences of full-suffrage democracy: were the lower-class citizens brought into each system through the extension of the franchise mostly mobilized by the existing parties and powerholders or did they organize parties and power centres of their own in opposition to the inherited system? There is very little discussion of the genesis of the five national party systems in the book and hardly a word about the socio-economic, cultural and religious conditions for the continued maintenance of the parties. This may be in full conformity with the deliberate decision to focus on the direct ties between citizen and nation, but it seems legitimate to ask whether this disregard for the political direction of citizen activity has not reduced the utility of the study as an empirical description of differences between countries.

The chapter on "Patterns of Partisanship" is no doubt the most disappointing to the political sociologist. There is an ingenious analysis of expressions of affect between voters for opposing parties in each country, but no considerations of the socio-cultural factors making for higher or lower levels of polarization between parties or of alienation from the national system: the data collected would have allowed a great deal of analysis in this direction and other studies could have been drawn on to round off the presentation of each party system.

The treatment of *Italy* is particularly problematic. The difficulties of conducting interview studies in a country with a high proportion of Communist voters are well-known: the Milan organization working for Almond and Verba could only register 4.5%. PCI voters and 5.5% PSI voters in the sample as against 22.7% and 14.2% in the election of 1958. Most of the Communists and Nenni Socialists clearly refused either to be interviewed or to report their votes to the interviewers. Almond and Verba discuss the abnormally high refusal rate for Italy on pp. 116–118, but curiously do not relate it directly to the discrepancy for the PCI and the PSI. Other studies carried out in Italy also report marked discrepancies, but none that I have seen report as low per cents for the two parties of the left as Almond and Verba (see specifically the studies reported on in Alberto Spreafico and Joseph La Palombara ed. *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia.* Ed. di Comunità, 1963). This discrepancy raises general problems of strategy of research in politically divided countries, problems which ought to receive much greater attention than they have, both among political analysts and among the technicians of the survey profession. Dogan's current work on the stratification of the left vote in France and Italy and Allardt's work on the Communist vote in Finland may point the way toward complex combinations of ecological analyses of local variations with pinpointed survey research which will yield much more than the straightforward cross-sectional sampling procedures so far applied.

I hope I shall not be accused of carping at details in this well-written report on a pioneering study. My concern has been less with details of design and analysis than with the general problem of strategies for cumulative comparative research on political processes. Many of the additional analyses I have suggested can still be done: the authors have generously bequeathed the IBM cards of their five-country study to the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and I have myself supervised the work of several students at Yale with these decks. What is needed beyond this, however, is a cumulation of efforts to fit this body of data into a wider context of information on elections, parties, local administrations and interest organizations, first in the countries studied in such detail, later for a number of other countries. Almond and Verba have on the whole confined themselves to a presentation of their theory, their method and their basic findings. The community of political analysts must now seek to incorporate these data and these findings into a broader cumulative effort to improve the bases for cross-national comparisons. We still lack even the most elementary compilations of evaluated political statistics for the countries of the West. Experts on comparative economic growth can base their analyses on vast efforts of data collation and compilation by the UN and its agencies. Experts on comparative political development have no such basis for their work. Is it not time we plan the first *International Yearbook of Political Statistics*?

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A Cross-Polity Survey. By ARTHUR S. BANKS AND ROBERT B. TEXTOR. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. Pp. x, 1476. $20.00.)

Citing the exceptional case to prove one's general point is a sly game with a lineage tracing back at least to the devil, if not beyond. Within the social sciences, this pastime has flourished most, perhaps, among those macrocosmic disciplines where "accidents" of historical and cultural configuration can produce odd instances to "prove" almost any theoretical point. One of the many salutary effects of *A Cross-Polity Survey* may be to suggest, for the study of comparative politics, that such a game is out of bounds: if a generalization has any power, it should be demonstrably taking all polities into account at the same time, rather than merely a few strays that seem to fit. And the ingenious point of this remarkable volume is to give scholars the wherewithal to check out some of their more cherished ideas against data from a quasi-totality of the world's independent polities.

The book is unique enough in several senses to require close description of its contents, which happen to be largely computer print-out. The underlying research conception is due to Banks, who was initially interested in getting each of 115 polities coded into categories representing a large number of variables or dimensions. Ultimately, the coding was completed on a selection of 57 variables. A dozen or so of these are background variables of the "hard" variety—size, population, urbanization, per capita gross national product and the like—which require less judgment than simple care in locating the most reliable international tabulations. The bulk of the codings, however, attempt to locate the various polities in terms of concepts currently prominent in the theoretical literature of comparative politics. These include such attributes as the degree of political modernization; the ideological orientation of the polity (i.e., "doctrinal," "developmental," "situational," "conventional," or "traditional"); freedom of group opposition; degree of interest articulation by varying types of groups, and degree of interest aggregation by parties, legislature and executive; aspects of the Almond-Shils System Characterization; the nature and stability of the party system; the nature of the power distribution; and numerous others.

The way in which these data have been processed and printed out to form the main portion of the volume springs from a "Pattern Search and Table Translation Technique" originally devised by Textor for use with cultural anthropology materials. In effect, the computer examines the simple association of each of these variables with each other across polities, winnowing this large mass of potential information down to the more limited set of relationships that turn out to show sufficient strength to be of some empirical interest. These remaining kernels of wheat—still many bushels—are processed a bit further and then served directly to the reader in an attractive form including all of the raw and derived statistics for those so inclined, while describing the relationship and its strength verbally for those who are not.

Hence while a substantive treatise from these data is promised for the future, the current book spins neither story nor theory. It is intended purely as a reference tool. Being something of a do-it-yourself handbook for instant hypothesis-testing, it does not offer passive entertainment. Yet the active reader may lose himself for stimulating hours tracing out chains of reasoning through the output. The printed materials stop with the simple two-variable tables, but the raw codes for each country are provided so that the reader is free to make up more complex multivariate tables if he so desires. (For still greater flexibility, the authors make available the actual data cards as well.) A large number of the more striking two-way tables are printed with country names in the cells as well as the bare frequencies, a device particularly useful for the reader wishing to ponder deviant cases.

Indeed, where utility is a prime criterion, the book is simply a handsome job. The authors always seem one jump ahead of the reader in providing all of the ancillary material that might be needed for any odd way of reconstructing the data, a prescience notably lacking among most compilers of tabular material. A hundred introductory pages, written this time by the human hand, are of the same quality. Directions for use of the book are very clear, and include a series of methodological caveats that are painstakingly honest, much to the point, and remarkably complete.

Among methodological issues entertained in the introduction, there is one that deserves special note here, for it helps to locate this project among others currently afoot that bear it a family resemblance. These other ventures—such as the Deutsch-Lasswell Yale Political Data Program and the Dimensionality of Nations Project at Northwestern—are tending to hew as closely as possible to quantitative indicators of polity parameters that in principle could be derived by any investigator from the public record. In these cases there is often room for dispute as to just what facet of more theoretically central concepts any given variable may mirror. But the variable itself is replicable and has some clear if limited operational meaning.

The Banks strategy takes the other fork at this critical juncture. The attempt has been to code countries directly in terms of the key theoretical concepts (e.g., degree of interest articulation by associational groups), however diffuse and intuitive the judgment must be. This direct approach is the distinctive strength and weakness of the project. Its strength is obvious; the weakness will be felt by any user who finds himself disagreeing with the way in which countries familiar to him have been coded on these more fugitive dimensions.

Between these strategies there is no clear right and wrong. In fact, we may stand to benefit most if both approaches are pursued concurrently, for any science is a building of relative confidences, and confidence builds nowhere so rapidly as when contrasting methods produce convergent results. Nonetheless, the classic recourse in a highly intuitive coding of the Banks-Textor sort is to the use of multiple experts contributing independent coding decisions that can subsequently be evaluated for their consistency. The authors are well aware of this, and would have proceeded in just this fashion had sufficient resources been available. The research community can well regret this inadequate support, for no single type of additional information would fortify the Banks-Textor compilations quite as much as an indication of the degree of expert consensus that might be claimed for the codings on each variable.

However this may be, *A Cross-Polity Survey* ranks as a most provocative contribution to students of macrocosmic comparisons, both in its content and in its pioneering format. The publication of the data in this form had not originally been envisioned by the authors, and was done primarily in response to expressions of interest and demand. The demand is well-filled, and the book should serve as a key reference point for scholars and graduate students of various interests for some time to come.

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British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties, Rev. ed. BY R. T. MCKENZIE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. x, 694. $3.95.)

With the publication of the first edition of R. T. McKenzie's work in 1955, there occurred a revolution in the study of British political parties. Students had previously been half-content to accept the caricatures which the parties had drawn of themselves and of each other, or had fallen back reluctantly on the naive and tendentious outpourings of Ostrogorski. *British Political Parties* advanced, in the style of Michels, a number of sophisticated hypotheses concerning the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labour parties; it also contained a wealth of descriptive information on the history and formal structures of the two parties. Not surprisingly, it rapidly established itself as the standard reference work in the field.

"Standard" rather than "definitive," for British politicians (notably R. H. S. Crossman) and British political scientists (notably Henry Pelling and Saul Rose) have never wholly accepted the book's arguments, particularly as they apply to the Labour Party. Ever since *British Political Parties* first appeared they have conducted a running debate with its author in the learned journals and political weeklies. This debate is of interest partly because of its curiously inconclusive quality: however fast they run and however fine-meshed the nets in which they try to ensnare him, McKenzie always manages to elude his pursuers. The reason lies, I think, not merely in McKenzie's dexterity but in the imprecise, unrigorous nature of many of his arguments; often it is by no means clear what evidence McKenzie would accept as falsifying his arguments. Since these are reproduced virtually unchanged in the second edition, they deserve a brief examination.

McKenzie summarizes his main thesis on page ix of the Preface: "Despite the vast differences in origin, social composition and formal structure of the Conservative and Labour parties, their acceptance of the rules and conventions of the governmental system ensures that the distribution of power, as between the Leader and his front-bench colleagues, the parliamentary parties, their mass organizations and professional machines, will be (and is) fundamentally similar." As a corollary he maintains that the Leader of the Labour Party is very nearly as powerful in practice as the Leader of the Conservative Party is in both theory and practice: "by accepting the conventions of Cabinet and Parliamentary government the [Labour] party has ensured that in practice its Leader acquires influence and authority nowhere laid down in the party constitution." (page 300).

These passages encapsulate the chief contentions of the book. Yet they are far from unambiguous. The presence of the words "ensures" and "will be" in the two sentences just quoted makes it possible to construe them in several different ways: deductively, predictively, or even prescriptively.

Clearly the sentences are not intended to have merely deductive force (though at times McKenzie reiterates his thesis in a manner which suggests that he believes it to be almost self-evident). They are probably meant to be primarily predictive. The writer wishes to assert that any party which found itself in a particular situation would (as a matter of fact) be forced to order its affairs in a particular way. He may be right. But neither at this point nor anywhere else in the book does he explain why this must be so. Instead he contents himself with alluding repeatedly (pp. 300, 384, 454, 603, 639) to the fact that the Leader of a major party in Britain is either Prime Minister or a potential Prime Minister. This fact he clearly regards as the key to understanding the parties' power structures; but, apart from noting the importance of the patronage power, he makes little attempt to explain why it is the key. Indeed, although a Leader's status as an actual or potential head of government is undoubtedly of great importance, his possession of this status would seem wholly compatible with a wide variety of personal and partisan styles, and with the production of a wide range of substantive policies. Referring to the distribution of power within the two parties, the author uses the phrase "fundamentally similar"; but, apart from insisting on the primacy of the parliamentary over the extra-parliamentary organs of both parties, he never makes it quite clear what he regards as fundamental and what as merely peripheral.

McKenzie's imprecision on this point is closely related to another idiosyncrasy: his habit of suggesting that the future will be like the past without stating what circumstances in the past will be repeated in the future and produce the same consequences. In *British Political Parties* almost none of the arguments are spelled out in terms of actual or potential power relations; with few exceptions, they are neither more nor less than arguments from history. For example, in chapter VIII of the first edition the author argued that the parliamentary leadership of the Labour Party had been able to retain control of the National Executive Committee partly because the NEC included a large proportion of favorably disposed Members of Parliament. He neglected, however, to explain how this had come about, and instead made use of phrases like "a review of the record," "has much more frequently been the case," and "have invariably been well represented." (pp. 519–20). Thus, at this critical point, McKenzie's theory failed to take account (except in the most jejune way) of the possibility that the proportion of favorably disposed MP's might suddenly decline. This it did in the mid- and late-1950's, with highly embarrassing consequences for the leadership. This striking reversal of form is dismissed on pages 599 and 600 of the new edition in the most cursory possible fashion.

Partly owing to its essentially historical approach, *British Political Parties* contains no account of how the concept "power" is being employed. At times McKenzie seems to be suggesting that a Leader's power is to be measured in terms of the length of time during which he remains unchallenged in office (see *e.g.* pp. 298–300). But this is palpably absurd: members of a party may suffer a Leader to remain in office merely because he never does anything to offend them. At other times the writer appears to be applying a "success" criterion (*e.g.* in the Epilogue to the new edition). But even this is insufficient: a Leader may invariably get his own way merely because his instincts tell him when not to try to get his way. These points are, of course, perceived by McKenzie, but his failure either to suggest alternative criteria or to suggest a less mechanical analysis of power—perhaps a "cost-benefit" analysis—contributes to the oddly gelatinous quality of much of his argument.

In the same connection, it still has to be asked by what criteria a social scientist could determine that the power structures of two quite different organizations were "fundamentally similar." If, for example, two small boys at a county fair compete at lifting weights, and if one of them proves capable of lifting heavier weights than the other, then it makes sense to say that the one boy is "more powerful" in the "weight-lifting situation" than the other. But, with respect to two Leaders of two political parties with different histories, structures, personnel and ideological tendencies, what is to count for purposes of comparison as "the same situation"? Answers to this kind of question could undoubtedly be worked out to fit particular cases; but McKenzie not only does not answer such questions, he seems not to realise that they must be asked.

Finally, the sentences quoted at the outset may be construed prescriptively. In other words McKenzie may be informing the parties that they are, in some sense, obliged to conduct their affairs in a certain way. That he does indeed wish to prescribe as well as describe is indicated by the number of passages in which he chides Labour Leaders (particularly) for failing to appreciate the real power structure within their own party (see esp. p. 626), or else contends that it would be contrary to the British Constitution for extra-parliamentary parties to dictate policy to their co-partisans in Parliament (see *e.g.* p. 558). Where "is" appears to be failing, "ought" is summoned to the rescue. For a dispassionate description of party structures, parts of *British Political Parties* are remarkably hortatory in tone.

All this having been said, it remains true, of course, that McKenzie's book represented a major advance when it first appeared nine years ago, and that it continues to be both a stimulating work of scholarship and a thoughtful, provocative *tractatus*. Its major weaknesses —its lack of rigor and precision, its emphasis on description at the expense of explanation—are probably partly a consequence of its historical method. If and when a new McKenzie comes to be written, it will almost certainly be concerned with the interaction between structure and policy, with the consequences of ideology and social composition, with the construction of a more clearly delineated logical and theoretical structure, and (perhaps most important) with detailed analyses of the taking of particular decisions. Till then, and perhaps beyond, *British Political Parties* will stand comfortably on its merits.

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The Human Dimension in International Relations. BY OTTO KLINEBERG. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964. Pp. 173. Paper, $2.75.)

Professor Klineberg is a social psychologist who has contributed to our knowledge of the ways in which psychology operates through institutional settings among "primitive" peoples, thus producing distinctive behavior patterns. His work is justly distinguished for its clarity, insightfulness, and intelligence. As a man of good will Professor Klineberg hopes with this recent book to educate both the public and the professions concerning what social psychology has to contribute to international relations and thereby to improve the prospects for peace. The result is a work of pedestrian quality, distinguished primarily for oversimplification, which would serve to dishearten anyone who believed that an important key to the problems of international relations could be found through the explorations of social psychologists. If so distinguished a man as Professor Klineberg fails so miserably in his venture, one might infer that good will and intelligence are not sufficient to overcome lack of knowledge of the subject matter and of the genuinely relevant disciplinary skills.

For instance, Professor Klineberg tells us that there are stereotypes, that they may contribute to international misunderstanding, and that it may be possible to overcome them by education. But, as a careful man, Professor Klineberg does not assume that stereotypes necessarily produce bad results. Nor does he indicate the practical relationship of stereotypes to the relations between the U. S. and U.S.S.R. I venture to suggest that the problem is unimportant even as a marginal matter, although this might be less true of Greek-Turkish stereotypes on Cyprus. Unfortunately, in the latter case, I do not think we could make a dent in the problem by exiling all the social psychologists in the U. S. to Cyprus and by turning them loose on Makarios.

Again, Professor Klineberg speaks of personality and attitudes as important in international decisions; but, wisely, unlike some who have written on the subject, he then recognizes that political "role" is by far the more significant factor in shaping behavior. Unfortunately, he makes the admittedly diffident suggestion of mental tests, which he compares to other health tests, for the holders of political office. I suggest that Professor Klineberg might not like his own idea if he thought through the problem of institutional mechanisms and the consequences for the political machinery by means of which men are governed (quite apart from all questions of practicability).

Professor Klineberg then discusses the psychological mechanisms, such as projection, denial, and so forth—topics treated by Charles Osgood and Jerome Frank. Professor Klineberg is too intelligent to lay too much stress on these mechanisms as explanations. Yet he is not adequately aware that the topic is a snare and a delusion. Did Churchill project his own hostility onto the Germans when he urged Britain to oppose Nazi aggression? To pose the question is to demonstrate that adequate analysis requires a political analysis of the elements of Nazi policy. That is, one must know whether Germany was probably genuinely aggressive or Churchill probably genuinely hostile. And, if one makes such an analysis, the policy consequences will generally be elucidated apart from psychological analysis. Psychological analysis then has value primarily as a propagandistic tool, and this is the way in which Osgood and Frank use it, although perhaps unknowingly.

In essence, solutions to problems of international politics, to the extent that there are solutions, require knowledge of politics. This is made most clear by Klineberg's reference to Urie Bronfenbrenner's work on the mirror image concept. Bronfenbrenner, a social psychologist and an ex-colleague of mine, took a trip to Russia and thereby became an expert on the Russian problem. He discovered through interviews that Russians and Americans had fears that mirrored each other—thereby apparently showing that both were false. He then made an analysis of Russian social psychology for the *New York Times Magazine* and predicted that if we confirmed the Russian fears by pushing them, they would act as they did in Stalin's time, and become aggressive internationally. Unfortunately for his theses that was not what happened in Stalin's Russia.

Klineberg recognizes that the mirror-image concept is too simple. But he buys other generalizations that are no better—the argument that expectancies produce war, which, where it is not a tautology, is often false, and the argument that shelters are bad and increase the danger of war. He does not recognize the chasm between his psychological generalizations and the international situations to which they are to be applied. He has the pitiable hope that more scientific knowledge of a psychological order will suffice. But the best psychoanalysts do not apply their cherished Freudian concepts in the absence of a detailed case history. And at least they are dealing with personality and not with politics, the realm to which Klineberg hopes to apply his psychological generalizations.

To the extent that psychological explanations apply—even if only marginally—to international politics, they will hinge on the psychological reactions of particular individuals with particular personalities in particular political roles in particular political circumstances. Thus the attempt to apply psychological generalizations in the abstract only produces that kind of stereotyped thinking against which Professor Klineberg protests in his book. It is interesting that awareness of the problem of stereotypy—indeed that intensive work on it—has not inhibited social psychologists from engaging in the worst kind of stereotyped and prejudiced thinking when they reason about international politics. (For example, statements about military pressures, irrational diplomacy, and so forth.) This, indeed, raises a question as to the value of general psychological knowledge in international relations.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Mathematics and the Social Sciences. EDITED BY JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH. (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1963, Pp. vi, 121.)

In his second monograph in a series sponsored by the Academy (The first was *The Limits of Behavioralism in Political Science*, 1962), Professor Charlesworth has edited a collection of essays which, in the main, will make profitable reading for the non-mathematical political scientist, and which may even prove of some interest to the moderately well initiated. Professor Leonid Hurwicz writes on the uses of mathematical analysis in economics, and Professor Oskar Morgenstern deals with the limitations therein. This pattern is repeated for political science by Professors Oliver Benson and Andrew Hacker, and for sociology by Professors Harrison White and Don Martindale. The essayists in economics and sociology are in general agreement that mathematics is *in principle* applicable to the analysis of human behavior. The illustrative applications in economics and in sociology are impressive, and Professor White has chosen examples particularly well suited to the non-mathematician. Professor Hurwicz, in addition to his illustrations, provides a brief but encouraging history of the development of mathematical economics, and Professor Morgenstern convincingly disabuses one of the notions that mathematics is a fixed set of techniques, and presents it as a growing body of ideas with a history of adaptation to the tasks at hand. In the final essay, Professor Martindale develops a formidable argument for the applicability *in principle* of mathematics to the study of human behavior. Moreover, he presents a scathing and cogent critique of the abuses of mathematics in that enterprise. All of these essays are worthy of the attention of political scientists, and are surely deserving of more elaborate treatment than I afford them here. However, given the clientele of this REVIEW and the nature of the essay by Professor Hacker, I must, with apologies, give economics and sociology short shrift in order to focus in the political science section of the monograph.

Professor Benson's essay is a veritable inventory of the uses of mathematics in political science. Unfortunately, it is painfully lacking in critical evaluation. Perhaps even more desirable than evaluation would have been a critical *filtration*. Such filtration might not have left much, but it would have put the skeptic on his mettle—facing him with the task, let us say, of attacking the logic and significance of the voting paradoxes as against such a task as attacking the uncritical use of scales in voting analyses. To lump these indiscriminately together is to contaminate the former with the deficiencies of the latter, and is to obscure the task of the skeptic—who serves his purpose best when addressing himself to the well wrought.

Professor Hacker's essay is a plea for the abandonment of the mathematical approach to political analysis and is rooted in a set of perspectives which have profound implications for the discipline. Since his views are apt to strike sympathetic chords among large numbers of political scientists, they deserve and will receive extended treatment here.

One is initially confronted, in this essay, with a series of specific criticisms of mathematical abuses. In general, cases of such abuses are correctly identified, but in each instance, the prescription for rectifying the abuse is somewhat disconcerting. Thus, in the case of the Kort-Fisher controversy over Professor Kort's mathematical analysis of the Supreme Court (This REVIEW, 1957, pp. 1–12, and 1958, pp. 321–48.), Professor Hacker is unhappy with Kort's efforts. However, in citing Fisher's critique, no notice is taken of Professor Fisher's central criticisms, *viz.* that a logically inappropriate mathematical technique had been used, that the technique used did not work upon further application, and that an inappropriate inference had been made. All of these are overlooked to focus on the observation that Fisher and Kort disagree over the relevance of "jurisdictional issue" to a particular case. Ignoring, or unaware, that this is empirically resolvable in terms of the variance accounted for by the inclusion or exclusion of the item from the analysis, Professor Hacker concludes that "weighting is ultimately a question of interpretation, and it requires the scholar to impose his personal judgment on the facts he has before him." (p. 65). This would not be a terribly objectionable conclusion were it not intended so literally and so pervasively. His central criticisms of Guttman scaling and computer simulations are that they do not permit the input data to be subjectively weighed. Professor Hacker is justifiably concerned about the validity and reliability of the data, but he seems entirely unaware of the light which mathematical tools can shed on these problems.

One comes away from his illustrative case criticisms with the feeling that Professor Hacker is not really in a position to comment critically on specific abuses of mathematics. However, in all fairness, it is not specific abuses to which he is raising objection—although he unwisely addresses himself to them. Rather it is the entire scientific enterprise to which he objects, as becomes explicit toward the end of the essay:

> What must be abandoned is the hope that political analysis can be either objective or scientific. The underlying method of the natural and physical sciences is inapplicable to political study. (p. 74)

His prescription for the discipline is quite forthright:

> What is wanted is more subjective analysis, more individual scholarship, and more research that is highly personal in conclusion and design. Each student of politics must describe the world as he sees it, holding onto the faith that his perceptions and evaluations are valid. There must be a certain display of arrogance here, a sense that everyone is out of step except one's self. There is also involved the courage to weather the scorn of more conventional colleagues. For their agreement will only be obtained if controversial elements are stripped away, leaving ideas and approaches that are unexceptionable. (p. 75)

Are we then to assume that each man's subjectivity constitutes so formidable a barrier between himself and reality on the one hand and between himself and his fellows on the other, that he and his fellows can never concur on a reliable estimate of the vital parts of that reality? Must the vital parts always be controversial? If so, how do the trivial come to be so amenable to rigorous analysis? Consider the central questions in political science, those of the conditions of war and of peace, of domestic cooperation and of civil strife, of individual gratification and of deprivation. Either these conditions are going to be understood through the rigorous interplay of imagination, logic, and evidence (i.e., science) or they are not going to be understood at all. If the latter is our assumption, then indeed the entire discipline, from Plato through Lasswell, is, has been, and will continue to be "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."—ARTHUR S. GOLDBERG, *University of Rochester.*

James Mill and the Art of Revolution. BY JOSEPH HAMBURGER. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 289, $6.50.)

It is agreed that the passage of the English Reform Bill of 1832 was one of the most significant events in the history of democracy. It is also widely agreed that the Philosophical Radicals played a significant role in the passage of the Bill. Professor Hamburger, a political scientist at Yale, has interrupted a more general study of Philosophical Radicalism in order to examine the relationship between the Radicals and the Bill. The enterprise is of interest to both historians and political scientists, although the significance of the study for the latter group is reduced by the somewhat narrow strategy which the author has employed.

The early 19th century found the British political system at a turning point. Considerable segments of the population which had been politically inert were now demanding the right to effective participation, but constitutional arrangements, particularly suffrage and representation, thwarted their desires. This led to efforts on the part of reformers to expand the political machinery so as to accommodate the newly activated groups, and it prompted serious concern as to whether the adjustments could be made quickly enough to dissipate the revolutionary potential inherent in the situation. It is Professor Hamburger's argument that the (James) Millite Radicals perceived a connection between reformism and fear of revolution and built a novel theory of political tactics out of it. Desiring extensive reform, but themselves fearful of violence, Mill and his followers, who had no political authority but who had considerable access to those in authority, coolly and deliberately magnified the danger of revolution so as to frighten those in authority into enacting the Reform Bill. To accomplish this they stirred discontent among the populace and, more importantly, quite consciously sent false information to key party figures,[1] produced distorted newspaper accounts of events, and in general utilized the "language of menace" to influence those in authority. "In creating what was in fact a tactical doctrine for reformers, Mill seems to have been confident that there would be no violence—that the people would not go too far and that, rather than risk disorder, the governing officials would prudently make concessions." (p. 25.) Hamburger then goes to some pains to show that in fact there was very little revolutionary potential in the society (Ch. 4.) and that, excepting local circumstances, the authority structure was capable of dealing with whatever such potential there was (Ch. 5.). Yet the tactics of intimidation were sufficiently effective to warrant the conclusion that the Radicals played a significant role in the passage of the Bill and that use of menace and intimidation was their distinctive contribution.

Hamburger's history casts doubt upon a number of standard accounts of the passage of the Bill, and specialists will want to look closely at his full and effectively marshalled evidence. For the political scientist, the work is highly suggestive on a number of central issues. Unfortunately, however, the author has chosen not to follow out the implications of his materials or to relate them to more general propositions and bodies of literature. This is most obviously the case as regards Philosophical Radicalism. The relationships between the tactical theory described and the larger propositions of Benthamite and Millite thought, particularly concerning the connections between interest, force, and democracy, are beguiling indeed. But Hamburger gives them exceedingly brief attention. Again, the book presents extremely suggestive material concerning the conditions conducive to revolution. But this material, with the exception of several references to Tocqueville and some use of Lyford Edwards,[2] is not related to the very rich body of theory concerning revolution which has come down to us from political philosophy and which has been greatly expanded in the 20th century. Much the same can be said concerning such questions as the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism (there are some interesting comments on this question in the first chapter), the motivation of political theorists, and the relationship between self-interest, public opinion, and the exercise of authority. In all of these respects Hamburger's materials could illuminate and be illuminated by consideration of existing literature.—RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, *Reed College.*

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[1] Hamburger speaks too confidently of the Whig and Tory parties throughout. Cf. R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties*, pp. 1–3.

America and Europe in the Political Thought of John Adams. BY EDWARD HANDLER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, Pp. ix, 248. $5.25.)

A careful reading of Professor Handler's book should convince anyone of the superficiality of many of the recent generalizations about the political thought of John Adams. He was not an admirer of Burke, nor is he the American equivalent of Burke. He was not a radical when young, a conservative in his old age. Nor is his three volume *Defence of the Constitutions* (1786–88) entitled to much of the praise that it has received, ordinarily by authors who have neither read that long and less than enthralling work nor analyzed it as carefully as has Handler.

This is not a book in which John Adams and his writings have been debunked, or cut down to size. What the author has done is to dissect the *Defence* and, somewhat more briefly, other of Adams' many writings, for the purpose of placing them in perspective. Most interesting among his conclusions are the curious variations of relativism and universalism in Adams' thought, and the even more curious unrealism of the theorist assigned by, among others, Beard, Laski and Parrington, to the position of master realist and foremost universalist among American writers on politics. Adams was a major figure, and his work is far from insignificant, but his books do exhibit limitations concerning, for example, the social and economic basis of America (as well as France and the Netherlands) which most writers have overlooked. His elaborate defense of the separation and balance of powers in American state constitutions, especially the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 of which Adams was the chief author, contains little attempt to employ American experience or American authority or American social circumstance, and deals almost endlessly with largely irrelevant material from European examples and authors, ancient, medieval and modern. He "performed the extraordinary operation of engrafting the social conflicts of Europe on American soil" where they did not fit. He admired the English system without much understanding either of the prevailing system of patronage and sinecures or the real position of the mass of the English people. The rigidity of his political analysis may have enabled him to predict more accurately than others the political aftermath of the French Revolution, but kept him from seeing the vast social and economic gains to the French peasants from that upheaval, even after the Restoration. Nevertheless he was, as Handler indicates, closer to the liberalism of the *philosophes* than to the romantic conservatism of Burke's *Reflections.*

The book is recommended for anyone interested in Adams or his age. I could have wished for more on the highly successful Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 (it is the oldest written constitution in existence), and for some commentary on the absence of a theory of judicial review in Adams' theory of the balance of powers. It is, however, unfair to criticize a book for not dealing with points the author does not choose to discuss. What he does consider he deals with admirably.—BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, *The University of Texas.*

Politik und praktische Philosophie. Eine Studie zur Rekonstruktion der politischen Wissenschaft. BY WILHELM HENNIS. (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand-Verlag, 1963, Pp. 132.)

The centenary of Max Weber has brought the problem of *Wertfreiheit*—perennial since Weber—to the fore again. The Max Weber-conference of German sociologists at Heidelberg (April 1964), with the usual array of value-relativists vs. value-absolutists, centered around the problem. And with the short but weighty volume under review we have the first, and massive, attack on Weber's position by a representative of the new German political science.

Professor Hennis follows two lines of attack. The first concerns the *object* of political science.

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[2] Lyford Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (University of Chicago Press, 1927).

He indicts recent political science for having followed Weber's footsteps in narrowly centering interest and research around the "givens" of the 19th century, nation-state and civil society, and thus finding the essentials of politics in the power-struggle of nations and of groups within nations. One can indeed criticize Weber and some of his followers for considering the nation-state as a so-to-speak eternal category. What follows, however, is merely the necessity to enlarge the field of enquiry so that it encompasses phenomena beyond these (in a manner not foreign to the Weber of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*). Thus Hennis' first line of attack does not really affect the fundamental premises of modern political science.

His second line does. It is concerned, not with object but method. Modern political science, he claims, has given up concern with aims and ideals in favor of mere facts and means because only in this way, so it believes, can one conform to the ideal, or model, of "scientific" approach. According to Hennis, the decay of the old science of politics began with Bacon, Descartes, and especially Hobbes, and led through Kant to modern positivism. No longer interested in the "ought to" (in the "ends of the state," *Staatszwecke*, for instance), present political science, with its demand for certainty and use of formal logic, can only produce "statistics of power relationships" ("Statistik von Machtlagen"). Against this, Hennis seeks to establish, or reestablish, a true science of politics as part of a philosophy of practice. In doing so, he is not satisfied with raising again the customary objections to value relativism (difficulty to find criteria for selection of problems, to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant, etc.). Going back to Aristotle's "topics" and the ancient methods based on topics and rhetoric, he proclaims political science as a "science of probabilities," which, by surveying the entire ambience of a problem, its givens, the pros and cons of a situation, arrives eventually at the best possible solution.

To this reviewer the chief value of the study seems to lie in its careful tracing of the much neglected history of the old political science which did follow the methods outlined by Hennis, and its battle with and eventual breakdown in the face of what he indicts as modern scientism. But what does the new-old approach he advocates provide? Does it amount to more than an advocacy of paying more attention to politics as an "art," something the "relativist" Weberian would not deny as long as it is kept separate from value-relativist political "science?" This reviewer, in his capacity as a college teacher, is reminded of the cherished game of assembling the pros and cons in discussing a political question, where some students are always disappointed when no clearcut solution emerges either way. But Hennis is sure that in a discussion of this sort the "end of the state" or the meaning of the "common weal" can be found unequivocally. Like our Straussites, however, he never tells us what they are. This reviewer doubts that it will ever be possible to construe a "Sollen" out of the "Sein." He would, however, challenge Hennis to write a follow-up study undertaking to do this, which, even if it should fail in its main endeavor, could hardly fail to be provocative and stimulating even to as stubborn and old-fashioned a Weberian as the undersigned.—JOHN H. HERZ, *The City College, New York.*

The Conservative Affirmation. BY WILLMOORE KENDALL. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963. Pp. xiv, 272. $5.95.)

In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo. BY FRANK S. MEYER. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962. Pp. 179. $3.95.)

If these two books constitute sufficient evidence for a generalization, it would appear that the self-avowed Conservatives are having difficulty agreeing among themselves as to what it is precisely they stand for. They seem to be able to identify one another but they do not always like what they find. Both Willmoore Kendall and Frank Meyer want to say that their brand of Conservatism differs from that of Russell Kirk but they also want to say that they differ from one another.

Kendall sees the conflict between Liberals and Conservatives as a kind of warfare. The Liberals are "a disciplined and battle-wise enemy, with crystal clear war-aims and a grim determination to win." The Conservatives have as yet no "war aims" but simply a determination to resist. The issue at stake is whether "the destiny of America" is the Liberal egalitarian revolution or "the destiny envisaged for it by the Founders of the Republic." By what means or upon whose authority we appropriate the genuine vision of the Founders is not entirely clear. But Kendall has no difficulty at all in singling out those politicians who, in his opinion, have in recent decades been most faithful to that vision. They include in addition to the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, Senators Byrd and Goldwater and the late Mr. Francis Walter. And he is equally clear about the political issues that divide the Liberals from the Conservatives. The Liberals are those who favor changing our immigration policy, closing the loopholes in the income-tax laws, creating more TVA's, giving federal aid to education, providing more public housing and abolishing the House Un-American Activities Committee. The Conservatives are those numerous members of Congress who are resisting. The Liberals are those who believe in their hearts "that no measures ought to be taken against the Communists at all" and the Conservatives are those who recognize Communism for the real menace that it is.

It is unfortunate that such conclusions as are recorded in an opening chapter entitled "What is Conservatism?" may keep many readers from reading further—indeed, the judgments do seem perverse. For subsequent chapters reveal an analytical ability and a pungent style that is fascinating even when one disagrees with the conclusions. A chapter on "The Two Majorities in American Politics" suggests an explanation for the tension between the Executive and Legislative on the federal level that focuses attention on a problem that has not as yet been adequately explored. Chapters on "The Social Contract," "Conservatism and the 'Open Society' " and on "Christian Pacifism" are well worth reading if only for their provocative effect. But limitations of space imposed upon the reviewer do not permit an adequate summary of their argument. The last hundred pages of the book consist of book reviews.

The most unfortunate thing about Kendall's book, in my opinion, is the fact that it lends some intellectual authority to a conspiracy theory of politics which over-simplifies political issues and tends to engender panic when what we need most is sober reflection and prudence. The use of terms like "attackers" and "resisters" reminds one of Carl Schmitt's notorious attempt to reduce politics to a struggle between "friends" and "enemies." To inject charges of "treason" and of "heresy" into the consideration of domestic political issues hardly promotes rational consideration of the merits of alternative proposals. I doubt very much that the Founders of our Republic would have regarded those of us today who question their ultimate wisdom in all matters as "subversive" for they were the first to acknowledge that their Constitution was a less than perfect document.

Frank Meyer wants to say that the Conservative credo affirms the freedom of the individual person as an absolute value. Government, according to this credo, has only two natural functions: "to protect the rights of citizens against violent and fraudulent assault, and to judge in conflicts of right with right. It has a further third function, which is another aspect of the first, that is, to protect its citizens from assault by foreign powers." There are good historical reasons for describing this credo as "liberalism" but Meyer wants to call it conservatism. Both the "liberal-collectivists" (who are really democratic socialists) and the New Conservatives (who are really Hegelians) err by exalting the community above the person. When he says that the error goes back to classical political philosophy which regarded the state as "an entity possessing a moral being of its own," he simply misunderstands the classical teaching. Plato never ascribed to the *polis* a mind, will or purpose of its own, as Meyer suggests. The unity of the human community, for Plato, is not the substantial unity of an organism but a moral unity of shared idea and purpose. To affirm, as Plato and Aristotle did, that the primary function of the state is education (in the broadest sense of the term) and the promotion of virtue does not lead one, as Meyer suggests, to embrace Nazism or Communism.

Meyer is alarmed by the fact that not only New Conservatives but some liberal psychologists as well talk a great deal about "alienation." He seems to find some sinister implications in this because one of the first persons to identify and discuss the problem of alienation was Karl Marx. It may be that it is a genuine problem and not a sinister plot. And if socialism is not a genuine answer to the problem of alienation it would be more to the point for Meyer to suggest a better solution. For all his avowed concern for the absolute value of human individuals he is singularly unconcerned about the problems of persons. There is no mention in his book of the social and economic conditions which called forth such political responses as Wilson's New Freedom and Roosevelt's New Deal—it all seems to stem from an enormous theoretical error. And in this connection it is interesting to note that Abraham Lincoln's claim to fame, according to Meyer, is that he was instrumental in "undermining . . . the sovereignty of the several states."

Both books lead one to the conclusion that any attempt to explain American politics and the real issues that confront us today in terms of a Liberal-Conservative dichotomy is unenlightening.—JOHN H. HALLOWELL, *Duke University*.

The Quest for the Dream: the Development of Civil Rights and Human Relations in Modern America. BY JOHN P. ROCHE. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963. Pp. xii, 308. $5.95.)

Liberalism and the Retreat from Politics. BY WILLIAM J. NEWMAN. (New York: George Braziller, 1964. Pp. xv, 190. $5.00.)

The two books under review both deal with liberty but they have little else in common. Professor Roche confines himself mainly to civil liberties and civil rights, while Professor Newman, largely disregarding this sphere, deals with freedom and power in the broadest possible sense. He writes of ideas and moods and vaguely sensed obstructions. Roche treats more directly of events, allowing them to indicate the prevailing moods.

The Quest for the Dream is a specialized study in political and social history, giving minimal attention to the legal aspects of the subject. Beginning with the impression that American civil liberties were in parlous condition, Professor Roche was soon convinced by the facts that, on the contrary, "never since the foundation of the Republic has there been such a concern for the basic principles of decency and civility in intergroup relations as we know today." (P. ix.) He traces the story of human relations from the turn of the century to today. The First World War "led to an ignoble and disgraceful defacement of American ideals"; "the American dream had become a nightmare." (P. 49.) F.D.R's. liberalism was somewhat inchoate and almost wholly lacking in an ideology, yet its net effect on liberty was positive. During the same period, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, "Tom-Tom" Heflin, and others of the "Yahoos" raised a frightening threat to liberty, but in the end they were contained. Although the Second World War itself showed in almost every respect a heartening contrast to its predecessor as far as civil liberties were concerned, it was, in due course, followed by a powerful attack upon liberty and decency. Again the Yahoos failed. Here Roche makes one of his few forays into speculative theory. "Freedom in our urban society, by a curious paradox," he concludes, "is sustained by the very impersonalization of city life and of the development of legal and political institutions which have muffled interpersonal and intergroup conflicts among people necessarily living at very close quarters with each other." "Ironically," he continues, "the collapse of that sense of community so highly esteemed by nostalgic sociologists seems to have created a new atmosphere of liberty and procedural due process for the nonconformist, who no longer finds himself perpetually in face-to-face relationships with his neighbors or subjugated to the coercive power of the 'group'—whether it be the rural parish or the ethnic ghetto of fifty years ago." (P. 232)

The last quotation from Professor Roche's excellent volume provides a good starting point for discussion of Professor Newman's briefer study of liberalism's "retreat from politics." While generally he impresses his own organization and analysis on the material, Newman devotes himself extensively to an interpretive account of the ideas of such writers—most of them sociologists—as Hannah Arendt, David Riesman, C. Wright Mills, Robert Heilbroner, and Paul Goodman. While Roche is concerned primarily with those specific liberties we know as "civil," Newman almost completely ignores this important aspect of liberalism. If Roche can be chided for interlarding his factual recital with too little theorizing, Newman's speculation (and that of the authors he treats) far too often loses touch with the facts. Half-truths and unsupported generalizations abound; and all too frequently contrary propositions seem equally plausible.

Two features of *Liberalism and the Retreat from Politics* frustrate this reviewer. One is that almost every page invites dispute. The other is that it is difficult to know when the author is adopting or approving the ideas of those whom he discusses. One gets the impression throughout most of the volume that Newman agrees that freedom is declining (*cf.* Roche to the contrary); that we have lost the sense that we can control our lives (except as we can withdraw into an inner world of privacy), but that our frustrations come not so much from any identifiable individuals, groups, or organizations as from a nebulous "system," or "power structure." Liberals are caught between the "upper world of bureaucratic insolence," and "the lower world of anarchic freedom" peopled by the direct-actionists. "The tragedy of the loss of society," and here Newman clearly seems to be speaking for himself, "lies precisely in the gulf between the official liberal in the White House, trapped into isolation by the system" and the vital energies and aspirations of the real heroes of America, the Marchers, with which he is out of touch. (P. 114.) Moreover, Newman himself feels frustrated by our politics of accommodation. One gets the picture of an "angry young man" frustrated because his anger is "accommodated."

Perhaps these reactions are unfair. The author concludes on a note of modest optimism that seems to belie much of what has gone before. In the concluding chapter, where it appears, rather to the reader's surprise, that his academic heroes are men like Key and Schattschneider, it appears that the liberal has a role to play in public life after all. Here, under the name of "flexibility," the author praises a feature of our political system that sounds remarkably like the "accommodation" earlier decried. Here, too, his earlier concerns about the power structure and the "system" inexplicably fade from view. More hard thought and careful expression would have made this book much sounder—but also less provocative.—J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College.*

Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought. BY PAUL E. SIGMUND. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 335. $6.95.)

The Political Ideas of Nicholas of Cusa with Special Reference to His De Concordantia Catholica. BY MORIMICHI WATANABE. (Genève, Suisse, Libraire Droz. Traveaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, Vol. LVIII. 1963. Pp. 215.)

We have here two volumes which continue the distinguished modern inquiry into political theory in the middle ages. Here especially is the impact of Renaissance thought on Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), a notable Catholic leader of the XV century. While the two volumes cover much the same ground, there are significant differences. Sigmund is concerned with the philosophical background of ideas in Cusa's work, while Watanabe presents with effectiveness the historical background of each of the problems he discusses. In this sense, these two books are supplementary. In addition, it would seem that in style Watanabe has the edge over Sigmund, though clearly it must be difficult to write engagingly about the German Cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa. I would argue that Watanabe shows more sensitivity than Sigmund to the niceties of Catholic philosophy and doctrine, but in both works one misses the explication for the time of some notable concepts in the apparatus of Catholic apology. Such ideas as natural law, indirect power, designation theory, divine right, and the exact nature of the higher dignity of spiritual power are not discussed with lucidity in either of these works, though there seems to be more sense of the meaning of medieval law in Watanabe than in Sigmund.

Another difference is of significance. Sigmund relies almost entirely on German scholarship, with little reference to the work done in, for example, the Latin countries. Watanabe uses much of the same material, but the influence of Anglo-American writing in the field of medieval and Renaissance political thinking is more clearly perceptible. On p. 85, for instance, Sigmund makes reference in a footnote to the work of Father John Courtney Murray on John of Paris, but he does not explain what is there argued. If he had he might, indeed, have been forced to alter the treatment of John of Paris, including his emphasis on indirect power and jurisdiction *per accidens*. Considering the various interpretations of John of Paris it might have been well, at least in footnotes, to have explained something of the dynamism of John of Paris scholarship.

De Concordantia Catholica is often considered the most important work in political theory between Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli. It would rank above Cusa's philosophical work, especially *De Docta Ignorantia*. The first work is distinguished for its defense of the General Council of the Church, and particularly the Council of of Basel, to which he presented his *De Concordantia,* probably in 1433. The Council of Constance had cured schism in the Church, but the Council of Basel degenerated into an attempt to create another schism. Such a degeneration led Cusa to become a supporter of the Pope against the Council, and it explains why there have been so few Councils in the succeeding centuries. Cusa's general position is argued in philosophical terms in his later work. Political thinkers have stressed Cusa's use of the ideas of consent and representation, and the principle of the organic analogy (quite common, of course, in medieval thought). Latterly, the emphasis on Cusa's work has been on neo-Platonic thinking, that is, hierarchical and analogical ideas in making comparisons between the divine economy, the government of the Church, and the government of the Empire. But while this exploration, in Sigmund in detail, is impressive, neither writer discusses the extensive modern scholarship which has been bringing Plato and Aristotle together and which would argue that as much of Plato remained in Aristotle, the resurgence of Platonism in the Renaissance was more a matter of emphasis than of contradiction. Of course, it can well be argued that the Pseudo-Dionysius, or Dionysius the Areopagite, was neither Plato nor Aristotle.

The discussion of consent and representation in these two volumes is of especial importance. Any student of modern theory and practice of representation might well start with the problem of virtual or figured representation in the conciliar movement of the XV century. Ideas such as customary law, tacit consent, *quod omnes tangit,* all become involved. It is clear that medieval ideas of consent and representation, even in advanced conciliar theory, do not equate with a purely behavioristic and modern interpretation of representation. Our modern practice of imputing a representative quality, say to the Constitution or to the judges of the Supreme Court, has the qualitative aspect of much conciliar theory. Or, even the Pope as representative of the Church, or the Cardinals or Patriarchs, or the Council, may be viewed as St. Augustine suggested the "figure" of the Church. But the analogy might go further, since the Council descended into disorder, in which no guidance of the Holy Spirit could be claimed. So in modern representation, parliamentary life has receded before the necessity of the virtual or figured representation of the "head of state," or even of the President of the United States.

In medieval study, more than in most, it is easy to say too little or too much. To argue that the spiritual power is superior to the temporal does not argue in any sense that the Church should exercise temporal authority (except perhaps in papal territory and in other quite special circumstances). To argue that the emperor has his power directly from God does not suggest that he is exempt from ecclesiastical censure because of sin. To argue for the spiritual *plenitudo potestatis* does not argue in itself that temporal jurisdiction is a subdivision of the papal curia. The relation of the spiritual and the temporal is at all times a complicated issue, and at no time was it more complicated than in the divergent currents of thought of XV century Canon Law and philosophy. Furthermore, each of these various ideas has a long history; these authors might well have discussed the vote in favor of collegiality in the present Vatican Council as a continuation of some conciliar notions, as well as more ancient arguments about the nature of the power of the Bishop of Rome.

But whatever qualification one may make in the controversies over medieval thought, we have here two able books, both of which represent an enormous amount of study and patience. We are indebted to both Sigmund and Watanabe and to their publishers. Sigmund gives us lessons in philosophy which, no doubt, the contemporary political theorist always needs, and Watanabe gives us historical information condensed from extensive sources. But both authors would say clearly that their studies were not possible without the immense amount of modern scholarship which has been devoted to medieval thought and to Nicholas of Cusa.—Francis G. Wilson, *University of Illinois.*

An Introduction to the Social Sciences. By Maurice Duverger, Translated by Malcolm Anderson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 342. Cloth, $7.50; paper, $2.95.)

M. Duverger's highly compressed description of some leading techniques used in the contemporary social sciences is intended mainly as a textbook.

Sources of Information in the Social Sciences. By Carl M. White and Associates. (Totawa, N. J.: The Bedminster Press, 1964. Pp. x. 498. $10.50.)

Brief reviews of the principal sub-fields of history, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, education, and political science, with a listing of the reviewer's choice of the leading works in each. Heinz Eulau wrote the section on politicial science.

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S. SIDNEY ULMER
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4. University of Cincinnati
5. Hope College
6. Michigan State University
7. Harvard University
8. State University of Iowa
9. University of Wisconsin
10. Stanford University
11. University of Hartford
12. University of Sheffield, England
13. University of Southern California at Los Angeles
14. University of Illinois
15. University of Miami (Florida)
16. United States Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
18. University of Oregon
19. Kansas State University
20. University of Colorado
21. University of Michigan
22. Israel Institute of Applied Social Research
23. Thiel College
24. University of Maryland
25. University of California at Berkeley
26. Yale University
27. University of Florida
28. Columbia University
29. Utah State University
30. Western Reserve University
31. Portland State College
32. University of Massachusetts
33. Pennsylvania State University
34. Los Angeles State College
35. Warsaw University (Poland)
36. University of Oklahoma Medical Center
37. Bell Telephone Laboratory, Murray Hill, New Jersey
38. Indiana University
40. Wesleyan University
41. University of Iowa
42. Howard University
43. Florida State University
44. The RAND Corporation
48. Yeshiva University
51. Southern Methodist University
52. Vanderbilt University
53. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956–1957. By J. W. Anderson. (University, Alabama: Inter-University Case Program, University of Alabama Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 139. $3.95.)

According to the preface, ever since receiving an APSA congressional fellowship in 1956, Mr. Anderson, an editorial writer for the *Washington Post*, has been trying to reconstruct the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Originally commissioned by the Inter-University Case Program to do a biography of that measure, Mr. Anderson decided to do a prenatal history instead. For his researches convinced him that a detailed knowledge of the unsuccessful efforts to pass similar legislation in 1956 was essential to understanding fully the story of the 1957 Act. Hence, this study is devoted to recounting the birth and death of the 1956 Civil Rights Bill (H.R. 627) only.

As the title indicates, Mr. Anderson focuses on the respective roles of President Eisenhower and Attorney General Brownell in this drama. Briefly his thesis is that Brownell was the prime mover in initiating and pressing for the enactment of such legislation. At most Brownell was able to gain the lukewarm support of Ike for two of the less controversial provisions (for a Civil Rights Commission and an additional Assistant Attorney General to head a separate Civil Rights Division) in the omnibus bill that was finally approved by the House but failed to receive consideration by the Senate. And he had to circumvent Ike's explicit opposition to the stringent enforcement sections by "bootlegging" drafts of them to the Hill. Only in the exigencies of the presidential election campaign following the close of the Congress that had killed H.R. 627 did Ike come around to endorsing all the proposals incorporated in that measure.

Avoiding the all too frequent tendency of case studies to divide the opposing sides into "good guys" and "bad guys," Mr. Anderson treats this emotion-laden subject with commendable restraint and objectivity. He provides an excellent capsule explanation of the need for federal civil rights legislation in 1956. His discussion of successive versions of complicated provisions of the 1956 Civil Rights Bill is not too difficult to follow. In addition, this study reaffirms that the origins of legislation are often obscure and the end product is almost invariably conglomerate, that Cabinet officers sometimes differ sharply with Presidents over vital particulars of Administration measures, and that occasionally the President is but a reluctant vehicle for legislation that circumstances require him to support.

Offsetting these substantial virtues are some rather serious defects. The study lacks coherence. Devoted entirely to the 1956 campaign, the last chapter has little discernible relevance to the rest of the story about Eisenhower, Brownell, Congress, and the 1956 Civil Rights Bill. Also, though a practicing journalist, Mr. Anderson apparently made no attempt at reporting in depth. This work appears to be based almost completely on newspaper articles, the *Congressional Record,* books about the Eisenhower era, and other generally available published sources. And Mr. Anderson did not probe into some intriguing aspects of his subject. What were Brownell's motives? How much collusion was there between Brownell and his congressional allies? Had Brownell primed then Representative Keating to request drafts of the proposals he was pushing over presidential opposition? Possibly the answers to many questions of this sort were unobtainable. But it would seem that with his privileged access as a member of the Washington Press Corps, Mr. Anderson could have dug out more of the "inside story" than he did. Finally, there is no set of conclusions presented to draw the moral of the tale. The reader is left at a loss about why and how this study is an indispensable prerequisite for understanding the legislative history of the 1957 Civil Rights Act—its principal justification.—KENNETH KOFMEHL, *Purdue University.*

Prairie Rebel: The Public Life of William Lemke. EDWARD C. BLACKORBY. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 339. $6.50.)

Some months ago the Greater North Dakota Association sought to learn the tourist's "image" of North Dakota. With some chagrin it was eventually revealed that North Dakota had no image. The image was neither negative nor positive. It just wasn't. No such non-image seems to exist for students of American political phenomena, however. North Dakota's Nonpartisan League, its state-owned industries and banking facilities, and its generally chaotic assortments of Insurgents, IVA's, ROC's, Rumpers, Langer and Lemke Leaguers are regularly noted in works on parties and interest groups.

Only now, though, through Professor Blackorby's biography, has the role of William Lemke in North Dakota politics been fully delineated. Blackorby leads us through the formation of the Nonpartisan League by A. C. Townley with Lemke's generous assistance; the historic 1916 session of the North Dakota Legislature in which the still unique pattern of state enterprise was developed, and at which Lemke acted as caucus leader though not an elected member himself; the campaign for election and (also still unique) recall of the League's top three office-holders in 1921. We are also told of the continual struggles, in each of which Lemke was a prime contender, for control both of the NPL and of the Republican party of which the League formed so important a part. Blackorby exposes his reader, as well, to the almost incredible series of errors, blunders, and accidents—in all of which Lemke also participated—that characterized the strategies of both the leaders of the NPL and the various, often colorful, oppositions raised against the League.

Given the nature of his subject, Professor Blackorby does not—nor can he—limit his focus to the sundry intrigues of North Dakota politics. Much effort has also been expended in describing Lemke's role in national politics: his opposition to Wilson, his initial support and eventual repudiation of Franklin Roosevelt, his almost single-handed struggle on behalf of the two Frazier-Lemke bankruptcy acts, and his ill-advised Presidential candidacy for the party of Townsend, Smith and Coughlin.

But, despite several dramatically told tales of Lemke's role in national politics, Blackorby's narrative seems best done when focused on matters at the state level. Students of state politics will value the careful descriptions of legislative actions as well as the author's concern with analysis of a number of primary and general elections. Readers interested in the agrarian politics of the midwest may also appreciate this account. If nothing more, one may come to understand—simply because Blackorby himself uses them—the irrelevance of terms such as "liberal" and "conservative," "isolationist" and "internationalist" when applied to that politics.

Professor Blackorby has, of course, employed all relevant, standard source material. But much of his contribution lies in the extensive use of Lemke's (and others') papers, numerous interviews with persons intimately knowledgeable of Lemke's affairs, and a wealth of unpublished material in the form of theses, dissertations and the like. This contribution is further enhanced by several very welcome personal recollections of the author introduced as important sidelights in the narrative.

This work is not, to be sure, without some fault. One would wish, for example, for somewhat more detailed treatment of the conviction in 1918 by Minnesota courts of Townley for sedition. It may also have been wise to describe more carefully the meaning of a state-owned grain elevator system to North Dakota farmers at the time of the 1916 Legislative session. Finally, however, one must add that this biography suffers least from the malaise affecting so many political biographies: Blackorby is obviously fascinated by his subject, but his fascination interferes not at all with the preparation of a finely balanced portrayal. If anything, Blackorby may at times be too severe with the "Prairie Rebel."—JAMES HERNDON, *University of North Dakota.*

The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It. BY CHARLES L. CLAPP. (Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1963. Pp. 452. $6.00.)

This volume presents the observations of three dozen incumbent Congressmen on the House of Representatives. They occurred at a Brookings Institution Round Table in 1959 at which, over a six month period, groups of nineteen Democrats and seventeen Republicans each met in eight separate sessions. The selected Congressmen were of middling to minimal seniority and "above average in terms of effectiveness and ability." Their observations are generalized from mutual discussion and generously quoted to give point to the reporting. They are supplemented, too, with some information not generally known about Congressional habits and practices.

The discussions appear to have been most concrete and conclusive when such institutions as committees and party leadership were at issue. On individual tactics and informal norms there was, significantly, much disagreement and uncertainty. Participants differed about the persuasiveness of House debate, the influence of personal friends on a colleague's position, the merits of the specialist *versus* the generalist approach to legislative effectiveness, the importance for survival of "case work" and constituency nursing, the frequency with which one need "vote one's district," the value and availability of information from various sources, including the executive branch. Either definitions and perceptions of these issues varied among individuals or individuals differed in their aptitudes and constituencies, or, more probably, both. Perhaps the discussions indicate more variety and freedom of action on these points than Congress and political organization are often conceived as offering; but one cannot be sure how sharply the issues were defined. Members did agree on two requisites to success within the House: willingness to shoulder committee work, and a ready sense of reciprocity.

Probably the most useful sections of the volume are those dealing with the committees and the leadership. The process of selection to committees and its compromises of seniority are described in valuable detail. There are some interesting criticisms of the concentration of committees (and, reportedly, of influence) brought about in 1946, of committee staff limitations and their hindrance to continuing oversight of the executive branch, and of the independence of conference committees.

The uncertainty of discussants about whom to include in "the leadership" and their general agreement on its informal, easygoing methods are enlightening. It appears that more formal party organization and general participation would subject the leadership to more rank and file pressure on some questions and divide the parties (especially the Democrats) on others, and that the leadership operates more through subsequent sanctions than by advance demands or commitments. The top leadership is characterized as "preoccupied with accommodation and consensus" and compromised by "interlocking circles of personal influence" just below the top. The results of this ambiguous and individualistic "system" for public policy are not much discussed; personally, some Members found it frustrating and others found it gratifying. The date of the discussion is worth bearing in mind as an insight on the Eisenhower years from the Congressional side: both the bipartisanship of House leadership and the imperceptibility of White House leadership receive frequent comment: and it seems probable that individualism and ambiguity were especially felt in that period.

The Congressman is a useful book for students and a valuable supplement to case studies and systematic treatises. Scholars will find it a source of hypotheses even if it is inevitably impressionistic on many points. The volume contains more information and insights about the House than can be summarized or suggested briefly; and Charles Clapp has written it fluently and fruitfully.—CHARLES R. GILBERT, *Swarthmore College.*

Southern California Metropolis: A Study in Development of Government for a Metropolitan Area. BY WINSTON W. CROUCH AND BEATRICE DINERMAN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. Pp. xiv, 443. $7.50.)

Los Angeles has a secure place in American folklore for many familiar reasons: climate, smog, film-making, growth, traffic, right-wingers, and so on. Political scientists tend to marvel at its having the most newspapers, cities, city managers, decentralized administration, and intergovernmental agreements in any U. S. metropolitan area. It has also been the most studied by students of political science, thanks largely to the Haynes Foundation and the California Legislature.

Winston Crouch has officiated at much of that research, and he has viewed the rest from close at hand. Now, with help again from Haynes, he and Beatrice Dinerman have drawn all the studies into a single volume. Parts one and two of *Southern California Metropolis* retell the history in plentiful detail that will primarily interest Southern Californians. As the outsider loses his way along L.A. streets and freeways, here also he threads at his own peril among the specifics of laws and functions, incorporations and annexations, cities, suburbs, and county. But a big city necessarily has a big story.

What is new for Los Angeles is that the authors have recast its story in terms of "the process by which organized groups have sought to identify public issues and reach decisions on them." (p. v). They concentrate upon the contestants for power and their strategies for attaining and using influence or power over local government services. Process analysis provides many insights that older means of metropolitan analysis by reciting organizational facts and figures do not provide. Parts of the L.A. story have been told thus before as in Vincent Ostrom's *Water and Politics.*

Crouch and Dinerman have the same trouble encountered by other writers who have used this method; when they personify groups—cities, county, special districts, citizen associations—as antagonists in the local arena. The authors at no time suggest that the many groups are equal in size or that their members are uniformly and accurately represented by their leaders. The figure of speech, however, conceals the wide shadings of opinion that may exist within a group. And the leading personalities who can make all the difference in a situation must now and again be submerged in the telling. Occasionally a forceful opinion leader emerges, as does Chief Engineer William Mulholland of the City Water Bureau in the water supply debate of the twenties. Were there really so few strong leaders? The problem may be implicit in the method of analysis, but I think not.

The authors explain this by insisting that few strong and capable individuals are precipitated by L.A. politics:

> Los Angeles, a relatively young metropolitan area, does not have among its leadership groups individuals whose interests are in a sense detached from interest-group advantage. Some great urban centers . . . have a cadre of senior statesmen. . . . Some have "graduated" from the partisan battles or struggles of industry and have considerable wealth as well as personal prestige. Others are members of old families with inherited wealth who possess marked ability in their own right. To say that Los Angeles does not possess either type of potential leader is not to state a value judgment that such leadership is indispensable or that it is to be hoped for in future. One must simply observe that no such types exist here. . . . (p. 393).

There do not seem to be many of other types either.

The writers of *Southern California Metropolis* do not see fit to accord business interests much attention in their picture of recent public debate in Los Angeles. They depict the railroads, gas, electricity, and transit companies as involved in the struggles of earlier years in a major way. One does not, however, get a sense of any large-scale involvement of the private sector in the debate on public issues today. And with political parties sidelined on local problems by non-partisanism, things sound pretty quiet out there in Southern California.

A major advantage of this style of story-telling is that it enables the writers to deemphasize their own values somewhat more than do traditional modes of analysis. "There are no heroes; there are no villians" (*sic*), Crouch and Dinerman announce in beginning (p.v.). They succeed in recounting the story with a minimum of indignation. This is a welcome relief from the alarm-bell school of metropolitan writing.

Late in Part Three, after a review of the ongoing administrative decentralization in the county the authors begin to look for generalizations. They find proof in L.A. that big governments can be close to the citizen and responsive. The other side of administrative decentralization, however, is that it seriously deters comprehensive reorganization or perhaps creation of a metropolitan government. Decentralization "bolsters the existing sense of localism and meets the existing demands" (p. 359). The authors refrain from judgment on this finding.

"Need" for integrating governments is always a normative construct. Crouch and Dinerman are as neutral in story-telling as they can be. Only now and again do they tease the subject-matter, and then most mildly, to make a point. Thus it seemed to one reader.

Non-Angeleños will want to concentrate on the last two chapters of *Southern California Metropolis*. There the framework and the prospects for change are discussed. Big change, the authors say very convincingly, will come about in Los Angeles as in other metropolitan areas only with establishment of the pre-conditions for change:

> Any strategic move for greater governmental integration would have to be waged on *three* fronts. On the philosophical front, those favoring substantive alterations in the status quo would be required to present a case strong enough to counter-balance a long-standing, tenacious fear of big government. On the legal front, legislation would be needed to implement the modifications and give them the blessings of legitimacy. On the political front, an active drive would have to be made to secure the

> necessary official and popular backing for any proposed changes. This would require skillful leadership, careful determination of goals, and effective engineering of opinions to gain consent. (pp. 363–4).

The authors then switch from a war metaphor to a betting metaphor and find that the odds are heavily weighted against change. The latest, best hope, they hold, is for a ground swell of "countervailing discontentment" to arise under strong leadership. Neither the discontent nor the leadership are visible to Crouch and Dinerman. They all but ask, under present conditions who would want to lead?

This is a good book. The need now is for someone like Winston Crouch to take the Los Angeles metropolitan experience and compare it in process terms with other large urban complexes. That would help push the whole subject of metropolitan politics and administration ahead of where it now stands.—GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD, *Syracuse University.*

The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801–1809. BY NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR. (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 318. $7.50.)

Noble E. Cunningham has now contributed two volumes on the early organization of the Jeffersonian Republicans. He has thus added greatly to our knowledge of the beginnings of party organization on the national scale in a new country. There is now a growing body of literature in this field to which W. N. Chambers, Seymour Lipset, and Peter Charles, along with myself, have also contributed. There is thus beginning to emerge a considerable body of literature on how the national organization of parties evolved. As is well known, despite the fact that all of the authors of *The Federalist Papers* did not anticipate national political parties, nor was such a system of parties anticipated by the makers of our Federal Constitution, nor even by the first three presidents; yet all of these presidents, as well as the authors of *Federalist Papers*, contributed to the formation of such national parties. It may well be that some of the principles, both as to organization and policy of early political parties have broader application than just in the pattern of American culture.

In his first volume, which covers the period from 1789 to 1801, Cunningham has told us the story of the first opposition party, namely, the Jeffersonians during this period. Based on this first volume and the second one, which is under review, certain generalizations appear.

(1) As has already been indicated, the role of national parties was not anticipated by the Founding Fathers.

(2) National party organization was stimulated by the top national party leadership. These national leaders found need for party support to accomplish both their executive and their legislative programs.

(3) The first nominating process, as is already known, was through the legislative caucus. Separate caucuses functioned at both the state and the federal levels.

(4) Local party organizations began in the Middle Atlantic States, and in those states where politics was most highly competitive.

(5) In order to deliver the vote, it became necessary to broaden the party machinery to include popular participation. Within a few elections this changed the role of the leadership. Initially the leadership imposed almost all decisions from the top. This changed to an interaction process whereby rank and file voters begin to influence the party process of decision making.

(6) At the close of this period in 1808, the state caucus was beginning to yield to the caucus-convention in Pennsylvania in 1808 and the outright convention in Rhode Island by the same year. On the other hand, the national caucus remains unchanged. This reflected the growing process of democratization.

(7) During this time it becomes accepted that a person could campaign for office. This process and developing campaign methods are extensively reviewed in the two books.

In conclusion, scholars are presented with much data which show the actual broadening of the process of popular participation in political decision making and candidate choice. Cunningham has presented a richness of detail from original sources which adds greatly to our knowledge as to this process.—MANNING J. DAUER, *University of Florida.*

Nelson Rockefeller—A Political Biography. BY JAMES DESMOND. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. Pp. xv, 330. $5.00.)

Early in the 1930's, following Nelson Rockefeller's graduation from Dartmouth, story has it that a prominent colleague of ours was approached by a representative of the Rockefeller interests who proposed giving said political scientist a lifetime contract to act as young Rockefeller's political mentor.

A short time ago a prominent Republican state legislator in New York who has a vital interest in social legislation exploded with anger while discussing his Republican colleague and state executive. The legislator had worked hard for Rockefeller's election in 1958 and had looked forward to the new Republican governor's leadership and support for bills long blocked by conservative legislative leadership. Instead he insisted, "All

Rockefeller did was satisfy himself as to who held the reins and then work out an entente with them."

The first of these anecdotes may be apochryphal. The second is a fairly accurate quote. Both say a good deal about the political career of Nelson Rockefeller, much of which is not stated in this campaign biography—a typical representative of the species—no better nor worse than most—more valuable, in fact, for what it does not say.

Author Desmond, a *New York Daily News* reporter, has done some fine political reporting, but not in this book. His expressed intention was to let the chips fall where they should, but his first exposure to Nelson Rockefeller apparently so overwhelmed him that despite the author's thanks to the Governor for "the long hours he managed to spare for interviews" one finds little new information, limited insight, and too much rah rah for good old Rocky.

If the organization and the content of this volume say anything, it is that Rockefeller has never hesitated to use name and fortune to achieve access to powerful individuals of both parties and that from the moment he began to run for public office, the stopping-off place might have been Albany but the destination was clearly the White House.

We are reminded by Desmond of Nelson Rockefeller's career in public service—his stints as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs; as consultant at the framing of the United Nations Charter; and his administrative roles in Health, Education and Welfare and in the Defense Department. Each of these roles is discussed, however, as if Rockefeller's activities involved decisions that shook the very foundation of the Republic.

The most threadbare part of this biography, perhaps for good reason, deals with Rockefeller's role as Governor. There is little comment, for example, relative to the Governor's close working relationship with State Senate Majority Leader Walter Mahoney or Lieutenant Governor Malcolm Wilson whose views on most issues approach the Goldwater position. Nor does the reader find much written of the lost opportunity to revive the pitifully ineffective Republican organizations of New York City. Nor are we told why Nelson Rockefeller with so many ties to the great metropolis of New York City has not given active and constructive leadership to the solution of the desperate problems of his state's metropolitan areas.

This review is written just prior to the California primary, in which Sam Lubell among others found so many of those interviewed dissatisfied with the choice between Rockefeller and Goldwater. The same was true both in New Hampshire and Oregon. Why do so many people dislike or distrust this big, handsome, outgoing political figure whom many politicians thought would be another F.D.R.? Desmond provides not even the beginning of an answer to this question.—Ralph A. Straetz, *New York University*.

The Democratic South. By Dewey W. Grantham, Jr. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 109. $2.50.)

The Democratic South is the publication of a series of three lectures given by Professor Grantham who is professor of history at Vanderbilt University, for the Lamar Memorial Lectures delivered at Mercer University in 1962. Because the term "Democratic" in the title refers to the dominant party of the South, the publication is of interest to political scientists, especially those concerned with Southern politics and with the processes of party politics.

The contents seem to represent the text of the lectures without any additions and is in four parts: The Democratic Basis of Southern Politics, The Forging of the Solid South, The One Party South in Mid-Passage, and Tradition and New Departure. As the section titles indicate the lectures are bound together by an interest in the nature of party politics in the South. While other political phenomena are mentioned—for example the role of Southern political leadership and the function of tradition—these always refer to interacting influences with the Southern party structure.

Key's monumental *Southern Politics*, understandably, dominates scholarly thinking about all phases of politics in the South—so much so that we tend to forget, as Grantham makes clear, that, important and suggestive as Key's work is, the structure and processes of Southern politics have hardly been systematically described as yet, much less adequately analyzed. Like Key, Grantham, paints a broad canvas in looking at Southern politics and his work is especially useful for pulling together older and more recent work and assessing their theoretical relevance for Southern politics. A dominant theme in the work is that Southern politics is much like other politics in the United States, that one-party politics has obscured the underlying structure of political and social conflict and the rich colors and tones of diversity. Important as the politics of racism has been, there have always been other themes, other conflicts, sometimes bursting into open political warfare, often smouldering beneath the surface of the political structure. The way in which a dominant sectional issue, in this case racism, somehow assumes a salience in public opinion which effectively suppresses other forms of interest, is a process that is not yet clearly understood.

The section on The Forging of the Solid South summarizes the historical evidence on the process by which the South disfranchised the Negro, suppressed the Republican party and forged a Democratic political culture founded principally on the issues of states rights and white supremacy. Grantham's citation of the evidence makes clear that the Democratic South did not follow automatically with rigorous logic from the outcome of the Civil War and the nature of the South, but resulted from a convergence of forces acting upon Southern problems at that time. The main outlines are well known: the defection of the Whigs to the Democratic party, the failure of the Populists and Fusionist efforts to erect a liberal opposition and the scared sacrifice of Negro voting to prevent a viable political opposition. Finally, the result was to transform potentially liberal political movements into puzzling mixtures of progressivism and racism and turn possible progressive Southern statesmen into racial demagogues who were liberal on other socio-economic issues.

Both the virtues and the limitations of the lecture series are to be found in this work. While encompassing a broad familiarity with both the historical and the political science literature of Southern politics, the text is delightfully written and undoubtedly has broad audience appeal. Yet, where the reader wishes for more systematic description the point is more often clinched with a pungent anecdote; where more protracted analysis seems in order, a generalization serves to conclude.—Kenneth N. Vines, *Tulane University*.

Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers. By Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal. (New York: Atherton Press, 1963. Pp. ix, 281. $6.95.)

This case study of the creation and development of an unusual Congressional committee—the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—is an outstanding addition to the literature on Congressional institutions and behavior. The story, carefully developed with persuasive documentation and analytical skill, amply supports the authors' conclusion: "The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is, in terms of its sustained influence in Congress, its impact and influence on the Executive, and its accomplishments, probably the most powerful Congressional committee in the history of the nation."

The Committee began its career in 1947 with impressive resources and has steadily added to them, with only occasional and minor interruptions to its growth in power. Caution and restraint, the authors find, marked the first stage, 1947–49; active partnership, the second, 1950–53; committee predominance, the third, 1953–58; consolidation of committee influence the fourth, 1959–. Among its initial assets were the isolation of the Atomic Energy Commission (a multi-membered body) from the President and the statutory base of the committee itself (unlike other committees it does not rest upon the rules of the two houses). To these the committee has managed to add high cohesion and stability in its own membership, to build up and maintain an able staff, and to convince the Congress (including other committees) to delegate most atomic matters to its care. With these resources fully in hand the Joint Committee began early to penetrate the Executive, making itself almost literally a part of the Executive branch. It breached the walls of Executive privilege, so that no secrets the committee wanted to know could be withheld from it; it sponsored its own "projects" and persuaded the AEC to "go along"; and on a wide front it preempted Executive prerogatives in policy initiative and formulation. Nor were the committee's powers to veto executive proposals neglected. Within less than a decade of its birth, the JCAE had absorbed into its own jurisdiction so much of the traditional executive powers that the lines between the two branches had ceased to have much more than symbolic meaning.

The penetration of the executive by the JCAE had a parallel in Congress itself. The committee steadily absorbed the conventional legislative powers too, using its statutory base as a committee to enhance its delegated powers in both legislation and financial authorizations. "The delegation of Congressional power to the JCAE is of a somewhat distinctive quality," the authors observe, and proceed to enumerate the ways in which the JCAE has minimized Congressional scrutiny of its activities and proposals so that the JCAE "has been functionally independent, although it is structurally an integral part of Congress . . . [it is] a legislative-administrative hybrid, whose operation has taken away from the Executive far more than it has given Congress."

The authors of this admirable study remain prudently close to their data in their conclusions and generalizations. Readers of their work may perhaps raise some more general questions: Is the JCAE the archetypal model of the Congressional "oversight" of the Executive which was sought by some in the Reorganization Act of 1946? Or does the story of the JCAE suggest that such "oversight" is purchased at as much cost to the Congress as to the President?—Wallace S. Sayre, *Columbia University*.

Congressional Districting: The Issue of Equal Representation. By Andrew Hacker. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963. Pp. xi, 132, $3.50.)

Hacker's book is billed as a "problem paper" written for The Brookings Institution to identify issues likely to arise in reapportionment of Congressional districts in the next decade or two. The focus is on "the overriding issue of equal votes for equal citizens" which depends upon nearly equal district populations.

Two chapters briefly sketch the historical development of reapportionment and the shifting rolé of the judiciary in these matters. Hacker sees reapportionment as "basically a civil rights question" and draws an analogy between Negroes who are forcibly denied the suffrage and underrepresented urban voters whose districts are larger than those of overrepresented rural voters. Thus he can limit his discussion of representation to apportionment of legislative seats, avoiding complicated issues of intervening variables in the policy process. If you are not for "one man, one vote," you are against civil rights.

A chapter on political cartography examines three methods of gerrymandering: creating "excess" votes, increasing "wasted" votes, and increasing "effective" votes. Since all professional politicians are guilty of ripping the opposition by district manipulations, it would be utopian to expect fair play from legislatures in redistricting decisions. Equal population districts are thus viewed as a general protection against the most excessive abuses of the gerrymander.

The next chapter attempts to relate party competition, electoral competition, party support, standard of living, and population composition to the equitability of representation as measured by deviation from the population mean. Those most grievously underrepresented include suburban districts and economically wealthy districts. The correlation is less certain on party competition ("safe" and "fighting" districts fare about the same), electoral competition, and party support (Democratic districts fare slightly better than Republican districts). This is probably the weakest chapter of the book. Analyses are based in some cases on one election, a single index of standard of living, or different Census reports, and no time depth is provided. No tests of significance or strength of correlation are offered.

Hacker examines consequences for policy of the present system and bases his analysis on four roll-call votes of the 87th Congress. Without claiming validity or adequacy for his sample, he warns that liberals may have little to gain from equal districting, and that in general the policy results of redistricting would be exceedingly difficult to predict. But he disclaims cruciality of policy consequences when he states that "how they (Americans) will want to use their power, what kind of Congressmen they will elect, what will be the ultimate legislative outcome—these are important questions, but they should not affect the overriding issue of equal votes for equal citizens."

In his concluding chapter, Hacker predicts that by 1972 nearly ⅔ of the Congressmen will come from districts outside an equitable variation from the population norm unless extensive reapportionment is accomplished. The coming battle will be between rural and suburban minorities with the residual majority as referee. Hacker has no confidence that Congress will be much help because of self-interest, antipathy toward the Supreme Court, and respect for the states. Neither can state legislatures be trusted to do the job, for they are without a sense of "fair play," are themselves unrepresentative, and are subject to the influence of state politics.

Of course this leaves the courts, whose entry into the reapportionment business Hacker applauds. Courts are now drawing up apportionment plans or delegating this responsibility to experts. Legislative apportionment has departed from the elegant debate of political theory seminars and law journals. Judges, lawyers, and legislators are turning to the literature of political science for answers to, or at least systematic statements of, the issues of legislative representation. Have we produced anything useful for the policy-maker as he looks for solutions? A careful reading of the footnotes in *Baker* v. *Carr* is not reassuring.

The quality and quantity of literature in this area varies. We have abundant homilies on equal representation which proceed from a few assumptions in democratic theory (largely from the populist tradition) to prescriptions for legislative arrangements, with few side trips into more sophisticated questions of legislative behavior or the nature of policy-making. We also have prodigious documentation of the lack of equal numerical representation, consisting of listings of frequencies, intensities, and geography of malapportionment measured in population terms. Analyses of the impact of reapportionment schemes upon policy-making have been adventitious at best and do not represent a very high quality of research in the area of legislative behavior.

Some of the most hopeful research in recent years has centered upon legislative bodies, state and national, and upon what can be called generically the "policy-making process." Unfortunately, this research has not been carefully built into the concerns of those who affirm the value of equal numerical representation and document its violations. As a consequence we have no ready answers to such questions as: "What other variables than district size are important in obtaining 'equal representation'?"; "Are there other ways to approach equal representation than the 'one man, one vote' formula?"; "What are the probable consequences of changing institutional patterns to conform with notions of numerical equality?"; "What impact does adjustment in one phase of policy-making, the legislature, have upon power relationships in the policy process viewed as a whole?". The slogan "one man, one vote" does not do justice to sophisticated problems of representation, unless we believe that the most important problem in the politics of democracy is to divide all folk into equal piles and to assign one legislative seat to each pile.

Hacker provides us with an appeal for equal numerical representation and documentation that this ideal is currently violated. He does not move us ahead on the other questions.—DAVID R. DERGE, *Indiana University.*

The Supreme Court on Trial. BY CHARLES S. HYNEMAN. (New York: Atherton Press. 1963. pp. xii, 308. $6.50.)

So that law may grow, wrote Cardozo, "the judge stretches a point here in response to a moral urge, or makes a new application of a precedent there. Before long a new tradition has arisen. Duties that had been conceived of as moral only, without other human sanction than the opinion of society, are found to be such that they may effectively and wisely be subjected to another form of sanction, the power of society. The moral norm and the jural have been brought together, and are one." But when judges reflect the moral urges of one portion of society at the expense of another, the growth of law is often painful: for a time, the political legitimacy of certain rules is uncertain; the moral and jural norms only partially coincide; and the judiciary itself, according to Charles S. Hyneman, goes on trial.

The Supreme Court on Trial is the work of mature scholarship. According to Professor Hyneman, the Supreme Court is presently on trial primarily because of its decisions in the *Segregation Cases* in 1954 and 1955. In those cases, he believes, the Court went far beyond stretching a point or making new application of precedent. He says the Court, in effect, established "a new constitutional regime," the precise bounds of which are yet unknown. And the consequences of the new regime are defiance in the South, rebukes by the Conference of State Chief Justices, and attacks in Congress. Yet the Court still sits much as before, proclaiming that its decisions are "the supreme law of the land, and Article VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' " (*Cooper* v. *Aaron,* 358 U. S. at 18.) This pronouncement, says Professor Hyneman, marks a high peak of judicial power in that the Court is asserting that it is above all other officials and branches of government in the exposition of the Constitution.

The doctrine of judicial review is, of course, at the heart of the problem, and Professor Hyneman explores its origins, legitimation, and challenges. He then reviews its exercise under various clauses in the Document—General Welfare, Commerce, Due Process, Necessary and Proper, Reserved Powers—and suggests that the Court's exercise of power in the *Segregation Cases* went far beyond the bounds of the traditional understanding of judicial review. Never before in the history of the nation, he says, has a Supreme Court decision—not even *Dred Scott*—required the re-ordering of our social and political institutions. Never before has a Supreme Court decision required such radical changes in behavior and attitude on a large part of our society. And this may be just the beginning, for Professor Hyneman says there is no evidence that "forces a conclusion that the Supreme Court judges will refuse to make further extensions of the new constitutional regime . . . " (p. 201).

If I correctly understand Professor Hyneman's thesis, it is that the Supreme Court has improperly exercised power in cases like *Brown* v. *Board of Education.* The main arguments in support of the thesis are: (1) that the exercise of such power is undemocratic and (2) that the Supreme Court attempted something the judiciary is incapable of accomplishing.

The first argument turns upon one's conception of democracy. "The democratic character of a political system," says Professor Hyneman, "is measured by three tests: (a) How much of the population shares (b) in how much of the crucial decision-making (c) with how much impact?" (p. 237). In other words, political action is democratic if it is responsive to the wishes of the people. To be sure, that is an element in most conceptions of democracy, but many persons would go further and add that the democratic character of a political system is also measured by the extent to which it maximizes the values of freedom and equality. I, for one, would have difficulty in characterizing a society as democratic if ninety-eight per cent of its population were crucially involved in a decision to deprive the remaining two per cent of free speech, equal voting rights, or an equal opportunity to public education. That is not to say my conception of democracy is better than Professor Hyneman's, but it is to say that reasonable men can differ on this matter; and depending upon their conceptions of democracy, the Supreme Court's decisions in cases like *Brown* v. *Board of Education* can be regarded as democratic or undemocratic.

The second argument is that the Supreme Court in "the new constitutional regime" is not only misperceiving its role but also its effectiveness. The Justices are acting like clergymen, says Professor Hyneman, in attempting to persuade the population to live up to its ideals (or perhaps only the Justices' ideals) of freedom and equality. "The judicial office," he asserts, "was constructed for the coercive act, not for argument, pleading, exhortation. The traffic of judges in ethical standards must be confined to standards that can be made effective in conduct by orders for compliance." (p. 274). If the *Segregation Cases* were but a gesture unconnected to significant behavioral changes in society, this argument might be persuasive, but such is not the case. True, the Supreme Court went on trial beginning in 1954, but some school integration has occurred since that time, even in the deep South. And public opinion surveys indicate that, at least in the North, attitudes in regard to this problem are shifting toward the Court's position. Further, it is not unreasonable to assume that there is some connection between the recent federal civil rights legislation and the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of racial segregation. Thus, it seems that the Court has had some success in moral persuasion.

Whether or not the exercise of power by the Supreme Court in recent years was improper is a moot question. Nevertheless, few would dispute Professor Hyneman's observation that the Court is on trial because of its militant stand on the issue of equality for the Negro in our society. The Court has moved further in this area than certain segments of the society were willing to go; and thus the growth of law has been painful and uneven. But there has been some growth; the jural and moral norms appear to be moving slowly toward each other. Yet it will be some time before they coincide, and the final societal cost of such growth is apt to be high. For that reason, among others, the arguments in Professor Hyneman's provocative book deserve serious consideration.—DAVID J. DANELSKI, *Yale University.*

The Republican Dilemma: Conservatism or Progressivism. BY CONRAD JOYNER (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 101. $4.50.)

This is a modest volume which describes the predicament with which the Republican Party has been confronted since it was forced into a minority position in national politics by the success of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Professor Joyner, who spent a year on the staff of Oregon's relatively liberal Republican Governor Mark Hatfield, now serves on the faculty of the state university in Senator Barry Goldwater's Arizona. Though he refrains from painting the picture in exactly this way, the author is in effect saying that the Republicans have spent the past quarter of a century torn between the approach represented by his former boss in the governor's office and that advocated by the political leader of his present home state. His conclusion is that both the progressive and the conservative wings of the party now possess an effective veto over candidates for the presidential nomination. The party's best hope, he believes, is for it to unite behind a "personality" who is acceptable to both wings and who has enough personal appeal to attract substantial support from beyond the limits of the party's regular supporters.

The book is presented as an analysis of the current political scene. The dust jacket, for instance, features a cartoon of Goldwater, Nixon and Rockefeller. Professor Joyner believes, however, that the pattern of the present Republican dilemma was established in 1940 when the Party nominated Wendell Willkie, who had been a Democrat only two years before, rather than a more orthodox candidate. This concern for the importance of the Willkie nomination leads to a rather surprising organization of the book, with five of the seven chapters being devoted to the 1940 campaign. The two Dewey campaigns, Eisenhower's two terms and the Nixon-Kennedy contest are covered in a single chapter, "The Decades of Accommodation: 1940–1960." In the final chapter the author presents his analysis of the party's present situation and prospects.

The book is written in a thoroughly readable style. If its price were lower, it might well sell in substantial volume to the general public. In terms of academic political science, however, it suffers from a lack of rigor. The fact that there are no footnotes whatever illustrates concisely that this is intended to be something other than a work of precise scholarship.

There is no systematic analysis of the relationship between recent findings as to factors which shape voter choice and the relative validity of the various proposals for Republican action. There is no explicit outline of the Republican dilemma as a struggle between what James M. Burns, for instance, presents as the congressional party and the presidential party. There is no trace of the systematic analysis of the effect on political conduct of varied tactical situations, such as we have in William Riker's studies of political coalitions. The story is not told in terms of an attempt to rescue the Republicans from the "party of nostalgia" characteristic which Samuel Lubell sees as the key to most party defeats in America. In the study of the Willkie campaign, there is no reference to the findings of the Sandusky study which Paul Lazarsfeld was conducting while the campaign progressed or to Donald Johnson's excellent study of Willkie's relations with other party leaders. Finally, there are no comparisons of the Republicans' dilemma with present or past dilemmas of other parties here or abroad.

There is no question but that this study of the efforts of our minority party to chart a path which will let it compete on at least even terms with its opposition deals with a major facet of the American scene. We can hope that Professor Joyner or some other member of the profession will follow this volume, which is successful in its own terms, with a more rigorous and far-reaching study.—PHILIP S. WILDER, JR., *Wabash College.*

The Image of the Federal Service and *Source Book of a Study of Occupational Values and the Image of the Federal Service.* BY FRANKLIN P. KILPATRICK, MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., AND M. KENT JENNINGS. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964. *The Image,* pp. xvii, 301, $5.00. *Source Book,* pp. xxv, 681, $10.00.)

The Image of the Federal Service and its companion *Source Book* are useful additions to the personnel administration literature and to the public administration literature generally. These books, and especially *The Image,* will be of interest to anyone concerned with the American bureaucracy. On another level the books will be of interest to students of occupational values and the sociology of work.

Kilpatrick (a social psychologist), Cummings, and Jennings (political scientists), started with two propositions: 1) that the United States could no longer afford to be without the "highest capacities for innovation, leadership, judgment, and management in all parts and at all levels of the administrative establishment; and 2) that at present "almost all federal personnel areas which require a high order of training and talent are facing supply problems ranging from difficult to dangerously acute." The main purpose of the research was to provide information that could be used to modify present personnel policy in order to alleviate the problems.

In fulfilling their purpose the authors investigated the occupational values of the general public, of federal employees, and several subgroups of these populations. Over 5000 standardized interviews were carried out both in the federal service and among the general public. The findings were voluminous and some were of considerable importance. There is no point in here summarizing findings, but one or two should be mentioned if only because they merit wide circulation.

In their study of occupational values the authors found that the lower the education of a respondent the simpler were his occupational concerns and the greater was his emphasis on physical, material, and immediate values. On the other hand, the higher the education of a respondent the more complex were his occupational concerns and the greater was his emphasis on abstract and long term values. The higher the education of a respondent the more likely he was to mention association with stimulating people, opportunity for self development, and challenge in describing an "ideal" occupation. The authors further found, and this was the crucial point, that "among people outside the federal government, the image of what the government has to offer most closely parallels the occupational values of those at the lower, rather than the higher, levels of attainment." It was seen, for example, as providing security, not opportunity for personal growth. The image of the service thus does not attract those who are most needed and for whom competition will be greatest.

In order to change this situation the authors argue for differential treatment of personnel. They recommend that to the extent possible the government tailor conditions of service to the needs and values of personnel at various levels and with various backgrounds. The civil service cannot, they argue, continue to treat all employees equally if it is to attract the people it most needs and who are the hardest to get.

This is not the only recommendation in the book. The authors recommend also a strong, well-planned information and education program and improvement in recruitment procedures. The last chapter makes several other recommendations and it is not a coincidence that the last is the weakest chapter. The authors emphasize that their recommendations are not dictated by the research and that a number of considerations other than the research were involved. A result is that many of the recommendations could have been made without benefit of the research findings. The authors do point out that many of the recommendations are not new, but they do not explain satisfactorily their connection with the research or why they were included in the book. One wonders if the book would not have been as informative and valuable without many of the recommendations. The research-recommendations nexus presents thorny problems. *The Image* illustrates but does not solve them.

If *The Image* has one weak chapter it has ten good ones. It is a good example of the kind of research that is too often lacking in personnel and public administration. The data it reports deserve careful consideration. But will they get it? A policy problem started the research but will the research findings be fed back to the problem? The utilization of research might well be another Brookings study.

In addition to presenting findings (supported by a useful number of tables) *The Image* discusses briefly the methodology of the research and includes in an appendix the questionnaire that was used. Methodologists may be interested in the brief discussion of self-anchoring scaling. The *Source Book* is essentially a reference work. It discusses in minute detail the methodology and findings of *The Image* and contains numerous tables.—JAMES W. DAVIS, JR., *University of Wisconsin.*

Apportionment and Representative Institutions. The Michigan Experience. BY KARL A. LAMB, WILLIAM J. PIERCE, AND JOHN P. WHITE. (Washington, D. C.: The Institute for Social Science Research, 1963. Pp. xvii, 408. $6.50.)

Re-apportionment experience since *Baker* v. *Carr* has been interesting not only for itself, but also because it has emphasized the shallowness of the public discussion that preceded the decision. Most of the participants in those discussions limited themselves to repeating slogans either for or against re-apportionment. Even some jurists and political scientists seemed so caught up in the urge for reform that they brought very little illumination to the discussions. Malcolm Jewell and those who joined him were among the welcome exceptions.

Predictions made in hope or fear prior to the Baker case have largely failed to materialize. Legislatures have not changed greatly. The liberal urban voter is not in full command. Core cities as well as rural areas have lost votes in some legislatures. They will lose more in the congressional redistricting. Suburbanities have been the most frequent gainers. In spite of earlier denunciations of the decision, Republican conservatives have turned to the courts when they felt they might improve their legislative strength.

Nothing in the writing of scholars prior to the decision prepared the public for the potential horror of an at-large election on the scale of the one coming up in Illinois. No analysis told the public or the courts that at-large elections ordered in a modified one-party state would simply reward the culprits responsible for the inequities.

In view of the general shortcomings of much of the earlier work, the detailed case study of re-apportionment in Michigan is particularly welcome. Prior to telling the Michigan story, William J. Pierce presents a long and thorough discussion of the legal rulings on reapportionment in the state and federal courts before *Baker* v. *Carr.* He also describes the legal developments after the decision up to the spring of 1963.

Most of the book is devoted to the description of the state Constitutional Convention and to the role of the Committee on Legislative Organization which devoted the greater part of its deliberations to the issue of re-apportionment. Professor James K. Pollock, who wrote the book's foreword, was himself a delegate to the convention and a key figure in the work on apportionment. He was also chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights, Suffrage, and Elections.

Ninety-nine Republicans and 45 Democrats were elected to the Convention. (Governor Swainson later replaced two resigning Republicans with two Democrats.) Republicans held this huge margin largely because only 17 per cent of the voters turned out for the special election. Urban Democratic strongholds elected 10 Republicans. Democratic areas on the Upper Peninsula selected five more Republicans out of a fear of city Democrats who were insisting upon a rigid "one man, one vote" formula.

Within the Committee on Legislative Organization nine members came from rural and Detroit districts that were over-represented in the legislature, while 12 members came from under-represented suburban districts. Once on the committee they generally voted with their party and certainly did not divide on a rural urban basis. The Committee's first report proposed retaining most of the numerical inequities of the 1952 "Balanced Legislature" Amendment. The *Baker* case was decided before any action by the Convention. The Committee then produced a modified recommendation which still gave special consideration to sparsely populated areas under a complicated formula for establishing senatorial districts.

The authors explain and generally defend the action of the Convention. They point out that the new constitution places Michigan fifth among the states under the terms of the Dauer-Kelsay Index. In the case of the lower house they argue that if one takes the state political situation into account that no matter which party controls the house it will represent districts having a majority of the state's population.

Both Pierce and Lamb examine the possible impact of the Court's decision if it is to be applied to local representative assemblies. These discussions may be among the most useful contributions of the book.

The authors have written an excellent, detailed study of re-apportionment in one state. More such studies could help raise the level of discussion in this field at a time when many re-apportionment problems are still to be solved.—HOWARD PENNIMAN, *Georgetown University.*

Forge of Democracy. BY NEIL MACNEIL. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963. Pp. xi, 496. $6.75.)

Neil MacNeil, chief Congressional correspondent for *Time,* is by instinct and experience just the man to produce a first-class book about the U. S. House of Representatives for the general reader and, with *Forge of Democracy,* he has done so.

Forge of Democracy is a history of the House but it is more than a chronological account. It is as well an effort to describe the present operations of the House and its function in contemporary American politics with heavy emphasis on the historical roots of present practices.

Clearly MacNeil loves the House as an institution but his study is far more balanced and extensive than William S. White's deification of the Senate, *The Citadel,* with its narrow focus on the "club" aspects of "the other body."

Because the House is so much larger in size than the Senate, so much more complex and less glamorous, it is less well understood by the American public. Yet, for a number of reasons the House has in the last few years, in MacNeil's words, "become again a decisive arena for the determination of national policy." This is the reason those citizens who want to understand current American politics—and I specifically include Members of Congress curious about the origins of their chamber—will find MacNeil's book so valuable. Indeed, I would make *Forge of Democracy* recommended reading for freshman Congressmen.

Rich in anecdote and particularly strong in its description of individual leaders of the House from John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay to Sam Rayburn and John McCormack, *Forge of Democracy* is interesting reading, at times even exciting.

As a Member of the institution, I have my differences with MacNeil's assessments at certain points. For example, I believe he over-emphasizes the extent to which the House, through its committee system, is able to make informed, rational decisions on matters of public policy, including consideration of the several appropriations measures each year. *Forge* gives the impression that the House specialists in each policy area are a match for the specialists of the Executive Branch and are able thoroughly to evaluate complex goals and means as well as specific programs and budgets. This is a conclusion surely open to question.

MacNeil does a particularly good job of analyzing the evolution of the new lobby in Washington, with its sophisticated techniques for getting at the recalcitrant Congressman, from the old lobby with its use of sometimes blatant social pressures and even bribery. His outline of the development of the investigative function of the House and of the work of investigating committees is also perceptive and I found his discussion of the celebrated struggle for control of the Rules Committee in 1961 an absorbing description of the high drama for which on occasion the House of Representatives is the theater.

As a political scientist reduced (or elevated) to politics, I have after six years in the House concluded that neither Congressman nor academic nor journalist alone can adequately analyze and describe the enormously complicated and fluid institution which is the House of Representatives. It is, however, almost entirely from these three groups that we have any hope of serious and accurate analysis of the House. Probably the most telling criticism that will be made of MacNeil's book by academic experts on Congress is that he has paid too little attention to the important contributions which political scientists have made in the last ten years to an understanding of legislative behavior. I don't want here to fall subject to a charge by the behavioral scientists that I think the only way to understand politics is through some mystical "feel" or intuition divorced from any pragmatic effort to collect and evaluate the hard facts. I am nonetheless compelled to say that intuition and instinct, if they belong to an observer of Neil MacNeil's talents, are still essential to understanding why politicians act the way they do.—John Brademas, *United States House of Representatives.*

Metropolis In Transition. Local Government Adaptation to Changing Urban Needs. By Roscoe C. Martin. (Washington: Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1963. Pp. viii, 159.)

"This study," Martin says in the Preface, "grew out of an invitation by the Housing and Home Finance Agency to explore mutual interests in metropolitan affairs." (p. vi.) A research contract to that end was subsequently signed between the HHFA and the Syracuse University Research Institute, with Martin as the chief investigator. Martin enlisted the services of eight others in the exploration, each of whom agreed to describe a local development in metropolitan affairs with which he was personally familiar, which Martin then amplified with his own research and interviews and wove together into an integrated study. The result is an interesting and encouraging case study report of a nation alert to its urban problems and acting in a variety of ways to meet them. Although no details are given about the nature of the HHFA's Urban Studies and Housing Research Program, hopefully it will sponsor a number of other studies as good as this one in the years to come.

Martin, Professor of Political Science in the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University, is perhaps as well qualified by research and experience to take an overall look at the topic of this study as anyone in the United States. He has never taken the view that there is a single best way for cities to adapt their governments to changing needs, and this book supports his judgment that there is a "wide range of adaptive measures available to governments as needs arise for accommodation in procedures or structures to changing conditions." (p. 12) Although he lists sixteen such measures in Chapter I, as he does also in two recent articles—see "Action in Metropolis," *National Civic Review* 52: 302–7 (June, 1963) and 363–7 (July, 1963)—the cases reported in this study are concerned with only seven of them: the service contract, as utilized in Los Angeles County, California; the conference approach, as developed in the Mid-Willamette Valley in Oregon and in the Washington, D. C. metropolitan area; the use of areawide planning, as brought to bear in the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, and in the Atlanta, Georgia, metropolitan region (in the Atlanta area, attention is focused on planning for rapid transit); the special district method, using the municipality of metropolitan Seattle, Washington, as the example; the development of county responsibility for meeting urban needs, as in the case of the assumption by Monroe County, New York, which includes the Rochester metropolitan area, of responsibility for health services; the creation of a new unit of metropolitan government, as in Nashville, Tennessee; and the development of a regional approach in the Delaware River Basin.

The case studies constitute a valuable source of knowledge to students of government in metropolitan areas, especially as they all have a good deal to say about the decision-making process in a metropolitan environment. Despite the increased attention to metropolitan problems in recent years, such studies as these are still all too few and far between. Until we have a great many more of them, both the total range of adaptive possibilities and the difficulties involved in bringing them into use will not be fully known.

Uniformly interesting and well written as the case studies are, it is the concluding chapter which deserves special comment. Although Martin is too astute to expect final conclusions to result from only nine examples, he does see the nine cases as contributing to a number of tenative hypotheses about the nature of local government adaptation to changing needs. Action has generally been forthcoming, Martin suggests, in response to a particular problem which needs solution, not from the demands of logic or doctrine; in almost every case, the action took some time to bring about and then it was only because there was both good political leadership and a campaign of public education to achieve popular acceptance; and compromise and "fortuitous developments" played an important part in each instance. Martin stresses the fundamental importance of the states in making local adaptation possible. "Though given the form of an hypothesis," Martin declares, "this rule comes as near being absolute as any that may be stated." (p. 133) The section on states and metropolitan areas is as clear a call for action in that quarter as has yet been issued. Finally, Martin recognizes the responsibility of the federal government, which he feels must ultimately be a large one because of the number of federal programs which affect people in metropolitan areas, because of the demands of politics, and because of the superior resources of the federal government.

All in all, packed in the brief compass of this book is as good a summary of what is currently afoot in adjusting local governments to the metropolitan explosion as there is anywhere. The excellent bibliography adds even more to the book's value in this regard. I should think that the book will be a most useful supplement in a good many political science courses as well as a primer for the use of local, state, and federal officials actually engaged in making adjustments to changing urban needs. As good and useful as it is, however, it will by its very nature quickly become dated. So much is happening on the metropolitan front, and it is happening so quickly, that no one can hope to produce a definitive study in the area for a long time to come. Martin would be the first to recognize the truth of this statement, however, and it is to be hoped that he is already at work on the sequel volume or volumes to the present excellent beginning.—RICHARD H. LEACH, *Duke University*.

The Washington Lobbyists. BY LESTER W. MILBRATH. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. Pp. 431.)

A great deal of nonsense has been written about lobbyists in the past but thanks to Mr. Milbrath, a political scientist at Northwestern University, it should be considerably harder to do in the future. This full-length portrait of the Washington lobbyist strips him of most of his glamor but clothes him instead with a respectability he deserves much more.

Mr. Milbrath defines lobbying as the "stimulation and transmission of a communication, by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing his decision." Lobbyists are people who lobby—and that includes in addition to the conventional interest group representatives the officials of government, inside Congress and the executive agencies, who work on their colleagues and on members of the other branch. But just as the exciting prospect grows that Mr. Milbrath means to explain pretty much the whole of the political process he backs away.

For the purpose of *his* study, "Washington lobbyists are persons with Washington addresses who registered in compliance with the Regulation of Lobbying Act during the first two quarters of 1956"!

One must of course be sympathetic; this was a one-man study and had to be made manageable. Nevertheless Mr. Milbrath has had to be content with the self-identification of lobbyists who chose to register under an act notorious for ambiguous definition and lax enforcement. Thirty percent of those registered in the period studied had no Washington address but 614 did; of these 114 were in the sample and 101 were interviewed. Three quarters of them lobbied both Congress and the executive. A schedule rich with open-ended questions was used. Congressmen and their staffs were also consulted. The rigor of the study and the energy of the author, who did all the work himself, are admirable.

After his introductory chapters on lobbying and pressure groups, Mr. Milbrath focuses on the lobbyist as a political actor—who he is, where he comes from, how he is recruited, how he relates to government and his employers, how he affects the strategy of the organization he represents and what tactics he employs with government. To analyze his role in the political system, Mr. Milbrath constructs a model of government as a communications network in which the body politic is linked directly to governmental officials in a power and communications relationship, and indirectly through various auxiliary actors representing pressure groups, political parties, the mass media and opinion groups. The lobbyists "are the auxiliary actors whose role demands most forthrightly that they try to influence the decisions of the officials" but they must compete with numerous other would-be influencers. Finally, an assessment is made of the value of lobbying in the American democratic process.

Lobbyists emerge as decent and necessary men who generally help their friends and leave their enemies alone, spend more time in their own offices than on Capitol Hill, and prefer direct personal communications to any other tactic of influence. Lobbying is remarkably clean; there are few rewards for dirty methods and it is virtually impossible to buy or steal anything really worth having. The services of lobbyists are useful but on the whole they are wasteful and probably could be obtained from alternative sources at a lower net cost to the body politic. Except for one service that is indispensable—the clash of viewpoints. The lobbyists' contribution is the representation of opinion, which is often the highly specialized points of view of groups. Mr. Milbrath surely is right when he says: "If we had no lobby groups and lobbyists we probably would have to invent them to improve the functioning of the system."

Mr. Milbrath has little confidence in legal controls of lobbying; he believes that system controls work better. The best check ultimately is the election of highly qualified officials. "The morality of lobbying is, in the final analysis, dependent on the morality of elected officials." The evidence of this study suggests that the morality of both is remarkably high.

This competent study of lobbying clearly is written for the discipline but it would be pleasant to think it might be read by some citizens who dither about the corruption and intimidation of public officials by those bad lobbyists.—Ralph K. Huitt, *University of Wisconsin.*

Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of Integration Since the Supreme Court's 1954 Decision. By Benjamin Muse. (New York: The Viking Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 308. $5.00.)

Perhaps the best summary that can be made of this book is that the decade of deliberate speed since *Brown* v. *Board of Education* is quite adequately and often admirably discussed, while the question of what the ten years have in fact been prelude to is not even approached, except in the last few pages. Taken on its own terms, though, the book has many virtues; it provides a short, succinct, and accurate summary of events.

Mr. Muse, a former Virginia State Senator and a journalist who has written widely, is now on the staff of the Southern Regional Council. He writes with understanding and good will, where humanly possible. He is forthright in his analyses and retains his knack of finding a slightly unexpected quotation in the archives to illustrate and spice his point. A Southerner, he does not hesitate to indict the state of mind of the Southern politician who can refer to "The People" without including Negro residents of their state, and has no use for the hypocrisy that is involved in university presidents blandly going into court and asserting that there had been no prejudice in total denial of admission of Negroes.

The over-broad focus of the book leads to rather hurried movement of the reader in and out of very complex incidents. As a consequence this is not as readable or as informative a book as his earlier account of Virginia's massive resistance. It does, however, provide a useful compendium of events, names and places, as well as some sense of the time dimension and milieu in which various celebrated events took place—and thus refreshes our memory and restores the contemporaneity of the events.

Most of the narrative is handled in unexceptional style that is sometimes pedestrian. Mr. Muse is not a scholar, though there are few indices of this fact in the volume. His discussion of the briefs of the litigants in the 1954 decision raises several points usually neglected in most writing. He quarrels with those critics who have suggested that had the Court been firmer in its implementing stand that there would have been less difficulty; by implication, he points out that Prince Edward County has hardly been noted for compliance. There are a few pages of quite interesting discussion of what has happened to Negro-White relations in the South, but these are quite impressionistic and fragmentary: nevertheless, they add some dimension to court decisions and newspaper stories.

It is a little surprising, however, to have a discussion of sociologists and psychologists proceed on the assumption that the two are identical. The Emmett Till case is handled in a misleading fashion, and Muse rather overstates what Van Woodward intended to say of the origin of segregation as an institution—as Van Woodward himself indicated in the new preface to the *Strange Career of Jim Crow*. But these loom as small points in a well-balanced book.

The real limitations of the volume lie in the absence of sharp analysis and some indication of a sense of significance beyond a few paragraphs of relatively simple rhetoric. Consistently, Muse suggests that Virginia could have taken the lead in integration had it not been for the actions of a few individuals, notably Senator Byrd. Similarly he seems to attempt to show that all would have been well in Nashville if it had not been for the intervention of Kasper, and in Little Rock if it had not been for the machinations of Faubus.

Beyond this personalism, there seems to be little attempt at explanation of causes. While the last point may well be only the professional complaint of a social scientist, the lack of large-scale concern with the motives and possibilities of the Negro Rights Movement will surely be of concern to any reader. To a surprising extent, the Negro does not appear in this book as an active participant in his own right; he is a passive observer who occasionally goes into court while white opponents or defenders play out their major roles.

In spite of some words about the dangers of violence, Mr. Muse seems almost Pollyannaish as he hails the Negro effort to become "a part of the American people." But as Mr. Muse's own pages remind us, Thurgood Marshall announced after *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, "once and for all, it's decided and completely decided." And while Marshall's comments seem less wide of the mark than Timmerman's statement that not in a thousand years would South Carolina desegregate, it has nonetheless presaged disappointment. Mr. Muse is empathic though impatient with his fellow Southerners. A chapter attempting to understand—not just endorse—the aspirations and the frustrations of the Negro would have been invaluable just because of the source.—SAMUEL KRISLOV, *University of Minnesota*.

American Farm Policy: A Case Study of Centralized Decision-Making. BY DON PAARLBERG. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964. Pp. xiv, 375. $6.95.)

This book was written for those with a nonspecialized acquaintance with U. S. agricultural policies. Certainly it would not be necessary to inform an agricultural economist that butter interests fight against margarine because the latter is made out of the rival farm products, soybean and cottonseed oil (p. 117). It is well designed, I think, for collateral reading in political science or in a course on "Problems of Democracy."

Mr. Paarlberg knows United States agricultural programs well: as an Indiana farmer, as Professor of Agricultural Economics at Purdue, and as a high-level administrator. One of the earliest members of the small group brought into the USDA by Secretary Benson in 1953, and as both White House advisor on agricultural matters and as administrator of the Food-For-Peace program in Eisenhower's second term, he should have been in a position to make a valuable analysis of centralized decision-making—what the book's subtitle would lead one to expect. However, those interested in this will find little on it here. He simply assumes that our major agricultural policy decisions are centralized and goes on to discuss their consequences. I would contend, on the contrary, that both policy and administration are handled by decentralized and almost autonomous subgovernments—many of the policies being worked out by powerful farmer-oriented agricultural committees and subcommittees in Congress and made effective only by farmer referendums, while locally elected farmer committees do much of the administering in the name of the executive branch.

American Farm Policy begins with an exposition of the venerable individualistic agricultural creed, and continues with the impacts of the great depression and of the chemical-biological-mechanical-managerial revolutions that have thrown this "agricultural fundamentalism" on the defensive. After exploring various definitions of the farm problem, Mr. Paarlberg then looks at past political solutions and their checkered histories. The next section contains a concise treatment of economic concepts—marginal utility, price, comparative advantage, etc.—which would make an excellent introduction to the subject for undergraduates hazy about basic economic principles. This leads into evaluations of the various commodity programs, showing why tobacco and sugar programs have worked while other programs have not. This is followed by seriatim treatment of some fifteen programs developed and applied by "centralized" government to increase demand, limit supply, differentiate markets, and provide direct assistance, all with the professed aim of meeting the basic farm problem, *viz.*, to adjust the number of producers, supply, demand and price so as to achieve an adequate level of farm income.

The author marshalls strong arguments against reduce-the-supply approaches which are tied too rigidly to high price supports. In discussing the marginal farmers, he doesn't come out and say that part of an effective program from "adjustment" in agriculture would be to get rid of about half of the farmers; instead, he favors a "positive" approach to promoting adjustment by opening the way to "non-agricultural opportunities" (pp. 65, 67, 143, 351).

There is little quarrel with his pragmatic appraisal of separate programs, but little new is added by reducing the level of analysis to homey analogies and by using undefined label groups such as "relievers, reformers, opportunists and subversives" (p. 19 ff.). His account also is marred, in my judgment, by scanty specific documentation. Although most data come from Department of Agriculture sources, other data are to be taken on faith.

The author has no ready-made panaceas. His main stress is that adjustment in agriculture will have to get away from the surplus-producing one-dimensional approaches to farm policy and start a "downward escalation" of prices, which will be possible only when programs are based on the reality of continued abundance rather than on myth of scarcity.—THOMAS V. GILPATRICK, *Sweet Briar College.*

Presidential Elections. Strategies of American Electoral Politics. BY NELSON W. POLSBY AND AARON B. WILDAVSKY. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. xii, 218. $2.50.)

Every four years the country is flooded with books on presidents, presidential candidates and elections. Most of these books have been written by newspapermen who have been asked to turn out potboilers. The published book has involved little or no research and only a minimum of reading in the rapidly growing literature of political science on these subjects. These quadrennial books have given the public a few facts and a good many anecdotes mixed with some unrecognized personal prejudices. Into this world of often second-rate publications Professors Polsby and Wildavsky have introduced a good serious book for public consumption.

They have directed their book to the "interested citizen" rather than to political scientists. The authors tell their readers that they are presenting them with the distilled and synthesized results of the work of other researchers in the field. They are almost too modest in their claim, since they themselves have published elsewhere some of the materials included in the book. Further, they developed some interesting arguments in various chapters that go beyond discussions normally presented by their colleagues.

The authors begin by painting for their readers a reasonably sophisticated picture of an American society within which presidential elections take place. In the course of this section the authors draw heavily on the findings of the Survey Research Center and other public opinion materials. Within this context they help the reader to see what are some of the problems of strategy that face presidential nominees. For purposes of illustration they usually draw on the 1960 campaign.

Throughout the book the authors do more than merely inundate the readers with facts and anecdotes. Their discussion of the nominating process, the actual campaign, and of the proposals for political reform are all serious efforts to increase the understanding of the citizen of his own institutions. Most of this is written at the level of the undergraduate or the average intelligent citizen.

The most interesting chapter for political scientists may well be the one most difficult for the citizen to follow. It deals with proposed reforms of the party system. The authors analyze the nature of the arguments for and against reforms, they try to take a position outside the struggle to analyze the arguments on both sides. In general they succeed very well in this attempt. Their conclusions will certainly please those who are opposed to change more than the advocates of reform.

They conclude by stating ". . . The case for party reform has certainly not been made. The enunciation of large national problems does not in and of itself demonstrate the linkage of these problems to the party system. The prescription of of reforms does not in and of itself provide the strategy or the power or the inducements to carry them out. Until these key links in the argument are forged, the advocacy of party reform will continue to be an academic exercise, appealing to the frustrations of unsophisticated audiences but without practical effect." In a good final chapter the authors discuss the importance of the present political arrangements for maintaining stability. They explain why extremists have generally had difficulties getting elected.

This book is better, more sophisticated and more intelligently argued than most of the vast numbers of books that have appeared in election years. Perhaps its publication may encourage other political scientists who have or can develop a felicitous style to make a try at the increasing citizen market. Such efforts would also be in the public interest.—HOWARD PENNIMAN, *Georgetown University.*

James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy. BY ARNOLD A. ROGOW. (New York, Macmillan, 1963. Pp. xv, 397. $6.95.)

In his biography of James Forrestal, Arnold A. Rogow asks some important questions about the mental health of high government officials who are responsible for the formulation of defense policy in the United States and for the use of nuclear weapons. Most specifically, he asks whether James Forrestal, who was depressed and suicidal at the time of his tragic death, may not have been ill for some time preceding his resignation in late March, 1949. If he was, then he was not fully capable of exercising his authority and responsibility in the defense establishment with care and discretion. The fact is that we will never know—and, from this viewpoint, Rogow's biography offers no new evidence or insight. But this is one of Rogow's main arguments: that we will never know if high officials should continue in their positions until we accept periodic psychiatric examinations with the same matter-of-factness that we do physical check-ups.

Rogow recognizes the difficulty of such a recommendation. "Psychiatry," as he indicates, is "less a science than other branches of medicine" and thus "more depends on the state of the psychiatrist than on the state of the discipline." But more inhibiting than the inexactitudes of psychiatry are the primitive myths with which most people approach psychiatry. V.I.P.'s, as Rogow points out, can never admit that they need psychiatric assistance, let alone that they are actually under treatment. Every sense of confidence in their ability to continue to make responsible decisions would be destroyed even if they are subject to only minor disorders and the treatment they require is more preventive than curative. With this kind of general ignorance of modern psychiatry and with the spotlight of publicity constantly focused on government officials, they are barred from taking advantage of whatever help might be available to them. Men might then continue in office to their own—and the nation's—peril.

Was this what happened in Forrestal's case? Rogow never really says that it did, but the implication is always there. The intensity of his opposition to American support for Israel, the passion with which he fought for a "tough" policy on the Soviet Union, the agonizing effort he put into trying to bring better organization to the defense establishment—in his account of all these trials, Rogow underscores the strain under which Forrestal operated and emphasizes the single-mindedness with which he responded. But even this cannot *prove* that Forrestal found it increasingly difficult to evaluate complex issues with objectivity and clarity. There are perfectly rational reasons for the stand Forrestal took on most important issues: the West dared not jeopardize access to Arab-controlled oil; the Berlin Blockade (as well as other actions) demonstrated the need to stand up to Soviet pressures; and inter-service rivalries were making it impossible for the military departments to agree on the broad dimensions of defense policy.

Nor is Rogow any more successful in uncovering the seeds of disturbance in Forrestal's personal life—in his alienation from his family, in his compulsion to remain emotionally free (even from his wife and children), and in his rejection of Catholicism. What emerges is a complex personality, but not necessarily a disturbed one. Indeed, here again, Forrestal's compulsive sense of purpose could as well be attributed to the willfulness that is needed to rise to power in business and government in American society, as to the personality marks left by his early development.

Where Rogow has been successful is in penetrating through to a problem many are worried about, but few have dared approach. As a political scientist, he is concerned with the behavioral factors of politics, even though his own psychiatric insights and the psychological information on which he has to draw, are both limited. The best he can do is demonstrate the complexity of Forrestal's personality, the importance of the central problem of the mental health of high officials, and the need for further case studies. And in this he is most successful.—GENE M. LYONS, *Dartmouth College.*

Supreme Court Practice. BY ROBERT L. STERN AND EUGENE GRESSMAN. (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1962. Pp. xxxv, 691, $13.75.)

Herein two experienced counsel tell other practitioners the do's and don'ts, the why's and wherefore's of handling a case in the United States Supreme Court. Political scientists who look in on the advice will learn a lot about the judicial process. The operations of the Supreme Court are not what they used to be and this reference book puts other, earlier guides into eclipse. This 3rd edition of *Supreme Court Practice* replaces the 1950 and 1954 editions.

The authors are entirely modest in declaring the book as "not limited to practice and procedure in the narrow sense." (p. iii). They describe the purpose of the book in this way: "It endeavors to inform the reader as to the principles of jurisdiction which determine whether a case can and should be taken to the Supreme Court, and as to the kinds of petitions of certiorari, Jurisdictional Statements, briefs, and oral arguments which are thought to be favored by the Court. The effort has been to set forth in a single volume all the procedural and jurisdictional steps to be taken in handling a case in the Supreme Court. Problems of substantive law are outside the scope of this work." (p. iii).

Stern and Gressman show the Supreme Court to be a creative governing body with initiative in all kinds of matters. For one, they amplify the well-understood significance of the Judiciary Act of 1925 restricting the Court's obligatory jurisdiction and increasing the scope of its discretionary power of review. Some 150 pages of the book treat the writ of certiorari in instructive detail underscoring the Court's "active and effective role in the realm of public administration." (p. 118). For another, they clarify the less-known discretion of the modern Court in refusing to review 75% of the cases coming by way of appeal and, therefore, presumably within its obligatory jurisdiction. This power of choice was gained by shaping a Rule of the Supreme Court, in four steps in 1928, 1936, 1942 and 1954, requiring counsel on appeal to show, in a preliminary statement, that the questions involved in his case are "substantial." Stern and Gressman conclude that the requirement that substantiality be shown "means that the Jurisdictional Statement now performs a function similar to that of the petition for certiorari." (p. 163). As with other subjects treated, the book includes statistics, reviews history, cites commentaries, quotes the views of the justices and comes forward with its own interpretation. Another available procedure contributing to the image of an active Court, administering its business with initiative, is the utilization of its certiorari jurisdiction *before* rendition of judgment by a court of appeals. This has seen the Court, as in the Nazi saboteurs' case, *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U. S. 1 (1942), passing on a case in less than five days after the judgment of a district court. It is a convenience to have the names of the fifteen or so cases of the past 25 years in which the Supreme Court has exercised this authority. (Pp. 19–20, 151–152). This initiative is justified as making it possible "for extremely important cases, in which the public interest required an immediate authoritative decision, to reach the Supreme Court without delay." (p. 19).

Students of American government will find much of value in *Supreme Court Practice* because the book takes nothing for granted. They will find meticulous sections on the composition, quorum, terms, sessions and dockets. There are even descriptions of the Supreme Court Building, its Library, the functions of the Clerk's Office, Marshal's Office and the Reporter. The basic jurisdiction and procedural framework of the Court are lucidly described. (Pp. 15–17).

Students of public law will appreciate many features of the book. The scholarly apparatus includes a detailed table of contents, the full text of the Rules of the Supreme Court with a special index to the Rules, pertinent provisions of the United States Code, a large subject index, a table of cases and a forthright statement called "What this Book covers and what it doesn't." These devices lead one to explanations of the colorful and the significant in the Supreme Court's work today like the following: the *in forma pauperis* petition, the improvidential grant of certiorari, the Miscellaneous Docket created in 1945, the amicus curiae brief, the Bar of the Supreme Court, the rare granting of petitions for rehearing, the Solicitor General, procedure in original cases before a Master, proceedings before a single Justice in Chambers, and the importance of oral argument. Stern and Gressman have also assembled a list of the 69 libraries in the country which are current depositories of briefs and records filed in the Supreme Court of the United States.—Clement E. Vose, *Wesleyan University*.

Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal. By Bernard Sternsher. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 535. $9.00.)

This is a formidable work. It is too long, too repetitious, too discursive, and too expensive. Yet the more one plods through the several hundred thick pages, the more one respects the author's industry, intellectual scope, and objectivity.

Mr. Sternsher does not gloss over his reliance on Tugwell's own works or his generally favorable attitude toward the achievements of Tugwell as a New Dealer and intellectual. What he considers crucial is the confrontation between a man of disciplined intellectual habits and an administration headed and staffed by flexible and practical men —especially Franklin D. Roosevelt—who needed the services of gifted and imaginative thinkers such as Tugwell and the rest of the Brain Trust. Hence this book becomes useful to anyone who is interested in the relation between political thought and social action, and who would like to see what happened when a man with a well considered but not rigid set of ideas had to deal with congressmen, lawyers, farm spokesmen, conservative editors and columnists—and with such unpredictable colleagues as Harold Ickes and Henry Wallace.

Influenced by Thorstein Veblen and others who abhorred the human and material waste implicit in laissez faire, Tugwell had preached the need for democratic collectivism—for economic and social planning that would bring some order and discipline and efficiency to the economy without overriding local needs and attitudes. Inside the New Deal he had to deal with other officials and brain trusters who followed different theories, (such as atomism, resulting in bursts of trust-busting), with spenders and inflationists, with anti-capitalists who wanted simply to crack down on businessmen. Insisting that the problem was one of systems and institutions and not individuals, Tugwell tried to bring some order to one of the most chaotic sectors of the economy—agriculture.

Tugwell learned many things in the early New Deal: that American government operates by bargaining, pressuring, manipulating, and occasionally retreating, rather than by great coordinated movements forward; that one of the largest economic interests in the nation—the consumers—were one of the least influential in Washington (despite his valiant efforts to help them); that a controversial Undersecretary of Agriculture must take the political rap for his boss in the White House and ultimately is expendible; and that if economics required collectivism, "politics required that collectivism be disguised as competition. . . . "

Tugwell came under heavy fire, mainly for views he did not hold and for official acts he did not commit. He was far less doctrinaire than his critics thought; for example, he ended up something of a Keynesian, though only after he had given up hope of seeing collectivism implemented, the author says. The irresponsible criticism of Tugwell in the press, as we look back on it today, demonstrates not only how an administrator can be isolated and destroyed, but also how much more decent and sophisticated the major newspapers have become in dealing with personalities in Washington. Happily Roosevelt did not jettison Tugwell for good; the President appointed him war-time governor of Puerto Rico, where the "dreamy theorist" carried off brilliantly his administrative chores.

One wishes that Mr. Sternsher could recast the material in this book into a short paperback that would present more cogently and meaningfully the problem of the role of the intellectual in politics. Or perhaps Tugwell, who today lives happily in Rio Piedras and lectures occasionally at Columbia and elsewhere, could undertake the job. His life is both a warning and a lure to political scientists considering public office; it is a fascinating case study in the uneasy and never-ending conflict between politicians and intellectuals.—James MacGregor Burns, *Williams College*.

Dear FDR: A Study of Political Letter Writing. By Leila A. Sussmann. (Totawa, New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963. Pp. xxv, 194. $6.00.)

In his extensive introduction to Dr. Sussmann's book, Robert K. Merton neatly summarizes the volume as follows: "This tightly organized and unpretentious book reports varied aspects of a developing pattern of communication between a self-selected part of the American people and men in high political office. It has many stories to tell. The social historian, the sociological theorist and political sociologist, the social psychologist and the intellectual historian will each find much in the book of direct interest, depending upon the perspective from which it is read." The full impact of Dr. Merton's statement became obvious to this reviewer upon reflective contemplation of the total content. Dr. Sussmann has admirably minimized verbiage and produced a truly multifaceted approach to an important topic.

Unlike some other studies of letter writing, Dr. Sussmann does not simply present an editorialized version of actual correspondence received by the late President Roosevelt. Direct quotes from letters are utilized for illustrative purposes only and have been well selected to bolster the author's conclusions.

The major emphasis of this volume is directed to the thesis that FDR purposely and carefully developed the direct mail technique as a political device. While summarizing the historical evolution of letter writing to the chief executive, Dr. Sussmann emphasizes that Franklin D. Roosevelt and his aides Louis Howe and James Farley deliberately set about to encourage and refine direct mail correspondence as a major facet of FDR's political campaigns. While the author notes that because of illness Roosevelt had a real need for a meaningful substitute for direct personal contact, the trend established during his long years in office has continued unabated to the present time. In short, a technique which was established by FDR even before he became President as a personal *modus operandi* served to establish, to a considerable degree, a permanent public impression of the accessibility of the President through letter writing.

Dr. Sussmann concentrates on the correspondence of FDR in 1932, his first bid for election, and in 1940 when the third term issue was involved. The comparative analysis of the correspondence in two divergent situations provides several insights into the developing nature of the Roosevelt technique of political letter writing. Evidence clearly exists that attention to personal correspondence proved to be a more valuable gauge of public opinion than polls or newspaper reports.

The comprehensiveness of this relatively short volume is emphasized by the inclusion of a discussion of both the nature of the content of the correspondence as well as a statistical evaluation of the character of the writers. A particularly valuable contribution exists in the comparison with other existing analyses of letter writing including an unpublished study of the political correspondence received by Eisenhower in 1948.

While a separate bibliography is not included, perusal of terminal footnotes of each chapter affords ample direction to related studies in the field.—J. H. Bindley, *Knox College*.

Electing the President: 1964. By Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. and Arthur L. Peterson. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964. Pp. xiii, 252. Paper, $1.50.)

A joint description by a Democratic and a Republican political scientist of the legal, organizational, and electoral framework of the 1964 elections, the two parties' probable strategies, and a review of the 1960 election as it bears on the 1964 scene.

New York Herald Tribune 1964 Presidential Election Guide. (New York: Whitney Communications Corporation, 1964. Pp. 192. $3.95.)

Covers much the same ground as Ogden and Peterson, but through a series of short articles mainly by journalists.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Five African States: Responses to Diversity. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963. Pp. 643. $10.00.)

Everything about this book, from its title onwards, is puzzling. What purpose did the editor have in mind in putting together five diverse and largely unrelated essays about five "states" having little more in common than being located on the same continent?

The book has no conceptual framework. There are no unifying themes or hypotheses which are examined. There is no methodological exercise involved. There is no body of generalizations or abstractions.

There are five case histories, not studies, of "responses to diversity" to internal pressures and external problems, or at any rate, that is about as much rationale for the collection of essays, as is given in a brief introduction. In fact, the concept of diversity having been mentioned, it is thereafter largely ignored. The essays are not constructed around the thrust of diversity internally and the responses of African states to it with concepts, policies and programs of state building, nation building, economic development, or technological revolution; similarly, the essays do not emphasize the theme of external diversity and the responses thereto in the form of neutralism, bloc memberships, Pan-Africanism, bilateral arrangements and alliances, *etc.* For the reader interested in the interaction of economic and political factors in internal development, and the interplay of internal development and external posture, the pickings are thin.

The essays recite in response to a fairly mechanical outline the internal development and external policies of five African countries. One of the five, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, seems a particularly inapposite choice. Not independent, and on the verge of dissolution, when Dr. Spiro wrote his essay, it is not at all clear what, if any, relevance the mélange of "responses" by the United Kingdom Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office, white settler governments, or nascent African governments, has for anybody or anything else in Africa.

The essays by Dr. Le Vine on the Federal Republic of Cameroun, Dr. Thompson on Dahomey, and Dr. Karis on South Africa are relatively straightforward exposés of the countries they are dealing with, well-informed, and useful compilations of data. (The essay on South Africa also raises the question of relevancy.) In light of the *coup d'etat* in Dahomey in late 1963 Miss Thompson may want to revise her conclusion that the deposed President Maga "through forging a one-party system had given it [Dahomey] a relatively stable administration." The newly contrived one-party system replacing the Maga one, seems as fragile as its predecessor and as little likely to provide the stability or unity sought.

The fifth essay in the group by Dr. Bustin on the Congo (Léopoldville) was to this reviewer the least satisfactory of all. The trees are all there, but not the forest. The basic nature of the Congo crisis, born with independence and unabated to this date, does not come through. The dual set of problems confronting the Congo—those that arise when a highly underdeveloped country is thrust into independence without even minimal preparation, and those that arise when a relatively developed "enclave" economy falls upon evil days—does not come through. It is this admixture of elementary and sophisticated political, social, economic and financial problems which makes the Congo crisis so intractable.

And of all the essays, the Congo essay must be handled with most caution. The author has a point of view which does come through, and is not beyond being questioned. For example, the author tells us "separatism . . . was by no means a novel feature in the mining province, although it has always been an exclusively white attitude" (p. 119). The author could profitably have recourse to the new C.R.I.S.P. study "Sécession au Katanga" for a more balanced, informed and documented picture than he presents of this critical issue, including the "exclusive" white nature of the separatism. To take account of the tribal and separatist tendencies present in Katanga (and everywhere else in the Congo) may make the picture more complicated; it does not deny the leading role or complicity of the European sociétés or settlers.

Even more typical of the author's style and revealing of his viewpoint is the key passage on page 117. Here the author proclaims: "Congolese unity was by no means a self-evident proposition" at independence. (Of course not; quite the opposite was self-evident to just about all of us in the Congo in the months before independence.) Then we are told: "Neither, however, had centrifugal trends attained irreparable decisiveness, and no *ex post facto* rationalization can conclusively demonstrate the inevitability of the post-independence disintegration of the Congolese Republic." (Omitting the lawyer's word "conclusively," it is much like flogging a dead horse to demonstrate, no rationalization is needed, the inevitability of the disintegration of the Congo Republic. How anybody could have thought otherwise is puzzling, and how, at this point in time, anybody could suggest that any other result was possible is even more puzzling.) Finally, we are exposed to the conclusion: "Then as now, anarchy rather than ingrained separatism has been the fundamental issue on which the future of the Republic revolves." Once again dismissing the lawyer's word "ingrained" leaves us with something approaching the *reductio ad absurdum*, i.e., in the absence of unity, which did not make "disintegration" inevitable, anarchy rather than separatism "was and is the issue." Aside from the fact that anarchy would seem an even more advanced form of disintegration than separatism, and the obvious fact that if anarchy "was and is the issue" then disintegration need not have happened, it already existed, and notwithstanding "white separatism" which two pages later we are told about, there have been at least three major secession movements in the Congo, to say nothing of innumerable incipient ones, and ever since early 1963, there have been 22 provinces, created from the former six, all of which have exhibited distinctive separatist tendencies.

And so to end where I started, although the essays pull together and concentrate in convenient form much useful information, and provide some useful appreciations, the purpose intended to be served by this volume remains obscure.—Arnold Rivkin, *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.*

The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. By Charles F. Gallagher. (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1963. Pp. 275. $5.50.)

It is a pleasure to report that Mr. Gallagher's book is one which should long remain a classic in its domain. The reviewer renders this opinion considerately, after teaching a course on this subject to a group of French and American university students and knowing what materials are available and what the needs are. The book is recommended to anyone who is required to know something about North Africa, and therefore it should be used to introduce students of international politics to this area.

As Gallagher states, a large part of the book is devoted to preparation because so few Americans know much about the Maghrib. About a third of the book deals with the background: the Land, an "island" surrounded by water on the north and west, and sand to the south and east; the People, basically the Berbers mixed with Arab, Turkish, Jewish, Negro, and European influxes; the Punic and Roman legacies, the first incursions of semitic and latin civilizations whose traces can be seen today; Islam and the Arabs, whose social structures, cultural patterns, and religion strike the eye as being basic to an understanding of North Africa. However the European influx has had more influence than is generally recognized, and it is still not yet certain that one can predict the ultimate cultural tendency, Arabic or European, for the next generation. And finally the European period in transition to independence.

Certainly a detailed description and a review of North African history is necessary for the average reader to gain full understanding of the second third of the book, which deals with the nationalist struggles and the problems of independent North Africa.

The author not only has a style which makes reading his book a pleasure, but he also has enlightened insights which help make an understanding of the distinctions between Tunis, Morocco, and Algeria neat and lucid. The fundamental differences between Bourguiba, leader of a one-party, secular, planned democracy, Ben Bella, dictator of a socialist nationalist revolutionary party, and Hassan II, monarch of a religious, conservative, multi-party, laissez-faire state, are here described so as to point out the impossibility of a political union in the Maghrib—in spite of fervent declarations on that score by every statesman from the area. Unity or federation is not likely in the near future due to the different phases of evolution in the three countries; and shared history, religion and language along with a common struggle of "love-hate" against France cannot resolve the contradictions between conservative, reformist and extremist states. Certainly the history of the Arab world in attempting unity points out that the Maghrib should not entertain any greater hopes or expectations.

The last third of the book deals with North Africa in world politics, and it is obvious that the author was limited in space. Certainly what we do get is an excellent survey, very well balanced in light of inflammatory material, such as the war between the French and the Algerians. It is hoped that Mr. Gallagher will follow this first survey with a more detailed study which he is so eminently and obviously qualified to do. There are many topics which need more attention: the results of the American landings in Morocco and of having American troops present for long periods in that country; President Roosevelt's visit to Casablanca and his contact with local political leaders; a more detailed and critical study of the Aid program in Tunisia; an investigation into Senator Kennedy's declaration for independent Algeria (pg. 108)—how much of it was motivated by a political hope to embarrass Mr. Dulles?—and certainly the strategic uses of North Africa: an entry into the Mediterranean and an important consideration in the deployment of the Sixth Fleet. By that time it will be seen how successful the Maghrib has been in its hopes of playing a leader's role on the African continent and whether it may even go further away from the attraction of the Arab world. Certainly Mr. Gallagher is right in emphasizing that there should be no drive by the United States to replace France in an area where she already shows leadership based on a long-standing association.

The Harvard Foreign Policy Library is to be complimented on a book of important consequence and handsome format which deals intelligently with problems in an area where more and more Americans will one day find they have a committed interest.—HERBERT MAZA, *Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Aix-en-Provence.*

Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. BY RICHARD L. SKLAR. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 578. $12.50.)

This first book by an exceptionally able young Africanist is a prodigious work. Thorough utilization of the extensive documentary and secondary sources is supplemented by a wealth of original material gathered by the author in England and all parts of Nigeria in 1957–1958. The result is a major contribution to our understanding of political processes in Nigeria, and also in developing areas generally.

The work is obviously a labor of love, not only in terms of the massive and painstaking data collection in its preparation, but also in the transparent affection for Nigeria and Nigerians which shows through on every page. It is unlikely that a book of this scope could have been written otherwise; Mr. Sklar succeeded in gaining cooperation of all political groups, no easy task for the expatriate scholar in a country where partisanship is intense. The book thus benefits both from the extensive interviewing conducted by the author, and from unusual access to internal party documents and meetings. Parenthetically, we may add that some dedication on the part of the reader is also required; the dense, detailed character of the study, however rewarding for the specialist, will make the going difficult for the newcomer to Nigerian politics.

Mr. Sklar picks up the threads of Nigerian nationalism where they had been left by James S. Coleman (*Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*) in 1952. The heart of the book is a detailed analysis of the three major political parties, National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC—since renamed National Convention of Nigerian Citizens), Action Group (AG), and Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), as they developed in the 1950's. Post-independence politics are not the primary focus, although reference is made to events through 1962. The parties are examined in relation to changing social structure, ethnic and religious behavior referents, and other associations (tribal organizations, minor parties, youth movements, etc.).

The nexus of social conflict is skillfully used as an analytical tool; Mr. Sklar explores a series of local controversies in all three Regions, which lend fascinating insight into the intricate party relationships with the social forces involved. Too many writers have examined African political systems merely at the summit. The careful scrutiny given to a number of pivotal local situations gives unusual depth to this work.

Exhaustive data are presented on the Nigerian elite. Among its other virtues, the book is a fine dictionary of Nigerian political biography. The excellent index contains approximately 750 entries of Nigerian political leaders, national, regional, and local; for most, information has been provided in the voluminous footnotes and tables (nearly 100 pages) as to social origin, ethnic and religious identification, profession, and brief personal history.

Some may debate the use of the notion of social class which is encountered from time to time, and especially in the concluding, theoretical chapter on "The Social Basis of the Party-Power System." At this juncture, there is no scholarly consensus on the best frame for conceptualization of the emergent and highly fluid social stratification in Africa; for this reason, a more extensive elucidation of what the author intended by the term "rising" or "emergent" class, frequently used throughout the book but briefly defined only on pp. 480–481, might have been in order.

The questions involved here are too abstruse to be adequately condensed within the confines of this review. In the present state of flux, all speculation on this point must be tentative. However, armed with this disclaimer, the reviewer finds the author's conclusion of a "political subordination of communal interests to class interests" (p. 502) premature. In the theoretical discussion (although not in the preceding analysis), there seems a shade too much stress on the polarity rather than the symbiosis between "class" and ethnic-religious solidarities. Instead of implying a modern-traditional dichotomy between class-determined and communally-derived behavior, it would be at least as plausible to argue that both new social stratification and new forms of ethnic identification are products of modernization, and through their interaction are engendering a political process whose essential dynamic lies more in vertical communal than horizontal social cleavages.

However this may be, the meticulous documentation, impeccable objectivity, and comprehensive scope which characterize this work make it an indispensable guide to Nigerian politics on the threshold of independence. The author returned to Nigeria to take up a teaching position in 1963; perhaps we may hope for a sequel to this brilliant study.—M. CRAWFORD YOUNG, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Independence and After. BY RICHARD HARRIS. (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. iii, 69. $1.75.)

World Order and New States. BY PETER CALVOCORESSI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Pp. ix, 113. $4.25.)

These are two small, succinct, and cogent studies of the international implications of national emergence in the world today. Richard Harris' *Independence and After* is a very useful review of the revolution in the so-called emergent world. It attacks forcefully and with excellent logic many of the stereotyped beliefs that have grown up with the coming to independence of dozens of new states. Mr. Harris demonstrates that these stereotypes are the result of our ignorance of the revolutionary process in the emergent nations, and then proceeds to a concise restatement of the true nature of this revolution.

The "driving motives" are those which we had a century or more ago. "The revolution . . . is a revolution seeking more justice, seeking those ideals of the French Revolution that echoed through Europe during the nineteenth century." It is not, fundamentally, a revolution against poverty, as we of the West tend to perceive it. It is aimed at achieving equality with the older and more powerful nations, asserting their identity internationally. And the natural offspring of the desire for total independence which characterizes the emerging nations is neutralism.

The revolution of equality has a cultural aspect which the author describes as having religious, linguistic, and "anti-tawdry, commercialized aspects of Western culture" forms. It also involves a drive for "administrative equality," which is a reaction to "shame and diffidence" stemming from a recognition that the new administrations are perhaps inefficient or corrupt. In turn, this drive is most often manifested in the trend to military leadership, since the army is usually the only body that has the kind of efficiency, discipline and relative lack of corruption that is considered essential to the well-being of the new state.

Mr. Harris addresses himself next to the issue of social revolution. The conscious cause of the peasant's suffering, he notes, is injustice, not poverty. However, land reform programs, co-operatives, and other measures for social improvement and for representative government, which may eventually improve the lot of the peasant, are not stimulated by the peasants themselves, but by the intellectuals and the members of the middle classes. He considers neutralism an inevitable stage in the development of the new nations, and urges the Western powers to encourage the rise to power of neutralists in those nations. He concludes that the Sino-Soviet split presages a looser international organization of Communist parties and governments and a consequent diminishing of the Communist threat to the emergent world. What is necessary in any case, he argues, is that the West understand the nature and the necessity of revolution in the emerging states and work with it, to the end that "good and representative governments will emerge."

Although this is a most commendable effort, it seemed to this reviewer to be overly ambitious and to be marred by numerous over-generalizations. Though he concentrates his attention on South and Southeast Asia, he asserts that his remarks apply "equally to the Arab world, to Africa and to Latin America, though with obvious qualifications." If the reader views this airy assumption with some uneasiness it is with good reason, for while Mr. Harris makes some excellent points and succeeds in drawing together in a very few pages a good deal of worthwhile information and a number of provocative thoughts, he doesn't always come to grips with the points he raises, and in an attempt to set forth a kind of "guide to the perplexed" tries to bring out too much in too short a space.

Peter Calvocoressi, who is perhaps most widely known in the United States for his authorship of the excellent annual *Survey of International Affairs* published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, examines the problems involved in fitting the world's new—and frequently small—states into a peace-keeping system. Pointing out how the structure of Western society has been strained by a shift, presently in process, from our familiar system of nation-states to something "still not clearly perceived," and simultaneously by an ideological split "which is in some eyes tantamount to a disintegration of western civilization itself," he first outlines briefly the manner in which wars may occur and examines the relation of the new states to such threats to world peace.

The book is not concerned with the problems arising from a "universal violent war." Rather, it deals with the dangers arising from localised conflicts (limited wars), and with those stemming from internal local conflicts. Either type may be expected to occur on the continents of Asia and Africa, and while they may be settled without anything worse than a purely local war, it is also possible that a great power may become involved. Dealing first with the limitations of major states and then with the problems arising out of the instability of new states, the author suggests that "practical men" can take precautions and act with prevision to eliminate some of the causes of conflict and to arrest some of the outbreaks which will occur notwithstanding.

The scheme of international politics is in flux, and at the same time "there is a strong revolutionary force at work in the world which is not basically international at all and can be affected only marginally by international politics and endeavours." Our interest in this situation, which is "comparable with the tide of Europe's last six turbulent centuries," is to see to it that the new states should come through their inevitable revolutions without too much painful violence or "lasting aberration" into authoritarianism. The West's "persistent weakness" is that it appears hostile to this revolutionary trend, in part because of the inescapable initial anti-Western aspects of many of these revolutions, but the new nationalism is losing its anti-colonialist and anti-Western implications, and, adds Calvocoressi in unconscious agreement with Richard Harris, it is trending toward a nationalist neutralism with which the West can, and must, learn to work.

Calvocoressi looks ahead to a future of disorder in the new states and warns that the major powers will have to ask themselves the basic question of whether or not they should intervene, and if so, unilaterally or collectively. The opportunities for great power action are declining and there is a commensurate rise in the frequency of collective intervention. Although the Charter provisions for a Military Staff Committee and a permanent UN military force have come to naught, the United Nations is, in the author's opinion, still the most desirable instrument available for such action, and its collective authority (or executive capacity) should therefore be buttressed. This will necessarily involve a revolution in thinking on the part of the leaders of the major powers, but unless this takes place, "a peaceful state of affairs is very unlikely to be secured for the world."

Brief in compass, this is nonetheless an intelligent, perceptive, and systematically presented analysis, and deserves wider reading than it is likely to have.—WESLEY R. FISHEL, *Michigan State University.*

Cabinet Reform in Britain: 1914–1963. BY HANS DAALDER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, Pp. 381. $8.00.)

Professor Daalder's book will interest students of public administration as well as students of British government. For despite the title, he is as much concerned with administrative reorganization in Britain as he is with Cabinet reform. This is especially true of Part II of his work in which he focuses on the evolution of administrative machinery for dealing with defense and economic planning. His justification for including this section is that many of the techniques developed to deal with these matters later were applied in other areas. But he fails to substantiate this claim, since other parts of his work refer only occasionally and generally to this discussion of defense and economic planning. This section is further weakened by being merely a descriptive history of developments in these areas. The first part of his book, which discusses the development of Cabinet and administrative structure more generally, similarly contains little or no analysis. Thus, although Daalder states that he is not concerned to write a political history of successive cabinets, this in fact is what much of his book is.

Not until the final quarter of the book does he consider various proposals for Cabinet reform in an analytical framework. He sees three main schools of thought on Cabinet reform: the "technocrats *in politics*" who favor rationalization of interdepartmental structure to relieve the pressure upon ministers and the congestion of Cabinet business; the political failures and idealists who favor a "policy Cabinet" composed of non-departmental ministers free to make "objective" decisions on long-range action; and the "more empirical school" which favors a Cabinet of the most important ministers supplemented by an extensive system of Cabinet committees. Daalder does not entirely approve of any of these approaches nor does he offer any " 'solution' of [his] own, for the simple reason that [he] queries their existence. . . . It is policy, not machinery, that counts." Yet he comes closest to accepting the third view.

His discussion on this point provides additional evidence on the frequently noted importance of tradition and conservatism in Britain regardless of party. For after indicating that a number of developments around 1900 undermined "the confident British belief that a simple empiricism in matters of government would create the best possible of British worlds," he concludes that precisely such pragmatism was the most influential factor in the Cabinet's development. For Cabinet structure in the twentieth century has not been shaped by administrative theory but by "traditional forms of organization, personal factors, and *ad hoc* reactions to political and administrative problems."

Thus some critics of administrative theory may find confirmation of their position in Daalder's discussion of the British experience in attempting to develop the Cabinet toward a more rational organizational structure. Students of British politics will find useful his assessment of proposals for Cabinet reform in terms of the main functions of the Cabinet in the British system—a discussion which clarifies the obstacles to reform.

Although Daalder, who holds the First Chair of Political Science at Leiden University, wrote the original version of this work in his native Dutch, his writing is clear and generally attractive. His documentation is extensive and would seem to qualify him to speak with authority. Yet he commits one egregious, although minor, error, which questions the precision of his research. On four separate occasions he incorrectly refers to Clement Davies as Leader of the Liberal Party. He makes Davies Leader six years before he was elected to this post (and at a time when he was not even in the Liberal Party) and continues him in this position for four years after he had relinquished it.—Jorgen Rasmussen, *University of Arizona.*

British Politics in the Suez Crisis. By Leon D. Epstein. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 220. $5.00.)

After the surfeit of comprehensive theoretical schemes for the analysis of comparative political systems that have appeared in recent years, it is refreshing to be able to welcome a case study which sets out to test important middle range concepts in a specific political setting.

Drawing upon the complex and dramatic events of the Suez crisis of 1956–57, Epstein provides us with a cogent and detailed analysis of the functioning of the British political system under strain. His focus is almost exclusively on the internal workings of the system; he makes no great effort either to add to the extant literature on the diplomatic and military aspects of the crisis or to clarify the still frenzied controversies over the behavior of Dulles, Nasser or Khrushchev. This deliberate choice has freed him to concentrate all the more on the domestic British scene and to delve deeply into the roles of the parties, cabinet, Parliament and the instruments of opinion formation. In doing so, Epstein shows himself to be aware of the limitations as well as the utility of the case study approach and cognizant of the rather special character of the events which he has chronicled. His argument is that the unusual features of the case—the breakdown of the normal bipartisanism of British foreign policy, the intraparty deviations, and the great emotionalism that gripped the country—were necessarily aspects of crisis politics, which do not negate the conclusion that the basic responses in fact conformed to, and illustrate, the norms of the present British system, albeit in a somewhat exaggerated way.

Rather than treating his material in the strictly chronological and loosely structured manner typical of straight histories and cases prepared for pedagogical purposes, Epstein uses it to test general propositions that have been advanced to explain the workings of the British system. Thus he devotes considerable attention to an examination of the impact of the parliamentary system, the function of the political opposition, the ideological reflexes of the parties, the imperatives of party cohesion, the role of constituency parties and the alleged acceleration of "prime ministerial government." Wherever possible he has tried to frame his conclusions in the form of hypotheses suitable for further testing, not only in the British context but comparatively. While this is a single-country study, it evinces the strong interest of the author in laying the footings for a more comparative treatment of party systems.

The most important conclusion Epstein draws from this case is that the thrust of the British system, whether in crisis or not, is toward the maintenance of the government and its policy by means of a strictly party majority in the House of Commons. The political reactions to Suez conformed to this mold in an almost predictable way, despite the fact that Eden had acted almost independently of his parliamentary supporters and with the awareness that the chief opposition party and almost half the nation were bound to disapprove bitterly of armed intervention in the Middle East. Epstein's analysis gives ample evidence to the grip of official party positions on present-day British political attitudes and behavior. He demonstrates it in his description of the treatment meted out by their constitutency associations to the very few M.P.s who bucked the party line on Suez; and he tests it in his examination of the behavior of a cross-pressured group of politicians, the 17 Jewish Labour M.P.s who presumably were pulled in the direction of Conservative policy because of Eden's attack on Israel's traditional enemy. The concept of party as the dominant reference group in British politics also gets support from the extensive polling data and press analysis provided by the author. In general Epstein finds this rigidly partisan mold to be productive of stability and neatly functional to the demands of the British parliamentary system, although at the end of the book he raises, but does not pursue, a few doubts about its long-term usefulness.

One problem that faces the maker of a case study is where to begin and where to end. Obviously every political decision has antecedents and consequences, and difficult choices about cutting in and out must be made. Epstein has chosen, perhaps wisely, to concentrate mainly on the "Seven Days That Shook Britain," although he allows himself the latitude of moving into 1957 to examine the fate of the deviant M.P.s and to comment briefly on the impact of memories of Suez on the 1959 General Election. My only criticism here is that he might have dwelt with profit on the transfer of power from Eden to Macmillan and also on the way in which the new prime minister used his record on Suez, along with his patronage powers, to reunite the Conservative Party and steer his government through to the reestablishment of normal relations with Egypt and the United States in the spring of 1957. Such a follow-up would have permitted even more testing of propositions about the nature of political leadership in Britain; but it also might have made it a case-and-a-half.—JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, *Ohio State University.*

Gentlemanly Power, British Leadership and the Public School Tradition. BY RUPERT WILKINSON, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 243, $6.00.)

Mr. Wilkinson has written a somewhat infuriating book on a fascinating broad theme. The theme is the role of education in the process by which societies maintain stability and adjust to change. The book is in parts infuriating, because it never makes clear at what level the theme is being tackled. On the basis of the general title, of most of the introduction and of the first half of the work, it seems that the author wants to look at the question by concentrating on the part played by public schools in Victorian England. Within this relatively narrow compass, Mr. Wilkinson writes a dispassionate analysis which compares very favourably with what has been written ("The torrents of literature," as the author says in the Introduction) on this permanent subject of controversy. This is because the author does not simply want to study the conflict between public school ideals and democratic values, but analyzes the relationship between public schools and English society in general; he examines their impact in extolling the virtues of both unwritten law and restraint, of loyalty and co-operation and of dignified government, in exalting the amateur versus the technician, in making it possible for Britain to adjust to change while stressing the rôle of tradition; the basic conflict, that between imagination and conservatism, is analysed with great clarity and considerable force.

The section on Britain is thus very successful, although the author might perhaps have profitably ventured a little more into post-war British society. But the analysis of the impact of the public schools in their heyday is carried to some of its deepest consequences. Some of the claims which Mr. Wilkinson makes for public school influence may seem exaggerated and it may be felt that public schools were the products of British society as much as they shaped British society; but the author discusses this point in the Introduction and, more generally, this kind of circular argument can probably be made in relation to the impact of any institution. As measurement is still in its infancy in political science, one has perhaps to accept, at least provisionally, the idea of reciprocal influences, while recognising that the exact amount of reciprocity has gradually to be defined.

While the first half of the book is thus convincing, often novel and always interesting, the last part, termed "Comparisons and Implications," leaves the reader sometimes baffled and rarely satisfied. This is because, in this section, the author moves at gradually wider levels of generality and the subject matter of the work becomes, as a result, increasingly unclear. First, Mr. Wilkinson seems content to broaden his topic somewhat, and to compare British public schools with Confucian Chinese education. Some points are illuminating, others less convincingly put; there is some window-dressing, and a certain reluctance to consider fully the implication of contrasts which are somewhat grudgingly recorded. This is the case, for instance, of the analysis of the status of commerce and of the attitudes about change in both societies: such differences cannot be dismissed on the grounds that they are the products of different environments, as the general argument is concerned with the problem of the impact of some forms of education on society.

The analysis goes quickly on to a higher plane, however. The last fifty pages seem devoted to a general, and indeed theoretical, inquiry into the impact of education on the making of rulers. In two relatively short chapters, the reader is shuffled from Confucian China to Communist Soviet and Chinese societies, from the Japan of the Meiji era to Jesuit Colleges of the 17th and 18th centuries. Inevitably, such a survey is often superficial; indeed, its scope is left somewhat unclear: it does not consider all systems of education, but it does not consider only totalitarian systems either. The concluding remarks, which are in the nature of a general warning to Western societies confronted with apparent Communist success, seem to strike at the broadest possible level of generality.

Much of this section is vague and patchy (why aren't Continental European systems analysed, why indeed is the American educational system, with its emphasis on 'Americanisation,' never mentioned?) and the overall impression is disappointing. The book started, in a more pedestrian fashion perhaps, but more convincingly; it ends with a *morceau de bravoure* for which the reader was scarcely prepared. The author seems to have drifted into generalisations rather than decided from the outset which book he was writing. It is a pity that the real choice was not made, because Mr. Wilkinson did show aspects of the public school influence on British society which needed emphasis and for which, one hopes, the book will be read and remembered with great profit by students of British government.—JEAN BLONDEL, *University of Essex.*

Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición; de la Sociedad Tradicional a la Sociedad de Masas. By Gino Germani. (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca de Psicología Social y Sociología, Editorial Paidos, 1962. 266 pp.)

Latin America's few political scientists generally are found in schools of law or of public administration, and their work tends usually to reflect the most formalistic and legalistic aspects of those fields. The region boasts a larger number of sociologists, including some who have abandoned the humanistic and normative tradition of the *pensadores* for empirical orientation and theoretical sophistication. And almost by definition, Latin American sociologists are political sociologists, at least part of the time. Among the best of these is Gino Germani, who is professor of sociology at the University of Buenos Aires. His *Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición* is, therefore, a valuable contribution to the literature of political development.

The book is divided into four parts the first two of which deal in broad terms with general sociological theory and with a comparison between models of traditional society and industrial society. The third section discusses political transition in Latin America as a whole and the fourth transition in a single country, Argentina. The conceptual approach of the work will not be unfamiliar to North American social scientists, because Germani bases most of his formulations on Parsons, with assists from Merton, Lipset, Hyman and others in the mainstream of Western social theory. His real contribution lies, therefore, not so much in the realm of general theory building as in the nature of additional insights arising from application of general concepts to an area that has had surprisingly little attention in the evolution of development theory. This is true both of the sections concentrating on general theory and those dealing with Latin America and Argentina.

Conceptually, *Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición* is remarkably consistent and effective, considering that it consists mainly of shorter pieces published elsewhere, only some of which were reworked for the present book. Perhaps this lack of up-dating helps to explain why Germani does not mention some of the work of the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics, which closely parallels his own both in conceptualization and in findings. It is striking, for example, that Germani's findings clearly imply the existence of "development crises" of a sort somewhat more clearly enunciated by the Committee, a clear case of parallel and independent evolution of concepts.

Similarly, if one is to offer any objections to Germani's approach, they are the same as have been applied already to Parsons and Almond—that the formulation presupposes a unilinear progression toward industrialism and pluralistic democracy, and that it fails to demonstrate the process of change, offering instead two models at either end of a continuum. Germani commits what may be an even graver sin; he presents a diagramatic chart contrasting the economic, social, and demographic, as well as political factors found in traditional Latin American society as contrasted with the Western, industrialized society toward which he sees the several states of the region evolving. Although this may be a theoretical heresy, it is an extremely useful device for which I am grateful. Until some as yet unknown genius does supply us with a general theoretical approach that is process oriented, I shall remain grateful for the partial insights and limited understandings supplied by the workers in the field who must supply that future lawgiver with the materials from which he must build his theory. Gino Germani has given us an insider's view of Latin America that was lacking before, one which all serious students of the region's politics must now take into account.—Robert E. Scott, *University of Illinois.*

The Military and Society in Latin America. By John J. Johnson. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 308. $7.00.)

John J. Johnson has escaped the occupational affliction of professional historians: he does not suffer from myopia when confronted with evidence of social change. For change, rather than continuity, is the dominant theme of his major studies of Latin American politics. By demonstrating the dynamic, influential role of urban, middle sector groups in *Political Change in Latin America* (1958), he successfully challenged the pervasive image of Latin American society as a two-class system, bereft of a middle class. In *The Military and Society in Latin America,* he effectively attacks the conception of a monolithic military, rigidly attached to the values of a mythical status quo. "There is absolutely nothing in the evolution of the Latin American armed forces," he concludes, "to suggest that they can any longer be trusted to be the stronghold of tradition or that they will for much longer 'hold off the mob power of the left.' "

The burden of Johnson's thesis, while accompanied by inevitable qualifications and an analysis which distinguishes Brazil from Spanish America, incorporates the following propositions: military groups in Latin America are not continuously united on behalf of a cohesive set of interests; military careers have provided a rare opportunity for upward social mobility in Latin America (although wives of officers do not enjoy *ex officio* social prestige); contemporary military officers have been recruited from new social groups in Latin American society; members of military organizations, compared to leaders recruited from civilian sectors of the population, often can command superior technical and administrative skills; military groups are capable of consummating political alliances with leaders representing the interests of labor, professional and other urban groups; military officers in Latin America, unlike their counterparts in the United States, are not hostile to governmental management and direction of industry, since they "are essentially bureaucrats . . . with non-propertied status"; military groups, along with other segments of society, rally around nationalistic slogans; military officers "are more pro-Catholic and more anti-communist than the civilian sector from which the politicians are customarily recruited"; the monopolistic control of violence achieved by military groups, thanks to technological changes in armaments, has strengthened national governments at the expense of local *caciques* and regional *caudillos;* at least under some conditions, selected military groups may promote the modernization of their societies; and "professionalization and institutionalization have not as yet served to discourage the armed forces from attempting to exercise social control at the national level."

Despite Johnson's co-optation of the concepts of socialization, recruitment, modernization, professionalization and institutionalization, the book will not thoroughly delight the conceptually and methodologically fastidious. Thus there are occasional regressions into monolithic perceptions of the military. There is a disposition to accept somewhat uncritically the professions of military groups that their interventions are designed to perform functions of national guardianship or moderation which transcend the conventional interest conflicts of politics. The military intervention of 1964 in Brazil can be accommodated to Johnson's pattern of interpretation, but the pattern loses something in symmetry. Quotations from interviews provide illustrative confirmation for the author's evaluations rather than data which various scholars, independently, may consult for purposes of drawing conclusions and inferences. Pertinent factual materials, possibly garnered from classified sources, are inserted without documentation. Generalizations about public opinion (or the public image of the military) are based upon an inspection of popular ballads, novels, poems and paintings in museums. The research, in other words, has been carried out with imagination, but the results are presented in a form which does not invite replication, verification or parallel data collection. Its extensive bibliography notwithstanding, the work, therefore, probably belongs to the genre of the interpretive historical essay.

But before political scientists spring their methodological traps, they had better acknowledge, in a spirit of generosity and gratitude, not churlishly, that John J. Johnson, in the process of clearing substantive forests that they have neglected, has written the best book available on civil-military politics in Latin America.—Merle Kling, *Washington University* (*St. Louis*).

Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution. Edited by Dudley Seers. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964. Pp. xx, 432. $7.50.)

It is indeed a sad commentary on the world we live in that the best way to attract notice is by being troublesome. The experience of the little island of Cuba simply serves to prove this point once again. Prior to 1959 the literature on Cuba was scarce and often unrewarding. Since 1959 the literature on Cuba has almost reached the proportions of an all-engulfing avalanche. A few of these books have proven very useful, many are merely interesting, some are worthless. Happily one can place *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution* in the first category.

The volume at hand is the fruit of a relatively brief visit to Cuba in the late summer of 1962 by the editor and his three colleagues. Their purpose was to determine the extent to which the Castro régime had succeeded, during the first three years of its existence, in its objective of speeding up the elimination of the classic problems of an underdeveloped country: unemployment, poverty, and ignorance. In Latin America today the Alliance for Progress aims at solving these problems gradually over a long period of time by evolutionary changes. Castro hopes to solve these problems quickly, under forced draft, as it were.

In February of 1962 Dudley Seers visited briefly in Havana and was led to believe that a study of the sort he proposed would be welcomed by Cuban authorities and that full cooperation in the gathering of data could be expected. But by August of that same year, after a grant had been obtained from the Cabot Foundation in Boston and three co-workers had been recruited, the attitude in Cuba had so changed that effective completion of the project seemed almost hopeless. Undaunted by the many roadblocks put in their way, the four proceeded to gather data as best they could and then returned to the United States to complete their work. The fact that data were obtained in the face of strong opposition and that the completion of the manuscript was admittedly a hurried job might raise some doubts about the value of the work. The writers themselves admit reservations about their findings and conclusions, but feel that their work was worthwhile. This reviewer would agree.

The four contributors are of varied background and national origin, but they share a common interest in the economics of underdevelopment. Dudley Seers and Richard Jolly are both of British origin, trained at Cambridge University and now actively engaged in helping Africa solve its problems. Andrés Bianchi and Max Nolff are both Chilean economists, the former now teaching at the Centro Inter-americano de Enseñanza de Estadística in Santiago, while the latter is in Venezuela on the staff of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.

Editor Seers provides an introduction describing the general economic and social background of the Cuban revolution. Professor Bianchi discusses Cuban agricultural problems; Mr. Jolly examines the educational revolution and efforts to reduce adult illiteracy (there is an excellent appendix analyzing the political content of Cuban education in 1962); while Señor Nolff concerns himself with revolutionary efforts to achieve a high degree of industrialization at any cost. All demonstrate an understanding of the tremendous problems that had to be met in each situation, make an effort to show that progress of sorts has been made, but agree that lack of planning and the failure to build a statistical base for future planning has proven one of the gravest faults of the early phases of the revolution. Each contributor has provided a wealth of descriptive and statistical information which should be useful to future students of these problems.—LOUIS G. KAHLE, *University of Missouri.*

The Government of the State of Israel. BY JOSEPH BADI. (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1963. Pp. 307. $5.00.)

This formalistic account of the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that have evolved in the State of Israel since 1948 appears to add nothing whatsoever to knowledge and understanding of Israel's government or political affairs. The emphasis throughout is on static, legalistic statements of formal powers of parliament, prime minister, and cabinet. The writing is uncomplicated prose at the level of ordinary journalism. The treatment of political parties is ludicrously simple. The dull and often repetitious account of various cabinets,, parliamentary elections, and legislative events demonstrates a curious capacity for ignoring many important aspects of Israel's political development, trivializing some important aspects, and exaggerating the significance of some relatively unimportant aspects.

Of approximately 270 pages of text, about 30 are devoted to footnotes referring to legal documents and other sources, largely in Hebrew. The author appears to regard anything more than a casual reference to interpretative and analytical sources in English as off limits.

In reference to Israel's civil service, Mr. Badi's tone is often rasping. He refers repeatedly to criticisms of Ben-Gurion by the latter's foes, but he makes no effort to analyze the Prime Minister's contribution to the political development of the state.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this book is the author's failure to provide any meaningful context for his legalistic and formal political concerns. It is poorly organized, pretentious in its scholarly claims, and lacking in interest, either for the scholar or the layman.—MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, *Princeton University.*

The United States and The Middle East. EDITED BY GEORGIANA G. STEVENS. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Pp. 192. $3.95 Cloth, $1.95 paper.)

The Modernization of Administration in the Near East. BY W. HARDY WICKWAR. (Beirut: Published by Khayats, Distributed in the U.K. and Canada by Constable and Co., Ltd., 1963. Pp. 201.)

The book edited by Georgiana G. Stevens is the best short book on present day United States policy in the Middle East. Seven distinguished specialists explain and interpret the major factors affecting United States relations with the area, and they do so with dispassionate and perceptive insight of the realities of international politics, and of the economic and social trends in this restless and confused area. This volume sets a high standard, with more substance and sharper focus on policy issues than in some of the companion volumes produced by the American Assembly. However, the Editor goes too far in claiming that no other book appearing in this country today is primarily focused on the alternatives for American policy. Can one overlook John C. Campbell's *In Defense of the Middle East*?

Only the briefest comment can be offered on each article. William Sands, Editor of the *Middle East Journal,* in his "Middle East Background," emphasizes diversity in the area and concludes that "complete Independence" is one of the few *constants,* while the *variables* are "endless and unpredictable." William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State, writes with illumination on "Social Modernization: the New Men," whom he describes as "in the making," "a multi-class, non-traditionalist, as yet politically or philosophically uncommitted, pragmatic, disciplined, privileged core of 'new men'." He suggests the value of recalculating many of the area changes in the perspective of this group of 'new men,' rather than from that of the Middle East Society as a whole.

A. J. Meyer of Harvard writes on "Economic Modernization," stressing the rather considerable economic change in recent years and the intimacy of the area's relations with the West. Because he finds that about fifty per cent of governments' budgets now go to military purposes in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, he urges Western-Soviet collaboration with Middle Eastern nations to check the "potentially disastrous" arms race now proceeding "at full tilt." J. C. Hurewitz provides his usual sophistication in "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East," an area characterized by a bewildering interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics, including with the North African countries some eighteen states. His essay treats such concepts as "controlled regionalism," "disimperialism," "Arab socialism," "Arab unity," "Arab disunity," "Arab limited unity," "fragmented societies," "politics of modernization," and "politics of subversion."

Harry B. Ellis, Chief of the Paris Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor, again writes on "The Arab-Israel Conflict Today," and concludes that, despite the efforts of many since the 1949 Armistices to improve Arab-Israel relations, including Dr. Joseph E. Johnson's study of the Palestine refugee problem for the United Nations, "no visible sign of progress has emerged." Dr. Johnson's proposals were in effect rejected by Israel in November 1962; the Arab Governments, "while not rejecting the proposals openly, continued to insist that Israel first must accept in principle" the relevant United Nations resolution.

In a final chapter, Richard H. Nolte, Executive Director of the Institute of Current World Affairs, analyzes United States policy since World War II, selecting Professor E. A. Speiser's prescription in 1946 that a successful policy would rest on five key principles, including a clear perception of America's long range interests in the region, a certain consistency of policy throughout the area, and a satisfactory integration with US foreign policy in general. It would have to be based on a clear and up-to-date understanding of the social and political realities and trends in the area. While Mr. Nolte finds that in the past two decades these principles have been repeatedly violated, at heavy cost to the United States, since 1958 "substantial progress" has been made toward "filling the prescription for success." "A 20th-century Armegeddon is still possible of course; but it is a measure, at least in part, of American policy success in the Middle East that the threat has now receded, leaving instead reasonable hope for the future." Taking a closer look, the author finds the improvement began when America relaxed its unsuccessful effort to line up the Arabs with military pacts and assistant agreements with "political strings." The essence of the new approach was to recognize that Arabs should be approached on the basis of equal respect and not as instruments in the Cold War. However, the author recognizes that present US policy of substantial economic assistance to President Nasser is a controversial issue when the Egyptians bomb Saudi Arabian villages or resort to "aggressive" actions against other states in the area.

Another continuing problem, that of inter-Arab relations, has taken a turn for the better as a result of the Arab Summit Meeting in January 1964 (held after the book went to press). Nasser's soft talk to other Arab rulers, and even his line that non-violent retaliation should be taken to Israel's withdrawal of waters from the Sea of Gallilee made Nasser's diplomacy seem quite different from the image presented by Senator Gruening, who in 1963–64 was demanding a reversal of President Kennedy's policy of sizable economic aid to the United Arab Republic.

Hardy Wickwar's book is of a very different sort, actually a look at the beginnings of development in the Near East by the way of administration. The author, long concerned with development and administration of public social and economic services, has worked in the Near East on several occasions, most recently as visiting professor of public administration at the American University of Beirut, 1961–62. The book is a quick survey of Ottoman and British experience in the period prior to 1945. Fundamental questions are asked: "What are some of the forces that have made for modernization of Near Eastern administration in the past 150 years? What have been some of the characteristic outcomes of the process?"

He notes that many aspects of administrative modernization (prevalent elsewhere) did not become characteristic of the Near East—for instance, nation-wide social security systems, universal education, delegation of public services to local government bodies, and disciplined subordination of the armed services to civil authority. The author sees the likelihood of technical improvement in administrative services in the years ahead, and points up the need for "deconcentration of decision-making," that is, "shortening the line of responsibility." The requirements of development planning could become one of the most most potent incentives to administrative reform. —S. SHEPARD JONES, *University of North Carolina.*

Das amerikanische Regierungssystem: Eine politologische Analyse. BY ERNST FRAENKEL. (Köln and Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2nd edition, 1962. Pp. 399. DM 27.50.)

This analysis of the American governmental system by Ernst Fraenkel, Professor of Political

Science at the Free University of Berlin, although written primarily for German readers, deserves wider attention. As an explanation of a political system to an audience unfamiliar with the social context in which it operates, the book is of interest as a model for comparable undertakings in the field of comparative politics. It is an interpretation of American government in terms of the American political culture, which carefully avoids the perils of employing German terms and concepts to describe American phenomena. Professor Fraenkel is exceptionally sensitive to the error of merely "translating" a political system. He notes, for example, that the German concept of party membership has no counterpart in the United States, that the powers separated in the American system are differently conceived from their German namesakes, and that the U. S. Cabinet has both a different structure and a different function from the German "Kabinett." The author therefore endeavors to "transpose" the basic concepts underlying government in the United States from the American into the German way of political thinking. The incidental result is a series of comparisons between the German and American governmental systems, in which the performance of political functions rather than apparently similar political structures are compared. This gives the book an importance beyond the audience for which it was designed.

The material is not organized according to political functions, however. In order to approach the study from the point of view of the questions which German students of political science raise, the first half of the book considers the general principles of democracy, federalism, and constitutionalism, common to both American and western European systems. It explains the particular manner in which these principles are applied in the U. S. system in terms of the American historical experience. The second half of the book then offers a succinct analysis of the American political process, focussing on the role of the Presidency and Congress. Professor Fraenkel emphasizes appropriations procedure, because he considers it to be centrally important in any governmental system as well as a point of major contrast between the German and American governmental processes.

The success of the book in communicating an understanding of American politics to German readers is due not only to its method but to the author's exceptional qualifications. Trained as a lawyer, experienced as a political scientist first in American and then in German universities, obviously familiar with both political cultures, Professor Fraenkel possesses a remarkable understanding of the systems he compares. He writes with authority on legal and constitutional phenomena, and with a keen appreciation of the need to subject them to the methods of political analysis, displaying a combination of skills he demonstrated a generation ago in his study of the totalitarian legal system, "The Dual State." His special awareness of the German image of the United States, based on his published compilation of selections from two centuries of German writings on American politics, determines the emphases and the perspective of his study. The book is replete with citations to the German and American literature.

It is as a contribution to the study of comparative politics that Professor Fraenkel's study deserves professional notice in this country. The work is notable for its attention to political culture, and its insistence that a political system can only be understood as a whole. It emphasizes the points of greatest contrast between the American and European democracies in terms of their differing traditions, while employing the principles of government common to western democracies as an organizing framework. Among the most striking applications of this approach are the discussions of the differences between the German and American concepts of the separation of powers, between the German concept of the "Rechtsstaat" and the Anglo-American conception of the rule of law, and between the patterns of interest group access to government in Europe and in the United States. On this and on many other themes, the book offers the sharp insights into American politics which are so often the special contribution of the foreign observer and are, ideally, the fruits of comparative study. To the American reader, in addition, it offers fresh observations on the distinguishing characteristics of European democracy. Methodological observations are scattered through the text, including some unique comments on the need for a "philology of politics."

Despite its very considerable merits, the approach of the book has some drawbacks. The contrasts between the two governmental systems are sometimes drawn at the price of presenting a balanced view of the American system which is the book's primary purpose. For example, the absence of an ideological and a class basis of American, in comparison to European, political parties is stressed to such an extent that the impression is left that American parties are indistinguishable from each other. The local basis of American party organization is so strongly emphasized that the important function performed by presidential nominating conventions is not given its due, and the absence of party discipline in Congress is, if that is possible, exaggerated. The discussion of the electoral system has some general weaknesses. There is no reference to the problem of Congressional districting, and the book therefore provides no basis for an understanding of the most important issue to appear since its publication. There are some errors in the explanation of the presidential election, notably the statement (p. 144) that presidential electors are selected in each state by an absolute majority of the votes cast. This leads to the misleading assertion (p. 145) that elections with more than two candidates become "pure lotteries." This is illustrated by the example of Wilson's election with 435 electoral votes on the basis of 6 out of 16 million popular votes, without the explanation that Wilson outdistanced Roosevelt's popular vote by over two million, Taft's by nearly three million. The interpretation of American parties which the book offers is heavily based on their development before 1933, when they stood in sharpest contrast to their European counterparts, and fails to take the notable changes since then sufficiently into account. Likewise, for the sake of drawing comparisons, Congressional hearing are the subject of a careful analysis which yields an explanation of the failure of German attempts to imitate this procedure. But hearings, and the appropriations process, are stressed at the expense of the legislative process of Congress.

Such criticisms of emphasis and detail do not alter the fact that, in fulfilling its avowed purpose of explaining American government to German readers, the book is most impressively successful. In Germany, it has rightly been acclaimed as a definitive study. As a comparative analysis of political systems, however, its organization under the headings of principles and processes presents obstacles. A functional organization would have saved repetition, cross references, and, above all, would have permitted some broader conclusions. While it is fair to note that the book was not primarily designed as a comparative study, it is perhaps appropriate to express the hope that Professor Fraenkel will eventually offer us the comparative analysis of European and American democracy to which this volume makes such a valuable contribution.—GERHARD LOEWENBERG, *Mount Holyoke College*.

Erinnerungen: 1905–1933. BY THEODOR HEUSS. (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1963. Pp. 460. DM 19.80.)

Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Die Politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933. BY KURT SONTHEIMER. (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagsanstalt, 1962. Pp. 414. DM 45.)

Through the death of Theodor Heuss, Germans lost not only a beloved uncle-figure who had made the Federal Presidency a remarkably popular fixture, but also an articulate politician-publicist whose experiences link the political scenes of Empire, Weimar and Bonn. This first volume of his memoirs ends just before the Nazi takeover and is to be supplemented by a successor which collaborators of the recently founded Heuss Archive in Stuttgart are to edit from an unfinished draft. In view of his complaint in the preface that the manifold public demands on his time were handicapping progress one cannot be too optimistic about getting the full appraisal of post-war developments which one might have hoped for. Heuss ignored suggestions that he capitalize on his personal acquaintance with political figures to write a formal history, and chose rather to accentuate personal perspectives. A rich harvest of impressions range over such topics as his work with Naumann on *Die Hilfe*, contacts with luminaries in the arts and sciences, participant episodes of campaigning and parliamentary activity for the Democratic Party, experiences as a pro-Republic lecturer and publicist, and frank personality sketches of politicians on the middle and higher echelons of German politics. The lucidity and directness of his style, reflecting the trained hand of the professional essayist, lift the account high above the norm for this genre.

While Heuss' account vividly evokes aspects of particularly the Weimar atmosphere, it does not provide much in the way of reflective evaluation on the larger problems with which historians and political scientists are still grappling. There is a noticeable contrast between the sections which trace his optimistic enrolment in the avant-garde cultural and social reform movements of Wilhelmine Germany, and those which recall a decreasing ability to grasp and explain the mass intoxication of the later Weimar period. Though the dynamics now were so far removed from the cultivated concerns of his "circle," or the liberal values of the rump DDP, Heuss maintained to the very end his record as a prolific author of political pamphlets, and his 1932 study of National Socialism reached a wide audience. But he notes that in contrast to his *belles lettres* efforts, all of his political publications had been produced haphazardly, usually developed from lecture notes at the suggestion of a publisher. In this volume he writes sorrowfully that an attempt to disentangle the complex interrelationships of the later Weimar period, or even to evaluate the conclusions of historians, "goes beyond the strength of an old man."

Kurt Sontheimer, a young political scientist teaching at Berlin, by contrast is not daunted by the problem of untangling the complex intellectual web which connects the right-wing, anti-rationalists who generated much of the anti-Republicanism which Heuss had striven to stem. Building on the exploratory studies of Mohler and others, he seeks to trace the common threads of a diffuse "Ideenbewegung" which effectively denied the Republic the "intellectual-spiritual support which it so urgently required." This he does effectively without getting lost in philosophical nuances by systematically tracing the movement from its premises to its link-up with the Nazi propaganda steamroller.

As one take-off point he utilizes an analysis of the relativist concepts dominant in the German Staatslehre, where the "turning away from 19th century ways of thinking had been more rapidly and thoroughly carried through than in almost any other discipline." Then turning to the intellectual impact of the war experience, he examines writers like Juenger and Moeller van den Bruck and the immense impact of their anti-rationalist ideas, funnelled though they were through small coteries and periodicals. An analysis of the main ideas and symbols of the movement take up the bulk of the book and he succeeds well in reconstructing the intellectual mosaic from diffuse sources. Curiously, he does not deal with explicitly Nazi writers, arguing that prior to 1933 the intellectual appeal of Nazism was practically nil for the right-wing elite. Rather it was the purely physical power of the movement which mesmerized the anti-Weimar ideologists of all right-wing colorations. "At least from 1931 on an Antidemocrat had to back the Hitler movement insofar if he did not want to appear as a dilletante observer of political reality."—Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *University of Florida.*

Workers Councils. By Adolph Sturmthal. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. 193. $5.00.)

In this book Professor Adolph Sturmthal proposes to use a "comparative method" to describe and analyze the operation of workers councils in France, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Poland. In consequence he hopes to formulate hypotheses about the "relationship between ideology, and the stage of industrialization (technology) in four countries and how these affect the industrial relations in the plant." Specifically he wants to know the extent to which these institutional arrangements make workers active participants in government and private enterprise decision-making.

To evaluate such an undertaking in "comparative method" it is necessary to know the frame of reference within which the author makes his interpretations. If Sturmthal is to compare French industrial relations experience with that of the United States, for example, his interpretation of American experience must be reasonably clear. However, with the exception of an occasional reference to specific United States labor conditions, Sturmthal fails to build his study on any established theory of the American labor movement.

If the phenomena he is examining are not comparable to the United States, Sturmthal could develop, instead, some sort of working European model. He doesn't do this either, but proceeds to treat each country separately, and indeed quite differently, before he makes any "comparisons." For these reasons the book seems to make random observations about workers councils in each of the four countries without contributing to any theory of European industrial relations.

Since Sturmthal provides no explicit intellectual framework one is forced to look for inarticulate major premises underlying his study. A careful reading of the book suggests that the author is interpreting events through a neo-classical economic model in which "rational economic decisions" play a leading role in a country's growth and expansion. If this interpretation is valid his preference for a society with few governmental restraints, and greater worker participation is not surprising. One may even sympathize with him when he reluctantly "finds" that workers, particularly those in industrially backward countries, exhibit less capabilities or inclinations for making economic decisions. Sturmthal finds that wherever "workers councils" function, "management prerogative," ostensibly shared with the workers, inevitably returns to private or governmental employers (managers).

One reason why comparison with American experience is difficult is that such councils have no real parallel in this country. If anything, they are similar to the "company unions" or "joint-employer-employee councils" widely prevalent during the "American Plan" pre-National Labor Relations Act days. Sturmthal informs us that those who promote workers councils "are not always clear about what it is that they are supposed to do."

Various forms of workers councils are supported or opposed by both the political Right and Left as well as by European employers and unions. At different times councils function as economic bargaining agents, management consultants, trade union reformers, trade union organizers, political party subdivisions, pressure groups, or localized protests. They arise "spontaneously" against "low" wages or "poor" working conditions, and differ from non-union shop committees in this country by the degree to which they are institutionalized. In Europe, unlike the United States, the councils have achieved legal status in that they are established in accordance with elaborate labor legislation or as a result of "collective labor agreements."

The "workers councils" in European countries also reflect a wide variety of special interests. On occasion they indicate syndicalist or socialist aspirations, while at other times they are a function of employer efforts to drive a wedge between plant workers and "outside" unions. The councils have been used to thwart and frustrate labor organizations as well as to nurture company loyalty, anti-unionism, and economic conservatism.

In France and Germany employers have taken advantage of workers councils to weaken the economic power of labor unions. In France in particular employers have been able to evade collective bargaining by dealing with workers councils that have been debilitated by "dual unionism" and internecine union struggles. In Germany "non-partisan unionism," "co-determination" between workers and employers, and "fear of communism" are among the many factors contributing to impotent workers councils. The ineffectiveness of the councils in Germany is also related to the differing perspectives of security-minded older employers as compared to the upwardly mobile and apathetic younger ones.

In Communist countries the "independence" of workers councils is an aftermath of union policies too closely allied with the policies of Russian occupation or influence. In Poland and Yugoslavia Communist governments have used workers councils to regain the confidence of the workers. In Poland, and to a lesser extent in Yugoslavia, the "independence" of the councils is disappearing as "de-Stalinized" governments succeed in reintegrating workers into the government's economic program. Sturmthal notes that workers in these countries are becoming increasingly involved in "management decisions" by sacrificing their "bread and butter" demands.

In the author's view workers councils are ineffective when they are shunted off from economic decision-making, or when political sanctions limit their pursuit of private incentives. If economic market behavior is his standard then a large part of his book is superfluous. However, if one seeks a broader social and political perspective for the phenomena under scrutiny, a different interpretation of the same phenomena is in order. Professor Sturmthal has provided valuable data but has not given us helpful interpretation.—NATHAN HAKMAN, *State University of New York (Harpur College)*.

U Nu of Burma. BY RICHARD BUTWELL. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. Pp. viii, 291, $7.50.)

With varying degrees of success, political scientists have used an assortment of methodological tools in their efforts to make precise and accurate descriptions and analyses of political phenomena in the nations of the non-Western world. Despite their willingness to experiment, few have given serious thought to the use of political biography as a means for studying decision-making, leadership and political behavior. The few biographies of Asian leaders which exist are the works of journalists and professional writers; therefore, the focus is upon the leader as a unique and special person rather than upon his leadership and interaction with his followers. The publication of Richard Butwell's biography of U Nu, Burma's former Prime Minister, marks a fresh departure by a political scientist. Both the subject and the method require us to give it serious consideration.

U Nu is no ordinary Burmese. If he appears to some as a typical Burman because of his open and friendly manner, his variety of moods, his Buddhist faith and use of astrology in arriving at important decisions, he strikes others as unusual because of his unique ability to command the loyalty and following of members of all ethnic and religious groups in Burma, to lead his nation through its greatest crisis when several rebellions erupted at once and part of the army deserted, to earn the respect of world leaders as he sought to transcend the "cold war" and find new means of bringing all sides together for peaceful discussions. He is complex and, therefore, difficult to explain and analyze. Butwell rightly chooses to follow his career, to examine his ideas and the influences which shaped his thought and action in an effort to understand and try to explain his attraction as a leader who was kept at the helm of the nation from 1947 to 1958 and returned briefly from 1960 to the coup in 1962. Using all resources available, but depending heavily on interviews with Nu and the people who know him, the author gives a careful and accurate description of the growth and development of his subject's political skills and involvement, but fails to convey the warmth, personality and style of the man which play such an important part in Nu's ability to win and hold a following. In some of his harsh judgments of the Burmese leader, Butwell reflects the wisdom of hindsight that was denied to Nu in the course of his day to day activities. Despite these criticisms, the book adds to our knowledge and understanding of the man and his times and should be read by all who are interested in Asian politics.

The biography, as a methodology, is only partially successful. Its greatest strength lies in its ability to provide much needed information about how this leader made many of the crucial decisions which affected his nation. Through interviews and reconstruction of events, the author can present a detailed and fairly accurate account of how the leader interacted with those who gave him advice and carried out his orders. Another advantage to this method is that it presents much-needed data about the socialization process. By its very nature, it is concerned with childhood-education and family life. Thus its results added to those of the anthropologist and sociologist will provide a factual basis for developing useful propositions about this process.

The method, as used by Butwell, is less satisfactory in describing the system of communication which exists between his subject and the people of Burma. On the basis of election results, Nu was the accepted leader; but little attention is given to how he attracted and held his following, how he mobilized them to action and why they passively accepted his illegal removal from office.

Finally, the biographical method is defective when its subject is still living and potentially able to return to power. Being dependent upon interviews with people who were involved in the decision-making process, with those who had a hand in deposing and arresting the subject and with others who might, at some future time, have to serve with or under the subject, the author is constantly faced with the fact that the information he is receiving is tentative, biased and incomplete at best. Without key documents, which are not yet in the public domain, the author cannot always check the accuracy of his evidence. Yet, despite these obvious weaknesses, the biography of a national or regional leader is valuable because it provides insights to the political process which other approaches cannot provide. Many will agree that the strengths of this method outweigh the defects and that other political scientists ought to follow the path marked out by Butwell in this study of an Asian leader.—JOSEF SILVERSTEIN, *Rutgers. The State University.*

Data in Comparative Research. (Vol. XVI, No. 1, International Social Science Journal, 1964. Pp. 180. $2.00.)

This issue presents a useful review of the location and organization of the world's principal repositories of survey and aggregate data for political research as well as a discussion of problems in their use.

British Politics in Transition, 1945–63. BY FRANCIS BOYD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Pp. 253. Cloth, $5.00; paper, $1.95.)

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. EDITED BY CYRIL E. BLACK AND THOMAS P. THORNTON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. 467. $10.00.)

This volume is a result of the growing concern of American social scientists with the genesis, generation, and spread of guerrilla warfare and revolutionary domestic strife as they are managed by Communist cadres intent upon acquiring power in underdeveloped countries. Its focus upon the manner in which violence is used in Communist strategy is no doubt a reflection of the deepening American involvement in Southeast Asia. Two assumptions underlie the fifteen essays: First, the nuclear stalemate has made the major contestants wary of triggering a big war. Accordingly, they are intensifying their efforts at influence-building by a variety of approaches, ranging from economic assistance and cultural exchanges to "wars of national liberation" and political subversion. Second, the postwar emergence of former colonial areas to independence and their frequently inadequate approach to modernization have contributed to chaotic conditions that are highly favorable to protracted, local struggles. With the increasing instability and frustration occasioned by mushrooming population growth, exaggerated expectations, and overburdened elites, the developing countries have become a major arena of Great Power rivalry.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I seeks to establish the ideological framework of the Communists' use of violence and "the experience which Communists had with violence up until the time of the Second World War." Part II presents five case studies of the Communist revolutionary experiences up to the death of Stalin—Eastern Europe, Finland, the Southeast Asia revolts, the Viet Minh complex, and Korea. Part III analyzes the evolution of Communist strategies for revolution in the various areas of the world, particularly the underdeveloped countries. The final essay in this section integrates Communist theory with Communist experience and formulates generalizations concerning the likely pattern of future Communist efforts.

This reviewer finds Part I interesting, but the least satisfying. No doubt the effort has to be made to construct and evaluate the "theory" of strategy that the Communists subscribe to in their approach to the seizure of power, if only because the Communists themselves dwell extensively on the subject. However, one must not exaggerate the role that Communist theoretical formulations for revolution have had in the past in bringing Communist Parties to power. Where the Soviets (and Chinese) have succeeded, they have done so largely because of operational adeptness, and not because of any reliance on theory.

The case studies are scrupulously researched, well-organized, and impressively analyzed. One finds fresh insights and valuable information in all of them. The view that the Communist theory of revolution should be cautiously treated is supported by R. V. Burks. In his brilliant overview of the dynamics of Moscow's takeover in Eastern Europe, he notes that Communist experience in that area is not readily transferable to other areas: "The seizures of power in Eastern Europe were a direct result of the occupation of the area by Soviet armies and followed hard upon a major military upheaval which had been a traumatic experience for all the peoples involved, victors as well as vanquished." In the absence of a general war, no similar extensive breakdown of political systems is apt to occur which could provide as promising an opportunity for rapid Communist takeovers.

The record is clear: prior to World War II, the Communist strategy of revolution nowhere succeeded, not even in Russia in 1917; indeed, had Lenin adhered to doctrine, he would not have made a revolution. The establishment of Communist states in Eastern Europe and China was due, to a crucial degree, to the favorable environment provided by an international war which seriously weakened the incumbent government and led to their ultimate demise, a point forcefully developed by Cyril E. Black in his astute summary chapter. Not even in Cuba were the Communists instrumental in making a revolution; rather, it was only with Castro's acquiescence that they were able to capture it.

The region-by-region survey of Communist prospects is also ably done. Thomas P. Thornton skillfully traces the evolution of Communist theoretical formulations on underdeveloped areas since 1956 and emphasizes the difficulty that Moscow has had in dealing with the "national bourgeoisie." In his comprehensive survey of Asia, however, he seems at times to underestimate the barrier that nationalism poses to Communist ambitions. Manfred Halpern suggests that Communist Parties may find penetration difficult in the Middle East and North Africa because the nationalist leaders of the region "have shown themselves more aware of the implications of ideological choices." James M. Daniel reviews the Cuban experience and speculates on its significance for evolving Soviet strategy. William H. Lewis catalogues previous Soviet shortcomings in Sub-Saharan Africa and shows how they have led to recent reevaluations from which a more challenging policy may be expected.

It is difficult to do justice here to the wealth of information and insights that are contained in this important volume. In grappling with one of the key developments of our day—the increased spread of internal warfare as a mode of effecting political, economic, and social change—the twelve contributors have produced solid, well-documented essays that deserve careful study.—Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Approaches to the Study of International Relations. By Charles Boasson. (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum and Co., 1963. Pp. 100.)

Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective. By Richard N. Rosecrance. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963. Pp. x, 314. $6.00.)

The orientation of these books is basically very different. Boasson's work might be labelled as a study which theorizes about theory, whereas Rosecrance is concerned with the development of theory through the study of international political systems during the past two centuries.

Boasson is willing to accept a more leisurely pace toward the development of international relations theory than many students of the subject on this side of the ocean. He cautions against the adoption of rigid models, hypothesizing that the insecurities created by the world situation have influenced the recent drive toward the development of a more coherent theory. In this search for short-cuts and easy explanations many distorted models have been accepted. He notes, for example, the undue influence of models of industrial sociology in the study of international relations. He is also critical of excessive borrowing from mathematics and the physical sciences.

Boasson's concern for keeping international relations theory flexible seems to be motivated largely by his dislike of current models such as the power politics or military models. Instead, he opts for an international accommodation model. It would serve as an ideal type which would help in asking the right questions, at least as far as Boasson is concerned.

Turning now to the Rosecrance book which deserves more serious consideration, I have a procedural complaint regarding his separation of the theoretical model from the data. The first part of the author's analysis resembles most traditional historical treatises. In the second portion of the work Rosecrance introduces his model, selecting empirical illustrations from the previous descriptive analysis. It seems to me that a blending of the two would have been preferable, for such a procedure would help to minimize the problem of developing an abstract model and never using it effectively as is so frequently the case.

Rosecrance has divided the period since 1740 into nine historical systems. There are bound to be differences of opinion concerning the precise cutting points, but in general this study used wars to note the end of a system.

Each system is analyzed in terms of factors of disturbance and those contributing to stability. Three factors contribute to the degree of disruption in the system: the compatibility of the objectives of the actors, the tenure of the elite, and the resource capabilities of the disturber. Of these factors, Rosecrance places the greatest emphasis upon the second one. He notes that the four disequilibrial systems were found to precede or to accompany changes in the security of tenure of the national elite, suggesting that the elite attempts to solidify national support by aggressive behavior in the international system. Though there is undoubtedly a close relationship between internal stability and external aggressiveness, one finds contrasting hypotheses in the literature to the effect that as conditions begin to improve and to stabilize internally, the foreign policy of a state becomes more buoyant and aggressive.

The stability of the system in the last analysis is dependent upon its capacity to check these disruptive forces. Two factors which the author labels regulative forces and environmental capacity are involved. The latter refers to the capabilities of the environment to absorb and placate the objectives of states. Consequently, the same "environmental pie" might be adequate during one period but not during another, depending upon the extent of revisionist drive in the system. It is remarkable, however, that Rosecrance has diagrammed both of these factors as equally important in offsetting the disruptive forces in all but one of the historical systems. Indeed, one sometimes gets the feeling that the author has determined in advance whether the system was stable or not and then has proceeded to draw the lines accordingly. If stable, more weight is given to the lines representing regulative and environmental capabilities; if unstable, disruptive forces are given more weight. An operational procedure, attempting to measure each of the variables in a quantitative fashion, would seem to have been preferable. Nevertheless, the author has gone one step beyond the chronological describer of historical events.

There are many conclusions and statements in the study with which the reader may disagree. For example, I do not regard the current international system as a tripolar one in which the neutrals have a crucial impact upon the system, as Rosecrance seems to imply. Although they may affect voting alignments in the United Nations, power, however measured, is largely bipolarized. It is interesting to note in this regard that the present system is the only one which Rosecrance has diagrammed in tripolar fashion. His diagrams would seem to indicate the predominance of bipolarity in earlier years, but such has not been the case. In defense of Rosecrance it should be remembered that he is dealing with abstract forces and divisions within the world society which are not necessarily equivalent with nation-state boundaries. This shows up prominently in his discussion of the conflict between the forces of conservatism and liberalism during the Nineteenth Century.

All in all the book is worthy of serious consideration. Rosecrance has demonstrated quite admirably what can be done with secondary source analysis. We need more studies of this kind designed to tie together our isles of knowledge.—LLOYD JENSEN, *University of Illinois.*

The Future of the Commonwealth. BY THE RT. HON. LORD CASEY. (London: Frederick Muller Limited. 1963. Pp. 187. 18/-.)

Few men living write on the theme of the Commonwealth out of greater depth of personal experience and involvement than the author of this brief, tightly packed and intensely practical book. Lord Casey's seven years in the 1920's as Australian Liaison officer with the British Foreign Office, made his Prime Minister, S. M. Bruce, the best informed of all the Dominion Prime Ministers on foreign affairs. His later career as Australia's first Minister in Washington, Churchill's Minister of State in Cairo, Governor of Bengal, Australian Minister of External Affairs for many years, followed by his membership of the House of Lords, has covered the best part of the history of both the Old and the New Commonwealth. He has witnessed and had a part in the quadrupling of the membership of the Commonwealth in the last decade and a half. The third of his book devoted to the "background," the recent history of the Old Commonwealth and the transition to the new, has illuminating insights based on his own intimate experience. But the heart of the book, as its title shows, is devoted to "What might be done" to realize the immense and exciting potentialities of what still remains as one of the most remarkable associations of nations in the world. The author is completely realistic about what he regards as the recent decline of influence of the Commonwealth in the world and its loss of cohesion and common purpose. Unless something is done to arrest the decline, he believes that "we are approaching the point of no return as regards the future of the Commonwealth." His book has important practical suggestions as to what could be done in such fields as economic and technical aid; systematic effort on the part of the governments to increase personal contacts, the fostering by governments of cooperative research on a Commonwealth wide basis in regard to technical aid, population control, science, technology and development techniques. He would like to see the setting up of regional cooperative centers for research in such fields; the creation of regional Commonwealth Universities and Technical Colleges in Asia, Africa and the West Indies; and a system of organised personal liaison supplementing the High Commissioner networks. The aid of all the old Commonwealth countries should be secured for the teaching of English in the new Commonwealth countries; and large numbers of low cost books in English should be produced for use in the new countries.

No other large scale international association has had anything like the richness of cultural, educational, linguistic and professional relations that exist in the Commonwealth. These are priceless assets taken for granted since they are the product of long historical association, yet liable to erosion as a result of the growing national maturity of the Members of the Commonwealth. The author suggests steps to "recreate" and strengthen some of the many old professional, educational, and linguistic links. Great powers like Russia and the United States, forced by atomic stalemate into new fields of competition to win goodwill and influence in the world, spend large sums to create artificially what the Commonwealth has naturally and for nothing. The history of the Commonwealth has revealed its great capacity to adjust itself to secular change. Lord Casey has witnessed some of these changes; but his book suffers a little from being anchored too much in the assumptions and preoccupations of the time of his writing. The long range effect of De Gaulle's slamming of the door to the Common Market may turn out to be favourable to the Commonwealth. India's policy and role in the Commonwealth may be changed greatly by the attack on her by China and the rallying to her aid of the older Commonwealth countries and the United States. The threat to Malaysia by Indonesia has brought a strong reaffirmation of solidarity in the defence of Malaysia as "a Commonwealth country." The re-affirmation has come from the older Commonwealth countries to a new Asian Member. In Sir Robert Menzies' words in the Australian Parliament, pledges have been given of military assistance "in the defence of Malaysia's territorial integrity and political independence" in application of the "golden rule of mutual obligation."—H. DUNCAN HALL, *Bethesda, Maryland.*

The Passion of the Hawks. BY TRISTRAM COFFIN. (New York, Macmillan, 1964. Pp. 280. $5.95.)

Tristram Coffin has written about an important subject, but unfortunately he has written a terrible book. *The Passion of the Hawks* is a potpourri of quotations and anecdotes, strung together with simple journalistic logic, and ending with a hawk-like shriek at the perversity of man. Coffin is disturbed about the hold militarism has on America as a result of the requirements of the cold war. By "militarism" he means a state which has become critically tied to heavy arms production and cannot extricate itself from a continued dependence on high defense budgets. This is a dependence borne as much—if not more—by civilians, both politicians and industrialists, as by military leaders. Indeed, Coffin ends his book with a long quotation from a military man, General Omar Bradley, asking "How long . . . can we put off salvation?" as if to prove that a uniform does not necessarily make a man evil.

Coffin's book comes at a time when the broad dimensions of the cold war are changing. The early bipolarity has given way to a greater diffusion of power and to a kind of partnership between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. to maintain political stability in a world they dominate, but cannot completely control. The concept of "enemyship" which has been fostered by the cold war is no longer a valid guide for American national policy. And here Coffin is on the right track when he asks whether it is possible for America to develop and accept a different working rule for its diplomacy and defense when important vested interests are based on a continuation of the cold war spirit. Coffin is pessimistic and frustrated about the answer to this question, first, because he mistakes economic interest for political influence, and, second, because the only alternative to the cold war he poses is disarmament, about which he is equally—and rightly—pessimistic and frustrated. On the first point, he seems to forget that the "military-industrial complex," for all its power, could not defeat the nuclear test ban treaty once the possibility of negotiation existed and the President put his prestige behind it. And on the second point, new concepts of arms control have demonstrated that there is another—though more complex—set of alternatives between complete reliance on deterrence and complete impasse on disarmament.

Coffin's book bears comparison with Fred Cook's *The Warfare State,* which appeared about a year ago. Both are polemics, both are written by experienced newspapermen, both are reckless in the way they use their sources (though in Cook's book there are references, in Coffin's there are none), and both work away at important problems about which political scientists have made some, but not enough of a systematic contribution.

Despite the fact that the literature on national security affairs has become overwhelming during the past ten years, there is little to help understand the difficulties involved in shifting from the relative simplicity of the cold war to the complexities of a world of diffused power, as a basis for national policy. Where scholars have tended to look at the "inward" effects of the cold war, they have concentrated on efficiency and rationality in the organization of the Executive Branch. The work on the economics of disarmament (which is highly relevant to the issues raised by the polemicists) is relatively recent, largely technical, and written as if the transition from a defense-supported economy were an economic, rather than a political problem. Few scholars have been concerned with the impact of the cold war on the nature of American politics, on the choice of presidential candidates, on congressional elections, on the character of political debate, and on the problem of developing consensus in a individualistic, diversified society. The cold war has been a convenient rallying point for uniting the country behind its international commitments, and sometimes its internal goals, as well. If the nature of the cold war changes (on the assumption it will not "wither away"), the United States will have to find a new basis for gaining a democratic consensus on its world role and, in this quest, the political scientist should not leave the entire task of political analysis to writers like Mr. Coffin (and, for that matter, Mr. Cook).—GENE M. LYONS, *Dartmouth College.*

The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives. BY ALEXANDER DALLIN. (New York: Praeger, 1962. Pp. viii, 244. $5.75.)

The presuppositions of communism and of the United Nations are incompatible, making their coexistence at best an illogicality and at worst an expedient of temporary duration. Communism divides the world into the "peace zone" and the "imperialist camp." The expectation and prediction of its theory is that the former will expand to the detriment of the latter, eventually eliminating it from history, and with it the United Nations, which the theory views as merely a part of the superstructure of the capitalist world. The United Nation's assumptions of compromise through negotiation and of the amelioration of social and economic conditions through cooperation are, from the point of view of good communist theory, in vain, for the historical process is inexorable and will not yield to superficiality. Moreover, as the socialist world expands, it will not need the same expedients. The contradictions in society will have been resolved and basic harmony will prevail. It will be a classless society and, therefore, stateless. The trappings of politics, including the United Nations, will be irrelevant. Such is the Utopian forecast of communist thought.

This poses the question why anything but scorn should be the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the United Nations. Going back to the League of Nations, Dallin points out that prudence prevailed when in 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League as a hedge against the Fascist threat. A similar motive, he believes, continued to play a part in the Soviet attitude toward the founding of the United Nations, along with concern about what the United Nations might portend in her absence, and satisfaction at being accepted as a leading power.

Stalin's indifference to the United Nations was rudely shaken by Korea. This and other reverses, however, were attributed to the domination of the United Nations by the United States. Throughout this initial period, the Soviet Union was very much on the defensive. It saw no positive role for the United Nations in its own policy. Moreover, it refrained from joining other international organizations—nor did it conceal its contempt for them.

After Stalin's death the dogmatic rigidity of Soviet policy began to relax—in the United Nations, as elsewhere. Indeed, Dallin cites persuasive evidence that from 1955 to 1960, Khrushchev was highly optimistic about achieving a majority in the United Nations on behalf of Soviet objectives. He saw the new nations as natural allies. But his Middle Eastern policy was not profitable. Neither was the General Assembly amenable to Soviet leadership. Serious disillusionment came in the Congo, where Soviet aid to the Lumumba faction was frustrated by United Nations personnel acting under mandate of a Security Council resolution—to which the Soviet Union had itself acceded.

Stalin's initial indifference had given way to intense hostility toward Trygve Lie. Now Khrushchev's optimism was followed by implacable hostility toward Hammarskjold, followed by the demand for a "Troika"—the first formal demand by any government for fundamental change in the structure of the United Nations. This move received no support whatever outside the Soviet bloc. Neither did the Soviet Union succeed in imposing conditions on the election of U Thant, nor was it successful in its demand for splitting the membership of the Secretariat evenly three ways. However, one thing did result. The Soviet Union has for the first time become concerned with filling its own quota of appointees to the Secretariat.

"In the long run," Dallin says, "the contending forces as now defined and inspired may well be unable to coexist." "Yet," he continues, "in the short run . . . restraint from recourse to extremes, retreat from the logical to the political, from incompatibility to coexistence, from the inexorable to the possible, refraining from the *ultima ratio*, remain the essence of power politics. So long as this is true, there is continuing and important room for the United Nations, and for the Soviet Union as a part of it, in the duel of our age."

The unreality of communism's world view is bound to result in discrepancy between it and the actual policy of the Soviet Union. The reviewer would, therefore, be inclined to adopt a somewhat different emphasis from that of Dallin's conclusion. The long run would seem to be somewhat more promising than he suggests. As logic becomes increasingly compromised by practice, one might expect ideology to yield progressively to reality.

The book is an excellent treatment of a difficult subject. The final admonition of the author is beyond cavil. The United Nations cannot resolve the deep-seated conflicts among the great powers. To put this burden upon it would be to invite its collapse.—EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, *Indiana University.*

Diversity in International Communism, A Documentary Record, 1961–1963. EDITED BY ALEXANDER DALLIN WITH JONATHAN HARRIS AND GREY HODNETT for the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. 867. $10.00 cloth; $3.60, paper.)

Two rather different things make up this large and expertly edited book. Above all, there are 120 documentary items from twenty-five countries. These are accompanied by useful background information on the documents, on related developments, and on other countries. The documents range in length fron forty-four pages (the full text of Enver Hoxha's speech of November 7, 1961) to half a page (Malayan and Thai telegrams of greetings).

These documents reflect the ever greater and ever more heterogeneous flow of significant policy statements from Communist leaders all over the world. As such, the documents illuminate recent events most vividly. To be sure, on a technical plane one regrets the absence of a chronology and index. But students of politics, and of social change as well, are greatly indebted to the Columbia faculty members and publisher who brought out this excellent collection and its two 1956 forerunners, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* and *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe.*

However, the present volume is not only a collection of documents. Its editors state a second purpose, which lends it a substantive and methodological significance that a documentary collection by itself cannot possess. The significance derives from the twenty-page introduction to the volume, "Issues and Methods," by Alexander Dallin and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of Columbia University. The introduction emphasizes two propositions:

1. Key published documents, and the whole function of political communication, tell us more about the Communist variant of the political process than any other source.

2. Content analysis (or "specialized textual analysis," as the authors of the introduction call it) has of late been repeatedly borne out by subsequent events. To illustrate the successful utilization of this approach, the authors of the introduction point to recent books by Myron Rush, Donald S. Zagoria, Robert Conquest, Allen S. Whiting, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and William E. Griffith.

Professors Dallin and Brzezinski did well to devote a major portion of their all too brief introduction to Communist-type political communication. For it is worth noting that most Western interpretations today focus on "esoteric" political communication and its analysis. The methods of doing so remain all too often obscure or altogether unstated, and no less seldom lead to conjectures based on insufficient or quite ambigious documentation. The authors of the introduction to *Diversity in International Communism* warn against such malpractice, and their own systematic and cautious essay offers a variety of do's and don'ts. Nevertheless, the brevity of these introductory remarks, and the stated link between the present volume and the "esoteric communication" approach tend to raise and yet leave unanswered some basic questions about the value and the proper use of Communist documents. It is substantive scholarship alone that can test such documents and go beyond them.—GEORGE FISCHER, *Cornell University.*

Reunification and West German-Soviet Relations. BY WERNER FELD. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 204.)

The author of this monograph, which concerns one of the more troublesome issues of contemporary world affairs, concentrates on a single manageable aspect of the problem. As his subtitle indicates, he delimits attention to: "The Role of the Reunification Issue in the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1957, with Special Attention to Policy toward the Soviet Union."

The resulting study is neither a definitive historical recounting of the devisement of that policy, nor is it a comprehensive analysis of its development and application in the foreign relations of West Germany. Rather, it is a disquisition in the nature of a case study of the reunification policy, particularly as it is involved in West Germany's post-World-War-II relations with the Soviet Government.

An "Introduction" presents essential background to place the subject in perspective and describes the author's methodology, and the main body of the study is composed of four chapters. The first three deal, respectively, with the formulation of West German policy, the juxtaposition of the basic motivations and goals of West German and Soviet foreign policy, and the interaction of specific foreign policy issues between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. The final chapter summarizes the author's conclusions, suggests possible alternatives, and conjectures respecting the future.

The author questions the oft-stated general supposition that "The supreme goal of the Federal government . . . remains the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom" (p. 21). At the outset he hypothesizes: "Reunification in peace and freedom has had a lower political value than other foreign policy goals, and as a consequence, West German foreign policy makers, for reasons to be determined, pressed the pursuit of certain other foreign policy goals over reunification" (p. 23).

To test his hypothesis, he examines whether the foreign policy decision-making process of the Federal Republic has been so structured that reunification could prevail as a supreme value over alternative foreign policy goals, and he does so by reviewing the institutional aspects of the process, including the Foreign Office, the Foreign Service, and other important elite interest groups. Then, turning to international interaction, he analyzes the response of the Federal Republic to its interrelationship with the Soviet Union, in order to determine whether reunification was preferred to other policy goals, and he investigates German action vis-a-vis the Soviet Government respecting various policy issues, including rearmament, neutralization, a peace treaty, the Eastern provinces, and various other diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, as well as what he calls the mechanics of reunification.

Concerning basic policy, he concludes: "Undoubtedly reunification was considered as an important foreign policy goal, but when certain crucial choices had to be made, the attainment of other goals, such as alignment with the West and a strong economic posture, was preferred. These were the goals which were actually valued highest by the policy makers." (P. 180; also see p. 66.)

The approach taken by the author has undoubted merits, not the least of which is the concentration of attention on a dialectical analysis of the anatomy of an important policy problem. His volume is of interest and value, therefore, to serious-minded students of contemporary world affairs, in general, and of German affairs, in particular.

The approach also has its limitations, however. Because of the brevity of the study, it appears to be somewhat superficial, and in some respects the author relies rather heavily on the conclusions of the research of others. The reader may not be fully convinced that certain matters, such as the positions taken by the policy-influencing elites, have been examined in sufficient depth to warrant the generalizations reached.

Second, one wonders whether additional German foreign and internal policy objectives were adequately surveyed, such as achieving the termination of the occupation of West Germany and the joining of the family of nations as a trustworthy participant in world affairs, the establishment and maintenance of internal socio-political stability and the founding of a democratic system, the achievement of international power and prestige, and the like. By and large, these have been consummated, and in all probability this would have been impossible if the Federal Government had been ardently pursuing reunification in the context of the East–West Cold War.

Finally, the methodology employed tends to induce a polemical treatment, so that the reader is guided along a path of apparently predetermined logic, which the author seems to feel obliged to defend.

For a fuller understanding of the reunification problem, therefore, the reader will find it to his advantage to consider this volume in juxtaposition with other studies on the question, particularly Gerald Freund's *Germany Between Two Worlds* (1961), Grant S. McClellan's *The Two Germanies* (1959), Hilmar W. Schlueter's *Die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands* (1961), Heinrich Siegler's *Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage . . .* (1959), and especially James H. Wolfe's *Indivisible Germany: Illusion or Reality?* (1963).—ELMER PLISCHKE, *University of Maryland.*

World Pressures on American Foreign Policy. EDITED BY MARIAN D. IRISH. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 172. $1.95.)

This collection of eight essays, first presented as a series of guest lectures at Florida State University, is addressed to the question, "What ideologies, forces, events, and persons over which the United States has no jurisdiction are none the less influential in determining the role of the United States in the changing world scenes?"

Two fascinating paradoxes mark the transition that has taken place in recent decades in American foreign policy. One of these is that the more sophisticated and capable of coping with the environment the policy-making machinery of the nation has become, the less presumptuous the nation's policy-makers seem to be about their ability to control the environment. The second and closely related paradox is that the more awareness the nation's policy-makers have displayed of the limitations of their ability to control the world environment, the more extensive has become the commitment of the nation's resources to interaction with the environment. A strong commitment of the United States to broad international responsibilities came only with the trauma of World War II and its ensuing consequences. Since that time the glib self-confidence which marked the heyday of "manifest destiny" has been replaced by a growing awareness among policy-makers and attentive public of the need to understand the environmental factors which impose upon the nation both limitations and demands. *World Pressures on American Foreign Policy* is a reflection of this growing awareness and a contribution to it.

Marian Irish has written a succinct introduction to the essays, relating key points in each essay to one another in a way that helps to provide a coherence and logic which one might otherwise miss. The book quite properly has modest goals. It must also be said, however, that the collection suffers, as the products of symposia or lecture series often do, from a somewhat uneven treatment of the subject at hand.

For example, a twelve page essay by Gwendolyn Carter on "United States Foreign Policy toward South Africa" is the only attention which the rapidly changing continent of Africa receives, except inferentially, in the collection. The Middle East, a turbulent laboratory of awkward adaptation of American policy to the conflicting demands of Arab nationalism, Israeli nationalism, and adherence to the doctrine of containment of Communism, is ignored in the book. The problems which Western Europe poses for U. S. policy are dealt with in an article on Great Britain by William Livingston and in one entitled "Western Europe: Promise and Dilemma," focusing almost exclusively on France and the Common Market, by Roy Macridis. NATO receives a scant three pages of attention; Western Germany receives none. Essays on Latin America and on Asia are provided by Federico Gil and Lucian Pye, respectively.

Topics other than regional ones which were included in the volume were ideology, in an essay by Henry Mayo, and colonialism and dictatorship, in an essay by Frederick Watkins. Both essays are valuable and to the point. Other "forces . . . over which the United States has no jurisdiction" well might have been considered also. For example, what impact has technological change had upon American foreign policy? How have changes in means of communications and patterns of communications affected foreign policy? What problems do world patterns of population growth pose for American foreign policy? What has been the consequence for American foreign policy of commitments to international organizations, such as the United Nations?

Detailed comment on individual essays is not possible in this brief review. Some will differ with the positions taken by various authors. However, it is to the credit of authors and editor that value positions are clearly identified, essays are well organized and tightly argued. Therefore, the volume will have some utility as a supplemental reader in an introductory course in American foreign policy. Limitations of scope and depth of coverage to some extent are compensated for by brief judicious suggestions for further reading at the end of each essay.—John P. Lovell, *Indiana University.*

The Politics and Economics of European Integration. By U. W. Kitzinger. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 246. $5.50.)

EWG und Freihandelszone. By Karl Kaiser. (Leiden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963. Pp. viii, 270.)

In his book, Kitzinger has written the best available short analysis of the Common Market. Indeed, he has written two books. The first deals with the background of the European integration movement and the nature of federalist strategy in seeking a supranational Europe. In the second part, Kitzinger, who is English, presents a strong plea and case for British entry into the Common Market. Kaiser's book, originally written as a dissertation at the University of Cologne, complements Kitzinger nicely since it examines in detail the negotiations between Britain and the Six from Messina in 1955 to the end of these negotiations in 1958. It has become commonplace to blame de Gaulle for Britain's exclusion from Europe. Both of these books clarify that Britain's own record hardly excludes her from blame.

She was asked to join ECSC but refused. She was asked to join EDC before its demise; again she refused. And when the Six were planning EEC, Britain was once more asked to join; and again she spurned the offer. Instead, she suggested a larger Free Trade Area which, by eliminating the common tariff behind which the Six expected to integrate, would have killed the Common Market even before its birth. And when the Common Market was born, she sought to strangle the young infant with the rival Outer Seven.

But the Market proved a success. Kitzinger attributes it to the technique of integration. "Federalists believe that integration—whether economic or political, and above all a combination of the two—has its own logic and gathers its own impetus. Once the first few steps are taken, the rest will sooner or later, in one way or another, tend to follow. Integration of coal and steel will remove political obstacles to Franco-German friendship and create certain common interests. It will raise problems of transport harmonization and of social policy . . . The process snowballs until a single European Political Community results." He also stresses that although the Council of Ministers make the essential decisions, "this does not make the Economic Community into a merely inter-governmental organization . . . the bulk of major policy decisions can be taken only on the proposal of the Commission, so that the proposals themselves must come originally from an institution which is supranational in the Community sense. Without such a proposal from the Commission the Council is hamstrung. With the power of initiative the monopoly of the Community institution, and the power to legislate the monopoly of the governmental institution, the two are effectively interdependent, and policies must be evolved in a dialogue between them." The vital role of interest groups in this integrative process is also stressed.

Finally, Kitzinger emphasizes that while Europe's economic growth and political importance continue to rise, Britain continues to decline. Her exports to the Commonwealth have dropped drastically while the latter's trade with the Six is going up. Britain is not only increasingly unable to compete with American and European products in the favored Commonwealth market, but even in Britain itself! Imports were, for instance, rising fast in such traditional exports as textile manufactures, railway vehicles, ships, heavy electrical equipment, and many metal-manufactures. And in providing funds for developing nations, including the Commonwealth countries, the so-called "inward-looking" Six are second only to America. West Germany alone is providing more funds for India's and Pakistan's current Five-Year Plans than Britain. But the real case for Britain's entry into the Common Market is not profits, but politics. In an age of super-powers, only large powers can play a major role. As an isolated power, Britain would be increasingly ignored by Washington, Moscow, Peking, even New Delhi; their attention would be focused on Brussels. If Britain however joined the Community she would be able to continue exercising her influence. "All we can ask ourselves is whether Britain should be presented by that Community with *faits accomplis* in its own foreign policies, or whether Britain is to have a share in its decisions and their execution."

Yet on two points, Kitzinger is weak. First, like many functionalists, he overestimates the significance of the economic "snowballing" effect or, what Haas has called, the "spill-over." If this spill-over is to occur from the economic to the political realm, it requires a degree of political will. EEC was a deliberate creation of the Six. The very procedure by which the Council reaches decisions are less a predetermined result of a virtually automatic spill-over than of a prior political decision by each of the member governments to integrate. The spill-over is, in brief, the effect rather than the cause of further integration. The states remain the principal actors. Second, Britain's refusal to choose between the Commonwealth and Europe in the economic realm might have been brought about more clearly in order to underline Britain's own responsibility for the French veto of her membership. Kitzinger does say that the British negotiations "were asking, at one and the same time, for Britain to join the club, for special exceptions to the rules to be made in her favor (or more particularly in favor of her overseas family), and for certain of the rules of the club in effect to be changed also for its founder-members," but his discussion of the partial package deal does not properly convey the large number of economic problems which still remained unsolved.

Kitzinger does, however, see Nassau as a major factor in precipitating the de Gaulle veto, but he fails to elaborate this vital point. After almost 18 months of stalling, haggling, and seeking special privileges on essentially secondary matters, Britain chose between Europe and America in 48 hours. De Gaulle's veto was a logical conclusion of *Britain*'s choice. How Britain thought it could merge into powerful European union while militarily maintaining its special relationship with the United States remains a mystery. But it should not have been a mystery to Washington. If the latter desired British entry, London should have been allowed to use its only real bargaining point—its nuclear force—as an entrée into the Six. American policy only served to confirm de Gaulle's antipathy to "Anglo-Saxon" domination of NATO, as well as his suspicions that Britain's role within the Common Market would be that of a "Trojan horse" seeking to prevent its emergence as a strong, independent actor on the world scene and maintaining its subordinate status as America's ward. The miscalculations of London and Washington, which have generally been ignored by focussing all the blame on de Gaulle for purportedly wrecking the Kennedy Grand Design, might have been dealt with more fully in evaluating the responsibility for the collapse of the British membership negotiations. Nevertheless, the Kitzinger remains a splendid book which, one hopes, will be widely read by American college students in its paperback version, and the Kaiser provides a comprehensive and useful historical background.—John W. Spanier, *University of Florida.*

The Peaceful Atom and Foreign Policy. By Arnold Kramish. (New York and Evanston: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. xi, 276. $5.50.)

Arnold Kramish, a physicist, has been with RAND since 1951, served earlier with the Manhattan Project and the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and has served as a consultant on research and development to institutions of the European Economic Community and the OECD. His volume is packed full of information about the problems that applications of developing nuclear science are creating for the inhabitants of Earth. His evaluations of the capacity of political leaders to handle these problems make our future seem less inviting. His numerous suggestions for more effective policies and international institutions are provocative yet realistic.

Part I, a primer of basic knowledge about peaceful and military applications of atomic energy, might be too elementary for some but was highly informative to the reviewer. Particularly significant is the conclusion:

> Whether or not the world will be able to minimize the dangers inherent in the further diffusion of nuclear weapons will depend to a major extent upon whether agreements can be reached on the control and applications of peaceful atomic energy. Moreover, if significant accord cannot be attained on the peaceful applications, it is probable that the desired accord in the military sphere will never be achieved (p. 26).

Part II, "Developing Technologies," discusses the use of nuclear energy for power, propulsion, excavation, and for a variety of other purposes such as food preservation, pest control, and sewage disposal. Kramish again and again points out that regulation of hazards in the use of fissionable material, as well as the fulfillment of potential contributions to all mankind, requires international controls and planning.

Part III, "Disintegrating Policies," offers a brief survey of national nuclear capabilities and policies. Particular attention is given to the implementation of these policies in international organizations: Euratom, the European Nuclear Energy Agency (atomic arm of OECD), and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Kramish concludes:

> Much of the sad state of affairs which exists in understanding the issues of the atomic age must be attributed to the simple fact that political issues are being handled by scientists who only dimly comprehend the mechanisms of state craft, while many scientific decisions are being made by individuals who are perhaps politically astute but who either mistakenly believe that the basic facts of the atom are beyond their comprehension or assume they know enough (p. 252).

He proposes that needed "multitalented individuals" be developed, beginning in the senior year of college, continuing through graduate training, and including summer assistantships at atomic energy laboratories.

Throughout the book the attention of the political scientist is drawn to the tremendous importance of theories on the development of international organizations, and less formal international institutions, to mankind's efforts to utilize nuclear energy without either widespread destruction or pollution. This volume demonstrates that implicit theories are being developed by thoughtful practitioners. For example, Kramish points to the role small nations can play as "catalysts" through insisting on IAEA inspection of reactors received from the USSR or the United States (p. 206). He indicates how present insistence on autonomy by major powers may actually limit their control over their external environment when more nations have nuclear capability (p. 63). He shows how "a few leading nations" can sometimes put proposals into effect by declaring they will adopt them regardless of what others do. This may bring general acceptance quicker than conditional proposals to be adopted only if all nations agree (p. 73).

Kramish suggests that we may have to establish a "substructure, or a matrix, of nuclear behavior" before more comprehensive disarmament schemes can be implemented (p. 80). He offers a specific proposal for phased control of fissionable material moving in international trade which would lead to internal inspection of all installations reported to be peaceful (p. 72). Part of the gain from such activities would be an enhancement of the capacity of the IAEA to handle more extensive controls.

The sponsors of this volume, the Council on Foreign Relations, could make another important contribution by another study which would help to make the theories of international organization implicit in such proposals more explicit. Though political science has modest achievements in this area, the work on international integration of Karl Deutsch, Amitai Etzioni, and Ernst Haas seems most relevant.[1] Perhaps Mr. Kramish and a political scientist together might provide the talent needed for such a volume. This is not meant to detract from the volume under review in which Mr. Kramish, without evident use of the relevant literature in political science, sensitively and creatively discusses the development of political organizations.—CHADWICK F. ALGER, *Northwestern University*.

The Abolition of War. BY WALTER MILLIS AND JAMES REAL. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. Pp. xvii, 217. $4.50; Paper, $1.95.)

This book is an important addition to the growing literature which sees an analysis of the reasons for the persistence of war as a prerequisite for any progress in eliminating it. The authors point out that war "is a system, or cultural pattern for organizing and institutionalizing violence in intergroup relations" (p. 4). Buttressing their arguments with brief historical surveys, they maintain that whereas in the past wars and military institutions performed a social function, this is no longer true at present. They show how technology and politics in the last 150 years have been working towards the collapse of "the war system." War has become total and fighting war is ever more suicidal. Military power has become "useless" and the war system is characterized by its "inutility." The book presents a persuasive argument that the continuing competition in weaponry among the major powers is "insane."

The authors assert that "it is the great weapons systems themselves—with all the fears and ambitions that they engender—that are the major 'causes' of war between modern highly integrated states" (p. 108). The task of abolishing war is the task of bringing about a demilitarized world, and the requirement for this is said to be a revolutionary change in attitudes. Above all, men must come to regard the war system as "obsolete." They must also surrender certain "established concepts" and "myths" which they now apply to international relations. They must abandon the idea that the safety of their national communities depends upon military preparations and the myth that military ritual and war are essential for national unity.

The demilitarization which would be made possible by changed attitudes would come about through unilateral actions and tacit or self-enforcing agreements rather than through negotiated disarmament. A transition period of a dozen years is suggested in which competition in weapons would be replaced by a stabilized deterrence system. In the demilitarized world power conflicts would not be absent, but they would be carried on without resort to war (although some localized guerrilla conflicts might still occur). Power would be concentrated in a few great power centers such as Western Europe, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, and it is claimed that in the new context these powers would cooperate in maintaining order in the world.

It seems to this reviewer that the authors are correct in emphasizing the existence of a war system, embedded in our culture and sustained by widely accepted myths, as the fundamental reason for the persistence of war. Moreover, their call for a revolution in attitudes, leading to a demilitarized world, is quite appropriate. However, one may question whether their proposals go far enough in view of their own analysis and their radical goal. If the great weapons systems are indeed as useless and dangerous as maintained, then why not begin by getting rid of them now rather than holding out the doubtful hope that they may be stabilized? The authors insist that abolishing war need not await the establishment of a full-blown system of world law and world government. Yet one wonders if they do not underestimate the degree to which some moves in this direction would be required. If the war system is "deeply embedded in the notion of the sovereign national state" (p. 7), then some transformation in world organization more fundamental than the system of harmoniously coexisting super-sovereignties envisaged by the authors would appear to be needed. And if this is the case then the problem also involves modifications in loyalties and the creation of a world community—matters which the book does not deal with. But whatever areas of disagreement a reader may have, this is certainly a thought-provoking book meriting careful attention from all those concerned with preventing or abolishing war.—MICHAEL C. STRATFORD, *University of Minnesota.*

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[1] See, for example, Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification," *American Political Science Review*, XVI (December, 1962), 927–935; and Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," *International Organization*, XV, No. 3 (Summer, 1961), 366–392.

Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union. BY NILS ÖRVIK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1963. Pp. x, 64. $1.00.)

This is an extremely provocative tract by a Norwegian Laborite publicist and political scientist. Örvik's argument, which receives Henry Kissinger's imprimatur in a Foreword, is as follows: Soviet leaders fear that time is running out for them in the attempt to gain their major goal, control of Western Europe. The likely consequences of open aggression in Central Europe, especially Berlin, are too dangerous, even from the Soviet point of view. Soviet occupation of a peripheral NATO area would be both less risky and more productive; it would not be likely to arouse a direct military response from NATO, and the gains could be enormous. All the European members of the Western alliance would observe that the United States did not defend a member of that alliance, and would rush for a place on the neutralist (or perhaps even the Soviet) bandwagon. The possibility of Soviet aggression on the southern flank of NATO is dismissed by Örvik in three sentences. "What remains then as the most favorable NATO area is the vulnerable northern flank. Here the Soviets could combine their major political motive of weakening the alliance with important strategic objectives."

For Örvik, the whole northern flank of NATO (the front line from Germany northward) is not in danger—merely the "Northern Cap." This letter term is used today by sophisticated Northern Europeans to refer to what in the old days was called Lapland. Örvik, however, defines the "Northern Cap" in a novel way to include "those parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Soviet Union north of the 66th parallel and extending from the Norwegian Sea on the west to the White Sea on the east. It also includes the ocean areas and islands (notably Spitsbergen) between the northern coasts of those four countries and the Pole." In view of the facts that this area is *terra incognita* to most political scientists, and that Örvik's argument is based on geography, the two small maps are pitifully inadequate. Furthermore, it is doubtful that as an analytical concept "Northern Cap" has much value in thinking about international politics, since the four states involved have divergent approaches to international politics.

In spite of these divergent approaches, most observers probably assume that northernmost Europe is not one of the focal points of the cold war. Örvik, however, sees a direct conflict between the economic and strategic interests of the Soviet Union and Norway. The economic conflict is over the fishing industry in the Barents Sea. It is, frankly, difficult to envision Soviet leaders initiating a third world war over Norwegian cod and herring, however tasty. One suspects that these leaders would find Berlin much more appetizing than the Barents Sea. Örvik's analysis of Soviet strategic aims in Northern Europe is primarily historical, and it is here that his interpretation is weakest. The core of this analysis is a summary of Russo-Finnish relations which cannot stand serious scholarly scrutiny. Örvik describes, for instance, the policies of "the Finnish president, General Mannerheim" in the middle 1930's. Perhaps unfortunately for Finland, and certainly unfortunately for Örvik, Mannerheim was not then President of Finland. Without understanding Russo-Finnish relations (both Soviet and Finnish leaders will be surprised to learn that Finland does not interest the former militarily), Örvik suggests that Norway is today in the position of Finland in 1939. For undocumented strategic reasons that amount to *Lebensraum* for the Soviet Navy, Örvik foresees the Soviet Union occupying Norwegian territory. There is some artful language about "low-level, gradual extension of control" used in this prediction, but it is not explained how Soviet leaders could occupy territory of another state without the use of military force—especially territory belonging to a nation which resisted Hitler longer in 1940 than did France. Örvik, nevertheless, assumes that Norway would not fight to maintain its territorial integrity, and that NATO would not defend Norway. Clearly this tract is no more optimistic in its assumptions about human motivations than it is precise in its concepts or accurate in its history.—MARVIN RINTALA, *Boston College.*

Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964. Pp. 252. $5.00.)

The Sino-Soviet dispute has recently grown with such rapidity that it is difficult to keep abreast of events. This has had two effects. First, the disputants have introduced enough new data to render obsolescent almost every commentary written before December 1962. Second, general interest in Sino-Soviet relations has risen steeply, causing an unsatisfied demand for facts and interpretations. It is natural that journalists first attempt to fill this breach. So far, we have had three journalistic accounts: Edward Crankshaw's *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking;* David Floyd's *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict;* and the volume presently under review.

Harry Schwartz's volume is the most ambitious, as he introduces the entirety of Sino-Russian history to explain why the two nations have come almost full circle since 1949. The reason, according to the author, is simple and genetic: Chinese and Russian "fundamental interests" by nature always have been opposed. These interests are vaguely ascribed to realms of power, biology, national interests, historic and cultural backgrounds, levels of economy, and ambitions of national leaders. Marxism-Leninism, a recent accretion to both nations, is much less important. It follows, therefore, that ideological disputes are mere cloaks for national differences. A remark by President de Gaulle sets the tone: "The banner of ideology in reality covers only ambitions."

It is not surprising that the author fails to prove his thesis: his task is too big. By summarizing secondary Western sources, Schwartz can only present a one-sided and superficial picture. He gives little analysis of the domestic determinants of Chinese foreign policy. He does not relate Tsarist-Manchu relations to the European struggle for power. He pictures Stalin as a Soviet tsar pursuing an Eastern policy identical to that of his predecessors. Schwartz's list of determinants of Soviet and Chinese policy are not continually related to the history; the result is often a jumble of unexplained facts. As the author moves closer to the present, he drops all attempts at deeper explanation and leaves the reader with "nationalism" as the single force mutually repelling the two peoples. Ideological statements in the 1949–1962 period are glossed over: for instance, the 1957 Moscow Declaration rates one paragraph while the 1960 Moscow Statement is not even mentioned. Chinese involvement in East Europe in 1956, by contrast, is overstated: the Chinese somehow "forced" Soviet intervention in Hungary. These and other errors stem from trying to fit a vastly complex subject into an overly-simple explanatory mold.

But the political scientist will find a valuable summary of the events and controversies of the last year in Chapter X, "The War of Words." Here Schwartz effectively paraphrases and sets out the point-by-point arguments of both sides. He wisely lets the Russians and the Chinese do most of the talking by quoting long passages verbatim. He demonstrates that the two Communist leaders have gotten into a vicious circle over differences in policy toward the United States. He supports the Russian contention that Chinese substitution of the national liberation movement for the international working class movement is un-Marxist. Finally, he points out that senses of national pride have been inflamed dangerously and that recent propaganda outpourings no longer signify an attempt to convince the other side but represent an effort to re-indocrinate the Soviet and Chinese peoples at home.

Schwartz's thesis that ideology is unimportant as compared with nationalism is manifestly untrue during the Communist era of Sino-Soviet relations. Only when interparty conflict and intraparty ideological fervor rise to their heights does nationalism begin to play an important role.—THOMAS W. ROBINSON, *Columbia University.*

UNESCO: Assessment and Promise. BY GEORGE N. SHUSTER. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1964. Pp. xi, 130. $2.95.)

Political institutions which survive inevitably change under the impact of the environment in which they function. UNESCO has been no exception to this. The way it has changed and been changed by events and the meaning it has within the broad framework of American foreign policy, is the concern of this book of reflections about UNESCO written by the former president of Hunter College. It is the latest in a series of "policy books" issued by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Shuster properly recalls the historical events which led to the creation of the U.N. system. The book abounds in personal comments on problems that have plagued UNESCO since its beginning, including the wide array of criticism to which it has been subjected, sometimes from thoughtful sources, but more often from the ignorant and from the lunatic fringe.

Political scientists will find much of interest in this compact discussion about UNESCO. For in this context the book touches upon a wide variety of subjects of central concern to students of the governmental process: political decision-making; administration; gearing of national and international governmental institutions; organization of executive authority; public support, pressure and understanding; communication.

Among the specialized agencies, UNESCO has perhaps the broadest, least precisely defined constitutional purpose and has suffered most from irresponsible action by member states who have given it often ill-defined and usually financially-starved programs. UNESCO has always lacked a clear statement of purpose other than the very broad one that it should "contribute to peace" by various kinds of efforts to advance international cooperation in education, science and culture. Important as such efforts are in developing foundations for a world community, the Organization really has not been utilized by member states in a calculated fashion to build a climate of international understanding, to promote human rights or to help prepare peoples to learn to live in a more civilized fashion with their world neighbors. The program has primarily been a response to individual member states' demands often based upon pressures of various groups of specialists. It is not surprising that with the shift of voting power to countries preoccupied with the most elementary developmental needs, UNESCO is becoming increasingly an aid administering agency with a corresponding further drift away from the objective of contributing directly to peace (except as the assistance is a necessary indirect means of achieving conditions essential to peace).

The special problems of conducting U. S. relations with UNESCO, as part of the United Nations system, are examined by Shuster in the context of complex policy-making processes of the General Conference, the Executive Board and the Secretariat with its multinational staff of widely varying competence, and with deep commitment to different conceptions of UNESCO's purpose. His discussion of the role of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO reflects our continuing difficulty in gearing our own interests to those of the UNESCO community.

Perhaps it is the continuing influence of the dead hand of 19th century nationalism which is revealed in the failure of nations to translate the very humane concepts of the UNESCO constitution into a vigorous program of public action. Perhaps it is the complexity of the task of promoting a viable world community through UNESCO's multiple approach through education, science, culture and the mass media that makes men despair and fumble in this task, and which leads them to see greater success in the apparently neat, more mechanistic and seemingly more predictable steps taken through military programs or so-called "tough" or "hard-nosed" diplomacy. Yet, these are not alternatives. We obviously need the latter in order to gain time to build more lastingly with the former. The tragedy is that the years of relative peace that have in fact been gained partially through the U.N. and NATO have not been more effectively utilized to build through UNESCO the foundations of a more peaceful world community.

Fundamental to determining U. S. policy toward UNESCO is acceptance of a clear policy on the role of cultural activities and technical assistance in the U. S. conception of desirable international relationships. There continues even now to be a high degree of ambivalence in U. S. policy about the importance of these cultural relations in building a peaceful world community—a major objective of U. S. foreign policy.

Shuster's volume is a welcome addition to the very scant systematic literature on the specialized agencies. In its tightly compressed and fortunately very personally written form, it identifies many important subjects which require more systematic research to guide UNESCO policy toward advancing a more ordered world community.—WALTER H. C. LAVES, *Indiana University.*

The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe. BY RONALD STEEL. (New York: Viking Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 148. $3.75.)

Atlantic Dilemma. BY FRANK MUNK. (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana, 1964. Pp. xii, 177. $3.95.)

Mr. Steel's prose is swift, unmarred by tedious scholastic equivocation and methodological fads. He states his thesis forthrightly: NATO is "collapsing," the Atlantic Community is "nonexistent," the Russians "have more reason to support NATO than does the United States . . ." (p. 127). These are interesting propositions; certainly, they should be assessed searchingly and systematically. Unfortunately, Mr. Steel goes about his business neither searchingly nor systematically.

According to Mr. Steel, the United States viewed the "power rivalry" with the Soviet Union as a "moral crusade for the allegiance of mankind," and embraced the unlovely principle that "he who is not with us (is) against us. . . . " The U. S. government has done nothing of the kind. If U. S. conduct had been as toughly moralist as Mr. Steel asserts, then India and Ghana, not to speak of Tito's Yugoslavia, would never have received a penny of the American taxpayer's money. Contrariwise, the Soviets *do* view themselves as engaged in a struggle for the allegiance of mankind—a well-documented fact which Mr. Steel fails to note. Mr. Steel writes that Russia "has become a technologically advanced and increasingly bourgeois society, dedicated to the new status-quo and desperately trying to preserve it in the face of Chinese militantism (sic)." As Mr. Steel sees it, the Russians, "as they demonstrated by pulling missiles out of Cuba in 1962 . . . have no intention of sacrificing their own security to the support of foreign communists." Apparently, Mr. Steel is unaware of the fact that the communists, including Mao, have always condemned "left-wing communism" or "adventurism." Paradoxically, Mr. Steel writes on the same page that "we can expect the Kremlin to seek the spread of communism by whatever means may be open to it." It is difficult to reconcile this propensity with dedication to the status quo, new or old.

Turning to the examination of U. S. strategy, Mr. Steel finds the United States moving toward a "fortress America" defense. As support for this assertion, he adduces the alleged "downgrading of battlefield atomic weapons" in Europe. On January 27th, 1964, however, Secretary of Defense McNamara told the Committee on Armed Services that there had been "a 60% increase in tactical nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe during the last three years."

Mr. Steel does not dissimulate his admiration for General de Gaulle. He argues his case for Europe as a "Third Force" and for independent national nuclear power in terms which have become familiar through the writings of General Pierre Gallois and the off-the-cuff remarks of President de Gaulle himself. He accepts uncritically French official claims for the effectiveness of the *Force de Frappe*. The fact is that, as yet, the *Force de Frappe* does not exist and that it will not become effective before 1969—if all goes well and technological progress has not rendered obsolete the French weapons systems.

Mr. Steel makes a good case for the creation of a collective West European deterrent as suggested by Jean Monnet. It is difficult to see how such a European deterrent could be built without the strenuous cooperation of France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. It is precisely President de Gaulle's concept of a "Europe of the Fatherlands" which bars the approach to such a joint undertaking.

Mr. Steel shares not only President de Gaulle's preconceptions of nuclear strategy but also his peculiar political philosophy. Mr. Steel acclaims Gaullism for having replaced "the paralysis of multi-party government . . . by a strong central authority capable of providing democratic leadership. . . . " Thus, Mr. Steel notes approvingly, "parliament has been turned into an institution of debate whose major purpose is to inform the electorate rather than actually to legislate." Although it is not at all certain that the great majority of Frenchmen would agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Steel's notion of "democratic leadership," Napoleon III, Benito Mussolini and Lenin certainly would not have demurred at his disdain for parliamentary government.

Mr. Steel who, when not engaged in heated argument, can display considerable analytical skill, supplies a refreshingly candid answer to the fundamental question of NATO:

> Since only a political confederation can give the assurance that an attack upon one really is an attack upon all, alliances that do not federate are in danger of disintegrating.

If the United States had launched itself unambiguously upon the task of transforming the Western Alliance into a confederation, then Mr. Steel's case for the "end of the Alliance" could be soundly based upon Europe's refusal to follow American leadership. In fact, the crisis of NATO is not so much the result of the resurgence of European power as of the Hamletian indecisiveness of American statesmanship.

In conclusion, Mr. Steel writes:

> To circumscribe America to the little world of the Atlantic 'community' is to put an unworkable and intolerable chain upon American interests.

About 80% of the world's trade is done in the "little world" of the Atlantic Community. Virtually all the scientific, technical and cultural impulses which animate civilized life all throughout the globe still emanate from Mr. Steel's "little world." Mr. Steel deplores what he alleges to be the United States' lack of realism in world affairs. Some of the realities to which he seems a stranger are easily available in the United States Government's annual survey of foreign commerce and the publications of the United States Patent Office.

Mr. Steel's angry and contradictory book is recommended reading, for it supplies a valuable insight in the intellectual dilemma of American neo-isolationism.

Dr. Munk's *Atlantic Dilemma* covers the same ground as does Steel's agitated volume. It does so methodically and calmly. A pragmatic idealist in the style of Jean Monnet, Professor Munk does not see a full fledged federal union breaking from the chrysallis of NATO. He weighs carefully those factors which are favorable to the consolidation of the Atlantic Community, and those which are prejudicial to it; those which are centripetal and those which are centrifugal. Unlike Mr. Steel, Professor Munk does not propose that the United States, piqued at President de Gaulle's solism and hypnotized by the vision of Soviet metamorphosis, impatiently turn its back upon NATO. Professor Munk sees as clearly as does Mr. Steel the divisive trends which, here and now, assail NATO and threaten the disintegration of the Alliance. Yet he remains moderately optimistic. For one, an enormous capital of good will has been invested in NATO. There exists now a nascent popular movement for an Atlantic Community on both sides of the ocean. In the last resort, all Atlantic states are confronted by the same world problems: the health of the world market of which their common share amounts to four-fifths, and their relations with the two other major groups of humanity, one uncommitted, the other committed to surpass them.

Dr. Munk sees the present impasse of the Alliance as a "pause between generations" rather than the prelude to dissolution. The demise of NATO is not more historically inevitable than was its creation. The Atlantic Community of free and equal nations awaits the political will which alone can press it into the suitable institutional mold. Certainly, if the American people lack the will as well as the patience to wrest order from disorder and transform the Alliance in the image of their own institutions, then the Atlantic Community will turn into an empty shell as Mr. Steel so confidently anticipates.

Perhaps the best start which our policy makers can make towards repairing the damage and resuscitating that creative statesmanship to which the Western Alliance owes its existence, would be a careful reading of Professor Munk's excellent book.—ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, *University of Pennsylvania.*

American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies. EDITED BY HAROLD STEIN. (A Twentieth Century Fund Study, published in cooperation with the Inter-University Case Program by the University of Alabama Press, 1963. Pp. x, 706. $9.50.)

This ponderous volume of case studies represents the second of two projects on civil-military relations begun in 1953 under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund. The first study is the highly regarded *Arms and the State* (by Walter Millis with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein, Twentieth Century Fund, 1958). We are told in the foreword of the present volume that the case studies here presented were already well advanced in 1958, providing " . . . Mr. Millis and his associates with an important part of the substance of their account." The five year lapse between publication of *Arms and the State* and the appearance of *American Civil-Military Decisions* is attributed to ". . . numerous personal and technical problems, including in one significant instance, . . . getting clearance of a manuscript from the military authorities" (the latter being itself not a minor problem in civil-military relations). One regrets the delay, not because the studies are now dated (with one exception they are not), but because they are of such great value.

The eleven case studies of this volume cover a time span from 1931 to 1957. There is no attempt to provide historical continuity over the period transversed, nor would it have been possible. These are very diverse studies. That they are placed under the rubric of "civil-miltary decisions" serves to demonstrate the imprecise, indeed ambiguous, character of the ill-used phrase "civil-military." If the studies can be said to have a unifying focus it is in the decision-making processes in that sphere of politics where foreign and military policies are made.

The editor introduces the volume with a brief and lucid exposition of the historical, political and organizational setting from which these cases are drawn. The purpose of the book is " . . . to enlarge public understanding of the new and complex processes by which decisions are reached which bear on the formation and maintenance of public policy in both its civil and military aspects" (p. 3). The case studies appear in what Harold Stein appropriately terms "a discontinuous historical sequence." Each contribution can and does stand by itself. Yet those who have the interest and perseverance to push onward through the seven hundred pages of prodigious descriptions and analyses of selected "decisions" of national import will be amply rewarded. The book is rich with information heretofore not completely available or at least not readily accessible. Each study has attached a bibliographic note, ample references, and a generally sagacious interpretive comment by the editor.

A cursory review of the contents is all that is possible in this brief space. The studies are arranged in chronological order and may be divided (although the editor did not do so) into three sections: (1) studies of the prewar period; (2) studies of decisions relevant to World War II; and (3) studies of critical postwar decisions.

In the first section Michael D. Reagan presents two studies, "The Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1932: Stimson, Hoover and the Armed Services," and "The Helium Controversy." The first describes a diplomacy based on moral sanctions alone and reveals a total absence of political-military coordinating machinery which foreshadowed later difficulties in crisis management. The second demonstrates how in the American system foreign policies can be generated from sources outside the State Department or military, especially if the President is disposed to allow a forceful cabinet member to wield his influence. The third study in this section is by Albert A. Blum, entitled the "Birth and Death of the M-Day Plan," a description of efforts to develop plans for industrial mobilization in order to prevent the confusion experienced in 1917.

The second section contains studies that appear to be of greater relevance to contemporary problems, particularly with regard to coalition diplomacy. Marvin D. Bernstein and Francis L. Loewenheim subject "Aid to Russia: The First Year" to detailed exposition. Robert J. Quinlan is author of two studies, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy, and the Allocation of Ships (1940–1941)," an analysis of the decisions that kept our Fleet at Pearl Harbor to serve as a deterrent to Japanese aggression; and "The Italian Armistice," an engaging study of the interaction of coalition politics, national diplomatic objectives, and military necessities. The final work of this section is a very long and heavily documented study by Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," which traces the complex and tortuous route of policy development to the brink of the Carthagenian peace formula promoted by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) and thence to the more pragmatic anti-climax of moderation and adaptation.

The third and undoubtedly most relevant section contains studies dealing with emerging cold war problems. Paul Y. Hammond's second lengthy contribution provides a rigorously detailed accounting of the most spectacular interservice squabble since Billy Mitchell: "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics." Martin Lichterman illuminates the decision processes related to military operations in Korea in the fall and winter of 1950–1951 in "To the Yalu and Back." Lawrence W. Martin, in a brief and precise essay that some of the other contributors might profitably have emulated, presents an account of one of the most crucial decisions of the cold war, "The American Decision to Rearm Germany." The concluding study by Theodore J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," describes the strange coalition of forces that promoted aid to Spain in return for U. S. base rights despite the determined opposition of President Truman.

This case book suffers, as most case books do, from lack of unifying theory and subject matter. The scope of the overall inquiry is unclear. There is no precise notion of what a decision is or whether the focus should be upon interpersonal relations, interagency relations, international relations, or civil-military relations. Harold Stein's editorial comments do, however, provide a thread of continuity and coherence. One need not look to this book for the development of decision-making theories or prescriptions on civil-military relations. But the book is rich with data. Interviews with many of the principals strengthen interpretations of events, especially in the third section. Taken together with other recent contributions, in particular *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (by Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, Columbia University Press, 1962), one sees emerging an encouraging and instructive body of data, especially of postwar military policies, in terms of what might be called the "military policy process." *American Civil-Military Decisions,* tardy though its publication may be, is a significant addition to the literature of the field.—DAVID W. TARR, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Politics of Hysteria. BY EDMUND STILLMAN AND WILLIAM PFAFF. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. 254. $2.50.)

It is doubtful if this book will serve the thinking political scientist as a balanced, clinical study of the seemingly hysterical actions of nations in international affairs. The authors are just too excited (hysterical) to bring that off. Instead, they have written a first rate political tract, brilliant and perceptive, and guaranteed to raise questions and hackles on the part of readers. *The Politics of Hysteria* is a lecture of passion by authors disinterested in any concept of a value-free approach to subject matter. What they are saying and insisting is that political facts and concepts take on meaning only when analyzed within the framework of the historical character of life, that man stands at all times squarely in that historical process, and that man's present position in the stream of history is one of crisis, a crisis brought about by the impact of the West on the non-Western world. This book is a shrill bill of particulars against the West and one to be read against the clock.

The central theme is that the West has a Faustian heritage of violence and extremism that has caused it to destroy and devastate alien cultures and unhinge and upend societal life not in conformity with its own notions of universal order and universal solutions. This means, say the authors, that to be a man of the West is to be a man "implicated in incomparable crimes." But now the crisis caused by the West's technology and power is about to come full cycle. The non-Western countries unable to clear themselves of their futility in their own terms have turned to the terms of the West, so that there is "scarcely an African or Asian nation which can define its national meaning and its national ambition without reference to the values and the vocabulary of the West," that is to say without committing itself to violence. Sukarno will serve as an example. In the meantime, down on the farm, the West has lost its capacity to sustain belief in reason and is in mortal danger of adopting the mass fantasy and approach to violence that makes it indistinguishable from its earlier victims. It is, in short, on the verge of tearing itself and all others to tatters. Not without malice, the authors cite the edict of the old Abbot of Citeaux who during the massacre of the Cather heretics replied when asked how the heretics might be distinguished from the faithful: "burn them all, God will know his own." Today, they argue, God is indifferent and with good cause.

Mr. Stillman and Mr. Pfaff are cold judges of the way of the world. The fire they have built for their readers is not meant to bring cheer. Man must come back to restraint and reason or else all is lost. The Cold-War for all its apocalyptic quality is essentially ephemeral. Foreign policies of nations rooted in its structure are commitments to folly and illusion. With wisdom man may prevail, but it is going to be close.

This is not a book to be recommended to those already depressed in spirit or to those who like to read under a shade tree on Sunday. But it is a good book to jolt the arrogant, the ignorant, and the optimistic, all those who think the world is getting better all the time. In the opinion of this reviewer, it is a splendid little package of dynamite.—MILTON COLVIN, *Washington and Lee University*.

Building the Atlantic World. BY ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, JAMES E. DOUGHERTY, AND WILLIAM R. KINTNER. (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1963. Pp. xiv, 400, $6.00.)

This book was the work of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, of which one of the authors, Professor Strausz-Hupé, is a director. Four other members or former members of the Institute, Professors Stefan T. Possony, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Richard B. Foster, and Francis P. Hoeber, have had some part in the drafting of various chapters. In addition, a large number of American and European specialists took part in various discussions from which the authors, as they explain, derived considerable benefit.

This is an interesting and very useful book which should be read widely—but not uncritically. It shows some of the difficulties confronting authors of books of this type in our time. Although it was published only in 1963, some parts seem already dated.

The book begins with a chapter on the meaning of the Atlantic Community which goes over well-travelled ground but is essential and constitutes a useful, closely written summary. But it already contains one of the more controversial positions of the book (and one with which the reviewer agrees), namely that the West, that is Free Europe and the North American continent, encompass the highest form of civilization and of human values so far created, the only civilization capable of assuring liberty to the less developed countries, and powerful enough to defend the world against the twin threats of anarchy and tyranny.

From this general historical account, the book goes quickly to the problems of Atlantic defense and the evolution of NATO. The authors propose a system of mobile and land-based intermediate range missiles in Europe, and do not fear the consequences of some proliferation. They feel that such mobile nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of the countries concerned because "fear of escalation is a two-way street." Since the West presumably would refuse to be defeated, any war in which the balance were to tip against the West would be bound to escalate to nuclear proportions. Hence, the immediate introduction of tactical nuclear weapons would not be so destructive as to be lacking in credibility as a deterrent, while their presence would bring the danger of escalation into general thermo-nuclear war that much closer—a thought which the Soviets might well ponder.

Because a balanced system of responses seems indispensable, the fact that the present distribution of forces would make German troops almost inevitably the principal combat units of the first phase, could be maintained only if the Germans could count with absolute certainty on the immediate nuclear support of non-German units. Although the authors do not directly favor a national nuclear force, they believe that the U. S. has been unnecessarily restrictive towards sharing nuclear capability with its European allies. What the authors would evidently like to see is the encouragement of a European nuclear force and they see in the Western European Union a suitable framework for the control of such a force, a contention which is highly debatable and probably not acceptable to most Americans nor to European specialists.

The authors make a rather impressive case against taking the "detente" in East-West relations too seriously. They demonstrate that the periodic introduction of a "soft line" has been a consistent tactical approach of the Soviet Union since the days of Lenin and has never, and does not now, constitute an actual change of structure and policy of the U.S.S.R. though it is ideally fashioned to appeal to the psychology of the West and produce disarray in the Atlantic Alliance.

However, the book becomes somewhat disappointing when the remedial measures are suggested. Here, the authors seem to be able to come up only with an elaborate and impressive system of institutional changes within the North Atlantic Alliance without making a convincing case for the ability of such a structure to change the divergent views and interests of the various countries. Nor is it easy to see why countries with such divergences would be willing to put themselves into such a highly developed multilateral decision-making system.

Nevertheless, even where the book is weakest it is well worth reading, for it is bound to challenge the reader on almost every page and even its highly debatable institutional proposals challenge the reader, by implication, to come up with a better idea if he does not like what the authors propose.—ROBERT G. NEUMANN, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

The Winds of Revolution: Latin America Today—And Tomorrow. BY TAD SZULC. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. 308. $5.95.)

In Lafayette Square, a Manifest Destiny-style park, are the sculpted figures of a German, French, and two Polish generals. Across from the Square is the White House. The Generals supplied in large degree the indispensable elements that led to victory in our war of liberation. They would be out of place in The American Establishment of 1964.

These aliens would have to get adjusted to the self-righteousness, indifference to a catalyst, and lack of empathy and an effective *mystique* which have typified some of our contemporary foreign policies. More specifically, the White House ledgers on Latin America from 1958 to October of 1963, when Szulc mailed his manuscript, contain few credit entries of which we can be joyful. That is if we are true to our politico-social legacy, part of which is a heritage from the generals whose figures adorn Lafayette Square.

The American Establishment of 1964 avers we have recently scored Good Neighbor victories in Latin America and it is the fault of others, chiefly our neighbors themselves and Sino-Soviet saboteurs, that we have not accomplished much more. Covering mainly the 1958–1963 period, *The Winds of Revolution* does more: it dramatizes matters with flashes of an almost prophetic vision solidly anchored to a factual base.

The Establishment decrees that we exterminate Castroites for "in fostering revolutions . . . they lend new strength to the apostles of sedition. . . . " A great fear sways this adroit dignitary. "If this flood of pernicious example should extend over the whole of America, what would become of our religious and political institutions . . . ?" That is the core of Metternich's denunciation of us in 1823 shortly after we enunciated the Monroe Doctrine.

Leaving aside the Hispano-Portuguese volume, presses in a score of countries have disgorged more output on Ibero-Indio America since 1959 than probably in the 1900–1959 span. Volatile Fidel Castro is responsible for the world's current preoccupation with the twenty-two nations south of us. Of course no publication could adequately evaluate most of this material. Of the quantity this Caribbeanist has intently looked at, *The Winds of Revolution* is for its size the best. A few others produced by writers instead of statisticians may be equally good; none is superior.

Szulc writes with more insight about Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Mexico than do most generalists specializing in such areas. He does less well in the islands. He has no mention of Eric Williams in Trinidad, Haitian art, and Puerto Rican political scientists who have opted for independence. Most authors lack his advantage of not having to act as a public prosecutor or corporate director in that they were not roving Latin American correspondents during five recent years for *The New York Times.*

For regionalists to complain over Szulc leaving out something meaningful is like debating the merits of *pollo con arroz* or *chivito con frijoles.* But this often sterile exercise seems warranted in the case of Cuba. As Szulc is the joint author of a work on the Cuban invasion, surely a year later he should have become aware that José Martí is an Apostle in Cuba and for Castro and that the 1934 edition of *Azúcar y población en las Antillas* rang a tocsin. "If the sugar latifundium," Guerra y Sanchéz said in this book in 1934, "is permitted to develop freely, it will inevitably lead to the economic ruin and social and political decay of the country where it flourishes. . . . " The warning is equally applicable to the other monoculture economies. We and they are now half heartedly combating Latin America's economic ruin and social and political decay.

Nonetheless, commendation is due Szulc for his treatment of Castroism. He is also excellent in discussing the Alliance for Progress.

Senator Fulbright has been labeled an appeaser. "I believe," he said last April, "that we must try to overcome this excessive moralism, which binds us to old myths and blinds us to new realities. . . . "

Szulc says this repeatedly. Martí said it before Spanish troops shot him in 1895. The Latin American hurricane must be judged, Szulc says, "in the historical perspective of a great revolution with which the United States and the West must come to terms." The sculpted figures of our four foreign-born heroes in Lafayette Square should remind us that nearly all the West except us has come to terms or is close to doing so with a revolution. That does not mean we are not right. In may prove that everyone else is wrong.—BYRON WHITE, *East Carolina College.*

The Ad Hoc Diplomat. A Study in Municipal and International Law. By MAURICE WATERS. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. xii, 233. Fl. 20.00.)

States frequently employ in their dealings with each other special agents in addition to their regular diplomatic corps. In spite of this time-honored and wide-spread practice there has been hitherto no special study dealing with the status of these agents in municipal or international law. The little volume under review is thus a pioneering effort. Contrary to the expectations flowing from its title, the book is not, however, a comparative legal study of the subject. Rather, it concentrates on the *ad hoc* diplomats employed by the United States.

The first four chapters of the work thus investigate the position of the special diplomatic agent in our constitutional law. They emphasize the struggle between Senate and President over his appointment. They review also the historical reasons for and against his use and the Congressional efforts to limit and control his appointment to positions carrying diplomatic rank. The next three chapters explore, first, for comparative purposes, the international legal position of the regular diplomatic agent and of miscellaneous national representatives to international conferences, organizations, and commissions. Then they inquire into the international legal status of that public and open *ad hoc* diplomatic agent whose position has been anomalous in the theory and practice of international law because he has been sent abroad without rather than with a diplomatic title. A concluding chapter largely summarizes the results. Following the UN International Law Commission and the 1961 Vienna UN Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, it also proposes further study and clarification of present practice regarding *ad hoc* diplomacy. Four appendices provide the reader with a representative list of the special agents employed by the United States between 1789 and 1958; a partial list of national and international organizations created or joined by the United States since World War II together with the provisions for the appointment of United States delegates to these agencies; the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and two "socio-political" case studies of the special agencies of Colonel House and Harry Hopkins.

The volume is, on the whole, a very readable, informative, interesting, useful, accurate, perceptive, and at times, provocative analysis of the essentials of established theory and practice. It does not, and cannot, claim to contribute anything startlingly new to the traditional principles involved. But, in addition to the 1961 Vienna rules, it does incorporate into the discussion more recent United States and some foreign practice and opinion. Moreover, it is unique in its emphasis on the special agent. To a limited extent, it is unique also in supplementing the data gleaned from the traditional sources with information gathered by interview, correspondence, and observation at the Vienna Conference mentioned above. On this basis and to the extent indicated, it does reach rather sound, eminently accurate, and updated conclusions regarding the national and international legal status of the *ad hoc* diplomat. However, the book, like many others, is not free of errors of fact and of logic and of other imperfections. Space prohibits detail. Let it only be added that its merits outweigh its sometimes exasperating aberrations.—GEORGE MANNER, *University of Illinois.*

Conspiracy at Mukden; the Rise of the Japanese Military. By TAKEHIKO YOSHIHASHI. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xvi, 274, $6.50.)

"Westerners are prone to look upon any act of defiance by the military which undermines the authority of the duly constituted government as something grievous and monstrous. . . . The truth of the matter is that military hegemony in some form or other has been the rule rather than the exception in human history." (p. 239). Professor Yoshihashi makes this intriguing statement at the end of a book devoted to a study of the Japanese Kwantung army plot to capture control of Manchuria in September 1931. He does an excellent job of recounting the events that led up to the Manchurian incident, using Japanese sources that became available in the 1950's.

This detailed, chronological, and often dramatic, account of the 1927–1931 period in Sino-Japanese relations is rich in primary sources drawn from recently published diaries and memoirs. It is less successful in clarifying the admittedly complex issue of responsibility, as the Japanese leaders in Tokyo reluctantly or eagerly accepted the *fait accompli* in Manchuria. Splits existed within the parties dominating Tokyo politics; within the civilian rightist movements; within the senior military command in Japan; and within the subordinate command of the Kwantung army and the South Manchurian Railway. This is probably the best English work on the nature of these internecine struggles preceding the Japanese drive to war, but often the larger issues, suggested by the above quotation, are dealt with inadequately for a political scientist. Perhaps this is due to the work having been written first as a Yale dissertation under Professors Rowe and Yanaga, and polished without major changes for publication.

Five chapters set the stage for the Mukden incident of September 1931 by showing graphically how the internal confusion of Japanese politics and the mounting involvement of the Kwantung army in Chinese affairs led to a surge of autonomous action by middle-rank officers of that army. French government problems with the Algerian *colons* and right-wing officers, leading to de Gaulle's resumption of power, may be the closest parallel in recent years. The situation of China and Manchuria in that period, however, defies comparison, as tensions mounted after the Japanese murder of Chang Tso-lin, the London Naval Agreement, Shidehara's soft-line toward Nationalist China, and economic problems within Japan. Yoshihashi outlines these many sources of the Manchurian conflict well, but wisely refrains from charging that the Mukden army conspirators worked with the Showa restorationists in Tokyo. The climatic sixth chapter on the incident itself, the longest and best-written of the book, shows how the Tokyo civilian and military leaders bowed reluctantly to the "one-two punch" of army coups in Manchuria and assassination threats at home. It is a tragic story, full of significance for contemporary readers.

Without much access to Chinese sources or personal visits to Japanese actors still alive, the author has recreated a vivid scene of prewar confusion and paralysis in Japanese decision-making. Ex-General Araki, a hero of the Mukden conspirators, told me in 1957 of his continuing fear of corrupt party politicians' control of foreign policy ("They will sell their souls for trade with Peking"), but Araki also expressed contempt for vulgar civilian demagogues like Akao Bin. Ideological and personal factionalism among Japanese rightists prevent their postwar unity; the constitutional and popular reforms since 1946 deprive them of their prewar leverage within and outside the government. The author would have benefited from contact with the individuals active in prewar Japanese policy, but he correctly assesses the relative guilt and innocence of major figures. General Honjo in Manchuria, General Kanaya in Tokyo, and Premier Tanaka emerge less guilty than previously assumed. Mori, the *Seiyukai* politician, is pictured as the prime villain next to the actual Kwantung officer-conspirators themselves; but Wakatsuki and Saionji are not exonerated completely.

Japan today is far from the 1931–1945 dominance of military over civilian rule. Ironically, the Nationalist regime in Taipei may wish that some of their old *Kodoha* enemies of the 'thirties were more able to sway Tokyo policy. The weak anticommunist groups in Japan today may be able to assassinate a Socialist leader, but not deter Japan from a "One China; one Taiwan" policy. This raises the question of why the author ignored Manchurian separatism as a force helping motivate Japanese policy. Traditional China regarded the Manchu dynasty as "alien and foreign" before 1911; it could hardly expect Manchurians to be loyal to the Nationalists or their warlords. Taiwan benefited even more from Japanese rule, and had even less sense of loyalty to the Han Chinese. Japan today would welcome an independent Formosa, more sincerely than the Mukden officers who promoted "Manchukuo" in 1932.—Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA*

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER
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I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1963 LISTING

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* Similar lists have been printed in the REVIEW annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1963 list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes, and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in name, title, or classification; and deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

The lists printed in the REVIEW are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science; to avoid misunderstandings, entries are not accepted from individual candidates for degrees. The subject matter classification of an entry by the department concerned, if given, is followed. Each entry is listed under one classification only.

For a fuller note about coverage and subject matter classification, and for references to dissertation lists in cognate fields, see the 1960 list, LIV, 816.

For a chart which classifies, by subject category, the numbers of dissertations completed and in progress, 1951 through 1957, see this REVIEW, LII, 916.

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Chan Lien, The Criticism of Hu Shih's Thought in Communist China. *Chicago.*

George McKenna, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. *Fordham.*

Robert J. McShea, Spinoza on Political Obligation. *Columbia.*

Martin Manley, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui: An Appreciative Study of His Influence on the Theory and Practice of Modern American Constitutionalism. *Georgetown.*

Justine W. Mann, The Political and Constitutional Thought of John Archibald Campbell. *Alabama.*

Theodore R. Marmor, John C. Calhoun: Social Critic, Politician, and Political Philosopher. *Harvard.*

John C. Norton, The Politics of Pragmatism. *Illinois.*

Daniel J. O'Neil, Burke's American Friends. *Texas.*

Arthur J. Penson, Non-Violence and Passive Resistance in America: Theoretical Foundations, Practical Techniques, and Political Consequences. *Iowa.*

Joseph A. Petrus, Nationalism in Marxist Thought. *Texas.*

John W. Phelps, Jacques Maritain on Natural Law. *Indiana.*

Ronald L. Platt, The Concept of Interest as a Basis for Law and Politics: A Critical Analysis. *Oklahoma.*

Gardner Pond, Locke's Political Thought on Democratic Theory. *Johns Hopkins.*

Edward Rogowsky, The Politics of Anti-Trust Policy, 1953–1963. *Columbia.*

I. Mitchell Rosenberg, Jerome N. Frank. Philosophy of Legal Realism. *New School.*

Benjamin G. Ruekberg, Soviet Doctrines (1955–1961) Regarding the Struggle for Peace and Soviet Objectives in Promulgating These Doctrines. *Syracuse.*

Lyman Sargent, The Relationship between Political Philosophy and Political Ideology: A Study of Etiènne Cabet and His Communitarian Experiments. *Minnesota.*

Jane T. Schneider, Revolutions in the Making: 'Spontaneity' and 'Sophistication' in Italian Social Movements, Up to 1922. *Michigan.*

John J. Schrems, The Political Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer. A Study in Modern Liberal Political Thought. *Catholic Univeristy.*

Paul. M. Shupack, Morris R. Cohen and the Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial and Legal Philosophy. *Harvard.*

A. Don Sorensen, A Theory of the Nature and Function of Ideology in Political Life. *Illinois.*

Gregory Spanos, The Political Theory of L. T. Hobhouse. *Pittsburgh.*

Edward Stettner, Herbert Croly and the Political Thought of the Progressive Era. *Princeton.*

Abigail Thernstrom, Political Ideology in the Collected Papers of Gamal abd an-Nasser. *Harvard.*

Mark Warden, The Political Thought of Juan Doñoso Cortes. *Chicago.*

Stephen J. Wayne, Conceptions of the American Presidency: A Study of the Political Science Literature. *Columbia.*

Robert L. Wendzel, Hans Morgenthau: His Theories of International Relations. *Florida.*

C. Harvey Williams, On the Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Perspective. *Virginia.*

Edward A. Ziegenhagen, The Politics of Marginal Men—Case Studies in Political Leadership. *Illinois*. .

Kenneth C. Zimmerman, The Political Thought of John Morley. *Minnesota.*

Changes

Winberg Chai, The Political Thought of Kang Yu-wei: A Study of its Sources and Influences. *New York University.*

Anne E. Freedman, The Controlled Society. *Iowa.*

Elisabeth Hansot, A Study of the Problem of Change in Selected Utopias. *Columbia.*

Wilson C. McWilliams, The Idea of Fraternity in American Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Hi-Hun Pak, Relativism in Contemporary Political Theory: Kelsen, Popper, Weldon, and Brecht. *Minnesota.*

Kenneth Reshaur, The Concept of a Political Tradition. *Duke.*

Deletions

Vilma A. Cavallaro, Jose Ortega y Gasset: His Philosophy of Politics and History. *New York University.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Robert L. Anderson, Negro Suffrage in Relation to American Federalism: 1957–1963. *Florida.*

James F. Barnes, The Conciliar Function and Representative Government: A Comparative Analysis. *Ohio State.*

Wendell M. Bedichek, The Impact of Federal Activities on Municipal Government in Abilene, Texas. *Texas.*

James J. Best, Citizen Support of the American Political System. *North Carolina.*

Maurice C. Blanken, Methodist Social Action and Its Involvement in the American Liberal Movement, 1940–1950. *New School.*

Edgar M. Bottome, The Missile Gap—A Study in the Formulation of Public Policy, 1957–1961. *Fletcher School.*

Robert L. Casier, The Politics of Cloture. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Everett F. Cataldo, The House Committee on Ways and Means: The Policy-Making Role of a Congressional Committee. *Ohio State.*

James R. Cobbledick, Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1893–1903. *Fletcher School.*

Leon S. Cohen, The Southern Negro: A Model of Ethnic Political Assimilation. *North Carolina.*

Edmond Costantini, Leaders and Subleaders: A Study of Intraparty Conflict. *California* (Berkeley).

Albert Dixon, The Conservation of Wilderness: A Study in Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Russell Edgerton, The Development Loan Fund. A Study of Innovation in the American Government. *Columbia.*

Eugene Eidenberg, The Congressional Bureaucracy. *Northwestern.*

Sanford A. Greenberg, United States Policy Toward Africa, 1948–1964. *Harvard.*

Richard T. Greer, S. 1497, 87th Congress—A Bill Authorizing the Reconveyance of the Cheli Air Force Depot Property to the Original Owner: A Case Study. *Georgetown.*

James E. Gregg, Newspaper Editorial Endorsements: Their Influence on California Elections, 1948–1962. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Roger W. Haigh, The Politics of Reapportionment in Connecticut. *Fordham.*

Thomas A. Henderson, Congressional Supervision of Administration: The House Committee on Government Operations, 1946–1963. *Columbia.*

Carl Hetrick, A Description and Explanation of the Political Orientation and Participation of the American Foreign Policy Motivated-Public. *Washington* (Seattle).

Joseph C. Honan, The National Farmers' Organization: A Study of Agricultural Protest. *Missouri.*

Benjamin Hourani, Lawyers' Attitudes towards Politics. *Michigan State.*

Lester Jackson, The Civil Rights Act of 1964. A Study in Domestic Bipartisanship. *New York University.*

Thomas P. Jahnige, Science and Congress: A Case Study of Congressional Control of N.A.S.A. *Claremont.*

Aaron S. Klieman, President Truman and the Recognition of Israel in 1948. *Columbia.*

Bernard Lammers, The Roles of Congressional Tax Committees in Internal Revenue Legislation, 1953–1963. *Columbia.*

Robert W. Langran, Abington School District v. Schempp: Impact on Religion and Politics. *Bryn Mawr.*

Michael A. Leiserson, Mathematical Theories of Congressional Behavior. *Yale.*

William F. Levantrosser, Building a Federal Militia: Political Patterns and Policy Formation. *Rutgers.*

John F. Manley, The House Committee on Ways and Means as a Political System. *Syracuse.*

James H. McBride, The Senate and the Test Ban Treaty. *Georgetown.*

Julius J. Mastro, The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry as a Pressure Group. *New York University.*

Richard M. Merelman, Mass Culture and Political Ideology: The Case of the Television Western. *Yale.*

Ralph E. Mitchell, Atomic Air Power and American Foreign Policy: The Period of Nuclear Monopoly. *Kentucky.*

William R. Nelson, The Politics of Science: The Influence of the Manhattan District Group on Postwar United States Science Policy. *Colorado.*

Byron Nupp, Transportation Policy Formation in the Federal Government 1948–60: A Test of an Administrative Theory. *American.*

John M. Orbell, The Negro Student Protest Movement in the South. *North Carolina.*

John D. Palmer, Presidential Politics in Foreign Aid. *Texas.*

Marcus R. Raymond, U. S. Military Strategy in the Nuclear Era: Development and Evaluation of Selected Nuclear Programs Concerning Particularly the Area of Warfare and Limited Strategic War. *California* (Berkeley).

Elma Saletan, The American Bar. Its Organization and Functions. *New School.*

Walter L. Schneider, Decision-making in the American Government with Respect to Foreign Involvements. *California* (Berkeley).

Alan Seltzer, Business Self-Regulation. *Chicago.*

Ronald C. Semone, A Case Study of Class and Political Behavior: The Negro Middle Class in the South. *North Carolina.*

R. Harrison Wagner, United States and Inter-American Economic Cooperation. *Harvard.*

Ben-Zion Wardy, The Indian Policy in New York State. *New School.*

Timothy A. Williams, The Political Setting of Large Scale Military Retirement. *North Carolina.*

Matt W. Williamson, Case Studies of Republican Leadership in the Second, Third and Tenth Congressional Districts of Virginia. *Virginia.*

Ryh-Hsuih Yang, The Role of Chairman Vandenberg of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the First Truman Administration. *New School.*

Roy E. Young, Kennedy-Johnson Leadership in Civil Rights Legislation. *Texas.*

Changes

Marjorie E. Aghassi, Little Legislatures: Four Congressional Committees and Foreign Aid Legislation, 1947, 1964. *Columbia.*

Aage R. Clausen, Policy Dimensions in Congressional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis. *Michigan.*

Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Appointments As an Extension of Public Policy: The Decisional Tendencies of Eisenhower and Kennedy Appointees to the Federal Courts of Appeal. *Harvard.*

David E. RePass, The Effect of Economic Conditions on Political Attitudes: The Psycho-Political Impact of the Business Cycle on Nonfarm Populations, 1956–1960. *Michigan.*

David J. Stern, Congress, Taxes, and Political Processes: A Case Study of the Revenue Act of 1962. *Claremont.*

Harvey G. Zeidenstein, The Public Image of the Presidency: A Study in Leadership. *New York University.*

Deletions

Richard L. Conaway, Congress and the Problems of Providing Manpower for National Security, 1946–1958. *Pittsburgh.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

Michael M. Ban, The Power of the Supreme Court: (A Case Study) Police Compliance with Mapp vs. Ohio. *Harvard.*

Wallace Caldwell, Uses of the Administrative Process by States to Secure Civil Rights. *Washington* (Seattle).

William A. Dillon, Jr., The Role of the States in the Adoption of Federal Legislation to Develop or Protect Their Positions in the Federal System. *California* (Berkeley).

Peter G. Fish, Toward a Responsible American Judiciary: Integration and Coordination of Federal Judicial Administration in the Twentieth Century. *Johns Hopkins.*

John P. Flanigan, An Analysis of Justice Hugo L. Black's Views on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. *Fordham.*

Kathryn Griffith, Judge Learned Hand: An Examination of His Philosophy and Its Implications for the American Judiciary. *Chicago.*

Philip Hablutzel, Freedom of the Press in Germany: A Case Study in Judicial Process. *Chicago.*

Michael J. Horan, The Right to Choose: The Fourteenth Amendment and Enforcement of "Private" Discrimination. *Georgetown.*

Richard M. Johnson, Separation of Church and State; Acceptance of Supreme Court Interpretation. *Illinois.*

Basil McDermott, Political Conflict in the Federal Courts: Washington State's Redistricting Hassle. *Washington* (Seattle)

Dan M. Martin, John Quincy Adams and the Development of the Whig Ideology. *Princeton.*

Luster D. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: A Study of State Liability to Suit in the Federal Courts. *Georgia.*

Patricia R. Nelson, John Harlan: Modern Federalist. *Johns Hopkins.*

Lawrence K. Pettit, Congressional Politics and Federal Aid to Higher Education. *Wisconsin.*

Paul L. Rosen, The Supreme Court and the Social Sciences from Muller v. Oregon to the Present. *New School.*

Norton Rosenberg, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Association: A Study in the Process of Judicial Accommodation. *Johns Hopkins.*

Jack B. Schroeder, Federal Protection of the Right of Equal Access to Public Accommodations: An Exploration of the Constitutional Issues. *Mighigan.*

Joseph F. Schuster, Electronics Eavesdropping and the Bill of Rights. *Penn State.*

Sylvia Snowiss, Justice Black and the First Amendment. *Chicago.*

Charles J. Tanenbaum, Foreign Confiscatory Decrees in United States Courts. *Columbia.*

Richard M. Yearwood, The Law and Administration of Subdivision Regulation: A Study in Land Use Control. *Florida.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Robert W. Adams, Patterns of Decision-Making Within Local Leadership Elites in Columbus, Ohio. *Ohio State.*

James H. Andrews, State Policy and Constituency Interests in Illinois. *Chicago.*

Robert A. Barrett, Council Politics: A Study of the Policy Making Process in the Minneapolis City Council. *American.*

Frank M. Cates, The Ku Klux Klan in Indiana. *Indiana.*

Yong Hyo Cho, Local Government Systems in the United States. *Syracuse.*

Lattie F. Coor, The Increasing Vulnerability of the American Governor. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Richard C. Curry, The Implementation of a Constitution: A Study of Michigan Politics, 1963–1964. *Michigan.*

Stephen David, The Politics of a Formal, Long-term Interest Group Alliance: The Community Council of Greater New York. *Columbia.*

Joseph J. Elliott, The Governor as Legislator in Oklahoma 1955–1965. *Oklahoma.*

Miriam B. Ershkowitz, The Politics and Administration of Air Environment Regulation in New York City: A Test of the Edelman Hypothesis. *Penn State.*

Larry Esterly, Congressional Republicanism in the South: A Study of Constituency Trends, 1952–1964. *Johns Hopkins.*

John A. Gardiner, Police Court Judges as Political Decision-Makers. *Harvard.*

Louis H. Gold, The Group Basis of Civil Rights Conflict in New York City: 1953–1963. *Columbia.*

Jay S. Goodman, Party and Interest Group: The Democratic Party and Organized Labor in Rhode Island, 1952–1962. *Brown.*

Willard J. Hutzel, Political Clubs in Suburbia: A Case Study of Prince George and Montgomery Counties, Maryland. *Maryland.*

Albert C. Johns, A Study of Real Estate Regulation in Southern California. *Claremont.*

James T. Jones, Political Socialization in a Midwestern Industrial Community. *Illinois.*

Robert S. Knox, Republican Party Politics in Pennsylvania, 1946–1962. *Columbia.*

Byron G. Lander, The Emergence of Poverty as a Political Issue in 1964. *Missouri.*

Charles J. Libera, A Comparative Analysis of Municipal Expenditures and Revenues in Cities over 2500 Population in Selected Upper Mid-West States. *Minnesota.*

Harvey Lieber, The Politics of Water and Air Pollution Control in the New York Metropolitan Area. *Columbia.*

Clyde McKee, The Politics of Council-Manager Governments Having and Not Having Partisan Elections. *Connecticut.*

Stephen V. Monsma, Informal Groups in the Legislative Process: A Study of the Michigan House of Representatives. *Michigan State.*

Thomas A. Morehouse, The Conflict between Functional and Comprehensive Definitions of a Public Purpose: Metropolitan Planning and the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962. *Minnesota.*

Saul Orkin, New Jersey Democratic Party Politics, 1949–1953: A Case Study in Leadership Succession. *Columbia.*

William A. Schultze, Business and Reform in Selected New Jersey Municipalities: Case Studies to Discover a Non-Decision-Making Process. *Rutgers.*

Howard R. Scriven, The Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission and Mexican-Americans. *Claremont.*

William L. Shulman, The National Advocate, 1812–1829, and Pre-Jacksonian Democratic Reform in New York State: A Study in Political Journalism. *Yeshiva.*

Elias B. Silverman, The Politics of Governor Leader's Taxation Program. *Penn State.*

Donald F. Sullivan, The President and Civil Rights—1962 and 1963. *Oklahoma.*

Charles W. Wiggins, Interest Group Power Within State Legislative Systems: The Case of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Changes

Douglas I. Hodgkin, Breakthrough Elections: Elements of Large and Durable Minority Party Gains in Selected States since 1944. *Duke.*

Morley Segal, General Research Assistance to the California Assembly. *Claremont.*

Leo D. Vichules, Jr., Precinct Committeemen: An Analysis of Representation at the Grass Roots. *California* (Berkeley).

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

F. Hawkins, Canadian Post-War Immigration Policy: A Study of Canadian Immigration at the Policy-Making Level. *Toronto.*

Thomas A. Hockin, The Official Opposition Party in the British Parliamentary System: Its Function, Responsibilities and Problems—With Special References to Canada. *Harvard.*

Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labor in Politics, 1937–1961. *Harvard.*

C. I. Lumsden, The Modern Canadian Cabinet. *Toronto.*

Clement Menard, The Civil Service of Quebec. *American.*

F. W. Peers, Canadian Policy in Broadcasting. *Toronto.*

A. P. Pross, A Study of the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests. *Toronto.*

Paul Tennant, French Canadian Participation in National Political Parties, 1867–1965. *Chicago.*

Changes

James D. Johnson, The Combines Act in Canada: A Case Study. *Michigan.*

Johan A. Lovink, Quebec Party Politics: The Liberal Party Regime, 1897–1936. *Duke.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Additions

Frank L. Baird, Congressional Oversight of FCC Regulation of Programming. *Texas.*

Louis P. Beleky, The Organization State. A Study in Organization for Economic Development. *New York University.*

Edward L. Bumgardner, The Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program of the Department of Defense, 1961–1964: A New System of Management. *American.*

Wesley M. Butler, The Policy and Administration of Texas Migratory Farm Labor. *Colorado.*

Suk Choon Cho, A Study of Administrative Decentralization in the South Korean Government. *Minnesota.*

James P. Clarke, Codes of Ethics in the Public Service. *New York University.*

John S. Cutler, An Analysis of Public Service Internship Programs in Selected Governmental Agencies. *New York University.*

Roman Ferber, Workers' Councils in Poland. *New York University.*

James. M. Gerhardt, Universal Military Obligation and Selective Service in a Period of Nuclear Stalemate. *Harvard.*

Edwin V. Godbold, Executive Planning and Control in Military Service Headquarters: The Planning and Programming System in Headquarters Marine Corps. *American.*

Alden N. Haffner, Law Practice in Optometry. A Study of Conflicts in Public Policy. *New York University.*

Loren A. Helberg, The Budget as a Planning Tool for Vocational Rehabilitation. *Minnesota.*

James E. Jernberg, Program Budgeting: The Influence, Effects and Implications of Reform. *Wisconsin.*

W. Landis Jones, A Comparison of the Relations Between the Central Government and Local Governments in Urban Planning and Development; Great Britain and the United States. *Emory.*

Pyrung Kun Kang, The Developmental Process of Local Administration in Korea with Special Reference to the Effect of Central Control. *Minnesota.*

Kent Kirwan, The Study of Public Administration: An Analysis of Woodrow Wilson's "The Study of Administration." *Chicago.*

Walter E. Langway, Employment Security in Sweden. *New York University.*

Richard L. McAnaw, The State Administrators. *Iowa.*

Edward F. Marek, The Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York. *New York University.*

John P. Meekison, Mental Health Programming and Administration in the United States. *Duke.*

Mohamad Nakshab, Civil Service Reform and Social Environment in Underdeveloped Countries With an Emphasis on Iran. *New York University.*

Donald R. Notron, Judicial Administration in Colorado Municipalities. *Colorado.*

Jack Posner, Implementation of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. *American.*

Munawar A. Saeed, Some Problems in the Administration of Economic Development in Pakistan. *Pennsylvania.*

Conrado R. Santos, A Formulation of the Concept of Authority in Political and Bureaucratic Terms. *Michigan.*

Harry A. Shaatz, A Study of Board Staff Relations in Voluntary Social Agencies. *New York University.*

Jairaj Solomon, Problems of Personnel Administration in Indian Public Enterprises. *New York University.*

Abraham A. Stern, Supervisory Concepts and Practices in Representative Voluntary and Public Social Welfare Agencies in New York City. *New York University.*

Joseph A. Uvegas, The Politics of Council-Manager Government in Ohio. *Florida.*

Carwin C. Williams, The Public Service and Veteran Preference. *Rutgers.*

Hoon Yu, The Budgetary Process in Korea. *Minnesota.*

Bob Zimring, Social, Economic, and Political Influences on State Expenditures and Employment in Mental Health—1947–1962. *Wisconsin.*

Changes

Louis Alper, Determining Differences in Selected Factors in Promotability and Evaluation of Maintenance Employees. *New York University.*

Luciano Cappeletti, The Italian Bureaucracy: A Sociological Profile of Italian Higher Civil Servants. *California* (Berkeley).

Giacomo A. Sani, Bureaucratic Attitudes and Behavior Toward Political Change in Italy: From the Absolute State to Constitutional Government. *California* (Berkeley).

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Abdul Hussein Al-Ameri, Government and Politics in Iraq: Movement Toward Arab Unity. *New York University.*

Charles F. Andrain, Political Concepts of African Leaders. *California* (Berkeley).

Frederick F. Andrews, Soviet Foreign Policy toward Colonial Revolutions: The Case of Algeria. *Princeton.*

Alan Arian, The Persistence of Ideology: The Effects of the Maintenance of Kibbutz Membership upon Political Perceptions of Israeli Officeholders. *Michigan State.*

Joseph Badi, The Government of Israel. *New School.*

Jonathan S. Barker, Local Politics in Senegal. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard Barton, A Study of the Social Background of Indian Parliamentary Leaders. *North Carolina.*

Thomas A. Baylis, The New Class in East German Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Lucy C. Behrman, The Political Significance of the Mourides in Senegal. *Boston University.*

Sidney M. Berman, Ideological Dimensions of Modernization: With Special Reference to Puerto Rico. *Northwestern.*

Thomas P. Bernstein, Soviet and Chinese Organizational Policies in the Village in Preparation for and as a Factor in the Collectivization on Agriculture: A Comparison. *Columbia.*

Ervin Birnbaum, Religion and State in Israel: A Study in the Politics of Compromise. *Columbia.*

Howard Bliss, Belgium's Participation in Regional Organizations 1953–1963. *Cornell.*

William Blough, Revolution, the PRI and the Political Attitudes of Urban Mexicans. *North Carolina.*

Ken Adlam Bode, The Latin American Diplomatic Community: Washington, D. C. *North Carolina.*

Bruce M. Borthwick, The Islamic Sermon as a Channel of Political Communication in Syria, Jordan and Egypt. *Michigan.*

Thomas Brose, Ideology in the Mexican Presidential Election of 1964: A Study of the PRI. *Washington* (Seattle).

Paul E. Brown, Ideological Origins of Modern Argentine Nationalism. *Claremont.*

Louis J. Cantori, The Organizational Basis of a Mass Party: The Egyptian WAFD. *Chicago.*

William J. Casey, The Army and Civic Action in El Salvador. *Florida.*

Mary A. Cisar, West German Development Aid Policy. *Ohio State.*

James D. Cochrane, Political Aspects of the Formation and Functioning of the Central American Program of Economic Integration. *Iowa.*

Louise Comfort, The Formation of Political Conscience in West Germany. *Yale.*

James E. Connor, The Soviet State Bank: A Study of the Role and Development of an Instrument of Control. *Columbia.*

William J. Conyngham, Rukovodstvo: The Guiding Role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Economy. *Columbia.*

Edwin M. Coulter, The Diplomacy of the Sino-Indian Border War, 1950–1962. *Virginia.*

James F. Creagan, The Minority Parties of Mexico in the Role of Opposition. *Virginia.*

William T. Daly, Decision-Making in a Vacuum: The Evolution of the Nazi Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, 1933–41. *Princeton.*

John M. De Gregorio, The Yugoslav Workers' Management System: An Analysis of Titoism in Action. *Claremont.*

Richard Dekmejian, A Study of the Egyptian Political System (1952–1964). *Columbia.*

Henry Delfiner, The Relations between Church and State in the Field of Education: A Comparative Study of U. S. Swiss and West-German Traditions, Constitutional Aspects and Current Practices. *Fletcher School.*

Daniel D. DiPiazza, The Bucareli Conference and United States-Mexican Relations in the 1920's. *Missouri.*

W. Raymond Duncan, Education and Ideology: An Approach to Mexican Political Development. *Fletcher School.*

Blair Ewing, Politics and Medical Care in Four Western Democracies: A Comparative Study of the Origin and Disposition of an Issue. *Chicago.*

Ewald Feit, The Nomination Process in German and British Political Parties. *Michigan.*

Adele Ferdows, A Study of Fadayan Islam. *Indiana.*

Amir Ferdows, The Idea of Constitutional Government in Persia. *Indiana.*

Joseph M. Firestone, The Management of Conflict: A Theory and Comparative Analysis in Five Cultures. *Michigan State.*

John Fitzgerald, Political Development and Administration in Egypt. *Chicago.*

Peter L. French, Political Authority in Independent Kenya. *Yale.*

Erik J. Friis, Norway and the United Nations. *Columbia.*

B. Michael Frolic, Soviet Municipal Government and Planning. *Cornell.*

John J. Grotpeter, Nationalist Movements and Politics in the High Commission Territories of Southern Africa: Group Cohesion and Conflict. *Washington* (St. Louis).

David A. Gugin, Administrative Behavior in Uganda. *Wisconsin.*

Mickey T. Haggard, The Political System of the Mongolian People's Republic. *California* (Berkeley).

Roger P. Hamburg, The Soviet Union and Latin America: Perception and Policy, 1954–1964. *Wisconsin.*

Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Independent Tunisia: Economic Planning and Growth, Analysis and Appraisal. *Fletcher School.*

G. Eric Hansen, The Indian Reaction to the Socialist Revolution in China: Challenge to the Congress Party. *Fletcher School.*

Robert L. Hardgrave, Differential Determinants of Political Behavior in the Process of Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Three Tamil Communities. *Chicago.*

Shafig Hashmi, A Comparative Study of City Government and Administration: Kansas and Andhra Pradesh, India. *Kansas.*

Fred M. Hayward, The Formation of Predominantly Politically Oriented Organizations. *Princeton.*

Hormoz Hekmat, Iran and the Cold War: A Study of Small Power Behavior. *Columbia.*

W. Nathaniel Howell, Soviet Policy and the Kurds. *Virginia.*

Edward L. Hoyt, The Dilemma of Argentine Development: Frondizi's Economic Policy. 1958–1962. *Fletcher School.*

Robert Hunt, The Communitarianism of Jayaprakash Narayan as a Focus for the Study of Asian Democratic Ideology. *Princeton.*

M. Mahfuzal Huq, The Electoral System of Pakistan. *Columbia.*

George Ikeda, Factionalism in Japanese Conservative Politics. *Harvard.*

Clara J. Jensen, Religion in Politics in South and Southeast Asia. *Illinois.*

David Johns, Regional Politics in East Africa, 1957–1963. *Chicago.*

A. Ross Johnson, The Dynamics of Communist Ideological Change in Yugoslavia. *Columbia.*

Julian S. Jones, German Disarmament Policy from Bruning to Hitler. *Fletcher School.*

Savak J. Katrak, Liberalism and Nationalism in China and India: Some Problems Viewed in Comparative Perspective. *Harvard.*

Yinmaw Kau, Urbanization and Political Power in Communist China. *Cornell.*

Rita Kelly, Vera Zasulich: A Political Biography. *Indiana.*

Kenneth Kernaghan, Civil Liberties in New Commonwealth Countries. *Duke.*

Mark J. Kesselman, French Local Government: The Politics of Consensus. *Chicago.*

Hong Nack Kim, The Communist United Front Movement in China, 1931–1937, *Georgetown.*

Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in China: 1931–1934. *Columbia.*

Samuel S. Kim, The Burlingame Diplomacy in China, 1861–1867. *Columbia.*

Bohuslav Kymlicka, The National Committees of Czechoslovakia, 1944–1948: A Study of Local Government during a Seizure of Power. *Columbia.*

Abdul Lateef, Pakistan: The Ideology of a Nation. *Southern Illinois.*

Chung Sik Lee, Japan and the League of Nations. *Columbia.*

Young Ho Lee, Political Participation in Korea: Who Does What, Why, and How? *Yale.*

Keith R. Legg, Political Recruitment in Greece. *California* (Berkeley).

F. Roy Lockheimer, Habatsu (Cliques) and the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan. *Fletcher School.*

Donald J. McCrone, Party Identification: A Cross National Study. *North Carolina.*

George Maier, The Political Career of Velasco Ibarra. *Southern Illinois.*

James M. Malloy, Bolivia: A Study of Political Change. *Pittsburgh.*

Ronald A. Manzer, Teachers and Politics: The Role of the National Union of Teachers in Forming British Educational Policy. *Harvard.*

William R. Martin, Crisis Institutions and the Executive in Modern France. *Oklahoma.*

Pinchas Y. Medding, Internal Organization and Decision-Making Processes of the Israel Labour Party—Mapai. *Harvard.*

Horeya T. Megahed, The Impact of Traditionalism upon Political and Administrative Development in Mali. *Indiana.*

Sally L. Meiklejohn, A Political Study of Poland's "Recovered Territories," 1945–50. *Harvard.*

Ellen P. Mickiewicz, Party Political Education in the U.S.S.R.: The "Political Enlightenment" System of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *Yale.*

Robert P. Miller, The Machine Tractor Station as an Institution for the Organization and Control of Soviet Agriculture. *Harvard.*

Ghulam Mohammed, The Role of the Communist Party in the Formulation of Finland's Foreign Policy. *Minnesota.*

Joseph V. Montville, The Political Significance of Organized Labor in Egypt. *Columbia.*

Alasdair Morrison, Government and Politics in Britain. *Chicago.*

Robert Mortimer, Foreign Policy and Its Role in Nation-Building in Algeria. *Columbia.*

Yoshio Murakami, Japanese-American Negotiations: An Analysis of the Diplomatic Negotiations in Washington from April to November 1941. *Fletcher School.*

Serge Nessi, Change and Steadfastness: East Germany from Stalin's Death until the Berlin Conference of January 1954. *Columbia.*

Donald Niemi, Municipal Consolidation in Sweden since 1950. *Chicago.*

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Thomas E. Nyquist, Local Councils in the Sudan. *Northwestern.*

Ishwar G. Ojha, The Soviet and the Chinese Conceptions of the National Bourgeoisie of the Developing Areas, 1955–1963. *Fletcher School.*

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William J. Parente, A Comparative Analysis of Racism in the Communist Orbit: From Propaganda Weapon to Polycentric Factor, 1956–64. *Georgetown.*

Sandra S. Powell, Patterns of Change in Political Parties of Selected Latin American Countries. *Northwestern.*

Nimrod Raphaeli, Development Planning in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and the United Arab Republic. *Michigan.*

Lillian Rivlin, A Study of the Evolution of Neutralism with Particular Attention to Those States Which Claimed Leadership Roles. *California* (Berkeley).

Eleanor L. Roehr, Public Administration Aid Programs in Thailand and Burma. *New York University.*

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Philippe C. Schmitter, Political Groups and Political Development in Brazil since 1930. *California* (Berkeley).

Eduard J. M. Schmutzer, The Interaction of the National Movements in Indonesia before World War II. *California* (Santa Barbara).

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Aaron L. Segal, Efforts toward Closer Union and Federation in East Africa. *California* (Berkeley).

James D. Seymour, Communist Policies toward China's Intelligensia and Economic Managerial Class. *Columbia.*

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Phulgenda Sinha, The Praja Socialist Party in India. *American.*

Ieda Siqueira, Ideology and Institutions in a Developing Nation: A Study of Accion Democratica of Venezuela. *Florida.*

Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. *Cornell.*

Richard D. Stearns, The Problem of Trained Cadres in the (Former) Belgian Congo. *Fletcher School.*

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William L. Steude, Commissions of Inquiry: A Comparative Study of British, Canadian, and American Devices for Policy Formulation. *Michigan.*

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Michael W. Suleiman, The Party System in Lebanon: Its Origins and Growth. *Wisconsin.*

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Sidney G. Tarrow, The Problem of the Political and Economic Backwardness of Southern Italy, and the Role of the Government Economic Development Agency in Attempting to Overcome it. *California* (Berkeley).

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Rodger D. Yeager, The Dynamics and Effectiveness of Local Decision-Making in Tanganyika with Respect to Technical Development and National Integration. *Syracuse.*

Abdullah A. Kudsi-Zadeh, The Political Legacy of Jamal al-Din al Afghani: A Study of Religious Reform and Political Evolution in the Middle East. *Indiana.*

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Horst G. Duhnke, German Communism in the Nazi Era. *California* (Berkeley).

Stephen L. Elkin, Politics and Planning in London. *Harvard.*

John P. Haithcox, Nationalism, Communism and Social Mobilization: Royal Tactics in India. *California* (Berkeley).

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Daniel S. Lev, An Analysis of Political Development in Indonesia, 1957–1959. *Cornell.*

James J. Lynskey, The Role of British Backbenchers in the Modification of Government Policy: The Channels Utilized, the Tactics Employed, and the Issues Involved. *Minnesota.*

Lawrence L. Shrader, The Social Basis of Political Leadership in Rajasthan and Maharashtra. *California* (Berkeley).

Soma Vira, Impact of Urban Density upon Political Systems in South and South East Asia, a Comparative Study: India, Ceylon, and Indonesia. *New York University.*

Barbara Wolfe, The 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the All-People's State in Czechoslovakia. *Columbia.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION POLITICS AND LAW

Additions

Robert S. Adams, United States Disarmament Proposals 1919–1964. *New School.*

Berhanykun Andemicael, The Role of Non-Nuclear Powers in Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations in the United Nations. *Columbia.*

Joseph J. Arden, The Political Development of Western Samoa from Mandate to Independence. *Oklahoma.*

Michael Barkun, Toward a Theoretical Framework for Decentralized Law. *Northwestern.*

George S. Bauroth, Australia's Role in the Formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. *Connecticut.*

Peter G. Beck. The International Whaling Commission: A Case Study of Functional International Organization. *New York University.*

Paul Bernstein, Values and Perceptions: Four Case Studies in American Foreign Policy. *Pennsylvania.*

Joyce C. Berman, The Functional Relationship Between United Nations Secretariat Members and National Delegations in the Decision-Making Process. *New York University.*

Harry C. Blaney, Great Britain: Atlantic Co-operation and Interdependence—A Study of the National Politics of Western Unity. *Yale.*

C. Webster Boodey, Jr., National Claims to the Use of Outer Space for Military Purposes and the Development of the Public International Law of Space. *New York University.*

Steven J. Brams, Political Integration and the Analysis of International Transaction Flows. *Northwestern.*

William H. Brill, Civil Action in Bolivia. *Pennsylvania.*

John H. Burnett, Recent Soviet Foreign Policy With the United Arab Republic. *Emory.*

William R. Caspary, Reactions of Public Opinion to Events in International Relations. *Northwestern.*

Otto P. Chaney, Jr., The Contribution of Georgie Konstantinovich Zhukov to the Soviet Scene, 1918–1957: An Appraisal. *American.*

Herbert Cheever, Jr., Current United States Foreign Policy and India. *Iowa.*

Peter Ping-Chii Cheng, A Study of John Foster Dulles' Diplomatic Strategy in the Far East. *Southern Illinois.*

Minkyu Cho, Codification of International Law by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. *Minnesota.*

In Teak Chung, The Korean Nationalists Military Campaigns Against Japan 1907–1945. *American.*

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Michael J. Coyne, Participation of the Soviet Union in the International Telecommunication Union. *American.*

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Carl M. Dibble, United States-Turkish Relations, 1945–1960. *Chicago.*

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Mona H. Gagnon, United Nations Intervention in Civil War: Development of the Law of the Charter. *Harvard.*

Michael Gardone, The International Role of the Dollar. *Kentucky.*

Frederick J. Gerlach, Egypt and Divided Germany 1956–1963. *Columbia.*

Ahmad Ghoreichi, Russian Foreign Policy in Iran. *Colorado.*

James Graves, Host States and International Organizations. *Kentucky.*

Raymond N. Habiby, Problems of Loyalty of United Nations Personnel. *Minnesota.*

Paul T. Hanley, The Inter-American Defense Board. *Stanford.*

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J. Allan Hovey, Jr., The International Parliamentary Consultative Process as a Factor in Atlantic Cooperation. *Columbia.*

Nguyen Hung, The Tunisian Foreign Policy. *Virginia.*

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C. L. Brown-John, Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. *Toronto.*

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Birabhongse Kasemsri, State Responsibility with Respect to Damage Caused by Private Individuals to Private Alien Individuals on Its Territory: The Preventive Obligation in International Law. *Fletcher School.*

Robert O. Keohane, Political Influence and Bargaining in the United Nations General Assembly, 1960–1964. *Harvard.*

Jung Gun Kim, Observership Participation in International Organization. *Maryland.*

Helge Kjekshus, The Political Parties in the European Parliament. *Syracuse.*

Theodore J. Klein, Race Relations in the Republic of South Africa through 1962: A Study of the Fundamental Elements. *American.*

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Earl L. Koontz, The Role of the Special Fund in the United Nations Assistance Program. *North Carolina.*

Marian E. Krogmann, The Soviet Union and Outer Space. *Iowa.*

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John T. McAlister, Jr., Revolutionary War and Political Development: The Case of Viet Nam, 1945–1954. *Yale.*

Rev. Edmund F. McCaffrey, The Relevance of Systems Theories to the Analysis of International Politics. *Catholic University.*

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Lynn H. Miller, Regional Organizations and International Order. *Princeton.*

Barbara B. Moll, French Motivations in French-Israeli Relations. *Pittsburgh.*

Heyward Moore, Jr., Congressional Committees and the Formulation of Foreign Aid Policy. *North Carolina.*

Richter Moore, The Effect of Treaties on Private Rights in the United States. *Kentucky.*

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Anne Renouf, National Interests and Supranational Delegation: Discontinuities and Development in Anglo-French European Political Systems. *Yale.*

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Thomas W. Robinson, Theory and Reality in Sino-Soviet Relations. *Columbia.*

Arthur W. Rovine, The Top-Level Direction of the United Nations Secretariat: Structure and Political Decision-Making. *Columbia.*

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Krishna Prasad Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security, 1945–1957. *New York University.*

Arthur M. Sears, Berlin-International Point of Order. *Colorado.*

Richard D. Sears, Political Behavior of the African States in the Congo. *Indiana.*

Donald E. Secrest, United States Policies Toward Neutralism in the Post-World War Two Period. *Michigan.*

Esther M. Seeman, The Administration of the Minorities Treaties by the League of Nations and Its Implications for the United Nations. *Minnesota.*

Richard L. Seigel, Soviet State Policy towards India in the Period of Sino-Soviet Divergence. *Columbia.*

Francisco Soriano, Southeast Asian Countries Legal Position Toward Territorial Waters. *American.*

Robert L. Steers, The New Phenomenon of National Communist Parties and Its Impact on the World Communist Movement. *Ohio State.*

Ta Van Tai, The Role of the Military in Southeast Asia With Special Reference to Burma, Thailand and Pakistan. *Virginia.*

Ronald J. Terchek, The Making of the Test Ban Treaty in the United States. *Maryland.*

A. Paul Theil, The Politics of Nationalization: Ceylon. *Oklahoma.*

Elaine M. Themo, Sources of Indian and Mestizo Discontent in Peru and Manifestations of that Discontent in the Twentieth Century. *American.*

Alan R. Thoeny, Decision-Making and the Foreign Policy Crisis. *Wisconsin.*

Betty Traun, The General Committee in the Parliamentary Diplomacy of the General Assembly. *Columbia.*

Wesley B. Truitt, Representation to NATO. *Columbia.*

Maung Ye Tut, The Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations, 1955–1962. *Georgetown.*

Mamerto S. Ventura, United States Policy Toward Post-War Philippine Political Problems as They Affect Philippine Democracy. *Southern Illinois.*

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Vernon Warren, The Soviet Union and the Rise of Nazi Germany, 1933–36. *Kentucky.*

Carl Wasmuth, New Dimensions in International Programs and Budget Coordination. *Virginia.*

E. Eric Weise, Japan and the United States. *Indiana.*

Thomas Wilborn, Indonesian Foreign Policy. *Kentucky.*

Mark Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold and the United Nations. *Columbia.*

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William O. Chittick, The Domestic Information Activities of the Department of State. *Johns Hopkins.*

John D. Evans, Jr., The Horn of Africa: A Case Study of a Dilemma in Boundary-Making. *Georgetown.*

James H. Guill, The Territorial Sea: Proposal for a Functional Regime. *Georgetown.*

Dennis Livingston, Submarine, Airplane, Satellite: The International Regulations of Technological Innovations. *Princeton.*

Bernard Mennis, An Analysis of the Utility of Violence as Political Policy in Selected Historical Cases. *Michigan.*

Carla L. Rethmeyer, France's Attitude Toward International Organization as an Instrument for Keeping the Peace. *Fletcher School.*

Arthur H. Rice, International Atomic Energy Organization—U. S. Policies and Relations. *American.*

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Yasushi Sugiyama, Japan's Relations with Communist China, 1949–1963. *Maryland.*

James D. Thomas, American Origins of Federalism in the Indian Constitution. *Claremont.*

Philip D. Waddington, American Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice in the States of the African and Malgache Union (U.A.M.). *Pittsburgh.*

Theodore D. Wyly, Foreign Relations of the U. S. with France from 1919 to 1929. *Fletcher School.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

George D. Beam; A.B., Westminster, 1956; M.A., Pittsburgh, 1957; Ph.D., Michigan, 1963. The Use of Logical Models in Political Science. *Michigan.*

Franklyn Bonn; B.A., Minnesota, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Idea of Party in the Political Thought of Jefferson and Madison. *Minnesota.*

John C. Buhner; A.B., Franklin College, 1942; A.M., Indiana, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Political Theory of Non-Violence. *Indiana.*

Li Tze-Chung; LLM., Harvard, 1958; Ph.D., New School, 1963. International Criminal Jurisdiction. *New School.*

Chukwuemeka Ebo; Ph.D., New York University 1963. The Foundations of Zikism: Development of the Political Ideology of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 1937–1960. *New York University.*

Scott E. Edwards; B.A., San Fernando Valley State College, 1960; Ph.D., Claremont, 1964. The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. *Claremont.*

Charles J. Elliott; A.B., Harvard, 1953; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1958; Ph.D., Harvard, 1964. Freedom and Revolution: The Political Thought of Rosa Luxemburg. *Harvard.*

John W. Ellsworth; B.A., Sacramento, 1953; Ph.D., Claremont, 1963. Humanistic Ethics and Liberal Politics: A Study of the Political Thought of John Stuart Mill. *Claremont.*

Edward B. Estes, Jr.; A.B., Emory, 1955; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Florida, 1963. Unitary and Pluralistic Factors in Two Periods of the American Political Tradition: 1920–1932; 1932–1936. *Florida.*

Kuang-Huan Fan; Ph.D., New York University, 1963. The Study of Hu Shih's Thought. *New York University.*

Richard B. Friedman; A.B., Kenyon, 1957; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. T. H. Green and the Theory of Political Obligations. *Johns Hopkins.*

Russell G. Fryer; B.A., Tuscalun College, 1949; New Jersey State Teachers, 1956; Ph.D., New York University, 1964. Power and Human Nature in Western Political Thought. *New York University.*

Maurice M. Goldsmith; A.B., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: The Rationale of the Sovereign State. *Columbia.*

Robert A. Goldwin; B.A., St. John's (Annapolis), 1950; M.A., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Locke on Property. *Chicago.*

Richard S. Hartigan; B.S., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Noncombatant Immunity: An Analysis of its Philosophical and Historical Origins. *Georgetown.*

Paul J. Hoffman; B.A., Minnesota, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Party Responsibility and Political Experience: An Inquiry into the Attitude of American Political Leaders. *Minnesota.*

Morton J. Horwitz; B.A., City College (New York), 1953; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1958; Ph.D., Harvard, 1964. The Problem of Tyranny of the Majority in America. *Harvard.*

Joe Chou Huang; A.B., National Chengchi, 1956; M.A., Southern Illinois, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Political Theories of the K'ang-Liang School, 1894–1911. *Southern Illinois.*

Delos D. Hughes; A.B., Oberlin, 1956; M.A., North Carolina, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Impact of Political Ideas Upon Action: A Study of the Agrarian Idea in Contemporary American Politics. *North Carolina.*

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Lee R. Kerschner; A.B., Rutgers, 1953; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1958; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1964. Cybernetics in the Judgment of Soviet Philosophy. *Georgetown.*

Yousef Danesh Khoshboo; A.B., Tehran University, 1959; M.A., Southern Illinois, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Improvement of Civil Rights in the United States. *Southern Illinois.*

Daniel C. Kramer; A.B., Kenyon College, 1955; LL.B., Harvard, 1959; M.A., Pennsylvania. 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. G.D.H. Cole, Guild Socialism, and Workers' Control of Industry. *Pennsylvania.*

Purusnotman M. Krishna; M. Litt., Durham (England), 1960; Ph.D., New School, 1963. The Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. An Exposition and Assessment of the Integral System of a Leading Indian Thinker. *New School.*

Betty G. Lall; A.A., Stephens College, 1945; B.A., Minnesota, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Foreign Affairs Program of the League of Women Voters: Formulation, Mobilization of Public Opinion, Methods of Influencing Government Action, Evaluation of Results. *Minnesota.*

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Edward B. McLean; A.B., Indiana, 1957; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Rosa Luxemberg's Revolutionary Socialism: A Study in Marxian Radicalism. *Indiana.*

George R. Mace; B.A., Fresno State College, 1959; Ph.D., Claremont, 1963. The Hobbesian Nation. *Claremont.*

John D. May; A.B., Dartmouth, 1954; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. On Party Prowess: Three Images of Modern Political Dynamics. *California* (Berkeley).

Martin Meadows; B.A., Oregon, 1952; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Maryland, 1963. The Political Philosophy of Peter F. Drucker. *Maryland.*

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Thomas S. Schrock; A.B., Willamette, 1955; LL.B., Stanford, 1958; M.A., Chicago, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. On the Basis of Defoe's Political Thought: Robinson Crusoe. *Chicago.*

Julius Smulkstys; A.B., DePaul University, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Indiana, 1963. The Marxist Concept of Democracy. *Indiana.*

James Steintrager; A.B., Notre Dame, 1958; M.A., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Human Nature and Political Society: The Ethical Foundations of J. S. Mill's Political Thought. *Chicago.*

Philippa Strum; B.A., Brandeis, 1959; M.Ed., Harvard, 1960; Ph.D., New School, 1964. The Supreme Court and the "Political Question." *New School.*

Daniel Tuttle; A.B., Illinois, 1945; M.A.P.A., Minnesota, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. National Political Convention Delegates, 1944–1952: Their Characteristics, Qualifications, and Opinions. *Minnesota.*

DeLores J. Williams; A.B., Southern Illinois Normal, 1950; M.A., Chicago, 1954; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1964. Uncovering the Political Philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset. *Georgetown.*

Burton Zwiebach; A.B., City College (New York), 1954; LL.B., Columbia, 1957. Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Political Thought of R. H. Tawney. *Columbia.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Thad L. Beyle; B.A., Syracuse, 1956; A.M., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Illinois, 1963. The Cape Cod National Seashore: A Study in Conflict. *Illinois.*

John Bibby; B.S., Wisconsin State College, 1956; M.A., Illinois, 1957; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1963. Legislative Oversight of a Congressional Committee. *Wisconsin.*

Samuel H. Bloom; B.S.S., City College (New York), 1948; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1963. The Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944: A Case Study of the Separation of Church and State in the Field of Higher Education. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert L. Bowman; B.A., North Carolina, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Negro Politics in Four Southern Counties. *North Carolina.*

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James Dyson; B.A., Rhode Island, 1959; Ph.D., Indiana, 1963. Political Alienation: A Study of Apathy. *Indiana.*

Alice F. Emerson; A.B., Vassar, 1953; Ph.D., Bryn Mawr, 1964. The Reality of the Concept of the Public Interest: An Examination of an Idea within the Context of American Politics. *Bryn Mawr.*

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James B. Herzog; A.B., North Carolina, 1955; M.P.A., Harvard, 1960; Ph.D., Brown, 1963. The Role of the United States Navy in the Evolution and Execution of American Foreign Policy relative to Japan, 1936–1941. *Brown.*

Margaret A. Hunt; A.B., Michigan State; M.A., North Carolina, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Congressional Perception of Interest Group Activities. *North Carolina.*

William A. Kolstad; B.A., Macalester College, 1951; LL.B., Minnesota, 1954; M.A., South Dakota, 1958; Ph.D., Texas, 1964. The Role of the Supreme Court as Seen by the American Presidents: Washington to Eisenhower. *Texas.*

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David E. Smith; A.B., Western Ontario, 1959; M.A., Duke, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Emergency Government: A Comparative Study of Canada and Australia during World War I. *Duke.*

Roger M. Smith; B.A., University of Hawaii, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., Cornell, 1963. Cambodia's Foreign Policy. *Cornell.*

Leland G. Stauber; B.A., Chicago, 1956; M.A., Harvard, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Recent Soviet Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries: The Significance of the "National Democracy" Doctrine of 1960. *Harvard.*

Ernest Stock; A.B., Princeton, 1948; M.S., Columbia, 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Israel on the Road to Sinai: A Small State in a Test of Power. *Columbia.*

Walter W. Toxey, Jr.; D.V.M., Texas A & M, 1948; LL.B., Texas, 1951; M.A. Trinity, 1955; Ph.D., Texas, 1964. Immigration and Citizenship in the Commonwealth of Nations. *Texas.*

Otto Ulc; L.D., Charles University, 1953; M.A. Columbia, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Class Struggle and Social Justice in Czechoslovakia. *Columbia.*

C. Sylvester Whitaker, Jr.; A.B., Swarthmore, 1956; M.A., Princeton, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Politics of Tradition: A Study of Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946–60. *Princeton.*

Richard J. Willey; A.B., Massachusetts, 1960; Ph.D., Princeton, 1964. Labor and Politics in West Germany: The Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 1949–1963. *Princeton.*

Freeman J. Wright; B.S., Montana, 1955; M.S., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1964. The Evolution and Operation of Parliamentary Government in Chile. *Johns Hopkins.*

Labib Zuwiyya Yamak; A.B., American University (Beirut), 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; M.S., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., Michigan, 1964. The Ideological Foundations, Structure and Organization of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. *Michigan.*

Merwin C. Young; B.A., Michigan, 1953; Ph.D., Harvard, 1964. The Congo: A Study in Decolonization and Political Adaptation. *Harvard.*

Sepehr Zabih; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1957; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Dynamics of the Communist Movement in Iran. *California* (Berkeley).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION POLITICS AND LAW

Thomas L. Alexander; B.A., Florida, 1931; M.A., Duke, 1936; Ph.D., American, 1964. The Relationship between United States Foreign Policy

Aims Respecting the Federal Republic of Germany and the Information Center Service Operation (USIA) Support of these Objectives. *American.*

Elaine B. Andrews; A.B., Stanford, 1952; A.M., Fletcher School, 1958; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. International and Foreign Bond Flotations in London and the United States, 1860–1960. *Fletcher School.*

Peter R. Baehr; A.B., University of Amsterdam, 1956; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1964. Dilemmas in United States Foreign Policy in the United Nations with Regard to Problems of National Self-Determination, 1946–1959. *Georgetown.*

Firouz Bahrampour; B.A., American, 1961; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Political and Social Transformation of Modern Turkey (1923–1963). *American.*

Franklin G. Balch, III; A.B., Harvard, 1949; A.M., Virginia, 1950; A.M., Fletcher School, 1956; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The U. S. and Spain. 1945–1953: A Study in the Evolution of the Cold War. *Fletcher School.*

Terrell W. Bailey; A.B., Florida, 1954; M.A., George Peabody College, 1955; Ph.D., Florida, 1961. Inspection and Control of Nuclear Armaments in a Nation-State System: United States-Russian Disarmament Negotiations, 1945–1962. *Florida.*

James Barros; A.B., Columbia, 1953; M.I.A., *ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Corfu Incident of 1923: The League of Nations and the Great Powers. *Columbia.*

Richard C. Bowman; B.S., U. S. Military Academy 1949; M.S., Oklahoma, 1954; M.P.A., Harvard, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Question of Reality in International Politics. *Harvard.*

Robert Bresler; B.A., Earlham College, 1959; M.A., Princeton, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. American Policy toward International Control of Atomic Energy 1945–46. *Princeton.*

George W. Brown; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1950; M.A., Los Angeles State College, 1959; Ph.D., Claremont, 1963. Generals and the Public: Changing Perceptions of the Military Role. *Claremont.*

Donald I. Buzinka; B.A., St. Francis College, 1960; M.A., New York University 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Soviet-League Relations, 1919–1939: A Survey and Analysis. *New York University.*

Roger Carasso; A.B., Utah, 1952; Ph.D., Princeton, 1964. Ideological Consideration in the French Rejection of the European Defense Community. *Princeton.*

Bruce R. Carpenter; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1942; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., American, 1964. The Puerto Rican Visitor (Tourist or Travel) Business. *American.*

Faye Carroll; A.B., Western Kentucky, 1959; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1963. Southwest Africa and the United Nations. *Kentucky.*

Chin-Shan Chen; A.B., University of Shanghai, 1937; M.A., Southern Illinois, 1959; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. America's Non-Recognition Policy Toward Chinese Governments: An Historical-Political Analysis Applied to the Peiping Regime. *Southern Illinois.*

William D. Coplin; B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1930; M.A., American, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Image of Power Politics: A Cognitive Approach to the Study of International Politics. *American.*

Theodore A. Couloumbis; B.A., Connecticut, 1956; M.A., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1964. Greek Political Reaction to NATO and Western Orientation: 1952–63. *American.*

Arthur H. Darken; A.B., Bates, 1951; B.D., Union Theological Seminary, 1954; Ph.D., Columbia, 1964. The Struggle over Foreign Aid: Major Issues and Competing Theories in the Formulation of U. S. Foreign Aid Policy. *Columbia.*

Caroline A. Dinegar; A.B., Cornell, 1944; M.A., Columbia, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Some Aspects of the Use of Recognition of New Governments as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy, 1900–1960. *Columbia.*

Patrick T. Dougherty; B.A., Oklahoma, 1958; M.A., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Missouri, 1963. Catholic Opinion and United States Recognition Policy. *Missouri.*

William A. Douglas; A.B., Washington, 1955; A.M., Johns Hopkins, 1957; Ph.D., Princeton, 1964. The K.P.D. against Rearmament: The Role of the West German Communist Party in the Soviet Campaign Against West German Rearmament, 1949–1953. *Princeton.*

James F. Engel; B.A., Westminster, 1961; Ph.D., Virginia, 1964. Mexican Reaction to United States Cuban Policy, 1959-1963. *Virginia.*

Carl P. Epstein; B.A., Tulane, 1947; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1964. United States Policy of Nuclear Control 1953–1960. *American.*

Elsemie Esser; A.B., Heidelburg; M.A., Kentucky, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Mexican Attitude toward Political and Security Matters in the United Nations—1945-1960: A Case Study of a Small Power Politics. *Kentucky.*

Marina S. Finkelstein; A.B., Barnard, 1940; M.A., Columbia, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Individual Petition and International Responsibility. *Columbia.*

Leslie H. Gelb; B.A., Tufts, 1959; Ph.D., Harvard, 1964. Anglo-American Relations, 1945–1955: Toward a Theory of Alliance. *Harvard.*

Laszlo Gorgey; M.A., Virginia, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Influence of Foreign Policy on the

Development of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. *Virginia.*

Wolfram F. Hanrieder; A.B., Chicago, 1958; M.A., *ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1963. The Relationship Between International System Factors and the Foreign Policy Goals and Internal Socio-Political Processes of West Germany During the Period of 1949 to the Present. *California* (Berkeley).

John H. Hedley; B.S., Kansas, 1957; M.A., Tulsa, 1960; Ph.D., Missouri, 1964. The Truman Administration and the "Loss" of China: A Study of Public Attitude and the President's Policies from the Marshall Mission to the Attack on Korea. *Missouri.*

David C. Holly; B.S., Johns Hopkins, 1938; M.A., Maryland, 1939; Ph.D., American, 1964. The National Interest as Perceived by U. S. Policy Makers. *American.*

Richard D. Hughes; B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958; M.A., Colgate, 1960; Ph.D., Claremont, 1964. Soviet Foreign Policy and Germany, 1945–1948. *Claremont.*

A. W. M. Abdul Huq; B. Com., University of Dacca; LL.B., *ibid.;* Ph.D., Virginia, 1964. United Nations Status and Immunities Member Representatives, Officials, Armed Forces, Other Personnel and Other International Organizations. *Virginia.*

William H. Jackson, Jr.; A.B., Princeton, 1954; A.M., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. United States Assistance to Pakistan: A Case Study in Mutual Security Program. *Fletcher School.*

Nish A. Jamgotch, Jr.; B.A., Minnesota, 1954; M.A., *ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Claremont, 1964. Eastern Europe as a Soviet Core Interest. *Claremont.*

Yung-Hwan Jo; B.A., Lincoln Memorial, 1957; M.A., Tennessee, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1964. Japanese Geopolitics and the Greater East Co-Prosperity Sphere. *American.*

Wynfred Joshua; Canidaat, Amsterdam, 1953; M.A., Western Reserve, 1956; Ph.D., Pittsburgh, 1964. French Attitudes toward NATO. *Pittsburgh.*

Donald E. Kash; B.A., Iowa, 1959; M.A., *ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. International Cooperation in Space: The American Experience. *Iowa.*

Young Whan Kihl; Ph.D., New York University, 1963. A Study of Functionalism in International Organizations: With Special Reference to the Cases of the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union. *New York University.*

Benedict S. Kim; B.A., Georgetown, 1957; Ph.D., Yale, 1964. The United States and SEATO. *Yale.*

David L. Larson; A.B., Dartmouth, 1952; A.M., Fletcher School, 1957; M.A.L.D., *ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Foreign Policy of the United States Toward Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1963. *Fletcher School.*

Sister Mary Mangan; B.A., Webster College, 1935; M.A., St. Louis University, 1951; Ph.D., Yale, 1964. The Congressional Image of Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries (1949–1959) as Revealed in the Congressional Hearings and Debates. *Yale.*

Catherine S. Manno; B.S., Antioch, 1933; M.A., American, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Toward a Theory for Weighting Votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations. *American.*

George S. Masannat; B.A., Millikin, 1958; M.A., Louisiana, 1960; Ph.D., Oklahoma, 1964. Aspects of American Foreign Policy in the Arab Middle East: 1947–1957, With Emphasis on United States-Egyptian Relations. *Oklahoma.*

Pritam Merani; B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1958; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. India's Territorial Disputes: A Legal Analysis. *Johns Hopkins.*

Michael M. Milenkovitch; A.B., Ohio Wesleyan, 1956; M.I.A., Columbia, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Direction of Opinion by the Soviet Press in Comparison with the Press of Other Countries. *Columbia.*

Jamal E. Muzaffar; A.B., Kansas City, 1953; M.A., California, 1955; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1964. American-Soviet Policy in the Arab-East, 1939–1957. *Georgetown.*

Ronald C. Nairn; B.A., Canterbury University (New Zealand), 1950; M.A., Yale, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. United Nations Field Operations in Thailand: A Study in International Functionalism. *Yale.*

Virgil Ney; A.B., George Washington, 1953; M.A., Georgetown, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Resistance Warfare: A Military Phenomenon. *Georgetown.*

Robert C. Noel; A.B., California (Riverside), 1956; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1963. A Simplified Political-Economic System Simulation. *Northwestern.*

George R. Packard III; A.B., Princeton, 1954; A.M., Fletcher School, 1959; Ph.D.,*ibid.*, 1963. Japan's Reaction to the American Alliance 1960: A Study of Japan's Political Processes. *Fletcher School.*

Robert A. Packenham; B.A., Augustana College, 1958; M.A., Illinois, 1959; Ph.D., Yale, 1964. Foreign Aid and Political Development. *Yale.*

Glenn Perry; B.A., Union College, 1960; Ph.D., Virginia, 1964. The United States and Egyptian Neutralism. *Virginia.*

Robert Pfaltzgraff; B.A., Swarthmore, 1956; M.B.A., Pennsylvania, 1958; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963.

Great Britain and the European Economic Community. *Pennsylvania.*

Fang-quei Quo; A.B., National Taiwan University, 1951; M.A., Oregon, 1961; Ph.D., Southern Illinois, 1964. Japanese Liberalism: A Case Study in the Transplantation of Alien Political Theory. *Southern Illinois.*

Amir Rafat; License, University of Geneva, 1955; M.A., Nebraska, 1958; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1964. Nationalization of the Private Property of Aliens in Recent International Law (Iran, Indonesia, Cuba, Egypt). *Minnesota.*

Ahmad Ali Rajaee; Licentiate, Tehran, 1956; M.A., American, 1961; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and Its Objectives in the Middle East. *American.*

Bernard Reich; B.A., City College (New York), 1961; M.A., Virginia, 1963; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Israel's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Small State Diplomacy. *Virginia.*

Susan B. Rosenbaum; B.A., Cornell, 1955; M.A., Yale, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. "Peace with Honour": British Policy in Cyprus. *Yale.*

Rudolph J. Rummell; A.B., Hawaii, 1959; M.A., *ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1963. Dimensions of Conflict Behavior within and between Nations. *Northwestern.*

Walter S. Schoenberger; A.B., Pittsburgh, 1950; A.M., *ibid.*, 1953; A.M., Fletcher School, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and Its Political and Moral Consequences. *Fletcher School.*

George A. Selivanoff; B.A., British Columbia, 1957; M.A., American, 1962; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. Historical Review of the Position of the Individual in Modern International Law from 1648–1948. *American.*

James P. Sewell; B.S., North Texas State College, 1951; M. Ed., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1962. An Evaluation of the Functional Approach to International Organization, with Emphasis on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development. *California* (Berkeley).

Sheldon Simon; B.A., Minnesota, 1958; M.P.A., Princeton, 1960; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1964. National Foreign Policies and the International Labor Organization: A Study of the Reciprocal Influence of Political Norms. *Minnesota.*

Bhak Pati Sinha; B.S., American, 1954; M.A., Howard, 1957; Ph.D., Columbia, 1964. Unilateral Denunciation of Treaty because of Prior Violations of Obligations by Other Party. *Columbia.*

Jean E. Smith; A.B., Princeton, 1954; Ph.D., Columbia, 1964. Defense of Berlin. *Columbia.*

Jin Chull Soh; LL.B., Seoul National University (Korea). 1953; M.A., Southern Illinois, 1957; Ph.D., Oklahoma, 1963. Some Causes of the Korean War of 1950: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy in Korea (1945–1950), With Emphasis on Sino-Soviet Collaboration. *Oklahoma.*

Gordon L. Spangler; A.B., Tufts, 1950; A.M., Fletcher School, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1963. Farm Parity and Trade Equality: A Study of Conflicts U. S. Farm and International Trade Policies. *Fletcher School.*

Elizabeth Sterenberg; A.B., Knox, College 1929; M.A., Radcliffe, 1932; Ph.D., Chicago, 1963. The Role of Forced Labor in Economic Development. *Chicago.*

Sandra W. Thornton; A.B., Vermont, 1958; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1964. The Soviet Union and Japan, 1939–1941. *Georgetown.*

Clifton E. Wilson; B.S., Utah, 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *Minnesota*, 1964. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities in Recent International Law and Practice. *Minnesota.*

Larman C. Wilson; B.A., Nebraska State 1952; M.A., Maryland, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1964. The Principle of Non-Intervention in Recent Inter-American Relations. *Maryland.*

NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its twenty-second annual meeting April 30 to May 2 at the University of Wisconsin, with over 500 persons in attendance. General sessions of the conference were addressed by President C. Herman Pritchett of the American Political Science Association on the topic, "Political Questions and Judicial Answers," and by Dean James F. Crow of the University of Wisconsin Medical School on "Some Possible Human Consequences of New Knowledge in Genetics."

Panel sessions were devoted to a wide variety of topics covering such areas as the United Nations, Judicial decision making, civil rights, party leadership and organization, the radical right, Latin America and many others.

Special sessions were held for the organization of a midwest division of the International Studies Association and for the orientation of new members to the profession.

New officers of the organization are: John E. Stoner, Indiana University, president; Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin, vice-president; and as members of the executive council, Clark F. Norton, DePauw University and David Spitz, Ohio State University.

The 1965 meeting of the Conference will be held at Indiana University on April 22–24. The program chairman is John E. Turner, University of Minnesota.

The Iowa Conference of Political Scientists held its 1964 annual meeting at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, on April 11.

The Conference discussed Iowan county finances, anti-Americanism in Latin America and the academic preparation of Iowan high school teachers of government.

The new officers of the organization are: president, Erma Plaehn, State College of Iowa; secretary, Charles Clark, Upper Iowa University; members of the executive committee, James Magee, Grinnell College; Rev. Robert Ferring, Loras College; George Reynolds, Buena Vista College; Samuel Patterson, State University of Iowa; Donald Hadwiger, Iowa State University; Paul Willis, Drake University; Joseph Board, Cornell College; Stuart Ringham, Luther College; and Dean Yarwood, Coe College.

The annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association will be held at the Jack Tarr Hotel, Durham, North Carolina, on November 12, 13 and 14, 1964.

The fortieth session of the Institute of World Affairs was held December 1–4, 1963 in Pasadena, California, under the direction of James T. Watkins IV of Stanford University.

The theme of the Institute was the Grand Design and the daily programs dealt with the subjects: The Grand Design: Atlantic or European, The Grand Design and the Seven Seas, and the Grand Design in the United Nations.

Ross N. Berkes of the University of Southern California, the director of the forty-first session has selected "Power and Responsibility" as the theme of the meeting to be held December 6–9, 1964 in Pasadena.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Ford Foundation has awarded a grant to the Africa Studies Association for the production of a comprehensive descriptive guide to Africa-related archival and manuscript sources extant in this country. Complete in itself, the Guide will serve as the United States' national volume of the projected "Guide to the Sources of African History" outside of Africa, sponsored by the UNESCO-affiliated International Council on Archives. The Guide will cover the archive holdings of American government agencies, commercial concerns, religious and missionary groups and other non-commercial organizations. Africa-related papers of private individuals or families will be covered if they have been retired to depository custody. There will be no chronological limitations on coverage. For the purposes of the Guide, Africa is defined as the entire continent, plus the adjacent coastal islands, including Madagascar and the Mascarenes.

Persons having knowledge of archive and manuscript sources on Africa in this country are asked to contact Mr. Morris Rieger, Director, National African Guide Project, National Historical Publications Commission, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C. 20408.

The Society for Religion in Higher Education is offering a number of post-doctoral fellowships to encourage the growing interest in the relation of scholarship in religion to scholarship in other fields of study. These fellowships are made possible through a grant from The Danforth Foundation.

Grants are available to: (1) Scholars in the humanities, social and natural sciences for a year of study in religion and (2) scholars in religion for a year of study in another discipline.

These fellowships are open to scholars in any institution of higher learning in the United States or Canada without respect to discipline, religious affiliation or non-affiliation. Scholars applying for these fellowship grants must have a Ph.D. degree or its equivalent plus at least three years of teaching experience. Preference will be given to scholars under 50 years of age.

Maximum stipend is $8,500. Stipends will be based on experience, present salary and availability of other resources.

Completed applications must be received by December 1, 1964. Application forms and additional information may be secured from: Lawrence P. DeBoer, Executive Director, The Society for Religion in Higher Education, 400 Prospect Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06511.

Scholars interested in collaborating with each other in political and social studies of China and Japan between 1900 and 1945, are invited to associate themselves with the Collaborative Studies of China and Japan. Inquiries should be directed to Donald G. Gillin, Department of History, Duke University, Durham, N. C., or to Tamatsu Takase, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

For publication in the 1965 issue of its *Research Bulletin on Intergroup Relations*, the Society for the Study of Social Problems and a number of other cooperating organizations are conducting a census of research underway in 1964 in the general area of their interest. If you are engaged in any such research and wish to be included in the census, address a request for the questionnaire form to Mr. Morton J. Sobel, Director, National Department of Colleges and Universities, Anti-Defamation League, 315 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. 10016.

SSRC GRANTS FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

In this program initiated in 1963–64 support is offered to social scientists possessing the Ph.D. or its equivalent for field studies of multilateral processes in international affairs, with emphasis on change in activities of agencies, in relationships between agencies and governments, and in organizational patterns. The committee administering the program will welcome proposals for research, for example, on changes over time in objectives and roles of international organizations; new multilateral arrangements for the advancement of common purposes; political or technical interaction among international organizations or between organizations and governments or regional groups; and the experience of organizations in attempting to influence policies of governments in such areas as public health, economic integration, or political development. The committee wishes to encourage comparative studies of relationships and agencies, and research that may contribute to the development of theory; it is especially interested in proposals for studies of regional organizations and relevant movements and forces in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

Prospective applicants are invited to write to the Social Science Research Council, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017, by December 1, 1964. Letters should describe the substance and method of the proposed research in some detail. Previous research in the field of international organization is not required of applicants. The committee may invite qualified persons in the United States or abroad to undertake research under this program in order to broaden the range of comparative studies.

Stipends may provide for maintenance in lieu of salary for a year or longer, and for travel expenses. Research may be undertaken in 1965–66, or 1966–67.

SSRC PROGRAMS

The Social Science Research Council's programs of Research Training Fellowships, Faculty Research Fellowships, and Grants-in-Aid of Research have been under review, and it was not yet certain in June what form these would take for 1965–66.

The Council will again offer grants to mature scholars, not candidates for degrees, on essentially the same basis as before, for research on American Governmental and Legal Processes, and for Research on International Organization.

Under joint sponsorship of the SSRC and the American Council of Learned Societies, several programs of Fellowships and grants for training and research on certain foreign areas will be continued; inquiries concerning these should be directed respectively to the offices indicated:

Grants to mature scholars for research on Africa, Contemporary China, Latin America, and the Near and Middle East are administered by the SSRC; for research in Asian Studies and in Slavic and East European Studies, by the ACLS

345 East 46th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.

Fellowships for training in foreign area studies are administered by the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10022.

Inquiries, and requests for a final announcement to be issued in late September, should be addressed to Social Science Research Council Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017.

To avoid missing deadlines, prospective applicants should correspond with the appropriate office by early October.

The Africa Service Institute of New York has moved its offices to 60 E. 42nd Street, Suite 547, New York, New York.

The Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year as a center for public service education and research.

Peter Bachrach of Bryn Mawr College will be on research leave in England in 1964–65 under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

William B. Ballis of the department of political science of the University of Michigan, who has been in Europe on research and sabbatical leave, has been given another year's leave of absence so that he can occupy for 1964–65 the Chester W. Nimitz chair of social and political philosophy at the Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

Lucius J. Barker is on leave from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for 1964–65 as a fellow in law and political science at the Harvard Law School.

Carl Beck, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh, spent the summer months in Europe working on his research project.

Oliver E. Benson, director of the bureau of government research and professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, has been granted a sabbatical leave of absence for 1964–65 to do research.

Bernard C. Borning has returned to his post as chairman of the department of political science at the University of Idaho from a year's leave in Korea where he lectured at Korea and Seoul National Universities.

Bernard E. Brown, associate professor of political science at the State University of New York, will be on leave during 1964–65 and will teach at the University of Dakar, Senegal.

John W. Chapman, associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh was a visiting fellow in the department of philosophy of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University during April and May, 1964.

Harwood L. Childs, professor of politics at Princeton University, has been named editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Soon Sung Cho, formerly of Southern Illinois University, has been appointed visiting professor at the University of Nebraska.

Frederick N. Cleaveland has been on leave from his post as chairman of the political science department at the University of North Carolina since February serving as a member of the Senior Staff of the Governmental Studies Division of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. He will continue in this position for another year.

David J. Danelski, associate professor of political science, University of Washington, will be on leave 1964–65 to conduct research under a Social Science Research Council grant. He will also serve as lecturer at Yale University.

Raymond H. Dawson, department of political science, University of North Carolina, will lecture during the 1964–65 academic year at Kings College, University of London, on a Fulbright appointment.

Brewster C. Denny, director of the graduate school of public affairs at the University of Washington, was appointed by President Johnson in March to the thirteen-man United States-Puerto Rico Study Commission. The Comission was created by an act of congress in February, 1964.

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic of the Advanced School for International Studies has been appointed visiting professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Lewis J. Edinger of Washington University has received a Fulbright award to study in Germany. He will be on leave 1964–65 and will also serve as a senior research consultant to the Yale University Arms Control Project.

Daniel J. Elazar will be on research leave from Temple University for the 1964–65 academic year under a Guggenheim fellowship.

Alona E. Evans of the department of political science at Wellesley College will be on sabbatical leave during 1964–65.

George Fischer, Cornell University, is spending 1964–65 at the bureau of applied social research, Columbia University.

D. F. Fleming, emeritus professor at Vanderbilt University, was a visiting professor of international relations at the University of Arizona during the second semester, 1964.

Keener C. Frazer will be on leave this fall from the University of North Carolina in order to conduct research in Western Europe.

John F. Gange, professor of political science at the University of Oregon, was elected president of the International Studies Association at its spring meeting in Salt Lake City.

Federico G. Gil of the University of North Carolina will be on leave during the fall semester.

Robert Gilpin, assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, will spend the current academic year in France and Great Britain.

J. David Greenstone has returned from a year spent at Nokerere College, Uganda, with the University of Chicago-Nokerere exchange program, to take up a regular appointment as assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

Jean Grossholtz of Mount Holyoke College spent the summer in the Philippines and Malaysia on a research project under the Four College Non-Western Studies Program supported by the Ford Foundation.

Donald B. Hayman, who has been a visiting lecturer the past year at the University of Kansas, has returned to the University of North Carolina. He will divide his time between the institute of government and the department of political science.

Robert F. Hirschfield of Hunter College was adjunct associate professor of government at Fordham University during the summer semester of 1964.

Harry A. Holloway, associate professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, has been granted a leave of absence for 1964–65 to do research under a Rockefeller foundation grant.

S. Shepard Jones, Burton Craige professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, has returned from a year's leave of absence. During the fall semester of last year he was a lecturer at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and during the spring semester he was engaged in research at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

Kemal J. Karpat, assistant professor at New York University, has been elected a fellow of the Middle East Institute.

Robert F. Karsch is on leave from the University of Missouri during the current year to occupy the Chair of American history and institutions at Jadavpur University, Calcutta, India.

Melville T. Kennedy, Jr., associate professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College, will be on sabbatical leave during 1964–1965.

Merle Kling, professor of political science, Washington University, has received a research appointment at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, for the academic year 1964–65.

Walter S. G. Kohn, associate professor of political science at Illinois State University, has been granted a sabbatical leave for the second semester of 1964–65 and will do research in Europe.

Ladis Kristof is on research leave for the 1964–65 academic year from Temple University.

Robert S. Lancaster, professor of political science and dean of the college of arts and sciences in the University of the South, will be on leave during 1964–65 academic year. He will be a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Seoul, Korea.

John H. Leek, professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, has been elected president of the Southwestern Political Science Association for 1964–65.

Rene Lemarchand, assistant professor of the University of Florida, has been on leave during the second trimester of 1963–64 to Chatham College, Pittsburgh, to supervise their program on African studies. He will be on leave for the first trimester of 1964–65 for further studies in the Congo.

John W. Lewis, Cornell University, has received a grant for 1964–65 from the Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council to conduct research in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

William O. Lewis has resigned his instructorship at the University of Idaho to return to graduate study.

Gerhard Loewenberg will be on research leave from Mount Holyoke College during the fall semester under a Social Science Research Council grant.

Duncan MacRae, Jr., of the University of Chicago, is on leave for the academic year 1964–65. He will conduct research at the University of California, Berkeley, and in Washington, D. C.

James H. McKrocklin, professor and chairman of the department of government, Texas College of Arts and Industries, has been elected president of Southwest Texas State College, effective September 1964.

Donald R. Matthews, professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, will be a fellow this coming year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, California.

Douglas Mendel, Jr., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, spent part of the summer in Tokyo as a research fellow of the Elmo Roper public opinion research center of Williams College.

Frank O. Miller will be on leave from the College of Wooster for the 1964–65 school year to serve as visiting professor and associate director of the international division of Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.

John H. Millett, of the University of Wichita, will be visiting professor of political science at Washington University for the year 1964–65.

Donald C. Mundinger, associate professor of government at Valparaiso University, has been appointed a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for the Study of Higher Education, University of Michigan, for the academic year 1964–65.

Charles B. Neff, assistant professor at the University of Hawaii, has been granted a leave of absence to serve as a Peace Corps representative in Bogotá, Colombia.

Peter H. Odegard, of the University of California, will be visiting lecturer in the department of political science at Boston College for the fall term of 1964.

Karl O'Lessker has been granted leave from his position at Wabash College in order to campaign as the Democratic candidate for congress from the sixth district of Indiana.

Felix Oppenheim of the University of Massachusetts combined his regular duties during the academic year 1963–64 with a visiting lecturership at Amherst College.

Nissan Oren, assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University, will be on leave of absence during the academic year 1964–65 and will teach at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Belden Paulson, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, spent the summer in Italy under a university research grant.

Alfredo Pareja, University of Florida, spent four months in Ecuador and Colombia under a Guggenheim research grant.

Robert L. Peabody, assistant professor of political science, Johns Hopkins University, will be on leave of absence during the 1964–65 academic year under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

Melvin Richter, Hunter College, will be on leave during the 1964–65 academic year on a faculty research fellowship of the Social Science Research Council.

James S. Roberts returned in September to his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Reno, following a two-year leave of absence to teach public administration in Pakistan.

Warren Roberts has returned to his position at Wabash College after two years on leave with the State Department where he worked on the Alliance for Progress.

Myron Rush of the RAND Corporation has been appointed visiting professor in the department of government for 1964-65 at Cornell University.

Joseph Schlesinger of the political science department at Michigan State University will replace Herbert McClosky, who will be on leave for the academic year 1964–65 from the University of California.

John R. Schmidhauser was on leave from the University of Iowa during the spring semester of 1964 to campaign for the Democratic nomination for congress from the first congressional district of Iowa.

Edward V. Schneier of the Brookings Institution has been appointed visiting professor in the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University for the academic year 1964–65.

JASPER SHANNON received the Distinguished Teaching award at the annual honors convocation at the University of Nebraska.

MARSHALL SINGER of Brooklyn College was adjunct assistant professor of government at Fordham University during the spring semester of 1964.

LALITA P. SINGH, completing his doctorate at The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, has accepted a visiting assistant professorship at the University of Missouri for the current academic year.

O. GLENN STAHL, Director, Bureau of Programs and Standards, U. S. Civil Service Commission, was an AID observer-delegate to the Conference of Directors of Public Administration Institutes and of the Civil Service Commissions of African nations sponsored by the U. N. Economic Commission for Africa, and held at Addis Ababa in May, 1964. He will also lecture at the 96th session of the Salzburg seminar in American studies at Salzburg, Austria, during the winter of 1965.

GEORGE STAMBUK of George Washington University will conduct research in Europe under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

GILBERT STEINER, University of Illinois, will replace Victor Jones, who will be on sabbatical leave from the University of California for the academic year 1964–65.

THOR SWANSON, Washington State University, returned from a year's leave as of September, 1964. During his leave of absence he served on the staff of Alaskan governor, William Egan, as an NCEP faculty fellow in state and local government.

JIVAN TABIBIAN, Wake Forest College, will serve as lecturer at UCLA during the 1964–65 academic year.

ROBERT C. TUCKER, professor of politics at Princeton University, is on leave the current academic year at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.

DAVID A. WILSON of the political science department at the University of California at Los Angeles will serve as visiting professor of political science at the Berkeley campus for the spring semester 1965.

THOMAS WILSON, instructor in political science at Illinois State University, will be on leave during 1964–65 to do graduate work at the University of Illinois.

DAVID WURFEL, associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Missouri, is on leave this academic year serving as Fulbright lecturer in political science at the University of Singapore.

JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF, department of political science, University of Pittsburgh, will be on leave during the fall term.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

ROBERT W. ADAMS, doctoral candidate at Ohio State University, has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Miami University (Ohio) for the 1964–65 year.

ROBERT E. AGGER has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science and project director in the National Center for Research in Education Administration at the University of Oregon.

ROBERT L. ANDERSON has been appointed to the faculty in political science at the University of Mississippi with the rank of assistant professor.

PETER BACHRACH of Bryn Mawr College has been promoted to full professor in political science.

HARRY A. BAILEY has joined the staff of the department of political science at Temple University as an assistant professor.

CHESTER BAIN has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Emory University for the next four years.

HOYT B. BALLARD, assistant professor of government, Texas College of Arts and Industries, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Los Angeles State College, effective August, 1964.

CAROL E. BAUMANN has been appointed director of the Institute for World Affairs Education, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

PHILIP F. BEACH has resigned at Washington State University and has accepted appointment to an assistant professorship at Fresno State College, beginning in September, 1964.

DANIEL M. BERMAN has been promoted to professor in the School of Government and Public Administration at the American University.

Marver H. Bernstein, chairman of the department of politics at Princeton since 1961, has been appointed dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

John F. Bibby, assistant professor of political science at Northern Illinois University, was granted a NCEP-Eagleton national convention fellowship.

Joseph B. Board, formerly of Cornell College, has been appointed professor and chairman of the department of political science at Union College, effective February, 1965.

G. Robert Boynton, for the past year a visiting assistant professor at the University of North Carolina, went to the State University of Iowa in September with the rank of assistant professor.

Paul R. Brass, doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed lecturer in political science at Bryn Mawr College for the year 1964–65.

Henry L. Bretton of the University of Michigan has been appointed visiting professor of political science at the University of Ghana, (Legon) for a two-year period beginning October, 1964.

Fredric S. Burin has been promoted to professor in the School of Government and Public Administration at the American University.

Roger Carasso was promoted to assistant professor of political science at Northern Illinois University.

Donald Clare has resigned his post at Wayne State University to accept a position as assistant professor of administration at Florida Atlantic University.

Patrick J. Conklin has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Missouri.

Thomas I. Cook has resigned as chairman of the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Harry R. Cornell has joined the political science department of the State University of New York at Buffalo as a lecturer.

Robert A. Daland, who for the past year has had a joint appointment in the institute of government and the department of political science at the University of North Carolina, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department.

Anthony A. D'Amato has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at Wellesley College. Prior to his appointment he had been engaged in research at Harvard Law School.

David J. Danelski, University of Washington, has been promoted to an associate professorship.

Paul T. David has been appointed chairman of the Woodrow Wilson department of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Roger H. Davidson has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Dartmouth College.

Earl H. DeLong, formerly of Northwestern University became professor and dean of the School of Government and Public Administration of the American University, effective July 1, 1963.

John C. Donnell, formerly of Dartmouth College, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Temple University.

Jack D. Dowell has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at Washington State University, effective September 1964.

Rondal G. Downing has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Missouri.

Edward A. Duane has been appointed an instructor in the department of political science, Temple University.

W. Raymond Duncan has been appointed instructor in government at Boston University.

Rowland A. Egger has resigned his position as professor and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Virginia to become professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University.

Daniel J. Elazar, formerly at the University of Illinois has been appointed associate professor of political science, Temple University.

Alice Frey Emerson, doctoral candidate at Bryn Mawr College, has been appointed lecturer in political science at Bryn Mawr for the year 1964–65.

Howard L. Erdman, previously resident tutor in government at Harvard, has been appointed an assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College. He will also serve as a participant in the newly established Comparative Studies Center at Dartmouth.

Larry Esterly has been appointed instructor of political science at Youngstown University.

K. H. Fan has resigned from the department of political science at the University of Idaho to take a position at the College of Great Falls, Great Falls, Montana.

Robert K. Faulkner has been promoted to assistant professor of politics at Princeton University.

Richard E. Flathman has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Chicago.

William G. Fleming, who is completing his doctorate at Northwestern University, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina.

Pierre-Michel Fontaine has been appointed instructor of political science at Boston College.

H. George Frederickson has joined the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland as a lecturer.

Robert C. Fried, of the Connecticut College for Women, has accepted appointment at UCLA as assistant professor.

Charles E. Frye of Bryn Mawr College has been promoted to assistant professor of political science.

Sanford Gabin has accepted an appointment as an instructor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

Linda K. Gerber has been appointed assistant professor of history and government at Adelphi University, effective September 1964.

Eggert W. Giere of North Central College, Illinois, has been appointed chairman of the political science department and promoted to the rank of professor. For the past ten years he has served as dean of students and now resumes full time teaching duties.

Robert T. Golembiewski has accepted a position as associate professor of political science at the University of Georgia.

Edward Gonzalez, Brookings research fellow, has accepted an instructorship in political science at Wellesley College.

Robert Kent Gooch, for forty years a member of the faculty of the University of Viriginia and chairman of the department of political science from 1924 to 1957, retired in June and was elected professor emeritus.

Charles H. Goodman has been appointed dean of the School of Government and Public Administration at American University.

Robert E. Goostree has accepted a professorship in American University's Washington College of Law.

Nelson P. Guild was promoted to associate professor of government at Hamilton College, July 1, 1964, after returning from a leave of absence as an APSA congressional fellow.

Arthur M. Handhardt, Jr., has been appointed assistant head of the department of political science at the University of Oregon.

Wolfram Hanrider has joined the faculty of Princeton University at the rank of assistant professor of politics.

Royce Hanson has been promoted to associate professor in the School of Government and Public Administration at American University.

Erwin Charles Hargrove has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Brown University.

Eleanor N. Heffernan has been appointed instructor in political science at North Central College, Illinois.

Robert D. Heidorn has been promoted to assistant professor of government at the University of Maine as of September 1, 1964.

Donald C. Hellmann has been appointed instructor in political science at Swarthmore College.

Laurin L. Henry of the Brookings Institution has been appointed professor of government at the University of Virginia.

Charles F. Hermann has accepted an appointment as an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University.

Douglas Hobbs has been appointed assistant professor of political science at UCLA.

Vaughan Howard, who has served as chairman of the department of political science at Tulane University since 1947, has resigned the chairmanship, but will continue to teach as professor of political science.

Nish Jamgotch has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at California State College, Long Beach.

Charles A. Joiner has been appointed chairman of the department of political science Temple University, and promoted to an associate professorship.

Richard M. Johnson, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Ray C. Jolly, adjunct professor in the School of Public Administration at UCLA has accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at the College of Idaho.

Louis G. Kahle has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Missouri, succeeding Robert F. Karsch.

Stanley Kelley, Jr., has been promoted to the rank of professor and named chairman of the department of politics at Princeton University.

Robert N. Kelson has been appointed Fred Morgan Kirby professor of civil rights and head of the department of government and law at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania.

Enver M. Kowry has joined the University of Maryland as an assistant professor of government and politics.

Donald J. Kreitzer has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at the New Mexico State University.

David C. Leege, formerly of Concordia Teachers College, River Forest, Illinois, accepted an instructorship at the University of Missouri in September in connection with an NDEA program and creation of a public opinion survey organization.

Gertrude Leighton, chairman of the political science department at Bryn Mawr College, has been promoted to full professor.

William M. Leiter, doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed to an instructorship in the political science department of the University of Rhode Island.

Lee A. Lendt, instructor in political science at Middlebury College, is leaving Middlebury and will be doing research in Washington next year. He will be replaced by **N. Lloyd Axworthy** who is currently doing graduate work at Princeton.

Louis Lipsitz, who has been a member of the department of government at the University of Connecticut and who has recently completed his Ph.D. at Yale, has been appointed an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina.

George Lipsky has been appointed professor of political science and geography at Wabash College.

Louis S. Loeb has been promoted to associate professor in the School of Government and Public Administration at American University.

Michael Lofchie has accepted an assistant professorship in political science at UCLA.

C. Peter Magrath has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Brown University.

Rocco L. Martino has been appointed professor in the Schools of Business Administration and Government and Public Administration of the American University. He will also be an assistant director for the operations research and systems analysis program of the university's Center for Technology and Administration.

Orville D. Menard, instructor of government, Texas College of Arts and Industries, has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of Omaha, effective September 1964.

Louis Meyer has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Arizona State University.

Robert F. Miller has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Washington University beginning in the fall of 1964.

Frank O. Miller has been promoted to associate professor at the College of Wooster.

Joyce M. Mitchell has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Oregon.

Stephen R. Mitchell has been promoted to an associate professorship in political science at Washington State University, effective September 16, 1964.

Hayward Moore, Jr., doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina, has accepted an instructorship in political science at the University of Rhode Island.

Frank J. Moreno has been promoted to assistant professor of government at New York University.

Stanley S. Newman has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science, Temple University.

Morris S. Ogul of the University of Pittsburgh has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

Kenneth Palmer has been appointed assistant professor of government at Hamilton College. He received his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University in June.

George A. Peek, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has accepted an appointment as professor of political science at Arizona State University.

Louis Phillips, formerly of West Chester College, has been appointed an instructor in political science at Temple University.

Don C. Piper has joined the University of Maryland as an assistant professor of government and politics.

Henry J. Pratt has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science of Emory University.

Nathaniel S. Preston has been promoted to associate professor in the School of Government and Public Administration at the American University. He has been named assistant dean for the Washington semester program.

Donald Puchala, doctoral candidate at Yale University, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo, effective February, 1965.

Willis H. Raff, has resigned his position at South Dakota School of Mines and Technology and has accepted a position as professor of political science at State University College, New Paltz, New York.

Nimrod Raphaeli has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Mostafa Rejai, doctoral candidate at UCLA, has been appointed assistant professor in the department of government at Miami University (Ohio).

Marvin Rintala, formerly of Brown University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Boston College.

Thomas W. Robinson has been appointed an instructor for the academic year 1964–65 in the department of government at Dartmouth College.

Daniel D. Roman, professor of business administration, American University, is now a professor in the School of Government and Public Administration and assistant director for research and development of the American University's Center for Technology.

Rouhollah Ramazani has been promoted to professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Hans Ridder has joined the political science department at California State College, Long Beach, as an assistant professor.

Walter A. Rosenbaum has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of Florida.

Donald Rosenthal has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Robert L. Rosholt, formerly with NASA and the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an instructor of political science at the College of Wooster.

Francis E. Rourke has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Lloyd Rudolph has been appointed an associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago, effective October 1, 1964.

Robert A. Rupen of the University of North Carolina has been promoted to the rank of full professor.

H. Kent Schellenger has been promoted to assistant professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

Jane Schneider has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Gordon Schochet, doctoral candidate at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island.

John R. Schott, teaching fellow in government at Harvard University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Wellesley College.

Jack Schroeder has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Michigan.

William A. Schultz has been appointed an instructor in government at Valparaiso University, effective September, 1964.

Charles Schutz of Wayne State University has accepted the chairmanship of the department of political science at Albion College, Albion, Michigan. He assumed his new position in June.

Kurt L. Shell, who has been in Berlin since 1961 doing research on a Ford Foundation grant, returned to Harpur College in September, 1964, with promotion to the rank of associate professor.

Roberta Sigel has been promoted to associate professor at Wayne State University, effective September, 1964.

J. DAVID SINGER has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan (part-time). His principal appointment continues at the University of Michigan Mental Health Research Institute.

ROBERT SITTIG has been promoted to assistant professor at the University of Nebraska.

FRANKLIN SMALLWOOD has been promoted to an associate professorship at Dartmouth College.

GENE EDWARD SMITH has been appointed an assistant professor of government for the year 1964–65 at Dartmouth College.

ROGER SMITH of Cornell University has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at the University of Washington.

GLENN H. SNYDER has resigned his position at the University of California (Berkeley) to accept a position as associate professor of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

JAMES R. SOLES has joined the University of Maryland as a lecturer in government and politics.

JOHN O. STITELY, director of the bureau of government research at the University of Rhode Island, has been promoted to the rank of professor.

JACK A. STRAIN, formerly assistant director of the Oklahoma Legislative Council, has been appointed acting director of the bureau of government research and special assistant professor of government at the University of Oklahoma for the year 1964–65.

JOHN H. STRANGE has been appointed instructor in politics at Princeton University.

DAVID E. SWEET has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Illinois State University.

ROBERT TERCHEK has joined the University of Maryland as a lecturer in government and politics.

BARBARA TURLINGTON has been reappointed as an instructor at Mount Holyoke College.

OTTO ULC of Grinnell College has joined Harpur College as an assistant professor of political science.

SIDNEY VERBA has resigned as associate professor of politics at Princeton to accept an appointment as a professor of political science at Stanford University.

PAUL W. WAGER, professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, retired as of September 1. Except for two periods of service with the Federal Government, he had taught at Chapel Hill since 1926.

JACK WALKER has resigned his position at Boston University to accept an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

PAUL WALLACE, who has been in India completing work on the doctorate at the University of California (Berkeley), has accepted a one-year instructorship at the University of Missouri.

KENNETH N. WALTZ has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

MAURICE WATERS has been promoted to an associate professorship at Wayne State University, effective September, 1964.

CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

LLOYD M. WELLS has been promoted to professor at the University of Missouri.

RICHARD S. WELLS, assistant professor of political science at Arizona State University, has accepted a position as assistant professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

BYRON S. WENG has been appointed instructor in the department of government at Miami University (Ohio).

ELLIOTT WHITE has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at Temple University.

JOHN P. WHITE has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Arizona State University.

DAVID O. WILKINSON has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at UCLA.

WAYNE YOUNG, doctoral candidate at the University of Oklahoma has accepted a position at Illinois State University.

ROBERT ZIMRING has joined the University of Maryland as a lecturer in government and politics.

HOWARD ZINN has been appointed associate professor of government at Boston University.

IN MEMORIAM

ROBERT P. BENEDICT, professor of government at Boston University, died in Hamburg, Germany, in April.

GARY L. BEST, assistant professor of government at Miami University (Ohio) since 1961, died in Palo Alto, California, of a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of 28. He took his Ph.D. at Northwestern University in 1960 and had taught at the University of Oregon before coming to Miami.—ALAN S. ENGEL

ESSON MCDOWELL GALE, born in Bad Axe, Michigan, December 8, 1884, well known as a Sinologist and a specialist on Far Eastern affairs, died in Bay City, Michigan, on May 15, 1964. He had been connected with the University of Michigan as student, teacher and administrator; and had taught at the University of California and at Northwestern University. He had served in official capacities several times in the employ of the American government and for many years in the employ of the Chinese government (in which he became Associate Director-General of China's Salt Administration). He was three times decorated by the Chinese government.

He was the author of several books, best known among which is *Salt for the Dragon*. In recognition of his scholarly work in the sinological field the University of Leyden conferred on him the degree Litt. Ph.D. He was a founder member of the Association for Asian Studies.

After retiring in 1955 as Director of the International Center at the University of Michigan, he and his wife made a last trip to the Far East and he served, from 1957 to 1959, on the faculty as Advisor to the Asiatic Research Center at the University of Korea. After a series of heart attacks, death came to him in his 79th year. He is survived by his wife, Annie Heron Gale.—STANLEY K. HORNBECK

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FLIGHT A—Approximately June 15 to September 1, 1965

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* * *

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* * *

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

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

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
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